Talk:Free will

Work needed

Hello everyone! This article currently appears near the top of the cleanup listing for featured articles, with several cleanup tags. Cleanup work needs to be completed on this article, or a featured article review may be in order. Please contact me on my talk page if you have any questions. Thank you! Dana boomer (talk) 16:20, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

I deeply wonder who made it a featured article in the first hand, since from a Pragmatic perspective the article lacks viable contexts and examples. Reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Existentialism" I get quite a different definition of "free will", illuminating the fact that there is no section Definitions and just one pretty vague definition in the intro, that pragmatically levitates in the blue. The article then cannot be called comprehensive per WP:FACR. Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 10:15, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

Sorry, I made a personal reinterpretation of existentialist "freedom" to free will. Better synthetize the links from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy really about "free will": Free Will O'Connor (2002+2010), Foreknowledge and Free Will Zagzebski (2004+2008), Hume on Free Will Russell (2007) and Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will Clarke (2000+2008).

The pragmatic image of Free Will is that it arose to explain why omnipotent creator God had the right to smite evildoers, while still carrying the label "good". It seems the main area of applicability is in justice, where the degree of freedom of will is determined in order to measure out a judgement and a suitable punishment for the criminal. A pragmatic assessment of the area of applicability is somehow missing. As a freefloating philosophical concept, a Wittgensteinian plain language adherent might not unlikely label Free Will as a "superstition". Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 10:41, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm unclear what point you are attempting to make here. The great majority of the "Western Philosophy" section here is about different definitions of free will and arguments for or against them. The rest of your comments appear to be reflections on what different philosophical schools might say about one definition or another, or speculation about how certain concepts of free will came into being. What are you suggesting be done about the article exactly? --Pfhorrest (talk) 19:21, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

The definition is not really the problem. The first sentences of SEP and REP are just as evasive. Still, the article might benefit from a review, and it may be worth comparing with earlier versions. The clean-up tag is presumably there because someone thinks the article is bloated. Vesal (talk) 22:24, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

I have made simplifications to the free will concepts diagram - removing all variations not discussed in the article. I do not mind the introduction as stands (after generalising quite an interesting expression of free will). I would suggest people propose specific alternative introductions, as they have already been doing. I think that the common complaints coming to this talk page are product of the content distribution across compatibilist/incompatibilist theories. This appears to be a direct product of the scholarly work to date regarding free will conception, and while the history is interesting this is probably irrelevant (unless of course references can be found). Despite this, I feel that it would still be useful to slightly shorten (/fork off) some content while lengthening other content on this page. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 00:55, 8 January 2011 (UTC)

I have doubts over whether it is accurate to say that compatabilists are "Those who deny that determinism is relevant". Would it not be more true to say something like that compatibilists accept determinism and believe it to have varying degrees of relevance to various definitions of free will? I don't have the expertise to say this correctly, but the main point is that denying all relevance of determinism seems to be a suspect description of the compatibilist view. Jeffj900 (talk) 15:35, 7 July 2011 (UTC)

Compatibilists don't necessarily accept determinism, though; they just say that determinism wouldn't rule out free will. They don't necessarily accept free will, either. Compatibilism is just the view that free will and determinism are not incompatible with each other, that they could co-exist. Within compatibilism, different camps then argue about under what conditions would or could someone have free will: Is it just freedom from physical restraint? Freedom from the threat of punishment? Freedom from psychological compulsion? Etc. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, all focus on one condition: freedom from determination. Compatibilists are distinguished from incompatibilists by not being so concerned about freedom from determination, but instead about those others sorts of things, which is what the phrase you quote is supposed to mean.

Perhaps you can help think of a clearer way to state that? --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:26, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Post to prevent bot archiving. Brad (talk) 02:10, 25 December 2011 (UTC)

Just as a note, in response to my post above (of a little over a year ago), there was some cleanup done on the article, and the number of cleanup tags was reduced to just a couple of minor fact tags. However, since then the number of tags has climbed again, and now includes at least one banner (an expansion tag). The tags should be addressed and either the issues fixed or the tags removed if they are not justified. Dana boomer (talk) 15:42, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

emphasize how the agent is known in metaphysical libertarianism

It now says under metaphysical libertarianism:

" An extra-physical will is believed to play a part in the decision making process. According to a somewhat related theological explanation, an independent soul is said to make decisions and override physical causality."

I would like to see added to that something like:

"The extra-physical will, or soul making the decisions is only known to exist by believing it is there. It can only be decided to exist, and not measured."

It already says in the first sentence that the extra-physical will is "believed" to play a part, but I think this needs to be clarified more directly, that in metaphysical libertarianism "believing" is itself an act of free will, and is required in referring to what makes a decision.

So for example a person chooses left or right, the person chooses left, what was it that made that person go left instead of right? For the metaphysical libertarian this question must be answered with a belief, so with a decision. For instance they might choose between the alternatives love and hate as to what they believe it was that made the person go left instead of right.

This is basically in reference to the creationist tradition of libertarianism, where God decides things, and God is known to exist through faith, which faith is an exercise of free will. So you see the logic repeated all the time in metaphysical libertarianism, what makes the decision is only known by deciding it is there. When people decide things, then you must "look into their heart" subjectively to find out what it was that realised one alternative over another. That is the sort of thing libertarians say. The general modus operandi with people, the beginning and end of the universe, the weather, the origin of species etc., it's all the same procedure, you see alternatives and a decision made, and then you make a decision in turn to find out about the spirit in which the decision was made.

This is also in general reference to the well known tradition in metaphysical libertarianism where goodness and evil are 1) things which are said to make a decision, which means they do the job of realizing an alternative, and 2) they are categorically not treated as matters of fact, but are instead held to be matters of judgement ie decision, belief etc. I think this is a very significant point of difference between libertarianism and the other theories, that in libertarianism good and evil are handled subjectively. --Syamsu (talk) 00:39, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

Can you cite any sources to support your interpretation here? It seems dubious to me, although perhaps I am failing to understand it. Looie496 (talk) 00:42, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

well it doesn't really matter much when you don't understand, because the procedure can be followed regardless if you understand it or not. I mean you can choose right? I will look for some references which emphasize God is known through faith ;) and some more general comments of libertarians similar to what I am saying. It says in the rest of the article that libertarians posit a duality. This is ofcourse the duality of what makes the decision, and was being decided over. A duality also of subjectivity and objectivity, a duality of worth and fact etc. --Syamsu (talk) 01:21, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

well I did some looking but I can't find it easily, but otoh obviously I am not the inventor of a doctrine which says love and such is what makes a decision turn out one way instead of another, and that love is known subjectively and can't be measured. Common knowledge is full of such explanations. It already says "believe" in the article, so I am merely emphasizing that what makes the decision is a matter of belief. How about not adding, but rewording the existing phrase into, "What makes the decision is said to be a matter of belief, not a matter of fact. On faith an extra-physical will or soul is decided to be there doing the job of deciding." Something like that. --Syamsu (talk) 02:51, 31 July 2011 (UTC)

Can you clarify for me: are you talking about the truth of metaphysical-libertarianism being a matter of faith (i.e. "Metaphysical libertarians believe, on faith alone, that uncaused agents are involved in decision-making"), or about faith being a part of metaphysical-libertarian doctrine (i.e. "According to metaphysical libertarians, faith plays a role in the decision-making process...")? --Pfhorrest (talk) 18:53, 1 August 2011 (UTC)

The first basically, in ML the agent can only be known by deciding what it is. This still leaves the decision and the alternatives as matters of fact. I read that generally all medieval monks are assumed to be metaphysical libertarians. I've also read general opnion of many intellectuals arguing against ML that this believing about the agent is mainly what they object to. So both inside and outside ML, the agent in ML is regarded as a matter of belief.

So what about changing it, like I said it is just a shift of emphasis in the present text. The text says ML "believe" there is an agent, what the text should say is ML treat the existence of the agent as a matter of belief. The rewording would make room for "atheist" metaphysical libertarians, people who believe there is nothing there doing the job of deciding. Now the wording is slanted toward believing there *is* an agent, or so to say, the spiritual domain is not empty. But ofcourse when you say something is a matter of belief, then also the negative alternative result must be allowed, that there is nothing there. --Syamsu (talk) 13:02, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

I would appreciate if you stopped edit warring on the page; citing sources from the literature may assist your changes. I am even quite sympathetic to your interpretation, but there is no reason to be so abrasive while arguing for it. elle _{vécut heureuse} ^{à jamais} (be free) 20:35, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

Obviously I think it already is sufficiently backed up that this is an accurate representation of libertarianism, it is mainly just a shift of emphasis not content. Your objection that no soul was mentioned was simply a mistake on your part, it was still mentioned. With the change I made the paragraph becomes more cohesive. The duality mentioned in the paragraph previously, more clearly flows to a duality of matters of objective fact and subjective belief. Any further rewording should make this distinction clear, your second rewording was not clear on this point. Do you really feel the need to have a reference that the existence of the soul in libertarianism is treated as a matter of belief, not a matter of fact? I refer you to William of Ockham's writings --Syamsu (talk) 21:00, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

"we can have no knowledge of an immaterial soul; nor can we prove its existence philosophically. Instead we must rely on revealed truth and faith" http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ockconn2e --Syamsu (talk) 22:02, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

I prefer the original wording FWIW. 1Z (talk) 23:34, 9 August 2011 (UTC)

I also prefer the old wording, and don't quite see the point Syamsu is trying to emphasize about it being a matter of "belief" vs "fact". This is a philosophical article and like all philosophical articles most of what we are doing is reporting the beliefs of various people. Those people usually believe the things they believe to be facts; to believe something is to hold it to be a fact. That doesn't say anything about whether the thing believed is proven or provable, empirically or otherwise.

If we were to emphasize "metaphysical libertarians believe that there is a nonphysical agent that makes people's choices, but that's just their belief and isn't proven", then we'd likewise need to emphasize "hard determinists believe that every event is necessitated by the events which preceded it, but that's just their belief and isn't proven" for consistency (see problem of induction). And we'd have to do that for every report of what anybody believes on every philosophy article on the whole wiki. If you (Syamsu) are not arguing for that, then why the special emphasis on the agent of metaphyisical libertarianism being an unproven belief?

Also, though I suspect there is strong correlation, not all metaphysical libertarians are religious and rely on "revealed truth and faith". There are those who take it as a brute fact observable by simple introspection that they have free will; combined with conviction in some argument for incompatibilism, this makes such people metaphysical libertarians. In other words, some people think metaphysical libertarianism can be and has been proven, and that others are irrationally unpersuaded by those proofs. Your emphasis on "that's just their belief" diminishes the validity of that belief as the wiki presents it. For neutrality we also can't assert that the belief is correct, but we should simply state "these people believe that such-and-such", without any emphasis on the proof or provability (or lack thereof) of said belief. --Pfhorrest (talk) 00:43, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

Can you reference any metaphysical libertarians who takes the existence of an extra-physical will, which is the original wording, to be a "proven" matter of fact?

I find that highly unlikely you could provide such a reference, in that the whole point in calling it "extra" physical seems to be that it is not measurable like all the physical things are.

Most people don't "usually believe the things they believe to be facts", most people usually make a distinction between matter of facts and matters of belief. For instance there was a movie last year or so, about a character who believed love was not real. As a movie is to a large audience, it seems many people are acquainted with the idea that some things are matters of belief. It seems bizarre to me a metaphysical libertarian would say something like love, or an extra-physical will is a matter of fact. I heared a radio show some time ago where a hard determinist, denying free will, said he could measure what a person likes with an mri brain scanner. That squarely belongs with hard determinism that you can measure the agent doing the deciding, it would be a mistake to put that in as an option with metaphysical libertarianism. As shown also by the reference to Ockham I provided, in metaphysical libertarianism some things are categorically not matters of fact.

You are also quite mistaken that saying it is a belief diminishes the validity. When a belief is arrived at in freedom this way, then that obviously has more validity than a belief forced by facts. For example somebody forced to believe in God, is less valid then somebody freely believing in God.

