Talk:Eastern Front (World War II)

horses

fascinating article. but i wonder if many of these writings of the Eastern Front are not missing a bit of the ordinary picture. take the photos for example. most are of fancy german tanks and airplanes. but what of this quote from Horses_in_World_War_II article?

"Infantry and horse-drawn artillery formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war; only one-fifth of the Army belonged to mobile panzer and mechanized divisions"

Pictures like these are probably more representative of the experience of the average person:

i don't feel like i have a good feel for where to put this information into the article, but i thought it might be interesting to discuss the issue. Decora (talk) 16:40, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

Information about importance of the Eastern Front

I'm sorry but I took the liberty to collapse the discussion above. If valid and/or useful points were made during this discussion, please summarize them below. --ElComandanteChe (talk) 21:19, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

File:19440709 german soldiers go into soviet captivity.jpg Nominated for Deletion

An image used in this article, File:19440709 german soldiers go into soviet captivity.jpg, has been nominated for deletion at Wikimedia Commons in the following category: Deletion requests November 2011 What should I do? Don't panic; a discussion will now take place over on Commons about whether to remove the file. This gives you an opportunity to contest the deletion, although please review Commons guidelines before doing so. If the image is non-free then you may need to upload it to Wikipedia (Commons does not allow fair use) If the image isn't freely licensed and there is no fair use rationale then it cannot be uploaded or used. This notification is provided by a Bot --CommonsNotificationBot (talk) 12:18, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

kick in the door quote wrong date

I believe this quote was made prior to the invasion. The given date of october 1941 makes lttle sense, as the invasion was already reaching its zenith.Inteluck (talk) 18:13, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

Information about importance of the Eastern Front Part II

In the other discussion, Paul Sibert stated the following:

"Secondly, the statement "But most historians agreed that if it had fought alone, the USSR victory would be questionable at least." is not correct. For instance, such a reputable scholar as David Glantz believes that the victory was possible, although it would be more costly. The reason for that was simple: the USSR won the most decisive battles, the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, virtually alone, because no considerable military of economic aid from the West had been provided by that moment. After Stalingrad, it was impossible for Germany to win (just to make separate peace with the USSR)."

I will start with the naval war:

Any consideration for the naval blockade Germany was suffering from the Western Allies? We have a detailed article about it and it's consequences: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany_(1939%E2%80%931945)

It's certain that Germany would present itself a much more stronger enemy if the blockade didn't existed. Much more stronger industrially than the USSR, which despite all the Lend-lease, bombing and divertion of German resources in several areas, was still matched in aircraft and armored vehicle production by Germany in 1944.

And about the U-boat production, consequence of the blockade, the Germans built over 1,000 U-boats during the war because it. Each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. A Panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 German tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war in the Atlantic. 40,000 Panthers, or resources from them directed in other areas could not have made a difference if the Germans were only in the East?

Air war:

Luftwaffe losses East/West:

4.06 times as many aircraft were lost in combat in the West than were lost in the East, a ratio reasonably close to Groehler's 3.41 for all "losses". The most chilling statistic for the JG 26 pilots appears in the sortie data. An airplane flying a combat mission in the West was 7.66 times more likely to be destroyed than one on a similar mission in the East. It is clear that the burden of sacrifice was borne by the Luftwaffe aircrew on the Western Front and over the Reich, not on the Eastern Front.

http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Allied Bombing:

The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55-60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20-25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.

Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher.

Note of mine: the author is very correct in the last line. Even more because the Germans dispersed many plants due to the bombing, which affected their capability with significance. This would not be the case with war only in the East. And any effort in strategical bombing from the Soviets would have drastical resources, since it would take large resources from other areas and their outdated bombers would suffer even more losses in the Germans hands. I belive it would be more easy for the Germans deploy an strategical bombing in the Soviet industry in this scenario than vice versa. The Luftwaffe would have the required time and resources to develop and produce aircraft such as the He 177 up to the task.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II

More about bombing, from the RAF's Bomber Command:

By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.

To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks. To put this into perspective General Erwin Rommel's German forces defending Normandy in 1944 comprised 50,000 men, and their resistance caused the Western Allies grave problems.

