Talk:Operation Nickel Grass

WikiProject Military history

(Rated Start-Class)

This article is within the scope of the Military history WikiProject. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see a list of open tasks. To use this banner, please see the full instructions. Start This article has been rated as Start-Class on the quality scale. Additional information... This article has been checked against the following criteria for B-Class status: Referencing and citation: not checked Coverage and accuracy: not checked Structure: not checked Grammar: not checked Supporting materials: not checked To fill out this checklist, please the following to the template call: | B1 <!-- Referencing and citations --> = y/n | B2 <!-- Coverage and accuracy --> = y/n | B3 <!-- Structure --> = y/n | B4 <!-- Grammar and style --> = y/n | B5 <!-- Supporting materials --> = y/n Associated task forces (general topics): Military aviation task force Associated task forces (nations and regions): Middle Eastern military history task force United States military history task force

Chronological problems with Operation Babylift Reference

Another Air Force decision was vindicated by Nickel Grass however; the C-5 Galaxy purchase. Since their introduction in 1970, the C-5 had been plagued by problems, not least of which was the deadly crash of a C-5 during Operation Babylift in which half the 300 onboard died. The Air Force claimed to have rectified the problems, but the C-5 was still viewed by the press and public as a monstrously expensive failure. During Nickel Grass, C-5s carried 48% of the total cargo in only 145 of the 567 total missions.

This has some chronological problems. I really don't know anythign about th C-5 galaxy or its problems but the operation babylift hapened two years after operation nickel grass so it doesn;t flow very well that Operation Nickel Grass built up support for the C-5 Galaxy aircraft when the diaster didn't happen until two years after the act that built up its reputation.

Bah! That's my fault. None of the references I used specifically cited Operation Babylift, I just identified that from my memory as one of the significant failures of the C-5. I'll fix the article up. -Lommer | ^talk 22:18, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

adequate number of refs?

I say there are, plus the style shows it was written AGF back when WP regs weren't so strict. Yes at some level it needs to be grandfathered in, but that is NO JUSTIFICATION for labelling it as open to challenge and subject to deletion. Maybe those who want to "cut it back" should spend their time finding the ONE OR TWO more cites that it perhaps needs, and less time trying to work with the admins to "make sure the tag sticks" 72.0.180.2 (talk) 02:34, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

Exaggerated effect of Nickel Grass

This article (and most on the subject) seems to greatly overstate the military (as opposed to political) value of Nickel Grass. By the time the operation was underway the Egyptians were in the process of shooting their bolt in the Sinai; the Syrians had already done so almost a week earlier in the Golan Heights.63.3.21.129 (talk) 05:25, 21 December 2009 (UTC)

Operation Nickel Grass was extremely important in that war, so how is this allegedly "exaggerated"?! Israel was getting desperate enough before this huge US military airlift, that the Israelis had threatened to the US that they would consider using their nuclear weapons against the Arab side (specifically Cairo, Egypt). Along with the US being Israel's main ally, the US wanted to prevent the use of an Israeli nuclear weapon during the war so the US did Operation Nickel Grass which affectly completely replenished and resupplied the previously depleted Israeli conventional military. --Historylover4 (talk) 01:17, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

The original comment says only that the purely military value (not political value) of Nickel Grass is overstated and nothing you have cited really refutes that.172.190.120.115 (talk) 00:52, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

I don't know how it can be argued that the military value of Operation Nickel Grass can be said to be allegedly "overstated"; whole books have been written on the topic with titles calling Operation Nickel Grass: "the airlift that saved Israel" and such. Again this US airlift to Israel just about completely resupplied the extremely depleted conventional Israeli military (which is again why Israel was considering using its nuclear weapons that it had obtained with French and British help in the 1950s and 1960s). --Historylover4 (talk) 23:48, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

I would not say military aspects are exaggerated, but I certainly note that political aspects are insufficiently included.CasualObserver'48 (talk) 01:52, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Lets use something wonderful called "critical thinking". The first large batches of aid arrived on the evening of Oct. 14 per this article. By that time (if you need, look at the main Yom Kippur War article), Israel had beaten off the Syrian attack and was invading Syrian territory, and had crashed the Egyptian attack at Battle of the Sinai. And if you examine the last article, you'll see furthermore that the Egyptian command actually opposed advancing since they had no air cover (something they would have still lacked, aid or not). i.e. Syria was busy defending itself, and Egypt could not advance (and being even less able to after losing that battle). And if you look at the article you'll find this: "By then, however, Israel was already winning the war[reference to Rabinovich]". Nor were Israeli supplies "extremely depleted": "while the American airlift of supplies did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely".[Rabinovich again in the Yom Kippur War article]".

So in our alternative Yom Kippur War with no aid, Israel maybe would have not crossed the canal and would have had a worse outlook post-war, but that's a bit far from being a threat to Israel's existence. Maybe (but that's speculation) Egypt and Syria would have tried to keep the war on longer to wear on Israel (can we be sure of this? How much did attrition effect them? Would the U.S. have stopped the war or given aid in this case?), but that's still a bit far from "threat to Israel's existence".

Now, we do know that Israel threatened to get nuclear, but that was earlier under a different circumstance. Regardless of Israel's motives then, by the time aid actually arrived we can surmise Israel was not in danger of elimination (or at the very least, that conclusion would need some basis and cites no one has bothered to supply). Therefor, calling the operation "the airlift that saved Israel" is highly dubious at best. 79.182.3.211 (talk) 01:12, 6 October 2010 (UTC)

The real crux of the matter is that too many people take the Israeli nuclear threat at face value, rather than as a (very) high-stakes bluff that ultimately worked. Indeed, the purported willingness of Israel to use nuclear weapons as a last resort continues to this day to serve Israeli strategic interests. What people tend not to realize is that, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (arguably) excepted, nuclear weapons have no real military value; they exist solely as a threat to world order, as something to be avoided at all costs. As such, they do have enormous, if limited, political value for those that possess them. Israel had them and made known that they could use them, the United States, fearful of what the Soviet and worldwide response to such an attack would be, made a choice to do what it took to avoid an Israeli nuclear response, however remote the actual possibility was of such an attack. It is hard believe that Israel, a nation with all of one ally in the world in 1973, would take the only decision that could reduce that number to zero and make itself the ultimate global pariah.172.190.138.108 (talk) 04:16, 4 August 2010 (UTC)