Susan Haack at the University of Miami,
|Main interests||Philosophy of science
Philosophy of logic
Charles Sanders Peirce
Susan Haack (born 1945) is an English professor of philosophy and law at the University of Miami in the United States. She has written on logic, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics. Her pragmatism follows that of Charles Sanders Peirce.
Haack is a graduate of the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge. At Oxford, she studied at St. Hilda's College, where her first philosophy teacher was Jean Austin, the widow of J. L. Austin. As an undergraduate, she took Politics, Philosophy and Economics and said of her taste for philosophy: "initially, the 'politics' part that most appealed to me. But somewhere down the line, despite encouragement from my politics tutor to pursue that subject, philosophy took over."
She studied Plato with Gilbert Ryle and logic with Michael Dummett. David Pears supervised her B.Phil. dissertation on ambiguity. At Cambridge, she wrote her Ph.D. under the supervision of Timothy Smiley. She held the positions of Fellow of New Hall, Cambridge and professor of philosophy at the University of Warwick before taking her current position at the University of Miami.
Haack has said of her career that she is "very independent":
rather than follow philosophical fads and fashions, I pursue questions I believe are important, and tackle them in the ways that seem most likely to yield results; I am beholden to no clique or citation cartel; I put no stock in the ranking of philosophy graduate programs over which my colleagues obsess; I accept no research or travel funds from my university; I avoid publishing in journals that insist on taking all the rights to my work; etc., etc. Naturally, this independence comes at a price; but it also earns me the freedom to do the best work I can, without self-censorship, and to communicate with a much wider audience than the usual “niche literature” does
Haack's major contribution to philosophy, in the 1993 book Evidence and Inquiry is her epistemological theory called foundherentism, which is her attempt to avoid the logical problems of both pure foundationalism (which is susceptible to infinite regress) and pure coherentism (which is susceptible to circularity). She illustrates this idea with the metaphor of the crossword puzzle. A highly simplified version of this proceeds as follows: Finding an answer using a clue is analogous to a foundational source (grounded in empirical evidence). Making sure that the interlocking words are mutually sensible is analogous to justification through coherence. Both are necessary components in the justification of knowledge. At least one scholar has claimed that Haack's foundherentism collapses into foundationalism upon further inspection.
Haack has been a fierce critic of Richard Rorty. She wrote a play, We Pragmatists ...: Peirce and Rorty in Conversation, consisting entirely of quotes from both philosophers. She performed the role of Peirce. Haack published a vigorous essay in the New Criterion, taking strong exception to many of Rorty's views, especially his claim to be a sort of pragmatist.
Haack (1998) is highly critical of the view that there is a feminine perspective on logic and scientific truth. She holds that many feminist critiques of science and philosophy are overly concerned with 'political correctness'.
Haack describes her 2003 book "Defending Science - Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism", as a defense of scientific inquiry from the moderate viewpoint. During an interview with D.J. Grothe, then of the Center for Inquiry, Haack put forward the proposition that those on the far left consider science to be rhetoric motivated by power or politics, then proceeds to show how science can, and often does provide real benefits and gains, regardless of what the left may claim. Conversely, Haack argues the book is an attempt to make a sounder and solider defense of inquiry in light of some Philosophers of Science narrow logical models of rationality. Haack's opinion on the topic of inquiry, whomever may be undertaking it, is that good evidence, sound methods, transparent review and fitting new discovery into the collective sphere of human knowledge are signs of robust inquiry. Haack claims that quality inquiry can be done by many, however the scientific community has numerous tools or helps that have brought many benefits to mankind, and which help foster science’s credibility. These tools and helps may not be available to those engaged in individual inquiry. When asked about how she responds to paranormal or supernatural claims, Haack indicates supporters of such claims have a heavy burden of proof. Rather than labeling such claims as pseudo-science, she admits these things can be "pretty bad stuff" and if they are to be considered seriously, they would need extraordinary evidence, and that such evidence should fit with the best warranted scientific theory about how things are. In this interview Haack also responds to the question of religion's compatibility with science. She agrees there is great tension between the two. While stating her disagreement with British philosopher of religion Richard G. Swinburne and Stephen Jay Gould, she referred to the pertinent chapter of her book for a comprehensive understanding of her views on this matter. 
