Talk:Anthropic principle

"Selection Effects"

I was reading the intro and I came upon this sentence, "Within the scientific community the usual approach is to invoke selection effects and to hypothesize an ensemble of alternate universes, in which case that which can be observed is subject to an anthropic bias." I'm kind of unclear on what sense the term "selection effects" is being used. Does this mean that scientists believe that those who posit the anthropic principal are cherry picking their figures so as to make it seem like various constants need to be the way they are for life to emerge; or does it mean that, since we only have ourselves one example of intelligent life, ourselves, our observations are biased; or some other third thing. This issue is, I'm sure, explored in the body of the article itself, but still...I think this could be a bit clearer. Corbmobile (talk) 01:56, 21 September 2009 (UTC)

Excellent question. I wonder why it was willfully ignored, and yet somebody decided to make the revision anyway? I have returned the page to resemble something more like what it was before what appears to be fanatics decided to make up their own ideas about it. island001 (talk) 16:05, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

So Island001, check out [1] . What fanatics do you mean? Physicists? 70.109.186.143 (talk) 02:01, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

What are you babbling about? Answer the question, or I start modifying the page without any discussion, and I can tell you that misrepresenting the citation as being that of a physicist, when, in reality, it is the ill-considered opinion of one lame FiLOsiFeR... doesn't help your credibility as being anything less than a truth spinning fanatic. Do you know any physics at all, Mr. Anonymous chicken, Nathan Brazil? It isn't like I didn't give you plenty of opportunity to prevent this from happening in the comments section of; "In reference to 'Failed science'", and it isn't like I have to justify anything that I've done here either, since the question has been willfully ignored for two years. The ball is in your court, sonny, and you had better start putting up or shutting up, fast. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Island001 (talk • contribs) 13:26, 29 July 2011 (UTC)

Far too many unsupported generalizations and POV statements

Currently, much of the article reads like an essay written with the goal of 'debunking' the anthropic principle, and it makes numerous unsourced generalizations towards this end. For instance, the current concluding sentence of the intro states: "Those who invoke the anthropic principle often invoke multiple universes or an intelligent designer, both controversial and criticised for being untestable and therefore outside the purview of accepted science." I have never seen a serious physicist or cosmologist invoking an intelligent designer in this way - in fact, the weak anthropic principle is a refutation of the arguments for intelligent design! Throughout the article, there is a tendency to give the 'last word' or summary to those making statements critical of the anthropic principle in various forms, often in a rather strawman-type way. Many of the arguments against various forms of the anthropic principle are addressed and answered in Barrow & Tipler's book, but these are mostly omitted from the article. For instance, Barrow and Tipler claim, in contradiction to the editorial assertion in the article, that the Weak Anthropic Principle indeed can be used to make testable predictions, and they give several examples, both historical and contemporary. Ben Kidwell (talk) 11:59, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Ben, Owen Gingerich and Freeman Dyson are both serious physicists/astronomers that have written something about "design" (Gingerich likes to say "small 'i', small 'd'" and distances himself from the Discovery Institute crowd). And it is completely true, in my opinion, that the WAP is used as "a refutation of the arguments for intelligent design". But I have heard theists try to use it as an argument for the existence of the divine in proto-nature. I don't get that argument either. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 22:00, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Yes, there seems to be a bit of a problem with a US-centric view. I don't believe that creationist variants of the anthropic principle are worth much attention from a global point of view. It would be nice if there was a way of splitting the article into a discussion of the genuine anthropic principle and its abuse by creationists. This might also solve the terminological problems introduced by the creationist re-definition of the terms WAP and SAP.

From a global POV this entire article is a massive breach of WP:UNDUE, by making the creationist redefinitions look much more significant than they are outside the US. A physics student from Germany, say, doesn't come to this article to read debunking of creationist nonsense in every single section. They come here to read about the real anthropic principle, which is tautological and far from discredited. But by talking about the Barrow & Tipler bullshit in every second paragraph the reader gets the impression that there is something wrong with the real (original) anthropic principle.

I guess the article's sorry state is due to some scientifically minded editors in the US not having heard of the term "anthropic principle" outside the creationism debate. Hans Adler 13:00, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Hans and Ben, this is very interesting. I didn't think the global point of view would be different from the US point of view in something like this. I have read brief overviews of this in different books, and have not looked into it deeply. But I think it is worth looking into. I can see your point about how this article is framed, and that the real principle is outside of this "debate" (framework). Why not tag it WP:UNDUE, and begin rewriting in a more objective frame of reference.

By the way, the brief overviews that I have read did not frame this in relation to creationism at all. So, I was surprised by the last sentence of the introduction. I am sure muliple universes are not outside the purview of accepted science. I think multple 'verses are considered to be very much within the purview of accepted cosomological science. Then to equate this with "intelligent design" - well I never heard of such a relationship before this article. After saying that I have to agree that this article is POV. Steve Quinn (formerly Ti-30X) (talk) 07:02, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

OK, I went ahead and tagged it as NPOV. The POV tag looked a little too strong, at the moment. Steve Quinn (formerly Ti-30X) (talk) 07:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

I haven't done anything significant with this article (I think I fixed a typo or the like), but I definitely agree with some above editors that the writing is far too tortured to discuss trite (and US-centric) creationist misuse of the concept. I am personally, for example, skeptical about the real "take away value" of the anthropic principle, but this skepticism is about philosophy of science not about some simple misunderstanding of the term. In other words, while I cannot promise I'll get around to it myself, I would strongly encourage some thorough rewriting of the article. Maybe spin off the minor US creationist silliness into one section, but leave the rest of the article to discuss the actual conceptual move by physicists. I'm not sure, however, that NPOV is precisely the way to characterize the problems, it's more about focus and clarity. But the need for rewriting remains in any case. LotLE×talk 08:50, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

