Special Night Squads
The Special Night Squads (SNS) (Hebrew: Plugot Ha'Layla Ha'Meyukhadot, פלוגות הלילה המיוחדות) were a joint British-Jewish counter-insurgency unit, established by Captain Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938, during the 1936-1939 Arab revolt. The SNS comprised British infantry soldiers and Jewish Supernumerary Police. Wingate hand-picked his men, among them Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, and trained them to form mobile ambushes. As practical support from the British was minimal Wingate collaborated illegally with the Haganah, reinforcing his unit with FOSH regulars.
Wingate, an intelligence officer in the British army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Jerusalem, examined sabotage and weapon smuggling operations in northern Palestine (Galilee). In March 1938, following several weeks of experimental ambushes and patrols, he had gained permission from the British General Officer Commanding (GOC), Lieutenant-General Archibald Wavell, to establish a joint British-Jewish unit for night operations against the Arab insurgents. However, the Jewish Agency had opposed this venture at first, leading to its postponement until early June.
The new British GOC, Lieutenant-General Robert Haining, had also approved Wingate's proposal to establish a "Night Movement Group", and the SNS became operative on early June, 1938.
The British 16th Brigade, under Brigadier John Fullerton Evetts, supplied three twelve men squads including officers, to the new unit. The men were taken from the Royal Ulster Rifles (squad commanded by Lieutenant H.E.N. Bredin), the Royal West Kent Regiment (Lt. Michael "Mike" Grove) and the Manchester Regiment (commanded by Lt. Robert King-Clark).
25 Jews were assigned to the unit as supernumerary policemen, all of them Haganah members. The Jews were hand-picked by Haganah regional commanders and by Yitzhak Sadeh, commander of the FOSH units in the Haganah. Later, 50 more Jews were adsigned to the SNS, also from Haganah cadres.
The Special Night Squads' primary task was to defend the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, which was frequently attacked by Arab insurgents. The squads also raided known insurgent bases, such as the villages of Dabburiya and Hirbat-Lidd. The force's success caused the cessation of attacks on the pipeline and brought a decline in insurgent activity in the area. It is presumed that about 12.5% of all guerrilla casualties in 1938 were caused by the SNS, which had lost only two of its men (Pvt. Stephen Chapman from the Royal West Kents and supernumerary Yosef Ben-Moshe) in action. According to Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld, their training included "... how to kill without compunction, how to interrogate prisoners by shooting every tenth man to make the rest talk; and how to deter future terrorists by pushing the heads of captured ones into pools of oil and then freeing them to tell the story".
Yoram Kaniuk writes:
The operations came more frequently and became more ruthless. The Arabs complained to the British about Wingate's brutality and harsh punitive methods. Even members of the field squads complained... that during the raids on Bedouin encampments Wingate would behave with extreme viciousness and fire mercilessly. Wingate believed in the principle of surprise in punishment, which was designed to confine the gangs to their villages. More than once he had lined rioters up in a row and shot them in cold blood. Wingate did not try to justify himself; weapons and war cannot be pure.
For its actions, Wingate was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO), and his three British officers were awarded the Military Cross (MC). Several soldiers and supernumeraries were also awarded medals and citations.
The success of the SNS caused the establishment of a fourth SNS-like unit in the Plain of Sharon, tasked with guarding the electric power line. During 1939 every British brigade in Palestine established its own Special Night Squads, although without Jewish participation.
Wingate left the SNS on October 1938, for a leave in England. During his leave he was involved with the Zionist opposition the Woodhead Commission report, meeting with such notables as Malcolm Macdonald, then secretary of the colonies, Beaverbrook and Churchill. This was frowned upon by Wingate's commanders, whe reomved him from command of the SNS and returned him to GHQ intelligence in November 1938. Bredin replaced Wingate as commander of the SNS, until it was disbanded.
The SNS continued to operate in the original form until January 1939 when, due to British policy change, the Jewish supernumeraries were forbidden from participating in offensive operations. Thereafter, the Jewish SNS served mainly on prison guard and garrison duties. They were disbanded in September 1939.
The British viewed Wingate as a security risk. He was posted out of the country and his passport was stamped "NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER PALESTINE".
Field Marshal Montgomery, who as commander of northern Palestine had authorised the SNS, told Dayan in 1966 that he considered Wingate to have "been mentally unbalanced and that the best thing he ever did was to get killed in a plane crash in 1944."
- Oring, 1981, p. 13.
- Rankin, 2009, p. 184.
- van Creveld, 2004, p. 46.
- Kaniuk, 2001, p. 19.
- Goodspeed, 2001, p. 96.
- van Creveld, 2004, p. 115.
- Brown and Louis, 1999, p. 193.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Special Night Squads.|
- Brown, Judith and Louis, Roger (1999). The Oxford History of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-820564-3
- van Creveld, Martin (2004). Moshe Dayan. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-84669-8
- Goodspeed, Michael (2001). When Reason Fails: Portraits of Armies at War: America, Britain, Israel, and the Future. Greenwood. ISBN 0-275-97378-6
- Kaniuk, Yoram (2001). Commander of the Exodus. Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-3808-X
- Katz, Sam (1988). Israeli Units Since 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 0-85045-837-4
- Oring, Elliott (1981). Israeli Humor: The Content and Structure of the Chizbat of the Palmah. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-87395-512-6
- Rankin, Nicholas (2009). A Genius for Deception: How Cunning Helped the British Win Two World Wars. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-538704-9