School speech (First Amendment)
The issue of school speech as it relates to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is one that has been of much debate and the subject of much litigation since the mid-20th century. The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech applies to students in the public schools: In the landmark decision Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court formally recognized that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
The core principles of Tinker remain unaltered, but are tempered by several important decisions -- Bethel School District v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick. Despite respect for the legitimate educational interests of school officials, the Supreme Court has not abandoned Tinker; it continues to recognize the basis precept of Tinker that viewpoint-specific speech restrictions are an egregious violation of the First Amendment. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Supreme Court declared: "Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional." Rosenberger held that denial of funds to a student organization on the sole basis that the funds were used to publish a religiously oriented student newspaper was an unconstitutional violation of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, for other speech, that is, on-campus speech which is neither obscene, vulgar, lewd, indecent or plainly offensive under Fraser nor school-sponsored under Hazelwood nor advocating illegal drugs at a school-sponsored event under Frederick, Tinker applies limiting the authority of schools to regulate the speech, whether on or off-campus, unless it would materially and substantially disrupt classwork and discipline in the school.
In Tinker, several students were suspended for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. This violated a rule targeted specifically at the wearing of the armbands; the rule did not apply to wearing other sorts of symbols. The Supreme Court held that the students had a First Amendment right to display the armbands at school, notwithstanding the school officials' fear that the display of the symbol would create a disturbance, so long as there was no more than an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance." If there were circumstances that would warrant a reasonable fear on the part of the school officials that the display would appreciably disrupt the appropriate discipline in the school, the Supreme Court indicated that school officials could have appropriately prohibited the display of the armband. However, "the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible." 
This case has turned out to be "[t]he bedrock from which most First Amendment claims involving students are evaluated", going forward from it, although the cases below have tempered its ruling.
In Fraser, a high school student was disciplined following his speech to a school assembly at which he nominated a fellow student for a student elective office. The speech contained sexual innuendos, but not obscenity. The Supreme Court found that school officials could discipline the student. In doing so, it recognized that "[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order." Recognizing that one of the important purposes of public education is to inculcate the habits and manners of civility as valued conducive both to happiness and to the practice of self-government, the Supreme Court emphasized that: "Consciously or otherwise, teachers--and indeed the older students--demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class."  Under the Fraser standard, school officials look not merely to the reasonable risk of disruption—the Tinker standard—but would also balance the freedom of a student's speech rights against the school's interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Schools have discretion to curtail not only obscene speech, but speech that is vulgar, lewd, indecent or plainly offensive.
The Hazelwood School District case applies the principles set forth in Fraser to curricular matters. In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court upheld a school's decision to censor certain articles in the school newspaper which was produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum. Echoing Fraser, the Supreme Court observed that "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with 'its basic educational mission' ... even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." School authorities and educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
Morse v. Frederick 
Morse v. Frederick blends Fraser and Hazelwood School District, applying them to a school-sanctioned event or activity. While students were along a public street in front of school watching the Olympic Torch Relay pass through, Frederick unfurled a banner bearing the phrase: "BONG HITS 4 JESUS." The banner was in plain view of other students. The high school principal seized the banner and suspended Frederick because the banner was perceived to advocate the use of illegal drugs. The Supreme Court held that a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. Not only was a school activity involved, but the banner's promotion of illegal drugs was contrary to the school's policy or mission to prevent student drug abuse.
School-specific factors 
The right of free speech is not itself absolute: the Court has consistently upheld regulations as to time, place, and manner of speech, provided that they are "reasonable." In applying this reasonableness test to regulations limiting student expression, the Court has recognized that the age and maturity of students is an important factor to be considered.
In the school context, the United States Supreme Court has identified three major relevant considerations:
- The extent to which the student speech in question poses a substantial threat of disruption (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.).
- Whether the speech is offensive to prevailing community standards (Bethel School District v. Fraser).
- Whether the speech, if allowed as part of a school activity or function, would be contrary to the basic educational mission of the school (Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier).
Each of these considerations has given rise to a separate mode of analysis, and in Morse v. Frederick the Court implied that any one of these may serve as an independent basis for restricting student speech.
The problem of disruption is perhaps the most fundamental issue addressed by the courts in student free speech cases.
The second major question addressed by the courts is closely related to, but nevertheless distinct from, the question of disruption. This is the question of speech which is offensive to prevailing community standards by reason of being vulgar, lewd, indecent, racist, or otherwise inappropriate in a school setting. In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Supreme Court recognized the special responsibility of the public schools to inculcate moral values and to teach students the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior. It therefore permitted a public school to discipline a student for making sexually suggestive remarks in an address to a school assembly, even though the remarks were not obscene in the traditional sense.
The ability to regulate inappropriate speech has been found to be especially important in situations where the student speech may have the appearance of being sponsored or endorsed by the school.
Impairing educational mission 
The third major area of concern addressed in student free speech cases is whether a particular instance of student speech may be viewed as impairing the school's ability to carry out its educational mission. This concern arises where the speech in question occurs in connection with a school-sponsored or school-controlled activity but is inconsistent with a legitimate pedagogical concern. In such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has found that student speech may be regulated. For example, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, it held that a school may exercise control over the content of a student newspaper when it attempts to address issues of divorce and teenage pregnancy; in Morse v. Frederick, it permitted a school to exercise control over the words displayed on a large banner at a school-sponsored event, when those words convey a message promoting the use of illegal drugs.
General factors 
Other factors are relevant to First Amendment cases generally.
Pure speech? 
One of these factors is whether the activity sought to be controlled is "pure speech" or sufficiently related to the expression of ideas to fall under the umbrella of the First Amendment. The meaning of "pure" speech is speech that does not need to involve words but generally is represented by symbols or actions.
Focus of protected speech activity 
The focus of the protected speech activity, whether pure speech or not, may have an impact on the propriety of regulation by school officials.
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. at 506 .
- 3-9 EDUCATION LAW § 9.04 (CHAPTER 9 Student Safety, Control and Discipline) -- Copyright 2008, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
- [Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. at 514 ]
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. at 514
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. at 511 .
- Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675, 92 LEd2d 549, 106 SCt 3159 (1986).
- Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 98 LEd2d 592, 108 SCt 562, (1988)
- Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council; Healy v. James (school case); Grayned v. City of Rockford; Adderley v. Florida; Cox v. Louisiana; Kovacs v. Cooper; Cox v. New Hampshire
- 1-9 Ohio School Law Guide § 9.74. Anderson's Ohio School Law Guide. CHAPTER 9: PUPILS. G. PUPIL REGULATION AND DISCIPLINE
- Bethel School Dist. 403 v. Fraser; Morse v. Frederick
- Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
See also 
- Broussard v. School Board of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992)
- Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
- Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education, 647 A.2d. 150 (N.J. 1994)
- Dean v. Utica Community Schools, 345 F.Supp.2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2004)