It is really hard to fix the intro and article without splitting the weak AP off. And it cannot be split up because then some zealots would merge it again under the guise of removing irrelevant pages and redundancy. From what Lulu has been saying, I gather that it would be acceptable to her to have the page discuss mostly the weak anthropic principle. However, the page is named "Anthropic Principle", so that really is the kind of thinking that contributes to this mess. If you want to see more about the weak AP, then maybe rename the page. And even then, few have bothered to define the weak AP clearly, and the best of these definitions are not "anthropic". So we would at best be stuck without proper references. Maybe all that ever needed to be said about this topic is "cogito ergo sum" - I think therefore (the universe) exists. Highlander (talk) 23:45, 2 November 2009 (UTC)

Regarding what has been said above, that "I am sure muliple universes are not outside the purview of accepted science". The problem here is that a different universe by definition of "universe" can never been observed, only be imagined or simulated. So it is not possible to use the scientific method of proving your guesses by experiments and logic. In particular, you cannot use experiments to disprove the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics. So it is philosopy. So the AP is really only important to science because scientists need to understand a little philosopy to understand what they are doing. People who misunderstand the AP contribute eventually to the bloat of this article, even if only in a line refuting the idea.Highlander (talk) 00:00, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

I personally don't think that the WAP should be split off, but that this article should emphasize the WAP as the principal meaning of the AP. I think that the WAP itself is very uncontroversial and that it can be clearly, accurately, and succinctly defined for the non-physicist as the Merriam-Webster has: "...conditions that are observed in the universe must allow the observer to exist."[2] This is virtually a tautology, it almost says nothing, how can anyone seriously dispute it?

But, even if it says virtually nothing, it does gives a framework for thinking about some astronomical and cosmological observations. I think that it speaks well to some questions like why is the universe about 10¹⁰ years old rather than 10⁸ or 10¹³ years (similar to what Dicke was asking). But this works for the age of the universe better than it does for fundamental physical constants, because the universe gets to try out all possible values for its age. (It was 1 millions years old once, and someday it will probably be a trillion years old, both of those universes were or will be far different than the present which obviously has to be supporting life sufficiently sophisticated to ask the question "why is the universe about 10 billion years old?" So it really isn't remarkable that the universe is about 10 billion years old because the question is better turned around: "At what age of the universe is it most likely for life, sophisticated enough to ask the question, to exist?")

It has been applied to the same kind of question about the few fundamental physical constants, some of which needed to be restricted to a relatively small range just for matter to form (the fine-tuned universe). And, if the universe was able to experiment with all other combinations of fundamental constants, then the same "why" question applied to the constants could be answered simply by the WAP. Or if there really is the multiverse and many other universes with some random distribution of values for the fundamental constants, then the WAP is sufficient to answer that "why" and no one need conclude that it is "remarkable" that the universe is so fine-tuned.

The SAP is different. It is not a tautology or truism and, at least superficially, should be considered a controversial assertion. We just do not know that it is true or not. Perhaps if SETI was intercepting dozens of instances of ET communication, or if we really understood how, given enough time, any small, rocky planet (of similar chemical composition as ours) just can't help itself but to eventually produce life, then the SAP would be less controversial. That wouldn't prove the SAP, but it would provide observational evidence that supports it. But we don't know either. Unlike the WAP, there is no solid reason of science to insist that the SAP is true. It might be true and ours and other galaxies might have thousands or millions of, not just habitable, but habited worlds. But we don't know and there is no solid evidence of such. We barely even know that there are small rocky planets outside our solar system (but it looks like it's the case).

Their FAP is even more speculative and, if included, should be depicted as such (rather than settled science). And I think it's legitimate that if the Barrow-Tipler definitions are included for completeness, it is very appropriate to quote Gardner's citing of their final statements and dubbing it the Completely Ridiculous Anthropic Principle (CRAP).

Even though the language above is my own, I think it's a very conservative view that considers what this term has been used for in the more popular media. I guess I can't claim it's NPOV, but it's so conservative in its claims that, even if it's my POV, it surely seems neutral to me. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 00:46, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

Made into a bit more encyclopedic language, it seems like 96- gets the summary of what we should present just about right. LotLE×talk 02:13, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

I guess I'm responsible for much of the tortuous prose. The trouble is that there are several straightforward ways this could be put which are mutually contradictory, since even the professionals don't agree what terms like WAP & SAP actually mean. Right here in this talk section, Ben Kidwell takes Barrow & Tipler at face value, while Hans Adler thinks B&T are "bullshit" (& I agree their approach has seriously muddied this subject, despite their major contributions), while 96... prefers Merriam-Webster which is short enough that it could be read as meaning any of the various WAPs & SAPs (and therefore quite likely to mislead, since each reader will read it in a way consistent with their own pre-exisiting ideas).

Another problem, as guessed by several above, is that many notable American scientists deem it their duty to rubbish the AP because they have only heard of it in the context of creationism. The "last word" effect that Ken mentions seems to be due to various editors finding such quotes and tacking them on at the end of sections that seem vaguely relevant; I don't think it is an organized attempt to discredit the AP. If you delete them, you are essentially claiming that, say, Stephen J. Gould's opinion of the AP is not notable, which seems dubious, or not worth recording because it's a misunderstanding, which is OR (though I would agree with you!). Furthermore you can't pretend that creationism is irrelevant given that Barrow & Tipler not only give this as a possible implication of their SAP but insist that the WAP is a development of classical arguments for the existance of god (quite wrongly in my view). And you can't just ignore B&T since their book is the major study of the subject (and still in print after 25 years).

