Philosophical skepticism

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For a general discussion of skepticism, see Skepticism.

Philosophical skepticism (from Greek σκέψις, skepsis meaning "inquiry"; UK spelling scepticism) is both a philosophical school of thought and a method that crosses disciplines and cultures. Many skeptics critically examine the meaning systems of their times, and this examination often results in a position of ambiguity or doubt.[1] This skepticism can range from disbelief in contemporary philosophical solutions, to agnosticism, to rejecting the reality of the external world. Philosophical skepticism is an old movement with many variations, and contrasts with the view that anything is certain, especially with absolute or unconditional certainty. For example, Hellenistic philosophers would claim such beliefs are dogmatism.

Philosophical skepticism is distinguished from methodological skepticism in that philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certainty in knowledge, whereas methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims.

History[edit]

Ancient Western Skepticism[edit]

The Western tradition of systematic skepticism goes back at least as far as Pyrrho of Elis (b. circa 360 BCE). However, "The 5th century sophists develop forms of debate which are ancestors of skeptical argumentation. They take pride in arguing in a persuasive fashion for both sides of an issue."[2] There were many disputes that could be found within the philosophical schools of his day, and according to a later account of his life by his student Timon of Phlius, Pyrrho extolled a way to become happy and tranquil.

Timon is reported as telling us that in order to be happy, one must pay attention to three connected questions: first, what are things like by nature? second, how should we be disposed towards things (given our answer to the first question)? and third, what will be the outcome for those who adopt the disposition recommended in the answer to the second question?[3]

In considering what things are like by nature, Pyrrho "Believing that equal arguments can be offered on both sides of any proposition, ... dismissed the search for truth as a vain endeavour."[4] Given this, Pyrrho says that "sense experience and beliefs .. are in fact neither true nor false." His words seem to suggest that verifiability is a necessary condition of truth. For our attitude towards things, Pyrrho is reported as saying that since our sense experiences and beliefs are neither true nor false, "therefore, we ought not to put our trust in them, but be without beliefs, disinclined to take a stand one way or the other, and steadfast in this attitude." This attitude to life would eventually lead the skeptic to a state of ataraxia, or freedom from distress and worry.[5]

Pyrrho and his school were not actually "skeptics" in the later sense of the word. They had the goal of αταραξια (ataraxia - peace of mind), and pitted one dogmatic philosophy against the next to undermine belief in the whole philosophic enterprise. The idea was to produce in the student a state of aversion towards what the Pyrrhonists considered arbitrary and inconsequential babble. Since no one can observe or otherwise experience causation, external world (its "externality"), ultimate purpose of the universe or life, justice, divinity, soul, etc., they declared no need to believe in such things. The Pyrrhonists pointed out that, despite claims that such notions were necessary, some people "ignorant" of them get by just fine before learning about them. They further noted that science does not require belief and that faith in intelligible realities is different from pragmatic convention for the sake of experiment. For each intuitive notion (e.g. the existence of an external world), the Pyrrhonists cited a contrary opinion to negate it. They added that consensus indicates neither truth nor even probability. For example, the earth is round, and it would remain so even if everyone believed it were flat. The opposite might also be the case.[original research?]

The goal of this critique, which Pyrrho's followers realized would ultimately subvert even their own method, was to cultivate a distrust of all grand talk. They expected philosophy to collapse into itself. How far in this direction the Pyrrhonean commitment extended is a matter of debate. The Pyrrhonists confessed a belief in appearances, e.g. in hot and cold, grief and joy. It is impossible to deny, they admitted, that one seems to be in pain or seems to touch a piece of wood. Their world, thus, was completely phenomenological. An accomplished Pyrrhonist could, ideally, live as well as a dogmatist but with the added benefit of not worrying about truth and falsity, right and wrong, God's will, and so forth.[original research?]

Later thinkers took up Pyrrho's approach and extended it into modern skepticism. In the process, a split appeared within the movement, never too large or well liked among the literati to begin with. In the Academic skepticism of the New or Middle Academy, Arcesilaus (c. 315 – 241 BCE) and Carneades (c. 213–129 BCE) argued from Stoic premises that the Stoics were actually committed to denying the possibility of knowledge, but seemed to maintain nothing themselves, but Clitomachus, a student of Carneades, interpreted his teacher's philosophy as suggesting an early probabilistic account of knowledge. The Roman politician and philosopher, Cicero, also seems to have been a supporter of the probabilistic position attributed to the Middle Academy, even if the return to a more dogmatic orientation of that school was already beginning to take place.

Diogenes Laërtius lists ten modes of reasoning which Pyrrhonists thought justified their position:[6]

1. Some things give animals pleasure which give other animals pain. What is useful to one animal is harmful to another.

2. Each human has a different assortment of preferences, abilities and interests.

3. Each sense gives a different impression of the same object.

4. There is no reason to think one is sane while others are insane—the opposite could be true.

5. Cultures disagree regarding beauty, truth, goodness, religion, life and justice.

6. There is no consistency in perception. (His examples were that the color purple will show different tints depending on the lighting, a person looks different between noon and sunset, and a very heavy rock on land is lighter when in water)

7. The senses can be shown to be deceptive. (From a distance, the square tower looks round and the sun looks small)

8. Things that strengthen in moderation will weaken when taken in excess, like wine and food.

9. When a thing is rare, it surprises people. When a thing is common, it does not surprise people.

10. Inter-relations among things are of course relative, and by themselves are unknowable. (i.e. to know 'father' you must know 'son,' but to know 'son' you must know 'father.' Neither can be known by itself.)

In the centuries to come, the words Academician and Pyrrhonist would often be used to mean generally skeptic, often ignoring historical changes and distinctions between denial of knowledge and avoidance of belief, between degree of belief and absolute belief, and between possibility and probability.[citation needed]

Sextus Empiricus[edit]

Sextus Empiricus (c. 200 CE), the main authority for Pyrrhonian skepticism, worked outside the Academy, which by his time had ceased to be a skeptical or probabilistic school, and argued in a different direction, incorporating aspects of empiricism into the basis for evaluating knowledge, but without the insistence on experience as the absolute standard of it. Sextus' empiricism was limited to the "absolute minimum" already mentioned — that there seem to be appearances. He developed this basic thought of Pyrrho's into lengthy arguments, most of them directed against Stoics and Epicureans, but also the Academic skeptics. The common anti-skeptical argument is that if one knows nothing, one cannot know that one knows nothing, and so may know something after all. It is worth noting that such an argument only succeeds against the complete denial of the possibility of knowledge. Considering dogmatic the claims both to know and not to know, Sextus and his followers claimed neither. Instead, despite the apparent conflict with the goal of ataraxia, they claimed to continue searching for something that might be knowable.

Empiricus, as the most systematic and dogmatic author of the works by Hellenistic sceptics which have survived, noted that there are at least ten modes of skepticism. These modes may be broken down into three categories: one may be skeptical of the subjective perceiver, of the objective world, and the relation between perceiver and the world.[7] His arguments are as follows.

Subjectively, both the powers of the senses and of reasoning may vary among different people. And since knowledge is a product of one or the other, and since neither are reliable, knowledge would seem to be in trouble. For instance, a color-blind person sees the world quite differently from everyone else. Moreover, one cannot even give preference on the basis of the power of reason, i.e., by treating the rational animal as a carrier of greater knowledge than the irrational animal, since the irrational animal is still adept at navigating their environment, which suggests the ability to "know" about some aspects of the environment.

Secondly, the personality of the individual might also have an impact on what they observe, since (it is argued) preferences are based on sense-impressions, differences in preferences can be attributed to differences in the way that people are affected by the object. (Empiricus:56)

Third, the perceptions of each individual sense seemingly have nothing in common with the other senses: i.e., the color "red" has little to do with the feeling of touching a red object. This is manifest when our senses "disagree" with each other: for example, a mirage presents certain visible features, but is not responsive to any other kind of sense. In that case, our other senses defeat the impressions of sight. But one may also be lacking enough powers of sense to understand the world in its entirety: if one had an extra sense, then one might know of things in a way that the present five senses are unable to advise us of. Given that our senses can be shown to be unreliable by appealing to other senses, and so our senses may be incomplete (relative to some more perfect sense that one lacks), then it follows that all of our senses may be unreliable. (Empiricus:58)

Fourth, our circumstances when one perceives anything may be either natural or unnatural, i.e., one may be either in a state of wakefulness or sleep. But it is entirely possible that things in the world really are exactly as they appear to be to those in unnatural states (i.e., if everything were an elaborate dream). (Empiricus:59)

One can have reasons for doubt that are based on the relationship between objective "facts" and subjective experience. The positions, distances, and places of objects would seem to affect how they are perceived by the person: for instance, the portico may appear tapered when viewed from one end, but symmetrical when viewed at the other; and these features are different. Because they are different features, to believe the object has both properties at the same time is to believe it has two contradictory properties. Since this is absurd, one must suspend judgment about what properties it possesses due to the contradictory experiences. (Empiricus:63)

One may also observe that the things one perceives are, in a sense, polluted by experience. Any given perception—say, of a chair—will always be perceived within some context or other (i.e., next to a table, on a mat, etc.) Since this is the case, one often only speaks of ideas as they occur in the context of the other things that are paired with it, and therefore, one can never know of the true nature of the thing, but only how it appears to us in context. (Empiricus: 64)

Along the same lines, the skeptic may insist that all things are relative, by arguing that:

  1. Absolute appearances either differ from relative appearances, or they do not.
  2. If absolutes do not differ from relatives, then they are themselves relative.
  3. But if absolutes do differ from relatives, then they are relative, because all things that differ must differ from something; and to "differ" from something is to be relative to something. (Empiricus:67)

Finally, one has reason to disbelieve that one knows anything by looking at problems in understanding objects by themselves. Things, when taken individually, may appear to be very different from when they are in mass quantities: for instance, the shavings of a goat's horn are white when taken alone, yet the horn intact is black.

Ancient Eastern Skepticism[edit]

Buddhism[edit]

Buddhist skepticism (Zen Buddhism) is not concerned with whether a thing exists or not. The Zen masters would answer questions "koans" with seemingly unrelated responses such as hitting the student. This would serve as a means of pulling the student back from the confusion of intellectual pontification, and into a direct experience. Since in Zen, all there is a direct experience, which cannot be explained or clarified beyond the experience itself, this answers the question.

  • Buddha is said to have touched the earth at the time of his enlightenment so that it could witness his enlightenment. In this way, Buddhism does not claim that knowledge is unattainable.
  • Buddhism places less emphasis on truth and knowledge than western philosophical skepticism. Instead, it emphasizes the goal of Bodhi, which, although often translated as enlightenment, does not imply truth or knowledge.
  • At least in its manifestation of Nagarjuna's texts that form the core of Madhyamaka, the anti-essentialist aspect of Buddhism makes it an anti-philosophy.[dubious ]From that stance, truth exists solely within the contexts that assert them.

Cārvāka philosophy[edit]

The Cārvāka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक) school of skepticism, also known as Lokāyata, is a distinct branch of Indian philosophy. The school is named after Cārvāka, author of the Bārhaspatya-sūtras and was founded in approximately 500 BC. Cārvāka is classified as a "heterodox" (nāstika) system, characterized as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought.

Jain Philosophy of Anekantavada and Syadavada[edit]

Main articles: Anekantavada and Syadvada

Anekāntavāda also known as the principle of relative pluralism, is one of the basic principles of Jainism. According to this, the truth or the reality is perceived differently from different points of view, and that no single point of view is the complete truth.[8][9] Jain doctrine states that, an object has infinite modes of existence and qualities and, as such, they cannot be completely perceived in all its aspects and manifestations, due to inherent limitations of the humans. Anekāntavāda is literally the doctrine of non-onesidedness or manifoldness; it is often translated as "non-absolutism". Syādvāda is the theory of conditioned predication which provides an expression to anekānta by recommending that epithet “Syād” be attached to every expression.[10] Syādvāda is not only an extension of Anekānta ontology, but a separate system of logic capable of standing on its own force. As reality is complex, no single proposition can express the nature of reality fully. Thus the term “syāt” should be prefixed before each proposition giving it a conditional point of view and thus removing any dogmatism in the statement.[9] The seven propositions also known as saptabhangi are[11]

  1. Syād-asti – “in some ways it is”,
  2. syād-nāsti - “in some ways it is not”,
  3. syād-asti-nāsti - “in some ways it is and it is not”,
  4. syād-asti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is and it is indescribable”,
  5. syād-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is not and it is indescribable”,
  6. syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavyaḥ - “in some ways it is, it is not and it is indescribable”,
  7. syād-avaktavyaḥ- “in some ways it is indescribable”

Each of these seven propositions examines the complex and multifaceted reality from a relative point of view of time, space, substance and mode. To ignore the complexity of the objects is to commit the fallacy of dogmatism. For a rigorous logical and mathematical interpretation see M. K. Jain, Logic of evidence-based inference propositions, Current Science, 1663–1672, 100.

Chinese philosophy[edit]

In China, the preeminent Daoist work Zhuangzi, attributed to 4th century BC philosopher Zhuangzi during the Hundred Schools of Thought period, is skeptical in nature and provides also two famous skeptical paradoxes, "The Happiness of Fish" and "Zhuangzi dreamed he was a butterfly".

Wang Chong introduced a form of naturalism based on a rational critique of the superstition that was overtaking Confucianism and Daoism in the 1st century CE. His neo-Daoist philosophy was based on a secular, rational practice not unlike the scientific method.

Islam[edit]

In Islamic theology and Islamic philosophy, the scholar Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) is considered a pioneer of methodic doubt and skepticism.[12][not in citation given] His 11th century book titled The Incoherence of the Philosophers marks a major turn in Islamic epistemology, as Ghazali effectively discovered a methodic form of philosophical skepticism that would not be commonly seen in the West until René Descartes, George Berkeley and David Hume. The encounter with skepticism led Ghazali to embrace a form of theological occasionalism, or the belief that all causal events and interactions are not the product of material conjunctions but rather the immediate and present will of God. While he himself was a critic of the philosophers, Ghazali was a master in the art of philosophy and had immensely studied the field. After such a long education in philosophy, as well as a long process of reflection, he had criticized the philosophical method.

The autobiography Ghazali wrote towards the end of his life, The Deliverance From Error (Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl; several English translations[13]) is considered a work of major importance.[14] In it, Ghazali recounts how, once a crisis of epistemological skepticism was resolved by "a light which God Most High cast into my breast...the key to most knowledge,"[15] he studied and mastered the arguments of Kalam, Islamic philosophy and Ismailism. Though appreciating what was valid in the first two of these, at least, he determined that all three approaches were inadequate and found ultimate value only in the mystical experience and spiritual insight (Spiritual intuitive thought – Firasa and Nur) he attained as a result of following Sufi practices. William James, in Varieties of Religious Experience, considered the autobiography an important document for "the purely literary student who would like to become acquainted with the inwardness of religions other than the Christian", comparing it to recorded personal religious confessions and autobiographical literature in the Christian tradition.[16]

Scholars have noted the similarities between Descartes' Discourse on Method and Ghazali's work[12] and the writer George Henry Lewes went even further by claiming that "had any translation of it [The Revival of Religious Sciences] in the days of Descartes existed, everyone would have cried out against the plagiarism."[17][not in citation given]

Schools of philosophical skepticism[edit]

Philosophical skepticism begins with the claim that the skeptic currently does not have knowledge. Some adherents maintain that knowledge is, in theory, possible. It could be argued that Socrates held that view. He appears to have thought that if people continue to ask questions they might eventually come to have knowledge; but that they did not have it yet. Some skeptics have gone further and claimed that true knowledge is impossible, for example the Academic school in Ancient Greece well after the time of Carneades. A third skeptical approach would be neither to accept nor reject the possibility of knowledge.

Skepticism can be either about everything or about particular areas. A 'global' skeptic argues that he does not absolutely know anything to be either true or false. Academic global skepticism has great difficulty in supporting this claim while maintaining philosophical rigor, since it seems to require that nothing can be known — except for the knowledge that nothing can be known, though in its probabilistic form it can use and support the notion of weight of evidence. Thus, some probabilists avoid extreme skepticism by maintaining that they merely are 'reasonably certain' (or 'largely believe') some things are real or true. As for using probabilistic arguments to defend skepticism, in a sense this enlarges or increases scepticism, while the defence of empiricism by Empiricus weakens skepticism and strengthens dogmatism by alleging that sensory appearances are beyond doubt. Much later, Kant would re-define "dogmatism" to make indirect realism about the external world seem objectionable. While many Hellenists, outside of Empiricus, would maintain that everyone who is not sceptical about everything is a dogmatist, this position would seem too extreme for most later philosophers.

Nevertheless, A Pyrrhonian global skeptic labors under no such modern constraint, since he only alleged that he, personally, did not know anything and made no statement about the possibility of knowledge. Nor did Arcesilaus feel bound, since he merely corrected Socrates's "I only know that I know nothing" by adding "I don't even know that", thus more fully rejecting dogmatism.

Local skeptics deny that people do or can have knowledge of a particular area. They may be skeptical about the possibility of one form of knowledge without doubting other forms. Different kinds of local skepticism may emerge, depending on the area. A person may doubt the truth value of different types of journalism, for example, depending on the types of media they trust.

In Islamic philosophy, skepticism was established by Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), known in the West as "Algazel", as part of the Ash'ari school of Islamic theology.

Francisco Sanches's That Nothing is Known (published in 1581 as Quod nihil scitur) is one of the crucial texts of Renaissance skepticism.[18]

Epistemology and skepticism[edit]

Skepticism, as an epistemological argument, poses the question of whether knowledge, in the first place, is possible. Skeptics argue that the belief in something does not necessarily justify an assertion of knowledge of it. In this, skeptics oppose dogmatic foundationalism, which states that there have to be some basic positions that are self-justified or beyond justification, without reference to others. (One example of such foundationalism may be found in Spinoza's Ethics.) The skeptical response to this can take several approaches. First, claiming that "basic positions" must exist amounts to the logical fallacy of argument from ignorance combined with the slippery slope.[citation needed]

Among other arguments, skeptics used Agrippa's trilemma, named after Agrippa the Sceptic, to claim no certain belief could be achieved. Foundationalists have used the same trilemma as a justification for demanding the validity of basic beliefs.

This skeptical approach is rarely taken to its pyrrhonean extreme by most practitioners. Several modifications have arisen over the years, including the following [1]:

Fictionalism would not claim to have knowledge but will adhere to conclusions on some criterion such as utility, aesthetics, or other personal criteria without claiming that any conclusion is actually "true".

Philosophical fideism (as opposed to religious Fideism) would assert the truth of some propositions, but does so without asserting certainty.

Some forms of pragmatism would accept utility as a provisional guide to truth but not necessarily a universal decision-maker.

There are two different categories of epistemological skepticism, which can be referred to as mitigated and unmitigated skepticism. The two forms are contrasting but are still true forms of skepticism. Mitigated skepticism does not accept "strong" or "strict" knowledge claims but does, however, approve specific weaker ones. These weaker claims can be assigned the title of "virtual knowledge", but must be to justified belief. Unmitigated skepticism rejects both claims of virtual knowledge and strong knowledge.[19] Characterizing knowledge as strong, weak, virtual or genuine can be determined differently depending on a person's viewpoint as well as their characterization of knowledge.[19]

The "philosophical" skepticism of Kant and its influence on classical German philosophy[edit]

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) tried to provide a ground for empirical science against David Hume's skeptical treatment of the notion of cause and effect. Hume (1711–1776) argued that for the notion of cause and effect no analysis is possible which is also acceptable to the empiricist program primarily outlined by John Locke (1632–1704).[20] But, Kant's attempt to give a ground to knowledge in the empirical sciences at the same time cut off the possibility of knowledge of any other knowledge, especially what Kant called "metaphysical knowledge". So, for Kant, empirical science was legitimate, but metaphysics and philosophy was mostly illegitimate. The most important exception to this demarcation of the legitimate from the illegitimate was ethics the principles of which Kant argued can be known by pure reason without appeal to the principles required for empirical knowledge. Thus, with respect to metaphysics and philosophy general (ethics being the exception), Kant was a skeptic. This skepticism as well as the explicit skepticism of G. E. Schulze[21] gave rise to a robust discussion of skepticism in classical German philosophy, especially by Hegel.[22] Kant's idea was that the real world (the noumenon or thing-in-itself) was inaccessible to human reason (though the empirical world of nature can be known to human understanding) and therefore we can never know anything about the ultimate reality of the world. Hegel argued against Kant that although Kant was right that using what Hegel called "finite" concepts of "the understanding" precluded knowledge of reality, we were not constrained to use only "finite" concepts and could actually acquire knowledge of reality using "infinite concepts" that arise from self-consciousness.[23]

Criticism of skepticism[edit]

Most philosophies have weaknesses and can be criticized and this is a general principle of progression in philosophy.[24] The philosophy of skepticism asserts that no truth is knowable[25] or only probable.[26] Some say the scientific method also asserts probable findings, because the number of cases tested is always limited and they constitute perceptual observations.[27] Another criticism is the proposition that “no truth is knowable” is knowably true is contradictory.[28] The here is one hand argument is also another relatively simple criticism that reverses the skeptic's proposals and supports common sense.

Pierre Le Morvan (2011) has distinguished between three broad philosophical approaches to skepticism. The first he calls the "Foil Approach." According to the latter, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism‘s value on this view, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge and justified belief. The second he calls the "Bypass Approach" according to which skepticism is bypassed as a central concern of epistemology. Le Morvan advocates a third approach—he dubs it the "Health Approach"—that explores when skepticism is healthy and when it is not, or when it is virtuous and when it is vicious.

Skeptical hypotheses[edit]

A skeptical hypothesis is a hypothetical situation which can be used in an argument for skepticism about a particular claim or class of claims. Usually the hypothesis posits the existence of a deceptive power that deceives our senses and undermines the justification of knowledge otherwise accepted as justified. Skeptical hypotheses have received much attention in modern Western philosophy.

The first skeptical hypothesis in modern Western philosophy appears in René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy. At the end of the first Meditation Descartes writes: "I will suppose... that some evil demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies to deceive me."

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Skeptikoi
  2. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Ancient Skepticism.
  3. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Pyrrho.
  4. ^ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Pyrrho.
  5. ^ Stough, CL., Greek Skepticism; a Study in Epistemology, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 19-29.
  6. ^ Diogenes Laërtius 9:80–88
  7. ^ On the ten modes, see Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Skepticism I.35–164.
  8. ^ Dundas, Paul; John Hinnels ed. (2002). The Jains. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-26606-8. 
  9. ^ a b Koller, John M. (July 2000). "Syādvāda as the epistemological key to the Jaina middle way metaphysics of Anekāntavāda". Philosophy East and West. (Honululu) 50 (3): 400–7. ISSN 0031-8221. JSTOR 1400182. Retrieved 2007-10-01. 
  10. ^ Chatterjea, Tara (2001). Knowledge and Freedom in Indian Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. ISBN 0739106929.  pp. 77–87
  11. ^ Grimes, John (1996). A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. New York: SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-3067-7.  p. 312
  12. ^ a b Najm, Sami M. (July–October 1966). "The Place and Function of Doubt in the Philosophies of Descartes and Al-Ghazali". Philosophy East and West (Philosophy East and West, Vol. 16, No. 3/4) 16 (3–4): 133–411. doi:10.2307/1397536. JSTOR 1397536. 
  13. ^ Annotated translations by Richard Joseph McCarthy (Freedom and Fulfillment, Boston: Twayne, 1980; Deliverance From Error, Louisville, Ky.: Fons Vitae, 1999) and George F. McLean (Deliverance from error and mystical union with the Almighty, Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001). An earlier translation by William Montgomery Watt was first published in 1953 (The faith and practice of al-Ghazālī, London: G. Allen and Unwin).
  14. ^ Gerhard Böwering, Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. Ghazali.
  15. ^ McCarthy 1980, p. 66
  16. ^ William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 319 [= 2002 Modern Library Paperback Edition, p. 438].
  17. ^ Lewes, George Henry (1867). The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 
  18. ^ Francisco Sanchez, That Nothing is Known, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
  19. ^ a b "SKEPTICISM". Encyclopedia of Empiricism. 1997. 
  20. ^ David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Book I, "Of the Understanding" and David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748).
  21. ^ See G. E. Schulze, Aenesidemus (1792), excerpted in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Translated with Introductions by George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2000. See also Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987; Chapter 9, "Schulze's Skepticism".
  22. ^ See (1) H. S. Harris, "Skepticism, Dogmatism and Speculation in the Critical Journal" (1985), in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Translated with Introductions by George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2000; (2) G. W. F. Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One", Translated by H. S. Harris, in di Giovanni and Harris (2000) (cited just above); and (3) Michael N. Forster, Hegel and Skepticism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989.
  23. ^ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic (1830), § 28, pp. 65–68, Translated by T. F. Garaets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1991.
  24. ^ Popkin, H and Stroll, A. Philosophy Made Simple’’ Broadway Books, NY, NY 1993
  25. ^ Kreeft, Peter & Tacelli, R. K Handbook of Christian Apologetics, IVP Academic, Ill. 1994, p. 367
  26. ^ Popkin, p. 205
  27. ^ Popkin, p. 230
  28. ^ Kreeft p. 373

Further reading[edit]

  • Beiser, Frederick C. 1987. The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
  • Breker, Christian. 2011. Einführender Kommentar zu Sextus Empiricus' "Grundriss der pyrrhonischen Skepsis", Mainz, 2011: electr. publication, University of Mainz. available online (comment on Sextus Empiricus’ “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” in German language)
  • di Giovanni, George and H. S. Harris, eds. 2000. Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism. Translated with Introductions by George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing.
  • Forster, Michael N. 1989. Hegel and Skepticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
  • Harris, H. S. 1985. "Skepticism, Dogmatism and Speculation in the Critical Journal". In di Giovanni and Harris 2000.
  • Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 1802. "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One". Translated by H. S. Harris. In di Giovanni and Harris 2000.
  • Popkin, Richard H.. 2003. The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Popkin, Richard H. and J. R. Maia Neto, eds. 2007. Skepticism: An Anthology. New York, New York: Prometheus Books.
  • Thorsrud, Harald. 2009. Ancient Scepticism. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
  • Zeller, Eduard and Oswald J. Reichel. 1892. The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. London, England: Longmans, Green, and Co.
  • Unger, Peter. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 2002.

External links[edit]