Sarwo Edhie Wibowo
|Sarwo Edhie Wibowo|
|4th Commander Trikora|
2 July 1968 – 20 February 1970
|Preceded by||R. Bintoro|
|Succeeded by||Acub Zaenal|
|5th General of the Army Special Forces commander|
|Preceded by||Mung Parahadimulyo|
|Succeeded by||Widjoyo Suyono|
July 25, 1925|
Purworejo, Central Java, Indonesia
|Died||November 9, 1989
|Spouse(s)||Sunarti Sri Hadiyah|
Pramono Edhie Wibowo
Hartanto Edhie Wibowo
Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (born in Purworejo, Central Java, Indonesia on July 25, 1925 - died in Jakarta, Indonesia on November 9, 1989 at the age of 64 years) is an Indonesian military leader and the father of Kristiani Herrawati, lady RI and the RI president's wife, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and also the father of Chief of Staff Pramono Edhie Wibowo . His role is very large while crushing rebellion G-30 PKI in his position as commander of the Special Forces (or Special Forces at the moment). In addition he also served as Chairman of the BP-7 center, the ambassador at South Korea as well as Governor academy.
Sarwo Edhie was born in Purworejo, Central Java to a family of civil servants working for the Dutch Colonial Government. As a child, he learned silat as a form of self-defense. As he grew up, Sarwo Edhie formed an admiration for the Japanese Army and their victories against the Allied Forces stationed in the Pacific and Asia.
In 1942, when the Japanese took control of Indonesia, Sarwo Edhie went to Surabaya to enlist with Defenders of the Motherland Army (PETA), which was a Japanese-run auxiliary force consisting of Indonesian soldiers.
Sarwo Edhie was disappointed as his duties during this period were mostly to cut the lawn, clean the toilets, and make the beds of the Japanese officers. When he did train, all Sarwo Edhie got to use was wooden weapons. After the Indonesian Declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945, Sarwo Edhie joined the BKR, a militia organization who would become the precursor of ABRI (the present Indonesian Army) and formed a battalion. However, the venture failed and the battalion disbanded.
Career up to 1965
Sarwo Edhie's career in ABRI saw him serve as Battalion Commander in the Diponegoro Division (1945–1951), then Regiment Commander (1951–1953), Deputy Regiment Commander in the National Military Academy (1959–1961), Chief of Staff of the Army Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD) (1962–1964), and Commander of RPKAD (1964–1967).
The RPKAD was the Indonesian government's attempt at creating a special forces unit (it would go on to become Kopassus) and Sarwo Edhie's appointment as the elite unit's ommander was thanks in no small part to Yani. By 1964, Yani had risen to become the Army Commander and wanted someone who he could trust as Commander of RPKAD.
Putting Down The G30S Movement
It was during Sarwo Edhie's time as RPKAD Commander that the 30 September Movement happened.
During the morning of October 1, 1965, six Generals, including Ahmad Yani were kidnapped from their houses and taken to the Air Force's Halim Airbase. Whilst this kidnapping process was being executed, a group of unidentified troops occupied the National Monument (Monas), the Presidential Palace, the Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI), and the telecommunications building.
The day started normally enough for Sarwo Edhie and his RPKAD troops and they spent their morning at the RPKAD headquarters at Cijantung in Jakarta. Then Colonel Herman Sarens Sudiro arrived. Sudiro announced that he was bringing message from the Kostrad headquarters and informed Sarwo Edhie of the situation in Jakarta. Sarwo Edhie was also informed by Sudiro that Major General Suharto, the Commander of Kostrad had for the moment assumed leadership of the Army. After giving it much thought, Sarwo Edhie sent Sudiro back with the message that he will side with Suharto.
Once Sudiro left, Sarwo Edhie was visited by Brigadier General Sabur, the Commander of the Cakrabirawa (Presidential Bodyguards), of which G30S member Lieutenant Colonel Untung belonged to. Sabur asked Sarwo Edhie to join the G30S Movement. Sarwo Edhie told Sabur flat out that he was going to side with Suharto.