As for the original complaint which lead to the current neutrality tag, this is only a B-class article and certainly not fully referenced, but I don't think the tag is deserved. Barrow, Tipler and Paul Davies are all very well known scientists who have claimed that the AP *may* imply a designer. None of them are really talking about an old man in the sky but at least Tipler and Davies actively advocate positions which are basically religious. Plenty of scientists believe in god (opinion surveys unsurprisingly show); of course such people mostly think that this has nothing to do with science, so they don't work in speculative cosmology. PaddyLeahy (talk) 21:44, 8 November 2009 (UTC)

I really think that the concepts of AP and FTU need to be differentiated. It's the FTU that may imply a designer (assuming that the universe is actually fine-tuned), not the AP. The FTU is the observation (possibly leading to a question of design) and the WAP is an explanation for the FTU that different people accept to different degrees. If the multiverse hypothesis is true (and I dunno how that could ever be tested), the WAP along with the notion of a zillion universes with a distribution of values for the dimensionless fundamental physical constants actually makes sense to explain FTU without needing a designer. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 08:02, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

I think you are on the right track, but not with regards to the need for multiverses. The WAP, when formulated right, means that since the probability of an observer existing is one, since otherwise the observer could never make the observations. Then, since we know the observer exists "cogito, ergo sum", all other pieces of the universe that have been observed directly or indirectly must fall neatly into their places. This is true even if we cannot directly observe and connect to other universes, although we can use mathematics to figure out how they would work. The idea of a multiverse just adds a little extra meat to the WAP, but at a price. For example, one such price is that people get the idea to calculate some probability that our universe exists. And this somehow leads to people questioning the WAP based on this incorrectly derived probability. See, calculating the probability is incorrect, since you cannot know the a priori probability distribution of the parameters. In fact, knowing the a priori distribution would require an outside observer, e.g. god. This is why the multiverse theory is not a good support for the WAP.Highlander (talk) 20:57, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

I thought the WAP sorta supported itself, since it doesn't claim much to be controversial. And it's the WAP that offers an explanation for the ostensible FTU. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 02:52, 10 November 2009 (UTC)

Agreed, that is why I think using a multiverse to make the WAP stronger actually weakens the argument.Highlander (talk) 23:20, 10 November 2009 (UTC)

But what I do not understand is, without a mechanism for generating a plethora of trials (the "multiverse" is such a mechanism), each with different fundamental constants, how the WAP can hope to speak to the cause of why the fundamental constants are what they are (or in an acceptable range for matter to form, supernova to cook up heavier elements, and enough time for rocky planets like ours to form long before their suns burn out). This is the cause-and-effect that I can understand: The Universe is not adapted to fit life, but life is adapted to fit the Universe. With many universes, taking on a variety of random values for the fundamental constants, the WAP does explain the selection process, why it's the life-friendly universe that we find ourselves in. But it doesn't do it for a single universe. I don't see how. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 00:38, 11 November 2009 (UTC)

The WAP works in that case for the very same reason that the WAP works to explain the question "Why is the Universe about 10 billion years old? My, aren't we lucky that the Universe is just about exactly as old as it needs to be to be supportive of life like us?" But the single Universe gets to try out all those other experiments: It gets to try out being 1 million years old (no life), 10 million years old (still no life), 1 billion years old (life unlikely) and 1 trillion years old (assuming no Big Crunch but maybe heat death - life unlikely). Just like that, if there are many universes with varying combinations of fundamental physical constants, it's only in the life-friendly universes with those constants in acceptable ranges that we'll be around to behold the coincidence and ask the question. But if this Universe is the only one, the "remarkable" or "uncanny" coincidence of those constants to be good enough for Goldilocks (it's the only bowl of porridge she got to taste) remains an intriguing question and the WAP says nothing to explain it. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 08:02, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

Well, the WAP is also a way of saying "things are the way they are because they are" in addition to talking about observers and their history. That is not a very useful statement, and so every scientist should still be on the look-out for better explanations. There is not need to refute the WAP though, scientists just need to be aware of its nature.Highlander (talk) 21:03, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

I didn't think one can even refute the WAP or other truism. I didn't think the issue is so much whether or not some truism is true (we accept that it is, but it might be a vacuous truth). I thought the issue of controversy was whether or not you can build on the truism to make a tangible conclusion about something else, such as an explanation for the FTU sans designer. In my opinion, it works with the multiverse as an additional axiom, but does not with a single Universe in all of physical reality. It doesn't mean that some other designerless explanations for the FTU cannot be found or don't presently exist, it only means that the WAP, by itself, doesn't have enough to explain it. 96.252.13.17 (talk) 02:52, 10 November 2009 (UTC)

Well, I tried hard to find something that is not neutral - that is if you grant some room for mentioning criticisms at all - and did find nothing. However, I found the paragraph starting with "Opponents of intelligent design are not limited to those who hypothesize that other universes exist..". The mentioning of intelligent design seems to come from nowhere(or maybe from some paragraphs up which was fine when the article was smaller), and the paragraph is so tortured it contradicts itself. How about adding a line like "Proponents of intelligent design often quote the fine-tuning observations that support the anthropic principle as a proof of an intelligent designer."Highlander (talk) 21:11, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

Well, I made the edit. The few claims of fact I made are supported by the articles on Intelligent design, Fine-tuned Universe and Design argument, which are linked.Highlander (talk) 21:32, 25 November 2009 (UTC)

Does someone speak up in favor of the NPOV tag? I think the article will not be improving much in this respect because it is hard (to me at least) to find POV statements, maybe with the exception of people who don't want to believe the weak anthropic principle and find the entire article to be POV. By the way, I am not surprised at all about the recent edit mentioning an argument that there is no anthropic reasoning involved in the discovery of the nucleosynthesis of C-12 - the very intro of this article mentions that "building up other substantive arguments based on a tautological foundation is problematic" and it always seemed to me that starting reasoning from measurements of the occurance of C-12 would be just as good as starting from an anthropic principle.Highlander (talk) 14:11, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Anthropic reasoning and the LHC(or similar devices)

I'm not exactly sure that it is smart to start up the LHC, or maybe later a more powerful device.

