Transaction authentication number
A Transaction authentication number, TAN or T.A.N. is used by some online banking services as a form of single use one-time passwords to authorize financial transactions. TANs are a second layer of security above and beyond the traditional single-password authentication.
TANs are believed to provide additional security because they act as a form of two-factor authentication. Should the physical document or token containing the TANs be stolen, it will be of little use without the password; conversely, if the login data are obtained, no transactions can be performed without a valid TAN.
An outline of how TANs function:
- The bank creates a set of unique TANs for the user. Typically, there are 50 TANs printed on a list, enough to last half a year for a normal user; each TAN being six or eight characters long.
- The user picks up the list from the nearest bank branch (presenting a passport, an ID card or similar document) or is sent the TAN list through mail.
- The password (PIN) is mailed separately.
- To log on to his/her account, the user must enter user name (often the account number) and password (PIN). This may give access to account information but the ability to process transactions is disabled.
- To perform a transaction, the user enters the request and authorizes the transaction by entering an unused TAN. The bank verifies the TAN submitted against the list of TANs they issued to the user. If it is a match, the transaction is processed. If it is not a match, the transaction is rejected.
- The TAN has now been consumed and will not be recognized for any further transactions.
- If the TAN list is compromised, the user may cancel it by notifying the bank.
However, as any TAN can be used for any transaction, TANs are still prone to phishing attacks where the victim is tricked into providing both password/PIN and one or several TANs. Further, they provide no protection against man-in-the-middle attacks where an attacker intercepts the transmission of the TAN and uses it for a forged transaction. Especially when the client system should become compromised by some form of malware that enables a malicious user, the possibility of an unauthorized transaction is high. It should be noticed that the remaining TANs remain uncompromised and can be used safely, even though action should be taken by the user as soon as possible.
Indexed TAN (iTAN)
Indexed TANs reduce the risk of phishing. To authorize a transaction, the user is not asked to use an arbitrary TAN from the list but to enter a specific TAN as identified by a sequence number (index). As the index is randomly chosen by the bank, an arbitrary TAN acquired by an attacker is usually worthless.
However, iTANs are still susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, including phishing attacks where the attacker tricks the user into logging in into a forged copy of the bank's website.
Indexed TAN with CAPTCHA (iTANplus)
Prior to entering the iTAN, the user is presented a CAPTCHA, which in the background also shows the transaction data and data deemed unknown to a potential attacker, such as the user's birthdate. This is intended to make it hard (but not impossible) for an attacker to forge the CAPTCHA.
This variant of the iTAN is method used by some German banks adds a CAPTCHA to reduce the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. Some Chinese banks have also deployed a TAN method similar to iTANplus. A recent study shows that these CAPTCHA-based TAN schemes are not secure against more advanced automated attacks.
Mobile TAN (mTAN)
mTANs are used by banks in Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and some in New Zealand, Australia and Ukraine. When the user initiates a transaction, a TAN is generated by the bank and sent to the user's mobile phone by SMS. The SMS may also include transaction data, allowing the user to verify that the transaction has not been modified in transmission to the bank.
However, the security of this scheme depends on the security of the mobile phone system. In South Africa, where SMS-delivered TAN codes are common, a new attack has appeared: SIM Swap Fraud. A common attack vector is for the attacker to impersonate the victim, and obtain a replacement SIM card for the victim's phone from the mobile network operator. The victim's user name and password are obtained by other means (such as keylogging or phishing). In-between obtaining the cloned/replacement SIM and the victim noticing their phone no longer works, the attacker can transfer/extract the victim's funds from their accounts.
Simple TAN generators
The risk of compromising the whole TAN list can be reduced by using security tokens that generate TANs on-the-fly, based on a secret known by the bank and stored in the token or a smartcard inserted into the token.
However, the TAN generated is not tied to the details of a specific transaction. Because the TAN is valid for any transaction submitted with it, it does not protect against phishing attacks where the TAN is directly used by the attacker, or against man-in-the-middle attacks.
ciTAN or ChipTAN
ChipTAN is a TAN scheme used by many German banks   . It uses a TAN generator which only works if the bank card for the account is inserted into it. The TAN generated is specific to the current transaction. There are two variants: In the older variant, the transaction details (at least amount and account number) must be entered manually. In the modern variant, the user enters the transaction online, then the TAN generator reads the transaction details via a flickering field on the computer screen (using a photodetector). It then shows the transaction details to the user for confirmation before generating a TAN.
This scheme is considered fairly secure, because the TAN generator constitutes a second transmission channel independent of the computer used. Even if the computer is subverted by a trojan, or if a man-in-the-middle attack occurs, the TAN generator will generate a TAN that is only valid for the transaction entered or confirmed by the user. Manipulation of the transaction thus becomes impossible, because the TAN would not be valid for a modified transaction.
An additional advantage of this scheme is that the TAN generator is not tied to a specific account. It can be used for multiple accounts, even at different banks, and losing it is not a security risk, because the security-critical data used for generating the TAN is stored on the bank card.
The following password managers include specific support for managing TAN lists.
- heise online (2007-10-26). "Verbessertes iTAN-Verfahren soll vor Manipulationen durch Trojaner schützen" (in German).
- Li, Shujun; Syed Amier Haider Shah, Muhammad Asad Usman Khan, Syed Ali Khayam, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Roland Schmitz (2010). "Breaking e-Banking CAPTCHAs". Proceedings of 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2010). New York, NY, USA: ACM. pp. 171–180. doi:10.1145/1920261.1920288.
- http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=vn20080112083836189C511499 IOL: "Victim's SIM swap fraud nightmare"
- Postbank chipTAN comfort, official page of Postbank
- chipTAN: Listen werden überflüssig, official page of Sparkasse
- Keypass documentation on TAN