At 11 AM that day, Sarwo Edhie arrived at the Kostrad headquarters and received orders to retake the RRI and Telecommunication buildings at 6 PM (The deadline by which the unidentified troops were expected to surrender). When 6 PM arrived, Sarwo Edhie ordered his troops to retake the designated buildings. This was achieved without much resistance, as the troops there retreated to Halim and the buildings were taken by 6.30 PM.
With the situation at Jakarta secured, Suharto turned his eyes to Halim Air Base. The Air Base was the place which the kidnapped Generals were taken to and the base of the Air Force which had thrown its support behind the G30S movement. Suharto then ordered Sarwo Edhie to retake the Air Base. Starting their attack at 2 AM on 2 October, Sarwo Edhie and the RPKAD had the Air Base taken by 6 AM.
Transition from Old Order to New Order
After taking Halim Air Base, Sarwo Edhie joined Suharto as both of them were summoned to Bogor by President Sukarno. While Suharto found himself admonished by Sukarno for ignoring his orders, Sarwo Edhie found himself shocked by Sukarno's insensitivity to the death of the six Generals. To his question of "Where are the Generals?", Sukarno responded "Aren't these things a normality in a revolution?".
On 4 October 1965, Sarwo Edhie's troops would preside over the exhumation of the dead bodies of the Generals from the Lubang Buaya well.
On 16 October 1965, Suharto was appointed Commander of the Army by Sukarno. By then, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had been accused as the culprits of the G30S and anti-Communist sentiments had build up sufficiently to gain momentum. Sarwo Edhie was given the task of eliminating PKI members in the Communist hotbeds in Central Java. This would result in the infamous mass-killings in October–December 1965 across Java, Bali, and parts of Sumatra.
There were numerous estimates as to the number of people killed during these months. Early estimates number between half a million at the very least and a million at the most. In December 1965, the number given to Sukarno was 78,000 although after he fell, it was revised to 780,000. The 78,000 was a ploy to hide the number of people killed from Sukarno. Speculations continued throughout the years, ranging from 60,000 to 1,000,000. Although the consensus seemed to have settled around 400,000. Finally, in 1989, before his death, Sarwo Edhie admitted to People's Representative Council (DPR) member that 3 million were killed in the bloodbath.
By the beginning of 1966, anti-Communist sentiments combined with the high rate of inflation caused Sukarno to begin losing his popularity in the eyes of the People. There were now anti-Sukarno protests, led by youth movements such as the Indonesian Student Action Front (KAMI). On 10 January 1966, KAMI issued three demands to Sukarno. They wanted PKI to be banned, for PKI sympathizers within the Cabinet to be arrested, and for the prices to be lowered.
Suharto realized the importance in aligning the Army with the protesters. During the first months of 1966, Sarwo Edhie together with Kostrad Chief of Staff, Kemal Idris actively organized and supported the protests whilst making a name for themselves among the KAMI protesters in the process. On 26 February 1966, KAMI was officially banned by Sukarno but with the encouragement of Sarwo Edhie and Kemal continued to protest. In a show of solidarity with the students, Sarwo Edhie enlisted at the University of Indonesia.
Although he was growing to be Sukarno's biggest political opponent, Suharto, a strong Javanese traditionalist, was always careful to avoid challenging Sukarno directly. By March 1966 however, he was ready to force Sukarno's hand. At the beginning of the month, he ordered the RPKAD to arrest PKI sympathizers within Sukarno's Cabinet. Suharto changed his mind at the very last minute, thinking that Sukarno's security might be compromised. However, it was too late to withdraw the orders.
On the morning of 11 March 1966, during a Cabinet meeting in which Suharto was absent, Sarwo Edhie and his troops surrounded the Presidential Palace without any identification. Sukarno, fearing for his life evacuated to Bogor. Later in the day he would transfer executive powers to Suharto through a letter called Supersemar.