I'm not scared, because I think doomsday would arrive much too fast for that. In addition, according to the many-worlds-interpretation of quantum theory, I'll continue to exist somewhere. Still, it would probably be more worlds without the LHC.

Is this a theory without falsifiable statements? No, not at all. I'm predicting that, should the LHC continue to be in operation for longer times, the scientists will find much fewer micro black holes than expected.

This will lead to the formulation of yet another "asymmetry"-law. When really, and this is where anthropic reasoning comes in, the following happened: Most micro black holes made the world cease to exist in seconds, so the possibility to really observe a black hole didn't exist for a long time.

I wish you a nice doomsday. The restaurant at the end of the universe is right around the corner.— Preceding unsigned comment added by Highlander (talk • contribs)

High, I didn't know you felt that way. You might want to take this up on sci.physics.research and/or sci.physics.foundations (both moderated). 71.169.180.4 (talk) 15:43, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for the pointer. There is at least one mistake in the CERN LSAG report. In particular, because of selection effects similar to those for the AP topic, Earth is not a good example of an astronomical body that has not been destroyed by micro black holes created by cosmic radiation - because the adverse event would destroy the observer, so that the observer would end up getting 100% non adverse events regardless of the actual probability. As this has been overlooked, my guess is similar statistical fallacies apply to other astronomical bodies as well.Highlander (talk) 23:49, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

High, are you saying that if they make a micro-blackhole at CERN LHC, that we'll get eaten up by it (and the whole planet) in short order? 70.109.187.252 (talk) 05:44, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

That's what I have to say, but of which I cannot be 100% certain, What I am certain of is that the current safety report as it is is based on a statistical fallacy. See the intro of the report here: http://lsag.web.cern.ch/lsag/LSAG-Report.pdf

If it helps, one can use the many-worlds-interpretation of quantum physics to see the fallacy, though that is just a tool to visualize the probability graph and isn't strictly necessary.

It can be attempted to fix the report by simply not speaking of Earth, but only of astronomical bodies that are farther away, but that raises the unanswered question, how far away has a micro-black-hole event to be to not have affected adversely the evolution and growth of humanity? And the further away objects are, the further on can look back in time, and the further one looks back in time, then some events actually appear that adversely affected life on Earth, like mass extinctions, suspected meteorites, and suspected gamma radiation hazards. Any arguments against the above might work, but will not be the clear-cut statistical almost-certainty of safety of the LHC that the report makes it out to be. In addition, that such a simple to spot mistake escapes the greatest minds makes me worry. I think at some point, maybe now, maybe with the successor to the LHC, intelligent life will have to learn NOT to conduct some experiments.Highlander (talk) 18:34, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

I dunno why not? We still have about 10,000 or 20,000 nukes left on the planet. Why not detonate them all on the Antarctic continent to see if we could melt enough ice to raise the ocean level a little bit? A worthy experiment. 70.109.180.65 (talk) 06:31, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

I learned that many of my above views have already been expressed in http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0512204 by Max Tegmark (MIT), Nick Bostrom (Oxford). I wrote my own text, but I guess it is written in a too authoritative tone to be accepted by newsgroup moderators.Highlander (talk) 17:23, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

High, I find it difficult to believe that the moderators of either sci.physics.research or sci.physics.foundations rejected a post from you about this. Did they send you back an email telling you why it was rejected? 70.109.181.128 (talk) 18:11, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, the mod of sci.physics.particle said I needed to give scientific arguments for my claim.. Then I broke down the argument right into the details at a very low level and submitted to both .particle and .research and the mod of .research said it was a posting inappropriate for the newsgroup. I guess it is really my fault for starting out with "I'm severly concerned.." I have since refined my position and arrive at a pair of probabilities (p,p²) as a lower bound for a disaster probability upper bound where p=number of LHC experiments vs number of naturally occuring collisions in the atmosphere of Earth, p squared is the LHC disaster probability bound. Using the LHC report data, this gives a pair of (10^-6,10^-12)Highlander (talk) 18:49, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, after making many mistakes in calculations, I made a javascript calculator which actually does calculate the probability pair mentioned above from 2-3 inputs. Hopefully, I made no mistakes this time.. See http://thedeadobserver.hostwebs.com/ Explore the result tuples yourself to form an opinion. (I hope nobody sees this as self-advertisement - the site is quite lacking polish for that; I simply intend to replace the above (bad) guess with a decent calculator).Highlander (talk) 21:16, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Conundrum

Interesting. Great article, thanks for the taking the time to collate and write. Anyone else said that?

In Origin, we see that "the steady-state theory, [which] had recently been falsified by the 1965 discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation. This discovery was unequivocal evidence that the universe has changed radically over time (for example, via the Big Bang)".

CMB discovery does no such thing, even though it was predicted by one party and discovered by another. It is quite possible that we live in a steady state Universe, and the burden of proof for modern science is onerous indeed.

