Social epistemology

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Social epistemology refers to a broad set of approaches to the study of knowledge that construes human knowledge as a collective achievement. Another way of characterizing social epistemology is as the study of the social dimensions of knowledge.[1] It is not universally accepted that a subject, activity, or discipline which could appropriately be called "social epistemology" exists - or could exist. One of the enduring difficulties with defining "social epistemology" is that of determining what the word "knowledge" means in this context. There is also a challenge in arriving at a definition of "social" which satisfies academics from different disciplines.[2] Social epistemologists may be found working in many of the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, most commonly in philosophy and sociology. In addition to marking a distinct movement in traditional, analytic epistemology, social epistemology is associated with the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).

The emergence of social epistemology[edit]

The term "social epistemology" was first used by the library scientists Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera in the 1950s. Steven Shapin also used it in 1979. But its current sense began to emerge in the late 1980s. In 1987, the philosophical journal Synthese published a special issue on "social epistemology" which included two authors that have since taken "social epistemology" in two divergent directions: Alvin Goldman and Steve Fuller3. Fuller founded a journal called Social Epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture, and policy in 1987 and published his first book, Social Epistemology, in 1988. Goldman's Knowledge in a Social World came out in 1999. Goldman advocates for a type of epistemology which is sometimes called "veritistic epistemology" because of its large emphasis on truth.[3] This type of epistemology is sometimes seen to side with "essentialism" as opposed to "multiculturalism".[4] But Goldman has argued that this association between veritistic epistemology and essentialism is not necessary.[5]

In 2012, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Social Epistemology, Fuller reflected on the history and the prospects of the field, including the need for social epistemology to re-connect with the larger issues of knowledge production first identified by Charles Sanders Peirce as cognitive economy and nowadays often pursued by library and information science. As for the "analytic social epistemology", to which Goldman has been a significant contributor, Fuller concludes that it has "failed to make significant progress owing, in part, to a minimal understanding of actual knowledge practices, a minimised role for philosophers in ongoing inquiry, and a focus on maintaining the status quo of epistemology as a field."[1]

The basic view of knowledge that motivated the emergence of social epistemology can be traced to the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, which gained in prominence at the end of the 1960s. Both brought historical concerns directly to bear on problems long associated with the philosophy of science. Perhaps the most notable issue here was the nature of truth, which both Kuhn and Foucault described as a relative and contingent notion. On this background, ongoing work in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the history and philosophy of science (HPS) was able to assert its epistemological consequences, leading most notably to the establishment of the "Strong Programme" at the University of Edinburgh. In terms of the two strands of social epistemology, Fuller is more sensitive and receptive to this historical trajectory (if not always in agreement) than Goldman, whose self-styled "veritistic" social epistemology can be reasonably read as a systematic rejection of the more extreme claims associated with Kuhn and Foucault.

Present and future concerns[edit]

At this stage, both varieties of "social epistemology" remain largely "academic" or "theoretical" projects. But both emphasise the social significance of knowledge and therefore the cultural value of social epistemology itself. Both journals, for example, welcome papers that include a policy dimension. More practical applications of social epistemology can be found in the areas of library science, academic publishing, knowledge policy and debates over the role over the Internet in knowledge transmission and creation.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

1. "What Is Social Epistemology? A Smorgasbord of projects", in Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, Oxford University Press, Pg:182-204, ISBN 0-19-517367-8
2. "Relativism, Rationality and Sociality of Knowledge", Barry Barnes and David Bloor, in Rationality and Relativism, Pg:22 ISBN 0-262-58061-6
3. A comparison of Goldman and Fuller can be found in Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller's Social Epistemology, Francis Remedios, Lexington Books, 2003. pp. 106 –112.
http://social-epistemology.com/2013/07/12/orienting-social-epistemology-francis-remedios/ 4. Social Epistemology, Steve Fuller, Indiana University Press, p. 3.

References[edit]

  • Berlin, James A. Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies, Indiana: Parlor Press, 2003. ISBN 0-9724772-8-4
  • Egan, Margaret and Jesse Shera. 1952. "Foundations of a Theory of Bibliography." Library Quarterly 44:125-37.
  • Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02051-5
  • Longino, Helen. 2001. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-08876-4
  • Remedios, Francis. 2003. Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology. Lexington Books. ISBN 0-7391-0667-8
  • Schmitt, Frederick F. 1994. Socializing Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-8476-7959-4
  • Solomon, Miriam. 2001. Social Empricism. Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-19461-9

External links[edit]