In 1967, Sarwo Edhie was transferred to Sumatra and was made Commander of KODAM II/Bukit Barisan. In Sumatra, Sarwo Edhie further weakened Sukarno's powers by banning his Indonesian National Party (PNI) throughout the island.
New Order radical
Sarwo Edhie's support was firmly with Suharto as the latter began making the moves to ascend to the Presidency. Factionally speaking however, Sarwo Edhie belonged to a faction dubbed by scholars as "New Order Radicals". Together with Kemal Idris and Kodam VI/Siliwangi Commander Hartono Rekso Dharsono, Sarwo Edhie wanted political parties to be dismantled and replaced with non-ideological groups which emphasized development and modernization.
"Act of Free Choice"
For this, Sarwo Edhie was transferred to West Irian to become the Commander of KODAM XVII/Cendrawasih. In the lead up to the "Act of Free Choice", through which Indonesia annexed the territory without holding a full referendum, Sarwo Edhie played a leading role in crushing Papuan resistance
Exclusion from Government and remaining career
Like many who had supported Suharto to power, Sarwo Edhie grew increasingly dissatisfied with the new President. As the years went on, Suharto began to exclude supporters like Sarwo Edhie from the running of Indonesia, preferring instead to take the advice of colleagues who had gone up the ranks with him such as Ali Murtopo. Being a New Order radical also did not help Sarwo Edhie's case and like Kemal and Dharsono, Suharto grew suspicious of him.
The final straw came in 1970, when Sarwo Edhie brought up the issue of Government corruption in 1970. From that point on, Sarwo Edhie was given positions that still held stature but kept him away from the politics of the Central Government in Jakarta. Sarwo Edhie then served as ABRI Academy (AKABRI) Governor (1970–1973), Indonesian Ambassador to South Korea (1973–1978), and Inspector General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (1978–1983).
When Suharto established Pancasila as the National Ideology in 1984, Sarwo Edhie was put in charge of the indoctrination process by being appointed Chairman of the Supervisory Body for Implementation of Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (BP-7) He was elected to the People's Representative Council (DPR) in 1987 and resigned his position in 1988 in protest of Sudharmono's nomination to the Vice Presidency.
Sarwo Edhie died on 9 November 1989
Sarwo Edhie was married to Sunarti Sri Hadiyah, with whom he had seven children: Wijiasih Cahyasasi, Wrahasti Cendrawasih, Kristiani Herrawati, Mastuti Rahayu, Pramono Edhie Wibowo, Retno Cahyaningtyas and Hartanto Edhie Wibowo.
Sarwo Edhie was the Chairman of Taekwondo Indonesia.
- (Indonesian) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo profile
- Djarot, Eros; et al. (2006). Siapa Sebenarnya Soeharto: Fakta dan Kesaksian Para Pelaku Sejarah G-30-S PKI (in Indonesian) (1st ed.). Tangerang: PT Agromedia Pustaka. p. 63. Unknown parameter
- Dake, Antonie C.A (2005). Sukarno File: Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan (in Indonesian) (4th ed.). Jakarta: Aksara Karunia. p. 111.
- Dake, Antonie C.A (2005). Sukarno File: Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan (in Indonesian) (4th ed.). Jakarta: Aksara Karunia. p. 194.
- Hughes, John (2002). The End of Sukarno: A Coup That Misfired A Purge That Ran Wild. Singapore: Archipelago Press. p. 194. ISBN 981-4068-65-9.
- Hughes, John (2002). The End of Sukarno: A Coup That Misfired A Purge That Ran Wild. Singapore: Archipelago Press. p. 195. ISBN 981-4068-65-9.
- : Kolektif Info Coup d'etat 65 :. - Dokumen
- Elson, Robert (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. p. 130. ISBN 0-521-77326-1.
- Elson, Robert (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. p. 134. ISBN 0-521-77326-1.
- Elson, Robert (2001). Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. p. 163. ISBN 0-521-77326-1.
- TAPOL, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign