Talk:Instrumentalism

Not much information about instrumentalism

The article seems to contain more information about what the critics of instrumentalism had to say than information about instrumentalism itself. I think a new/separate section explaining the concepts important to instrumentalism, and perhaps a list of well-known instrumentalists, would be helpful. I agree with User:Blainster, the differences between the three is subtle, and fleshing out more about instrumentalism would help clarify those differences.

Charlesreid1 (talk) 07:41, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

A good starting point: http://www.google.com/search?q=instrumentalism+science&tbs=bks%3A1 Kmarinas86 (Expert Sectioneer of Wikipedia) ^{19+9+14 + karma = 19+9+14 + talk = 86} 02:01, 16 December 2010 (UTC)

Philosophic hairsplitting?

Not being a professionally trained philosopher, I am having a difficult time finding more than a paper thickness of difference betweeen instrumentalism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism, other than the deployment of the terms by thinkers in different fields. I would appreciate a clearer differentiation, or alternatively, is there an extraordinary amount of effort being expended to build academic reputations by attempts to stake out their own positions (referring to the scholars, not the Wiki editors, of course!). This is not to say that the concepts are not complex, just that there seems to be more overlap among, than separation between them. --Blainster 18:12, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Pragmatic Epistemology considers that things can be true. Instrumentalisme rejects the concept of truth. Theories are useful or not. Utilitarianism is a normative concept. It argues that things are right or wrong. Instrumentalisme does not have anything to do with right and wrong. 76.27.192.231 (talk) 19:45, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Functions, Not Black boxes

"Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable, and that they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions." I could be wrong, but black boxes involve unknown transformations by definition, whereas theories themselves are explicit & thus given data, we know why it predicts what it does. As further proof, we can manually change a theory at any time. : Waxwings 23:07, 24 July 2005 (UTC)

The inside of a black box is not necessarily unknown. In this case, the term black box is used to mean that the inner workings of the theory are unimportant. 76.27.192.231 (talk) 19:40, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Ambiguous sentence

The sentence quoted above may not say what is intended. Does instrumentalism deny that theories should be treated like a black box? I think this sentence should read "Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable; rather, it suggests they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions."

Popper is not an instrumentalist

...and anyone who's read his Conjectures and Refutations should know this, since he directly attacks instrumentalism in more than one place. He is quite explicit on this point, so I have no idea why he's included in this article.

Then you should edit the article to reflect that. Providing citations would also be helpful.--droptone 22:00, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

Dear editors, please refer to Popper's Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge included in Conjectures and Refutations (Chapter 3). In this paper he presents 3 different positions: and it is quite clear that his position is neither instrumentalism nor essentialism. Jackbars 20:31, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

Well OK, I set that straight. (Stuck out like a sore thumb to me too, Popper distances himself from instrumentalism so often.) --_Felix 213.122.64.118 (talk) 11:45, 27 November 2008 (UTC)

O and T terms

Whom among the instrumentalitst makes this distinction between O and T? What is problematic is that what is meant by 'meaning' is unclear. I am a gene but my meaning (not any meaning?) cannot be derived from observation so I am a theoretical entity, likewise I am Simon (the one writing this remark) but yet my meaning cannot be derived from observation, so am I likewise a theoretical construct? I can directly experience acidity though I might use a more precise theory to define it, the same with the quality red...

Re: O & T terms

The analysis given in the article is flawed. Where it states:

"... Observation statements (O-statements) have their meaning fixed by observable truth conditions, e.g. "the litmus paper is "red", whilst observation terms (O-terms) have their meaning fixed by their referring to observable things or properties, e.g. "red". Theoretical statements (T-statements) have their meaning fixed by their function within a theory and aren't truth evaluable, e.g. "the solution is acidic", whilst theoretical terms (T-terms) have their meaning fixed by their systematic function within a theory and don't refer to any observable thing or property, e.g. "acidic". Though you may think that "acidic" refers to a real property in an object, the meaning of the term can only be explained by reference to a theory about acidity, in contrast to "red", which is a property you can observe. ..."

Both "red" and "acidic" are matters of perception and, therefore, equally subjective. To someone who is color blind or otherwise impaired, the litmus paper is not red. Contrarily, we can taste for acidity; and our taste-sense is as valid for determining properties as is sight. They are just different senses with which to "observe". From sensory organ to brain to interpretation a number of things happen, making each of these properties subject to what we "know" or have learned of our environment. Every individual having normal eye-sight and brain function sees an object of color red, and learns through rote that others consistently identify and register the same object as "red" as he does. But, we have no means of knowing perfectly that they see the color red as the same precise hue. How are we to know that the person with whom we agree it is red is not seeing a color that to us might by a little more cyan or magenta? Through long experience, each person registers his "red" as uniquely red, just as you register yours; the only consistency being that you register and label the same objects as having the same color - whatever its true color may be. Logically we know that however we interpret the color it must be have the same "true" color to everyone, regardless of personal interpretation. We analyze and determine no further than this because it is sufficient that we all recognize color consistently.

While the example given is flawed, the underlying idea still has some merit. Accepting both of these forms of "observation" as equally valid, what other property might constitute an un-observable statement or term (i.e., "theoretical"). An unobservable term is one we cannot observe directly or indirectly because we either lack the necessary sensory apparatus or for which there is no phenomenon capable of being sensed. Heat is detectible by humans but not temperature, which is only a measure of heat. Yet, humans can and do estimate temperature over a very limited range. This is a learned skill obtained from frequent reference to thermometers and "remembering" the relative sensation of heat correspondsing to a given temperature. Until the concept of temperature was first postulated and a measurement devised, the best people could say of heat was an object was either hot, cold or indifferent. Thus, temperature is extrinsic rather than intrinsic, and is unobservable only by indirect detection. There are other properties that are still less observable (e.g., entropy) and are normally detected as estimates made by long or painstaking observation. However, do these constitute "theoretical" properties or real ones. Using the same measuring apparatus, we get consistent results which are "observable", moving many extrinsic properties from the realm of theoretical to observable; with our senses extended through inventive means.

Self, good, cognition, and temperment, are a few more likely properties with which to illustrate this idea regarding the 'evaluability of truth', or, so called, 'subjective truth'. We all accept these terms as having some kind of validity, yet are hard pressed to verify them as measureable properties. I can only prove self and cognition to myself; all others having to take my word for it I have such properties. Similarly, all things we deem good are not invariably or universally so, but may only be good in some context of consensus or personal gratification. For example, an impulse to charity is generally considered a positive good, but not if it creates a permanent and burdensome condition of dependence. Sexual desire may feel "good" to the person having it, yet may feel threatening to others or disruptive to the society in which he resides when expressed.

When all means of detection and proof are exhausted, we fall back on faith. Faith is an acceptance that allows us to operate as though a truth were determined that is, otherwise, indeterminable. Faith is not the same as subjective truth, because the one enables us to operate in a consistent manner, where the other denies consistency is possible. There are many things we do and accomplish without ever taking stock of the reality underlying our decisions to act. We get into cars and airplanes having faith the brakes won't fail or airframe fracture; yet these are real possibilities. We investigate the universe in which we live and hypothesize possible explanations for everything we can see or conceive relying on base assumptions we know can never be proved or disproved. Ultimately, we have faith either in our theories or in something beyond our limited abilities of observation and conception. Either way, we are convinced of their truth.

John Dewey was wrong to see politics as "just" a means to an end. Moreover, if it was just a means, then which means should not have mattered so much to Dewey as results. Yet, Dewey strongly advocated a particular political philosophy over all others, one that was at odds with the prevailing political philosophy in which he operated. This means he had to start his program by supplanting the prevailing philosophy to reach his ends. It takes far more work to achieve an objective when you first have to replace an entire system and culture before you can make an inroad. Yet that is exactly what Dewey did.

Dewey was a socialist with a decidedly socialist agenda. The United States in which he operated was predominently geared toward the individual and recognized the ability and right of individuals to fend for ourselves. Dewey felt the individual was over emphasized, and his activism helped promote the movement that ultimately stigmatized individualism while codifying cultural conformity (regardless of his intent). The resulting culture is less resilient and robust than the one preceding it, as demonstrated by its vulnerability and inability to operate outside of collectivized norms wherever the norms breakdown. Ends over means tend to be myoptic, often with forseeable results. Emphasizing ends deemphasizes any system of values that serve as a guage for those ends or of the means to accomplish them. Dewey, himself, was a moral man, yet the consequence of his philosophy was to disconnect ends from means in the minds of those who followed after. For all Dewey's intellect (and it was considerable), he did not have sufficient forsight or willingness to determine wither he would take us.

Instrumentalism in 2009

I need(ed) to get a good reference or two for "Instrumentalism"; as usual I looked up Wikipedia. Now I see that the article is a little bit "unclear". This will not do! It is said (?) that the "World of Western Science" today is essentially instrumentalist! That is what I believe to be true... So! I wonder just how one might be able to add to or improve this article. Where would one start? Currently, the article is dominated by the "Critics" section. That doesn't look good. I wonder what sources I ought to use (for references) in order to "ground" a rewrite? --Михал Орела (talk) 20:06, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

One way in which to make some sort of progress (without digging a bigger hole of disputation) might be to (re-)define Instrumentalism directly in the article. I am thinking of beginning with the simple idea of "instrument" and its uses: musical instrument, scientific instrument, writing instrument, and so on.

• the flute is a musical instrument; it does not play music by itself. There is an agent that uses the instrument to produce the music...
• the telescope is one of the more interesting scientific instruments of early days (Galileo) which was instrumental (a deliberate reuse...) in showing us how things are in the sky...
• the writing instrument that usually springs to mind is the pen (and with it the saying that it is mightier than the sword). The key thing about the pen as instrument is that it produces writing which is not the same thing as speaking...

So, the idea is that instrumentalism is all about the use of instruments to perceive/create/understand reality... Philosophically, one might then deduce that everything we know can only be perceived by use of instrument. Is that the story? I will look to see how this view might be supported directly (by strong reference to sources). --Михал Орела (talk) 20:32, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Another way in which to "update" Instrumentalism for 2009 might be to pair it with things like Education, Health, Religion, Psychology, and so on. And then one might consider how deeply embedded the philosophy is "in certain parts of the world"? For example, in Education (specifically that part usually denoted by "Teaching and Learning") assessment plays a major role. Searching in the "usual" way

• instrumentalism+teaching+learning

brings up the text (via Google Books, of course) "Teaching Technology", edited by Frank Banks, Open University, Routledge, 1994. ISBN 0415102545, 9780415102544. 5 general features of Instrumentalism are listed (from Merson 1980, p17).

A third way might be the formulation of the hypothesis (and subsequent testing thereof) that Instrumentalism already existed (in practice) before Dewey. --Михал Орела (talk) 18:41, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Technocratic Instrumentalism

Now I have stumbled across "an active topic" in 2009 — "Technocratic Instrumentalism". So what exactly is this? A quick search throws up some surprises:

• "When Is It Unconstitutional to Call Nonsense Nonsense?" Comment by Chip Poirot, May 5, 2009 6:10 PM
• "The Ideology of SS Bureaucrats L. M. Stallbaumer-Beishline. Review of Allen, Michael Thad, The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps. H-German, H-Net Reviews. July, 2003.

--Михал Орела (talk) 13:39, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

John Dewey and Instrumentalism

A different approach to developing the main article might be to examine the first two paragraphs of the existing article in "forensic detail".

In the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view that concepts and theories are useful instruments whose worth is measured not by whether the concepts and theories are true or false (or correctly depict reality), but by how effective they are in explaining and predicting phenomena.