In the related chapter ten of “Defending Science”, Haack disagrees with Gould's claim that science and religion have their own distinct domains that do not overlap. (See NOMA). Haack also disagrees with Swinburne. Haack believes that while scientists, historians and detectives play a useful role in scientific inquiry, theologians do not. Haack shows how religion and science make claims about how the world is. She shows how science and religion also make assertions as to what could lead to a better human condition. By these statements, Haack shows that religion and science do not enjoy their own separate space. She points out areas where prior and current religious claims about the natural universe are strongly refuted by the best warranted findings of science. She also stipulates that controversy and unanswered questions abound in modern science. She summarizes her defense for scientific inquiry by stating that she makes no apology for reserving her "greatest admiration for those who delight to exercise the mind, no matter which way it takes them…those for whom doing their damnedest with the mind, no holds barred, is a point of honor”.
She has written for Free Inquiry magazine and the Council for Secular Humanism. Haack's work has been reviewed and cited in the popular press, such as The Times Literary Supplement as well as in academic journals.
Select Writings by Haack
- 1974. Deviant Logic. Cambridge University Press.
- 1978. Philosophy of Logics.
- Haack, Susan; Kolenda, Konstantin (1977). "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (Supplementary Volumes): 63–104. JSTOR 4106816. (Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper have strikingly similar views on the propensity theory of probability and philosophy of science.)
- 1993, Evidence and Inquiry.
- 1996, Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. The University of Chicago Press. (Extends the 1974 Deviant Logic, with some additional essays published between 1973 and 1980, particularly on fuzzy logic, cf The Philosophical Review, 107:3, 468-471 )
- 1997, "Vulgar Rortyism," The New Criterion 16.
- 1998. Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays.
- 2003. Defending Science - Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. ISBN 1-59102-117-0.
- 2005, "Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, ," American Journal of Public Health.
- 2006 (edited with Robert Lane). Pragmatism, Old and New.
- 2008. Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and Its Place in Culture
- "Interview with Susan Haack". Richard Carrier Blogs. 6 May 2012. Retrieved 11 May 2012.
- Aune, B. (1996). "Haack's Evidence and Inquiry". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 627–632. doi:10.2307/2108389.
- Flage, D. E. (1995). "Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology". The Review of Metaphysics 49 (1): 136–138. doi:10.2307/20129822.
- Fumerton, R. (1998). "Evidence and Enquiry". The Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 409–412. doi:10.2307/2660334.
- Tramel, P. (2007). "Haack’s foundherentism is a foundationalism". Synthese 160 (2): 215–228. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9108-y.
- Haack, Susan (1993). "Ch. 9: Vulgar Pragmatism: an Unedifying Prospect". Evidence and Inquiry. Oxford UK: Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-11851-9.
- Richard Rorty entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Haack, Susan (November 1997). "Vulgar Rortyism". The New Criterion.
- Haack, Susan (2000) . Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-31137-1.
- Susan, Haack. "Interview with D.J Groeth". Center for Inquiry.
- Haack, Susan (2003). Defending Science - Within Reason: between Scientisim and Cynicism. Chapter 10 "And, In Conclusion": Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-59102-117-0.
- "The Charles S. Peirce Society".
- Christian, Rose Ann (2009). "Restricting the Scope of the Ethics of Belief: Haack's Alternative to Clifford and James". J Am Acad Relig 77 (3): 461–493. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfp037.
- Susan Haack's Web Page at University of Miami.
- Susan Haack Summary biography.
- Interview with Susan Haack by Richard Carrier