Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States
|Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States|
Supreme Court of the United States
|Argued March 14–16, 1910
Reargued January 12–17, 1911
Decided May 15, 1911
|Full case name||The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, et al. v. The United States|
|Citations||221 U.S. 1 (more)
31 S. Ct. 502; 55 L. Ed. 619; 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1725
|Prior history||Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri|
|The Standard Oil Company conspired to restrain the trade and commerce in petroleum, and to monopolize the commerce in petroleum, in violation of the Sherman Act, and was split into many smaller companies. Several individuals, including John D. Rockefeller, were fined.|
|Majority||White, joined by McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar|
|Sherman Anti-Trust Act|
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States found Standard Oil guilty of monopolizing the petroleum industry through a series of abusive and anticompetitive actions. The court's remedy was to divide Standard Oil into several geographically separate and eventually competing firms.
By the 1880s, Standard Oil was using its stranglehold on refining capacity to begin integrating backward into oil exploration and crude oil distribution and forward into retail distribution of its refined products to stores and, eventually, service stations throughout the United States. Standard Oil allegedly used its size and clout to undercut competitors in a number of ways that were considered "anti-competitive," including underpricing and threats to suppliers and distributors who did business with Standard's competitors.
The government sought to prosecute Standard Oil under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The main issue before the Court was whether it was within the power of the Congress to prevent one company from acquiring numerous others through means that might have been considered legal in common law, but still posed a significant constraint on competition by mere virtue of their size and market power, as implied by the Antitrust Act.
Over a period of decades, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey had bought up virtually all of the oil refining companies in the United States. Initially, the growth of Standard Oil was driven by superior refining technology and consistency in the kerosene products (i.e., product standardization) that were the main use of oil in the early decades of the company's existence. The management of Standard Oil then reinvested their profits in the acquisition of most of the refining capacity in the Cleveland area, then a center of oil refining, until Standard Oil controlled the refining capacity of that key production market.
By 1870, Standard Oil was producing about 10% of the United States output of refined oil. This quickly increased to 20% through the elimination of the competitors in the Cleveland area. Although claims have been made that Standard Oil secretly secured preferential rates from regional rail roads, such a scheme never came into effect, and a more plausible explanation for the rise of Standard Oil was its ability to continuously lower its costs and thereby the cost to the consumer. The resulting competitiveness of Standard Oil compelled the competition to sell out or face bankruptcy, until Standard controlled most of the refining capacity of the U.S.
The Court concluded that this was within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. The Court recognized that, "taken literally," the term "restraint of trade" could refer to any number of normal or usual contracts that do not harm the public. The Court embarked on a lengthy exegesis of English authorities relevant to the meaning of the term "restraint of trade." Based on this review, the Court concluded that the term "restraint of trade" had come to refer to a contract that resulted in "monopoly or its consequences." The Court identified three such consequences: higher prices, reduced output, and reduced quality.
The Court concluded that a contract offended the Sherman Act only if the contract restrained trade "unduly"—that is, if the contract resulted in one of the three consequences of monopoly that the Court identified. A broader meaning, the Court suggested, would ban normal and usual contracts, and would thus infringe liberty of contract. The Court endorsed the rule of reason enunciated by William Howard Taft in Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), written when the latter had been Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Court concluded, however, that the behavior of the Standard Oil Company went beyond the limitations of this rule.
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting in the Court's adoption of the rule of reason. Among other things, he argued that the "rule of reason" was a departure from prior precedents holding that the Sherman Act banned any contract that restrained trade "directly." See, e.g.., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). While some scholars have agreed with Justice Harlan's characterization of prior case law, others have agreed with William Howard Taft, who concluded that despite its different verbal formulation, Standard Oil's "rule of reason" was entirely consistent with prior case law.
 See also
- Dudley Dillard, Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community (Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 409-410
- Reisman George, Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics, (Jameson Books, 1990), pp. 407-408
- Walker, Albert H. (1911). The Unreasonable Obiter Dicta of Chief Justice White in the Standard Oil Case: A Critical Review. New York.
- Taft, William Howard (1914). The Antitrust Acts And The Supreme Court.
- Bork, Robert H. (1965). "The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division". Yale Law Journal (The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 3) 75 (4): 373–475. doi:10.2307/794663. JSTOR 794663.
- Letwin, William (1965). Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act. New York: Random House.
- May, James (1989). "Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1888-1918". Ohio State Law Journal 50: 258. ISSN 0048-1572.
- Page, William (1991). "Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy". Tulane Law Review 66: 1. ISSN 0041-3992.
- Peritz, Rudolph (1996). Competition Policy in America, 1888-1992. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-507461-0.
- Meese, Alan J. (1999). "Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era". Boston University Law Review 79: 1. ISSN 0006-8047.
- Meese, Alan J. (2003). "Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason". Illinois Law Review 2003: 77. ISSN 0276-9948.
- McConnell, Campbell R.; Brue, Stanley L. (2005). Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies (Sixteenth ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. ISBN 0-07-281935-9.
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case John S. McGee Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 1, (October, 1958), pp. 137–169
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