If, however, I accept at face value that I can dig for a fossil, and that is proof that dinosaurs roamed the Earth long before Humans, and that I can point my dinosaur bone at the moon, and prove from it's cratered surface that a 'heavy bombardment' precluded any form of life, then from the very thinking that includes CMB as evidence, we predict a 'slow heat death' for the Universe, an incredibly long period of time until all matter is converted to photons.

Looked at this way, if, say, we stack sheets of paper from here to the Moon to represent time, then all life as we know it would be contained in less than one of those sheets.

An anthropic Universe? Seems we can't have it both ways. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Glebefarmer (talk • contribs) 10:37, 9 March 2011 (UTC)

Participatory Anthropic Principle

I deleted this sentence after the entry on PAP: "However, the argument leads to a chicken-and-egg problem, for those observers must exist in some universe of their own in order to act (unless the observer(s) is self-existent, which returns to the prior possibility)^{[citation needed]}". This is original work, not cited, and anyway the idea of PAP is that observers emerge or evolve in a universe. That is they do not have to exist originally (in some universe of their own). I'm not sure whether Wheeler's argument is that observers necessarily have to emerge in any universe (I think actually that may be Barrow and Tipler's interpretation of Wheeler's idea), or only that it is very likely that they do, but anyway the egg came first - I thought everyone knew that? Aarghdvaark (talk) 04:28, 5 May 2011 (UTC)

By logic, anthropic principle is absurd anytime we can rest: there must be infinite universes where life exists badly, for any one perfectly fitted for life, so let's rest and forget anthropic principle, it's just a story. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.31.246.182 (talk) 15:24, 12 June 2011 (UTC)

Opening Statement

I hope it's okay to sorta interject. Lot's issues brought up and I don't want to copy quotes.

First off, there is no "the" anthropic principle in the manner that the current section tries to favor it as a selection effect, or we wouldn't have all of these variant interpretations of the observation, of which selection effects and selection bias are one of these speculative definitions. The umbrella term, "anthropic principle", comes from the various applications of the observation that can make it strong or weak IF you have a complete theory.

I don't think that people need to have a complete theory to contemplate the general idea of the AP. The AP need not be the WAP, but none of the stronger variants dispute or are inconsistent with the WAP. The WAP is the least common denominator (in the metaphorical sense in terms of political or social blocks). No one disputes the WAP. But it certainly is not true that no one disputes the stronger variants. But we should get a citation.

All variants of the AP either say or are consistent with "observations of the physical universe must be compatible with the conscious life that observes it."

Selection effects and selection bias certainly aren't the AP, unless somebody comes up with a complete theory that justifies the assumption that the observation that carbon based life appears to be favored by the forces is just a consequence of either, for which, there is none.

The current opening statement, (directly below), is intentionally weak, because it willfully ignores the fact that the apparently bio-oriented observation is not expected by our best complete and conventionally tested theories that predict quite the opposite of what is observed.

"In physics and cosmology, the anthropic principle is the philosophical argument that observations of the physical universe must be compatible with the conscious life that observes it."

It needs to be replaced by the following to make it fair and unbiased:

In physics and cosmology, the anthropic principle is an umbrella term for a number of different applications of the observation that carbon based life appears to be favored by the forces <of the universe, at least in the locality of the life>,

No, that's the fine-tuned Universe. The AP is posited as a possible explanation for "...the observation that carbon based life appears to be favored by the forces" of the universe at least at their location in space and time.

And it isn't true either that the AP requires carbon chauvinism. When you put that in, you are making a qualification (that weakens the AP, as far as I can tell) that is also uncited. Conscious life perhaps, but the

in order to explain the structure of the observed universe, which runs contrary to the natural expectations of our best, most well tested theories.

The current opening statement is also intentionally biased toward one variant interpretation:

"Some proponents of the argument reason that it explains why the universe has the age

That's Dicke and Carter ...

and the fundamental physical constants necessary to accommodate conscious life.

... and that's Carter and also Barrow and Tipler...

As a result, they believe that the fact that the universe's fundamental constants are within the narrow range thought to allow life is not remarkable."

... I think that means (if one accepts some anthropic reasoning) there need be no intelligent designer to explain the FTU. It's not lucky. At least I think that was what is meant. Still sounds pretty consistent with what I remember in my astrophysics course long ago. I don't see this as misrepresenting how the AP is commonly discussed. Certainly with Carter vs. Barrow and Tipler and different wordings for SAP and the like, not everyone agrees on specifically what it all means (the WAP doesn't insist that conscious life had to emerge as does the SAP, at least one definition of it). But they all acknowledge that, whether it's remarkable or not that conditions that are observed in the universe, whether one accepts that they're fine-tuned or not, are consistent with the fact that some form of life is observing such conditions. It's anthropic; consistent with at least (not exclusively) anthrōpos. That's the common denominator.

This assumes that selection bias can be applied to the observation without a complete theory to justify it,

Maybe that reference to selection bias shouldn't be in the second paragraph. But I would like to hear from User:Highlander or User:PaddyLeahy before it's moved or removed.

and while it may currently be just as good as any other plausibility, this weak variant interpretation certainly is not "the" anthropic principle and should be removed unless it is changed to read something more like the following, which should go underneath the opening statement, (above):

I would point out that the WAP is consistent with every variant interpretation, but the primary definition is not merely the WAP. It's even less than the WAP. It's just saying that there is some connection with the content of the observations and the fact that people are observing the observations. You find that controversial? 70.109.187.95 (talk) 05:09, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

The weak anthropic principle is the philosophical argument that observations of the physical universe must be compatible with the conscious life that observes it. Some proponents of the argument reason that it explains why the universe has the age and the fundamental physical constants necessary to accommodate conscious life if there is a multiverse. As a result, they believe that the fact that the universe's fundamental constants are within the narrow range thought to allow life is not remarkable.