This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command

Lend-Lease aircraft:

Lend-lease aircraft amounted to 18% of all aircraft in the Soviet air forces, 20% of all bombers, and 16-23% of all fighters (numbers vary depending on calculation methods), and 29% of all naval aircraft. In some AF commands and fronts the proportion of Lend-Lease aircraft was even higher: of the 9.888 fighters delivered to the air defense (PVO) fighter units in 1941-45 6.953 (or over 70%!) were British or American. In the AF of the Karelian front lend-lease aircraft amounted to about two-thirds of all combat aircraft in 1942-43, practically all torpedo bombers of the naval air forces were A-20G Bostons in 1944-45etc.

http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/englis...deliveries.htm

A look about the early war help the Russians received from the British in 1941 is of worth: http://www.historynet.com/did-russia-really-go-it-alone-how-lend-lease-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

The critical LL aviation fuel supply is another thing: http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

A German perspective of the air war in both fronts: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/may-jun/collins.html

What is my point with all this? prove that in WWII all was interconnected. And everything I'm providing must be analized in a cumulative matter, not individually. When Paul Sibert tried to argue about the capability of the Soviets to defeat the Germans alone, and by citing Glantz, an author with doubtful personal conclusions, which, among other things, don't explain how the Soviets would defeat all the Luftwaffe and thousands of Panther and Tiger tanks with abundance of fuel in such a scenario, he is only showing his lack of global view of a GLOBAL conflict. Not that this would be necessarily impossible, but certainly would not be something easily predictable, and even less by the superficial logic he used. In the same way, it would not be impossible for the Western Allies defeat Germany alone. If Germany had conquered the USSR, then the things would be really complicated, since it would have a "gold mine". But, as already mentioned, the non presence of the naval blockade of the Western Allies would be a gold mine from Germany as well. To have a favourable chance of at least sign a favourable peace in the East.

Desconsideration of the Japanese side is another serious mistake, since the Japanese only attacked the Western colonies in the Pacific because the British and the Americans were involved in the war in Europe. They only entered in southern Indochina by this reason. It's quiet probable that the Japanese Empire would attack the Soviets if there were not tensions between the US and Germany. This would only complicate the Soviet situation even further. And there's also the Italians to be add in the equation.

There are many more factors I didn't mentioned. This article only shows that the war was decided in the East, like if everything happened there and regardless of the other fronts would happen in the same way. As it's name emplies, the conflict was global, and try put the Western Allies as secondary participants is totally against Wikipedia's policy of neutrality. Glantz is not neutral, he himself claims his goal is put light in the Soviet Union, and we should provide neutrality here.

To conclude my reasoning; people mostly considerate only the ground war as vital. Planes don't receive much consideration. But, a strong Luftwaffe in Stalingrad for example, could have avoided the massive casualities the Axis suffered there. Massive casualities in Kursk and Bagration could have been avoided as well, with maybe the Soviets suffering unsustainable losses. This puts the nail in the head of the casualities argument for this scenario, and even more if combined with other factors such as massive German armored divisions due to avaliability of oil to adequately train the crews and expand the arm. Casualities not occur for nothing, and the casualities in the East for both sides occured for several reasons, and such several reasons were in great part about the global conflict in which the Eastern Front was part of. My suggestion: put the importance of the Eastern Front in the same way of the book War, From Ancient Egypt to Iraq, from the DK publishing. This book let's very clear that the Soviets sustained most of the land warfare against the Axis, a fact, letting the individual contributions of the Allies separeted in order to the reader draw it's own conclusions. The book is an enclyclopedia of wars, and this only boost his credit for provide information like it in my view.

To confirm from two famous Russian and Western historians that this is an open subject: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4508901.stm

An article by Richard Overy, supporting his view of above and going in the same points as me: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/how_the_allies_won_01.shtml

Overy's words:

"Yet without Soviet resistance and reform, American rearmament and economic mobilisation, and western air power, the ability of the three major allies to wear down German and Japanese resistance would have been highly questionable."

Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 02:15, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Should associated belligerents get such prominence?

Would it not be better to have Germany and the SOviet Union shown with much larger flags and other nations should somehow with smaller writing? Over ninety percent of those who fought and died were surely from these nations. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 60.248.234.210 (talk) 04:00, 18 January 2012 (UTC)

Why? The casualities of the Germans and Soviets were direct consequence of their allies, which you considerate "less important". It was a World War after all. Marcelo Jenisch (talk)