Pending any reference on your part, I think you only demonstrate a lack of understanding of metaphysical libertarianism, which illustrates how important it is to emphasise this particular point in clear way. This particular point of how the agent is known in metaphysical libertarianism is not understood well by many people who are conditioned by school and university to rely on evidence for coming to a conclusion.--213.247.122.26 (talk) 09:03, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

Thomas Reid and C.A. Campbell are the first two libertarians who come to mind who appeal to introspection for evidence of the existence of free will. They're not saying "I can prove to you that I have free will" in a 3rd-person, scientific, physical sense, but "we can each prove to ourselves that we have free will; I introspect and see plainly that I do, and if you really have free will you can do likewise and see for yourself." They're not appealing to faith or divine revelation to tell them that they have free will; they can just see it for themselves, in themselves, and say everyone else should introspect and see so about themselves, too.

As for "proven fact", something doesn't have to be proven to be a fact. There are facts about things that we don't know yet. Is there life in the seas of Europa? We don't know, we have no proof either way, but it's either a fact that there is or a fact that there's not, even though we don't yet know which of those is a fact.

Similarly, of course people make a distinction between facts and beliefs: I might believe that there is no life on Europa and turn out to be wrong about that fact. But I believe it is a fact that there is no life on Europa; that just means the same thing as "I believe there is no life on Europa". Adding "it is a fact that..." to the beginning of a sentence doesn't add any content to it, it just emphasizes the speaker's conviction about it, like saying "it is true that...".

So emphasizing that something is just a belief implies doubt about the thing believed. But everything in philosophy articles here is dubious; you can always find a notable source who will disagree with something. That means we can't state anything as a fact in the wiki's voice, and have to simply state that people believe certain things; but putting special emphasis on how something is "just a belief and not proven" unduly takes weight away from that position, unless we did it to all positions, which would be ridiculous.

In short, we have to say just "P believes that X. Q believes that Y." We can't say "It is a fact that X. But Q believes that Y." Nor can we say "P believes that X. Q holds, as a matter of belief, that Y, but that isn't proven." Those would both by biased against Q; the latter less so, but still some, as it states P's belief without implications on its truthfulness, while it states Q's beliefs in a manner that casts doubt on it. It would be unbiased to say "P holds as a matter of belief that X, but that isn't proven. Q holds as a matter of belief that Y, but that isn't proven." But that would be ridiculously verbose and redundant and cast unnecessary doubt everywhere when the lack of consensus on facts speaks for itself, and we can just say "P believes that X. Q believes that Y."

That's probably all tangential though, as I get the feeling that the point you're pushing for is to have the article claim that all metaphysical libertarians believe the only way to know we have free will is through faith and divine revelation. That's clearly not the opinion of them all though, as Reid and Campbell provide counterexamples, and there are undoubtedly others out there too.

Maybe it would make a useful addition to the article, however, to have an additional paragraph about metaphysical libertarians and the differences within their ranks on how we know we have free will? The introspection camp vs the divine revelation camp. If you want to write up something about that, we can hash out the details there and maybe make some progress. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:42, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

The article does not say "free will" there, it says an "extra"-physical will or soul. When Thomas Reid says he can prove free will with introspection, he likely is referring to the alternatives, and decisions he sees in himself. These are matters of fact in principle for all metaphysical libertarians because of the way it is formulated, only what makes the decision is categorically considered not a matter of fact. As per example Reid talking about what makes the decision he turns into a mystic:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/ "Reid staunchly refuses to speculate on the substance of the self, however. Despite the fact that Reid is a substance dualist who believes that selves are eternal souls, he does not defend that view in the work that he published. In manuscript lectures, he describes souls as “beings of a quite different Nature” than material bodies and says that the death of the body does not imply the death of the soul (Animate Creation 617-618). As Reid spells out his metaphysics of the self and soul here, his arguments become theological and appeal to God's existence, love and justice."

I haven't looked at Campbell yet, I think the point is already proven. There is a very wide agreement among metaphysical libertarians. To be sure you may find some exception, but it is this point about the way in which what makes the decision is treated, what makes metaphysical libertarianism stand out much. Metaphysical libertarianism is often criticized for involving an unevidenced soul or extra-physical will. So metaphysical libertarianism is commonly identified with this particular aspect of it.

Your talk about "belief", is generic talk about belief, and not belief as it is understood in metaphysical libertarianism as distinctly applying to what makes the decision. In my rewrite I explained belief in the metaphysical libertarianism sense, which is like "decided to exist". Again, this is what sets apart metaphysical libertarianism much, which is why it should be formulated sharply and emphasized.

What I am pushing for is that the only way to know about what makes the decision in metaphysical libertarianism, is through deciding what it is. I think this is quite secular and common, as well as religious. It validates subjectivity in general. --Syamsu (talk) 22:54, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

Please folks, libertarianism just treats freedom as real, therefore they have a way of knowing (believing) which is based on just choosing what is there. Please do not edit it on the grounds that supposedly libertarians do not use choosing in their philosophy! There are loads of references for it, above are a couple from mainstream libertarians such as Ockham and Reid, please be reasonable thank you.--Syamsu (talk) 11:38, 25 October 2011 (UTC)

Whatever point you are trying to make is still completely opaque and seems to be shifting. First you seemed to be arguing that libertarians freely choose to believe that free will exists, which begs the question and is thus biased. Then you seemed to emphasize that belief in libertarian free will was just a belief and not proven, but that has undue weight issues. From there you seemed to be arguing that libertarians rely on faith and divine revelation to know that free will exists; I gave Reid and Campbell as counterexamples of libertarians who rely on introspection to tell that free will exists, not divine revelation. Now you seem to be arguing that libertarians "know" free will exists because they just decide that it does? That doesn't even make any sense, deciding to believe something doesn't pass muster as knowledge by any epistemic standard I've ever seen put forward, unless you want to go back to question-begging that "I decided free will exists, and that ability to make that decision proves that it does". Maybe if some libertarians actually use that argument it deserves a mention, but the way you're phrasing your edits in the article comes off as nonsense - it's not even clear what you're trying to say, or why you're trying to say it in the part of the article you keep editing. --Pfhorrest (talk) 19:52, 25 October 2011 (UTC)