The strong anthropic principle as explained by Barrow and Tipler (see variants) states that this is all the case because conscious life, in some sense, needed to exist. On the other hand, in a sufficiently large universe, some worlds might evolve conscious life regardless of adverse conditions. Douglas Adams used the metaphor of a living puddle examining its own shape, since, to those living creatures, the universe may appear to fit them perfectly (while in fact, they simply fit the universe perfectly). Critics argue in favor of a weak anthropic principle similar to the one defined by Brandon Carter (see variants), which states that the universe's fine tuning is the result of selection bias, e.g. in the long term, only survivors can report their location in time and space. Opponents of this will point out that this is an assumption that is not born out by any fact or established theory that supercedes the apparent connection between carbon based life and the structure of the universe, itself, via the commonality that the "flat" balanced universe shares with the numerous balanced conditions that are necessary for the habitable zones that enable the conditions for carbon based life to exist. They will argue that it is this commonality that most apparently calls for a carbon life-oriented cosmological structure principle that defines the structure of the universe from first physics principles, which is the preferred scientific solution, rather than to resort to speculative ideas that are neither established, nor observed.island001 (island001|talk) 20:00, 29 July 2011

About whether stronger variants of the AP are controversial or not.

Gracefool, it's just been cited. I dunno if Highlander or Paddy are listening. I think "contingent upon empirical verification" means "not necessarily true". Otherwise, we know that everything stronger than WAP is controversial in the sense that they make extraordinary claims. If it's controversial, it's not a tautology. But I do not know which editor first wrote it nor what citation may be forthcoming. 70.109.187.95 (talk) 01:50, 30 July 2011 (UTC)

Listen, even though I did not originally put that content in (I think either User:Highlander or User:PaddyLeahy did, and I'm pretty sure that they are physicists practicing the art), this commonly known fact about the anthropic principle: - WAP not controversial, SAP a little controversial, FAP and PAP quite controversial - is what it is. You demanded citations, I put some in. I dunno why you object to it so much, but it's factual and it's supported and it's your POV that is trying to weaken or obscure the meaning of it. The xAP has some measure of controversy attached to it unless x=W. It does because it makes claims that are not virtually tautological nor proven theorem. I don't get what the problem is, Gracefool. Can you bother to justify your changing of the content and meaning of the term here on the talk page before repeatedly changing it (apparently to suit your POV) in the article? 70.109.177.159 (talk) 02:26, 4 August 2011 (UTC)

I'd say WAP < SAP < PAP < FAP, where WAP is uncontroversial and virtually no-one apart from Barrow and Tipler accepts FAP. Loosely you could say that if something is uncontroversial then stating it is a tautology, e.g. "football is a game" is uncontroversial = obvious = a tautology. But I don't really support that line of thinking, so I don't think the WAP is a tautology. As for the sentence in question "Stronger variants of the anthropic principle are not tautologies and thus make claims considered controversial by some and that are contingent upon empirical verification", seems to say that anything which is not a tautology is controversial which is clearly wrong. I suggest we separate out the ideas of something being controversial, something being a tautology, and something requiring proof. Hope that helps Aarghdvaark (talk) 04:09, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Well, the point I was trying to make is that the WAP is uncontroversial because it is a tautology or virtually a tautology. Football might be a ball (instead of a game). But observing requires at least one observer, as a consequence of the premise. A fantasy (that I would think would be controversial in scientific circles) is an observer observing physical conditions that preclude the observer's physical existence. I don't agree (even loosely) that an uncontroversial statement is tautological (say "Killing innocent children is bad.") A sorta non-trivial value judgment (about what makes for "bad" and what does not) has to be first made. But "Dead people are not alive" should not be controversial and should not need external proof. 71.169.188.105 (talk) 04:43, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

I think WAP is uncontroversial whether or not it is a tautology. What does "virtually a tautology" mean? I take it to mean that WAP is therefore not a tautology. As regards your example of an observer, I can't help pointing out that an angel observing someone's life here is observing the physical although they're not supposed to be physical themselves - damn, there goes another can of worms. Aarghdvaark (talk) 07:36, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

My working meaning of "tautology" is a statement that is trivially true because the predicate of the statement is the same as the premise of the statement. "Dead birds are not living" is pretty much tautological. "Dodo birds are not living", while factual, is not tautological. Some research or finding of fact must be made to confirm it.

It is semantically possible to conceive of a circumstance where a hypothetical observer is observing conditions in the reality that the observer resides that preclude this observer's existence. For a mortal, physically realizable observer, I cannot see this as a possibility. For a transcendent god-like observer, perhaps. But, I don't think that physics or science deals with transcendent beings, since by definition, their existence is untestable. (E.g. it would be quite remarkable for a scientific observer of the heavens to conclude from these observations that the universe is 10⁴ years old.)

That's what I mean by "virtually tautological". The Merriam-Webster definition of the WAP: "conditions that are observed in the universe must allow the observer to exist", is, in my opinion, both quite succinct and virtually tautological. Observers must exist to observe (I think that is tautological). In order to exist, observers must exist in a reality with conditions or properties that are consistent with their existence (virtually tautological, but not necessarily so for the supernatural, at least not semantically). 70.109.189.90 (talk) 17:18, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Well, for me there is a need to say "The WAP is virtually a tautology" instead of "The WAP is a tautology" because not everyone's definition of a WAP will match all definitions of an observer, in fact we don't even have a definition of what an "observer" is, because we all think we know what an observer is.

To be a tautology, in practice the predicate of the statement needs to follow from the premise of the statement.