Instrumentalism relates closely to pragmatism, especially in the work of John Dewey and his student Addison Webster Moore. This methodological viewpoint often contrasts with scientific realism, which defines theories as specially being more or less true. However, instrumentalism is more of a pragmatic approach to science, information and theories than an ontological statement. Often instrumentalists (like pragmatists) have been accused of being relativists, even though many instrumentalists are also believers in sturdy objective realism.

To ground the assertion that "Instrumentalism relates closely to pragmatism" one might begin by considering the works of Dewey, such as

• Democracy and Education John Dewey

Since the text is fully searchable, it is easy to see that the phrase "instrumenalism" does not occur. However, both instrument and instrumentality occur frequently. If we look carefully at the use of the phrase "instrumentalities" will we then be in a position to grasp "Instrumentalism"? --Михал Орела (talk) 14:10, 17 June 2009 (UTC)

"When all means of detection and proof are exhausted, we fall back on faith"

No, not quite, I think. We fall back on proceeding 'as if' our axioms were, indeed, fact. The difference between religious faith and true philosophical acuity, to me, is that the philosopher knows he doesn't know, but proceeds as if he does, whereas the religious faithful, believes that he does know, because he is unable to proceed in uncertainty.

In essence, this also provides the dividing criterion between those who are true Instrumentalists, and those who are at heart Realists.

Realists assume ultimately, or have faith, that their models are close to reality. Instrumentalists point out that not only is there no proof that this is so, but there never ever can be. They merely note that, in order to proceed, it is necessary to assume for the purposes of analysis that there is at least some correlation between the model, and some unspecified reality. But they are fully aware of the assumptions, I think.

So: A Realist thinks he knows, and proceeds as if he does.
An Instrumentalist knows he doesn't know, but proceeds as if he does.
A Pragmatist, doesn't know if he knows or not, but proceeds with what simply works.
A Relativist is a more general case of an Instrumentalist.

This also counters the proposition that an Instrumentalist rejects the concept Truth, No, he doesn't reject the concept of Truth. How can one do that? The concept exists all right. He merely notes it as an unattainable goal. Like infinity. Its useful, you just cant walk there. The true instrumentalist position is more like Wittgenstein's 'whatever is the case' Its not that there is no case, its just that its undecidable by the use of abstract modelling. I.e. the construction of theoretical models that map it into entities with which we can dicker.

An instrumentalist that rejected the concept of Truth, would be an Idealist. Its all in the mind. The Instrumentalist surely says most of it is in the mind, but that doesn't mean something is not.

The Instrumentalist proceeds as if there is a Truth, he just accepts the fact that what he does, in no way clarifies, or ever can clarify, exactly what it is. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.89.132.226 (talk) 08:47, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

--The Natural Philosopher, posting anonymously in an idle moment —Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.89.132.226 (talk) 08:30, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Pragmaticism and Instrumentalism

I gave a short summary of a reference on pragmaticism and instrumentalism. In fact pragmaticism rejected instrumentalism from the start.

I removed the previous paragraph on pragmaticism and instrumentalism, which was unsourced and seemingly erroneous. If Dewey did have a bad student writing badly about instrumentalism, then there should be a precise citation establishing the notability of that student and describing the statements precisely.

I would ask that a philosopher check the definition of instrumentalism, which seems nonstandard to me. ThanksKiefer.Wolfowitz (talk) 23:23, 12 June 2010 (UTC)

Instrumentalism update 2011

I have made some small additions to this page and removed the disputed banner. Funnily enough, there is much useful information on the discussion pages. I am not a regular wiki editor, but I have removed the "disputed" tag, as I don't see the relevance any more. If you want me to add more to this page I will. Instrumentalism has a long history from Plato to the Post-Kuhn generation. I think the context of Pierce/Pragmatism piece is slightly misplaced, but that'll do for my edit today. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jonathan.mark.lingard (talk • contribs) 06:46, 23 January 2011 (UTC)