I agree with Pfhorrest that Syamsu's edits are incomprehensbile -- and the lack of any sort of reference is a further problem. Looie496 (talk) 20:20, 25 October 2011 (UTC)

All your points are already answered within this talk in a clear way, please just reread. For example I said Reid takes the alternatives and decisions as matters of fact, but "the self" he treats as a matter of faith. You must simply read what I write, this is bad faith of you to ignore what I wrote. I see that more people don't understand what I wrote, and true there may be lots who don't understand, but then this is not such a problem if that means that those people simply do not understand metaphysical libertarianism. Then you must simply try harder to understand what I wrote. I think you do not understand Reid's "staunch refusal" to evidence "the self", and Ockham's insistence that the "soul" cannot be proven even philosophically, let alone with measurement. Talk to me, and show me that you understand Reid and Ockham on this basically similar point. Otherwise again, when you don't understand, then the edit is right, and you must simply try harder to understand my edit, in order to understand metaphysical libertarianism. The same goes for looie, show me that you understand Reid and Ockham on this point --Syamsu (talk) 09:53, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

Syamsu, it's not a problem of not understanding metaphysical libertarianism or what particular metaphysical libertarians say, it's a problem of not understanding what you're trying to say about that, or issues with the way you're saying whatever you're trying to say.

If I read you above correctly now, I think the point you're trying to add to the article is that some metaphysical libertarians believe not only that free will is incompatible with determinism, not only that people have free will, not only that the self or agent which does the choosing is an immaterial substance or soul -- all of which are already stated in the article -- but that, consequential to its immateriality, nothing can be known about that self or agent, and consequential to that, that all beliefs about it must be formed on the basis of faith or revelation?

If that is a correct understanding, then please add your preferred citation(s) to this edit I just made (adding the sentence "Some philosophers, such as William of Ockham and Thomas Reid, argue that this mind, will, or soul, being nonphysical, cannot be known to empirical science, and that all beliefs about it are thus grounded in faith or revelation."), and maybe we'll have settled this? --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:58, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Yes that is basically a correct understanding, thank you very much. I still think the paragraph would be incorrectly interpreted though. It says:

"Non-physical theories hold that a non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality"

This is not really true in that you can be a metaphysical libertarian like Ockham or Reid, and not believe in God or a soul, and believe there is nothing there doing the deciding, so to say the spiritual domain is empty. The point is only the way that it is known, that it is known through faith that there is nothing there. So it should say something like: metaphysical libertarianism divides into non-physical and physical theories, the non-physical theories emphasise the way the agent doing the choosing is known, rather than what the agent consists of, be there any agent at all. The agent or soul is said to be only known, or rather felt, through free belief (faith / revelation) and not evidence. I don't think you need to be so careful to say "some", because I read that the late medieval monks are generally all regarded to be metaphysical libertarians. I don't believe Ockham and Reid are exceptions to the monks generally then.--Syamsu (talk) 08:58, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

I regret that it has been changed back. I think I have written a clear and correct representation of metahysical libertarianism. Now the passage seems to say again that metaphysical libertarians require a belief in a soul. This is a falsehood of such magnitude which cannot pass. To require a belief in a soul and implicitly require belief in God is anti-democratic, anti-freedom, anti-emotion, anti-religion. Very clearly in metaphysical libertarianism the way to arrive at a conclusion about an agent is by free belief. I have quoted 2 metaphysical libertarian philosophers previously going out of their way saying that they are opposed to evidence, even against philosophical evidence in coming to a conclusion about the agent. But really ALL late medieval monks are generally considered to be metaphysical libertarians. It is also quite obvious that religion centers around FAITH, not around evidence gathering. So I think I have made a fair and correct representation of common metaphysical libertarianism.

But on the other side I do feel I need more support from people here on wiki that what I wrote is a correct and fair representation of common metaphysical libertarian position. Think this through, is the way in which metaphysical libertarianists reach a conclusion about an agent a free way, or a way forced by evidence? Syamsu — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.57.25.110 (talk) 01:12, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

I did not simply revert your edit; I reverted it and then made my own edits to make the same point you seem to be trying to make with less collateral damage. Your edits implied that all non-physicalist metaphysical libertarians believe that there can be no evidence that there is any mind, soul, or agent doing the intervention in physical causality. That is very clearly not the case, as the example I added of Rene Descartes, the archetypical interactionist dualist, shows. I don't know how you can possibly claim that Descarte wasn't a metaphysical libertarian: he believed in immaterial minds independent from the material world which intervene in the otherwise-deterministic events of that world by causally affecting the physical brain, through the pineal gland of all things, and his entire philosophy was ultimately grounded in his supposed proof of the existence of such a mind (the cogito). I trust you don't need quotations to show that Descarte believed he had proven there to be immaterial minds independent of bodies, as that's pretty much his big thing, but here's a quick quote demonstrating Descarte's strong insistence on metaphysical liberty, courtesy of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the subject:

René Descartes, for example, identifies the faculty of will with freedom of choice, “the ability to do or not do something” (Meditation IV), and even goes so far as to declare that “the will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained” (Passions of the Soul, I, art. 41). In taking this strong polar position on the nature of will, Descartes is reflecting a tradition running through certain late Scholastics (most prominently, Suarez) back to John Duns Scotus.

You've shown that some metaphysical libertarians take an epistemological position on the demonstrability of the existence of any such mind / soul / will, and that has been included in the article already. I might even be willing to give you the benefit of the doubt that they are representative of a whole school or period, although the quote about about Descartes' position reflecting late Scholastic opinion would cast that into doubt. But it's a far leap from there to saying that all metaphysical agree with them, especially when one of the most famous philosophers of all time (Descartes) is a glaring counter-example.