To confer a proof from person A to person B that a statement is a tautology, axioms, facts and interpretations may be applied that person B believes in.

For example, "Dead birds are not living" is a tautology because we both know the fact that the word "dead" means "not living".

Wikipedia is frequented by very different people, and so just saying that "The WAP is a tautology" would incorrectly assume that we all share the same set of facts.

Now I find it interesting to discuss several definitions of an observer.

For example, one relatively "short-lived" definition of an observer would be: "The observer o was changed by an event e (to the state o')".

In the middle of the spectrum of observer definitions, other observers would exist for longer times and observe chains of events long enough to derive pyhsical laws, and to understand their own existence.

And on the other end of the spectrum of observers, I could define an observer as a sapient, carbon-based liveform, because that is what all readers of the Wikipedia I know are.

The latter is often termed as "carbon chauvinism", although it is just a different definition of an observer.

For the Merriam-Webster definition of the WAP: "conditions that are observed in the universe must allow the observer to exist", to follow,

I must also have the axiom or shared fact that "an observer exists in a universe if it is affected by events in the universe".

Although I would consider this to be obvious, some people would point to computer games being played, and say "I can observe that, but I'm not part of it.".

So (I think) I also need the shared fact that "if an observer exists in our universe, then it will affect the universe sooner or later."

I personally believe that the latter fact is true in our universe because "actio=reactio" or because some laws of the universe which we discovered suggest that it is a zero sum system in some ways.

There are several kinds of tautologies for example "White horses are white", "White horses are horses", and "White horses are horses that are white".

Especially the last sentence is often called an "empty" tautology, because there isn't a lot of new stuff to learn about white horses.

When the WAP is called an "empty" tautology, it is best to remind the one who calls it that, that in logic, a statement that is a tautology has first to be true to be called that.

I'd call such tautologies "complete tautologies".

I believe "virtually" complete tautologies such as the WAP are a very difficult base for further reasoning, and am somewhat sceptical when the claim is made that, for example, the discovery of the nucleosynthesis of carbon-12 is an example of an application of the WAP. It is, however, an example of reasoning similar to the reasoning behind the WAP.

I find the WAP still interesting to be studied as long as it isn't fully understood by everyone.Highlander (talk) 19:59, 24 August 2011 (UTC)

Anthropic units

An article which really needs work. No sources whatsoever. It has a section on the anthropic principle but doesn't refer to this as the main article, just in 'see also'. Dougweller (talk) 18:02, 28 August 2011 (UTC)

I've removed that unreferenced essay on the anthropic principle from that article, given that this article exists and is presumably the right place for it. I'm pasting it here in case there's anything in it that might be useful to this one:

The term “universal physical constants” is used in the scientific community to designate those constants of nature which represent the least amount of anthropic bias. To understand the meaning of this term, it is helpful to imagine highly intelligent non-human beings existing in some remote part of the universe. With such beings in mind, one can classify various natural constants in terms of the relative importance that these imaginary beings might place on them.
For example, human astronomers often use the “astronomical unit” (AU) as a reference for measuring distances in the solar system. The astronomical unit is defined as the mean distance of the earth’s orbit from the sun. This distance is an important reference for humans because it represents the orbit of our planet. But this distance probably wouldn’t be important to intelligent beings in some remote part of the universe. So the astronomical unit is not a “universal” constant of nature.
As a less obvious example, humans use properties of both water and the element carbon to derive measurement units. Water and carbon are both universal substances (believed to exist everywhere in the universe), so intelligent beings in some remote part of the universe might have access to these substances. However, they might not place the same importance on these substances. To understand this, consider that computers display some of the attributes of human intelligence. But unlike humans, computer chips are primarily composed of silicon. So if intelligent beings elsewhere were composed of silicon then they might not value carbon as an important element.
Although still a topic of debate, Scientists have achieved a level of consensus with respect to the universal status of certain physical constants. The constants which appear most likely to be universal are the following:
* The Universal Speed of Light in Vacuum
* The Universal Gravitational Constant
* The Universal Quantization of Action (Known as Planck’s Constant)
* The Universal Quantization of Charge (Known as the Elementary Charge)
The masses and various other properties of elementary particles and the coupling values associated with the strong, weak, and electromagnetic interactions are also considered to be universal.
As a final twist, some scientists now believe in the existence of other universes. The exact nature of these other universes and their topological connection to our universe is a topic of speculation and debate. But if they do exist, then some scientists further speculate that the values of universal constants may not be the same in each of the universes as in the others. For example, the speed of light might be faster or slower in one universe than it is in another. Scientists further speculate that if the universal constants are different in differing universes, then some universes may have values which support the evolution of intelligent life and others may have values which repress the evolution of life. Scientists and philosophers further speculate that it may be impossible for a universe which does not support intelligent life to exist, because existence is verified through observation by an intelligent being; therefore, a universe can not exist without an observer.
This belief in many universes, together with the belief that some universes have natural properties which prohibit the evolution and existence of intelligent life, is known as the anthropic principle. If the anthropic principle is correct, then one might rightly conclude that all units of measurement are anthropic units. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that we live in a universe which supports human life; therefore, our universe is an anthropically biased universe. Furthermore, any constants of nature that exist in our universe will be anthropically biased. Hence, our units of measurement will be anthropically biased.

Justlettersandnumbers (talk) 21:37, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

The AP says nothing about whether or not there are other universes. Justletters, you're reading more into it than what it is. The AP is as correct as any other tautology is. 70.109.187.107 (talk) 19:55, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Ooops, I now understand that Justletters isn't saying this, but it was the author of the content Justletters pasted in above. Sorry. 70.109.187.107 (talk) 19:57, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Give simple explanations to strong and weak AP

First, make it clear that the definition of strong and weak AP are unclear even among experts.