I'd also say that, even if Reid et al opine that the it cannot be known whether "the spiritual domain is empty", as a matter of our encyclopedic categorization those who hold (even on faith) that it is empty would by definition not count as the non-physical variety of metaphysical libertarian, as that variety is defined by the belief that there is something non-physical (if that is what you mean by "spiritual") intervening in the causal affairs of the physical world. Otherwise, if you believe that determinism is incompatible with free will, and that free will exist, but that there is nothing non-physical ("the spiritual domain is empty"), then you are by definition a metaphysical libertarian of the physicalist variety. Nevertheless, when I made my edits to the article I moved the mention of mind, soul, or will to be specifically an interactionist dualist view, making room for the position you seem to be pushing for that maybe there are non-physicalist metaphysical libertarians who not only say that belief in that mind/soul/etc is a matter of faith, but that it is not required to be a non-physicalist metaphysical libertarians, even though as far as I can see that position is incoherent.

The positions, narrowing down to yours, are:

• Is determinism compatible with free will?
  • Yes - Compatibilism.
  • No - Incompatibilism.
    • Does free will exist?
      • No - Hard determinism.
      • Yes - Metaphysical libertarianism.
        • Is the universe entirely physical?
          • Yes - Physicalist metaphysical libertarianism.
          • No - Non-physicalist metaphysical libertarianism.
            • Can we know or prove anything about the non-physical realm?
              • Yes - Descartes et al.
              • No - Reid, Ockham, et al.

The wording of the article as it stands now, after my revision and re-edits of you, say that:

• Some metaphysical libertarians are physicalists and others aren't.
• The ones that aren't physicalists believe that something external to the physical world intervenes in determinism.
• Interactionist dualists believe that a mind/soul/etc intervenes in the physical world's determinism. (This should be strictly redundant with the above as far as I can see, but I made it separate in charity to you).
• Some philosophers believe that any belief in a mind/soul/etc is a matter of faith beyond reason or science.

Tell me what valid point is still missing from that? --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:13, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

Ockham and Reid make practical use of their philosophy in arriving at a conclusion about an agent. It must be made abundantly clear that the belief in a soul is arrived at in a free way, in the metaphysical libertarian sense of freedom, of there being alternatives available. Without that being made clear it seems that the belief in the soul is some arbitrary add on having nothing much to do with their belief in free will.

Descartes is a seperate issue. His meditations don't neccessarily portray his points of view directly. In the meditations Descartes posits confusion, and then tries to find a way out of the confusion, which makes it a bit unclear what Descartes true position is. Unless you can show anywhere that Descartes says he can prove the existence of a soul, then the safe side is to say he does not think he can prove a soul existing. And even if Descartes would have said that he could prove that the soul exists, I think that is a highly unusual position to take, for 99.99 percent religion centers around faith not repetition of proven facts!

--Syamsu (talk) 10:58, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

And aren't you just making the same mistake with Descartes as you did with Reid? Aren't you just mistaking Descartes objective assertions of fact about the results of decisions showing up in the pineal gland first, from his SUBJECTIVE OPINION that these results, as the case may be, signify love or hate as what did the choosing? I think very clearly you are making this mistake, because Descartes talks about the soul being tied to the pineal gland, and not the soul as what constitutes the pineal gland. I think you simply fail to understand metaphysical libertarianism. Obviously it would be ridiculous to forbid practical use of metaphhysical libertarianism in an article devoted to metaphysical libertarianism. So as to say it may not be entered into the explanation that Ockham choses to believe in a soul containing love, over alternatively chosing not to believe it, which is simply to deny metaphysical libertarianism.--Syamsu (talk) 16:30, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

Descartes showed that the "soul could by no means be educed from the power of matter" How is that really establishing the existence of the soul as a matter of fact? Again this can be read as saying the soul choses, and the results show up in the pineal gland, and should be read as such. It is simply describing how the body is organized in terms of making decisions in a libertarian sense of turning out alternative ways. If we answer the question would Descartes have opined that an mri image showing electric current when somebody says they are experiencing love, is love, or would Descartes say that the electric activity showing up is reasonably an expression of love by free will? I think it must be the last.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm

"I had after this described the reasonable soul, and shown that it could by no means be educed from the power of matter, as the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created; and that it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members, but that it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours, and thus constitute a real man" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Syamsu (talk • contribs) 17:03, 9 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm having difficulty reading you again, but I think you are misreading me about Descartes, especially the throw-away comment about the pineal gland. The point I was making about Descartes is this: his meditations, as you say, begin by positing confusion, and then try to find a way out of it; on the way "down", he comes to the conclusion that he may be entirely mistaken about the existence of a physical world, and yet his mind still exist, proving (to his satisfaction) that minds are not dependent upon matter but exist (if they exist at all) independently of it; and then, at the "bottom", he concludes that he cannot doubt that his mind exists, proving (to his satisfaction) that there really are such things as immaterial minds, at least one, his; and then he builds back up to a full set of beliefs from that first indubitable fact, which is what I meant when I said his entire philosophy was "ultimately grounded" in it. Then elsewhere, he discusses the way in which these immaterial minds may interact with material bodies, identifying the pineal gland as the place where the immaterial soul and material body "meet", where the soul pushes the buttons on the brain, so to speak; I did not at all mean to imply that Descartes believes the soul to exist in the pineal gland or anything like that, as he clearly believes that souls/minds are completely independent from matter. But he also clearly believes that they can be known to exist by reason and not merely faith, as he gives a rational argument for their existence in the Meditations; and he clearly believes that they directly interact with material bodies and aren't just epiphenomena or something, as he identifies the pineal gland as the place where that interaction occurs.

You write that "99.99 percent religion centers around faith not repetition of proven facts". That betrays your bias toward this article: this is not an article solely about religion, but about free will in general, which is discussed in contexts of religion, philosophy, science, etc, as the lede clearly states. Religion may be all about faith, but philosophy is all about reason, and there are metaphysical libertarian philosophers who present well-known arguments purporting to show by reason that there are immaterial minds nondeterministically interacting with the material world. If there are notable people who believe that that is a futile venture and anything about the mind or soul can only be known via faith, then that's a notable opinion worth mentioning here; but we cannot state it as fact in the wiki's own voice, we have to identify it as the opinion of specific thinkers, and we cannot attribute that opinion as a defining characteristic of a given position so long as as there is any dissent about the matter within adherents to that position. Obviously not all metaphysical libertarians believe in a soul at all, as there is the physicalist variety; and even within the non-physicalist variety, there are some obvious examples like Descarte who think it's not just a matter of faith, but that reason can show it to be true.

You write that "Obviously it would be ridiculous to forbid practical use of metaphhysical libertarianism in an article devoted to metaphysical libertarianism." That is not obvious at all, and in fact would go against wikipedia policy. The methodology we are to use here is very clearly spelled out: we are to state what different notable thinkers believe, and explain their stated reasons for believing such, in the third person, not in the article's own voice, and clearly identifying it as their opinion, with sources to back that up. Also, once again you betray your bias toward this article: it is not an article devoted to metaphysical libertarianism, it is an article about free will in general, including all the different positions on it. But even in the article on metaphysical libertarianism, the view you are pushing is not defining of that entire position but is one sub-variety of it, and in either case, "practical use of metaphysical libertarian" as an editing methodology would be just as clearly against wiki policy; just as in an article about Christianity we cannot have the article state "God exists" and cite the Bible, even though that's what practicing Christians do when asked about God's existence. Because the article on Christianity must be written from a neutral point of view, not a solely Christian point of view; and even more so, the article on Religion in general must be written likewise. Similarly, the article on Metaphysical libertarianism must be written from a neutral point of view, not solely a metaphysical libertarian point of view; and even more so, this article on Free will must be written likewise.

I concur with your earlier comment that we need outside opinions on this again, by the way. --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:10, 10 December 2011 (UTC)

You set a peculiar limit to freedom of expression to exclude people who come to the conclusion that the spiritual domain is empty. Remember this is not really about the conclusion people arrive at, but about the way the conclusion is arrived at(by choice), and to what the conclusion applies (the agent / what does the choosing). The exclusion is kind of insulting to both those who believe in God, and those who don't believe in God. To the believers it implies, well you didn't have the alternative to say that the spiritual domain is empty, so you didn't really choose to believe in God, because you had no alternative. And the disbelievers are excluded altogether.

You can't say I am being prejudiced simply because I take account of religion. It is in the nature of metaphysical libertarianism that the conclusion about the agent is arrived at by free will, this is not a religious add on, it's just used a lot in religion.

I don't much have an objection to another category in which there are people like Descartes who believe they can make statements of objective fact about what's in the spiritual domain. --Syamsu (talk) 09:51, 12 December 2011 (UTC)

I don't see how I am "limiting expression" here; it's a simple matter of definition and categorization. If you take "spiritual" things and "non-physical" things to be the same (as you seem to), then someone who concludes that "the spiritual domain is empty" necessarily cannot be categorized as a non-physicalist metaphysical libertarian, because those by definition believe that something non-physical (i.e. spiritual) is involved. They might still be a physicalist metaphysical libertarian, but the paragraph we're debating is the one about non-physicalists. Even if I were saying that they weren't metaphysical libertarians, that wouldn't be the same as saying they weren't free: a metaphysical libertarian presumably believes that even the determinist freely chooses to believe in determinism. This is strictly about our third-person categorization of different kinds of belief; I'm saying nothing about whether or not any of these beliefs are held freely or not, but only things about what categories various beliefs fall into, regardless of how people end up holding them.

Either way, if you don't object to Descarte et al, then I think our dispute is settled? Unless you're saying that you're fine mentioning Descarte somewhere, but you don't want him called a metaphysical libertarian? Because he very clearly is, specifically of the non-physicalist kind. He may disagree with some other people in that category about the epistemological access to facts about minds/souls/whatever, but that just sub-divides the non-physicalist metaphysical libertarian category, which is how the article reads now. --Pfhorrest (talk) 18:07, 12 December 2011 (UTC)

I see no argument on your part with any merit, it remains bizarre that you limit freedom of expression to exclude feelings of emptiness. The sub-category in question here is really subjectivist and objectivist. Since metaphysical libertarians believe freedom is real, then not using freedom in coming to a conclusion about the agent makes Descartes less of a metaphysical libertarianist yes. I think my explanation focusing on the way the agent is known, rather than focusing on what the agent consists of (physical / non physical), is very much clearer to explain metaphysical libertarianism. --212.121.106.109 (talk) 09:06, 13 December 2011 (UTC)

Well.. let's just change it. It's really just a more clear explanation of metaphysical libertarianism. Noticeably you yourself did not get this free belief aspect of metaphysical libertarianism, so there seems to be good reason to explain it, because people don't get it.--Syamsu (talk) 08:57, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

I changed it. I intended it to be generically worded, so as to make more clear the logical structure. That freedom is first posited as real, and then the posited freedom is used to choose a belief about the agent. I think this is a fair, and clear enough representation of mainstream metaphysical libertarianism. I don't know where to place Descartes, I've seen him identified as a compatibilist. Cogito ergo sum could be interpreted as a subjective expression of self-identity as a thinker. Like a baker could say I bake therefore I am. In that case Descartes would fall into the category of subjective metaphysical libertarianism. To decide in which category Descartes falls it should be looked at how much emphasis he lays on faith in regards to God, and how much on evidence. I think Descartes lays most emphasis on evidence, and belongs in an objectivist category, not subjectivist. --Syamsu (talk) 17:16, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

I think you continue to be confused about where and how the appropriate place to make your point (which still needs citations I remind you, and you don't get to change the citation-needed date like that!). The paragraph you keep editing is talking about how some metaphysical libertarians believe that a non-physical agent nondeterministically intervenes in physical affairs, and others believe that the physical universe is just nondeterministic. This is solely a matter of categorizing the resultant beliefs by whether or not they believe there to be a non-physical agent. You are making a completely different point about why or how belief or disbelief in a non-physical agent is arrived at, and categorically claiming that everyone who believes there to be a non-physical agent arrives at that belief through faith or revelation, when that is clearly not the case.

To put it shortly in your own terms: the paragraph you keep editing is about physicalist vs non-physicalist, while you are talking about (in your terms) "objectivist vs subjectivist, and that is not the same distinction. Add another paragraph talking about that distinction if you want, but stop destroying the paragraph about non-physicalist view in your attempt to push this point.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 02:31, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Ok, I will try to phrase it in terms of objective subjective, that is more clear indeed. The "agent" is a part in every definition of free will. For example in determinist theories the agent is the brain. So the agent must also be entered into a description of metaphysical libertarianism.--Syamsu (talk) 15:20, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I agree that some sort of agency is involved in any theory of free will. The distinction in question (in the paragraph we've been fighting over) is between whether that agent is a physical thing or process, or a non-physical thing or process. You are then discussing another distinction about how and whether we can know if there is anything non-physical involved. The technical language for the difference between that distinction and this one is that the existing paragraph is discussing an ontological issue, and you're discussing an epistemological issue. If you want to develop that further, go right ahead; I left most of what you wrote in there, just separated it from what you had overwritten and reinstated that, so you can work on what you're trying to say all you want; but do note that it needs to be neutral and well-sourced.

(An aside: "Objective" vs "subjective" aren't very good terms for you to use either, unless you mean to say that Reid et al think that beliefs like "I have a soul" aren't things which are really, universally true or false, but that they're just "true for you" or "true for me"; so that, say, if you introspect or use your faith or whatever and find that you have a soul, and I do the same and find that you do not have a soul, we're both equally right. That's what a 'subjective fact' would be. If you believe that you have a soul, and that you are correct in that belief, even if you can't prove it, but if I think you have no soul then I am wrong, because you really do -- then you believe it is an objective fact, albeit maybe an unprovable one, that you have a soul).

(I also want to check for clarity here: you recognize that this physical/non-physical distinction is also a different one from the determinist/libertarian one, right? There are libertarians who believe that free will is a product of physical indeterminacy, e.g. quantum mechanical effects, and do not believe in non-physical substances being the seat of agency; and these people are not compatibilists either, because they think that if the physical universe was determinate, free will would be impossible. They are physicalists but not determinists. You get that, right? I just want to be sure.) --Pfhorrest (talk) 17:12, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

I aim to use the word subjective broadly as in choosing what the agent is, creating informtion in the process, and objectivity as basicly meaning transferring or copying information. But then I will state it in a generic way that covers both Reid and Ockhams view. Obviously one may still contest different subjective opinions. One who subjectively comes to a conclusion of emptiness may be subjectively accused of being hateful, so to say the spirit in which they arrived at the conclusion of emptiness was hateful. And then in turn this judgement on a judgement may be judged, and so on, until the final judgement :)--Syamsu (talk) 20:00, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Edition on the Physics sub-section of the article: Unfair appeal to authority avoidance

I eliminated the last sentence of the Physics sub-section. I believe it was an unfair appeal to authority because it could be read only as "According to modern physics"... and had no citations, and it was only after the commentary on a statement by Stephen Hawkings... I believe is unfair and unjustified to say "according to modern physics"... Physics is what Physicist practices and they need not to be in agreement when it comes to free-will discussions, one that is not completely in their domain. Since no citation was given directly, the sentence could be cause of bias... No other change was made on the article... I suspect of some bias towards the idea that free-will do not exist, but I have refrained to do all changes myself. Please. objectivity is part of any real encyclopedia. Let's foster it. The free-will debate is a genuine and on-going one, it hasn't be resolved. — Preceding unsigned comment added by MLearry (talk • contribs) 03:07, 18 August 2011 (UTC)

Excellent catch: you are absolutely correct that we should not represent Hawking's views as "modern physics". That was surely too sweeping a claim. I was surprised, however, to see that you deleted the entire reference to Hawking instead of making the relevant change. Accordingly, I have brought back those details, but made it more clear that Wikipedia is summarizing the views of this one man - without claiming he represents all of physics.

Actually it would be very interesting if there were any data on what physicists think of the plausibility of the different types of free will. I know of no such research, unfortunately.-Tesseract²(talk) 04:24, 18 August 2011 (UTC)

Schrodinger on Free Will

I changed the possibly ambiguous word "consensus" (because "scientific consensus" would not fit there) with "unanimity".

Besides that, I mostly just brought back the clarifying details about Schrodinger's position. Before those edits, the article called his book an essay, but also had no link to the actual book for those who want to read more. Not just those two small improvements were lost in a recent global undoing, however.

If we are going to mention Schrodinger on the topic of free will, we must clarify that he believed in a sort of universally pervasive, singular consciousness. The article missed this main belief of Schrodinger's by only alluding to "certain convictions of conscious experience". I have therefore mentioned this collective unconscious, and made it clear that - in his book - Shrodinger is explicit about why he is opting away from certain alternatives (e.g. souls). Perhaps most importantly, I made it more clear that Shrodinger's belief in libertarian free will is founded on what he calls "incontrovertible direct experience". That is very important and relevant.

Now that we have this section for that paragraph, perhaps we could discuss any further overhauls to it here? -Tesseract²(talk) 13:40, 3 October 2011 (UTC)

Hi Tesseract2,

1) The essay, "What is Life" was originally composed and delivered as a lecture, and not in book form. It is frequently published in collected works volumes, or along with a second essay by Schrödinger "Mind and Matter." Sometimes it's published on its own, and it's a trivial matter, really, what we call it, but technically it was not written as a book, just an essay.

2) I've read this essay many times, and we seem to have taken away partially different impressions. To limit OR / individual interpretation, perhaps we could agree on a version that maximizes Schrödinger's own words and minimizes interpretation. As a note, I find your interpretation interesting, and it may well be right about Schrödinger, but his full metaphysical views are quite complex and difficult to distill in summary, so I would also favor limiting the discussion to free will specifically, as that is the topic of the article.

Jj1236 (talk) 22:27, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

I'm glad we are talking. I agree that we should minimize our own interpretation (worst case I would be open to secondary sources pointing out anywhere I may have missed the mark - or you can just show me text that I didn't give due weight).

I suppose I will see where we diverge in interpretation. My most recent edit, I believe, reflects a bit more of the flow of logic Schrödinger seemed to present. I grant that his rejection of souls may not be crucial in the article here, but I think the following is also of dubious relevance: "he concludes "...'I' -am the person, if any, who controls the 'motion of the atoms' according to the Laws of Nature." He explains this position on free will by appealing to a notion of self that is emergent from the entire collection of atoms in his body, along with certain convictions of conscious experience. " This is confusing because his use of the word "I" in this passage is very nuanced. I do not think that is the best quote. I think we could really just get rid of all that. Especially considering he has started brainstorming on consciousness not, as you say should be our focus, free will. Free will itself is intuitively and obviously real to him as the article mentions just before that part.-Tesseract²(talk) 03:05, 6 October 2011 (UTC)

Teseract2, From my perspective, it seems like we agree about the most important details and have some minor differences about surrounding context.

Oversimplifying the relevance of Schrödinger's quote in question would be, "I control my body," which might be the clearest endorsement of free will. But you are right that the meanings in the actual quote are very nuanced. I favor putting the original text in the article as a quotation because it is carefully worded in a way that implies this nuance. For example, Schrödinger put "I" in quotes himself to alert the reader that there is more in the background, and that seems fine and fair to me.

On a very different topic, do you think the section on Hawking should discuss his various positions about time travel? At one point, he endorsed the possibility, and more recently retracted it. This could impact directly on questions of free will, or it could just be ungrounded speculation by Hawking. There's a curious meta-point about questioning whether physicists are authorities on philosophical topics, but that full discussion would be too much here. Perhaps highlighting the lack of unanimity safeguards against attributing too much authority to any one physicist, and that seems useful to me, even if going into all the details about each physicists' views could weigh down the discussion with too much detail.

Jj1236 (talk) 05:15, 11 October 2011 (UTC)

The article presently discusses Hawking's more explicit lines of reasoning about free will. I really do not think we should mention Hawking's views on time travel unless he was explaining how they have implications for free will. Even then, however, that would be especially "speculative" - not to mention the fact that you say he retracted those views. I think the Hawking part is good for now. It can get too easy to weight down an article.

I see your point, that the quotes around "I" alluding to nuance. But actually I think the article still goes too much into Schrodinger's general views. To keep directly on the topic of free will, I think the article could afford to say simply:
Erwin Schrödinger, a nobel laureate in physics and one of the founders of quantum mechanics, came to a different conclusion than Hawking. Near the end of his essay titled "What Is Life?" he says that there is "incontrovertible direct experience" that we have free will. Contrasting the views of Hawking and Schrödinger, it is clear that even among eminent physicists there is not unanimity regarding free will.

Let me know what you think.-Tesseract²(talk) 03:37, 14 October 2011 (UTC)

Material on free will and Epiphenominalism should be added to this article.

Material on free will and Epiphenominalism should be added to this article. Since its a featured article, I don't want to be WP:BOLD without talk page discussion first. Here is the upshot on the late metaphysician Yost of UCLA's discussion of free will in the context of discussing epiphenomenalism. Free will is an illusion because the mental world is an epiphenomenon of the physical world. If the mental world is an epiphenomenon of the physical world, then events in the physical world, such as brain events, can cause effects in both the physical world and the mental world, such as brain events and mental effects, but events in the mental world cannot cause events in the physical world. Therefore, under epiphenomenalism, free will is just an illusion. If something like this is acceptable by consensus to add to this featured article, then I will go track sources for it an write it in plainer English. PPdd (talk) 20:54, 25 December 2011 (UTC)

Sounds noteworthy to me. I'd probably add it as a subsection of "Other views". I think the "...as a pragmatically useful concept" section should be moved there too, and I will do so in a moment. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:22, 25 December 2011 (UTC)

There is now a section on "Free will as an illusion" as a result of my organization of the "Other views" section. I think your suggested addition would fit well there. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:06, 25 December 2011 (UTC)

The Joke

Since Libet's findings started to trickle out --- there was a lot of nonsense about our free will...

What?!? My free will is useless??? Here my friend - take it and tell me what to do...

Now, how could I give up something I did not have???? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 125.255.7.10 (talk) 06:41, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

More of a riddle than a joke, no? And the talk page is not really the place for either...

Still, I would say you can't. You can't give something you do not have. One scenario is where you could be falling for an illusion, and you don't have free will, and so you're giving your friend nothing. Or, at least not what you think you're giving her. One more scenario I can think of is where you are actually giving something up.

Actually the neuroscience of free will page talks about these issues. Philosophers use 'free will' to mean something like "a decision made free of coercion". Laypeople tend to use 'free will' to imagine something like a dualistic, magical, contra-causal, first-cause sort of thing. That is the one that Libet's experiments challenge - but most philosophers don't talk about free will that way anymore (apparently).-Tesseract²(talk) 20:04, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

I don't think it's accurate to say that most philosophers categorically take free will to be anything in particular. There was a time in most of the Modern era when most philosophers agreed that free will was not the dualist-magical-contra-causal-first-cause sort of thing, but even then they disagreed amongst each other about what it actually was. Some would have your will free so long as you are not physically restrained (e.g. in chains). Others would, as you say, have your will free so long as you are not socially coerced (e.g. at gunpoint). More recently, some would have your will free so long as you are not psychologically compelled (e.g. phobic). But also recently, some have rehabilitated the dualist-magical-contra-causal-first-cause sort of thing in philosophical circles, too. So there's not really, and hasn't ever been, any real consensus on the matter. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:50, 14 January 2012 (UTC)

Philosophers disagree over these words "free will", as always. I am referring to Professor Al Mele in the nature article saying that most philosophers talking about these matters are at least materialistic; that using free will to mean something magical would indeed be a "revival" because most philosophers don't use it that way - the way laypeople might tend to. I am saying yes, we agree.-Tesseract²(talk) 15:27, 24 January 2012 (UTC)

Let me add a note that this section was started by an indef-blocked editor, and additional material was added to it that looked totally incomprehensible to me, so I removed it. The IP is currently under a 72-hour block. Looie496 (talk) 18:27, 24 January 2012 (UTC)