Second some tongue-in-cheek definitions would work well, I guess, like: "The universe is at it is, because if it was not, we would not here be have this conversation". I leave it to you to tell me if this is WAP or SAP. And to give an equally tongue-in-cheek definition for the other one.

IMHO.--
David Latapie (✒ | @) — www 00:12, 16 October 2011 (UTC)

There are at least two problems with giving our own tongue-in-cheek definitions of the WAP:

First, Wikipedia asks contributors to base their work on reliable sources, so we should avoid just to make stuff up.

And in addition, we would just add to the confusion by adding even more WAPs and SAPs.

Your wording of the AP could be called a good wording of the WAP. I would try to give you another wording of the WAP if you give me your definition of an observer (See my comment above about observers).

Highlander (talk) 19:04, 17 October 2011 (UTC)

Well, it doesn't stop me from trying to interpret. For the WAP, I still think that the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition is succinct: "conditions that are observed in the universe must allow the observer to exist" and tautological, so it's hard to argue with it. But even if it is apparently obviously true, it doesn't really say much. (But if you're a believer in the multiverse or some many worlds cosmology, then the WAP serves to explain the Dicke coincidences or fine-tuned universe.)

For the SAP, it's a "stronger" statement in that it says more and makes a claim that is not tautological. It sorta claims that because the observed conditions are how they are (the FTU and the fact that we are here), that the Universe had no choice but to eventually have life, such as ours, emerge. It's like, even though a Royal flush is extremely unlikely, since it is not impossible, eventually if you continue to shuffle the deck and deal out 5 card trials, that eventually a Royal flush must be dealt (and only then will we be around to notice).

If SETI ever discovers intelligent life outside of our own world and solar system, that would make the SAP more plausible in my opinion. It would change the constituent parameters of the Drake equation from pointing to a result where there is maybe one other, maybe no other world with life out there to pointing to a result where there are probably tens of thousands of other living planets in our galaxy. This is because if SETI hears ET, ET has to be reasonably close (I think less than 50 or 100 lightyears). Even if the reality is that there are thousands of other civilizations out there, with 100 billion stars in the Milky Way, it would still be very unlikely that even one of those civilizations are close enough to us to ever be noticed. But if another civilization happens to turn up in our neighborhood, then it's likely that there are a lot more than thousands of other civilizations, but tens or hundreds of thousands. And if that is the case, then the SAP becomes more plausible (to me) than it is. But if we're alone in the galaxy and perhaps the whole universe, I think that means there is not much support for the SAP (and our living planet is a fluke). 70.109.191.47 (talk) 01:58, 18 October 2011 (UTC)

Back-to-front argument

"In 1961, Robert Dicke noted that the age of the universe, as seen by living observers, cannot be random.[8] Instead, biological factors constrain the universe to be more or less in a "golden age," neither too young nor too old.[9]"

I think I know what is meant here, but the way it is put is nonsensical. 1) The age of something can never be random, its age is simply its age at the time concerned. 2) Biological factors cannot constrain the universe to be anything. It is the other way around. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.11.3.250 (talk) 12:23, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

That's the whole point of the anthropic principle. Your point 2) is correct; biological factors do not constrain the universe to be anything. But biological factors do constrain whether or not any biological beings will observe the universe to be anything. Before getting to the fundamental constants, consider the age of the universe. The universe gets to experiment at being any age. Once it was less than a million years old. It was also a billion years old, once. Someday it will be a trillion years old. Now consider your (correct) observation that "It is the other way around." At what age(s) of the universe would you expect to see life emerging? Then when would you expect to see life that has evolved to sufficient sophistication to ask the question "how old is the universe?" Would it be surprising if the answer was "about as old as necessary for you to be there to ask the question."? 70.109.187.107 (talk) 19:39, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Clarifying the meaning of "tautology"

In the section "Critcism", the word "tautology" meant different things, either good or bad, to different people. After considering the terms: "vapid tautology", "boring tautology" and "empty tautology", and reading the wikipedia section on tautology, I believe the most appropriate and understandable term is "boring tautology". I know this sounds a bit too simple for an article that is seeded with difficult terms, but think about it.

As the job of wikipedia contributors is to find knowledge in sources, and then to evocate it back in better words, I am removing the citation needed tag, since I believe in this case it really was a "I didn't know about the other meaning of 'tautology'."-tag. Highlander (talk) 19:57, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

You are correct to flag this up as a weakness in the article - the fact that the terms truism and tautology are mentioned together perpetuates a widespread miconception that tautologies are necessarily devoid of meaning. In fact every theorem of propositional calculus is a tautology, as are many mathematical theorems, but that doesn't mean they are unsurprising or devoid of interest. I will think about some changes to clarify this in the article. DaveApter (talk) 10:55, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

It is true that every proven theorem amounts to a tautology. Personally, I am not well pleased with either articles on tautology here. I believe that the pertinent (to this article) meaning is A tautology is a logical statement in which the conclusion is equivalent to the premise. I think this emphasizes the meaning of a statement where the conclusion is transparently equivalent to the premise. There is nothing wrong with a tautology if it helps one focus on simple truths that (nearly) no one can argue with. I don't know if "boring tautology" is the right word here. I think that, perhaps, the criticism of the AP as a tautology is that it (to the critic) is considered a "meaningless tautology". To that critic, the AP doesn't really say anything or is inconsequential. I think we need a better adjective than "boring". People and books and stories are boring. The AP is not boring, but if I were that critic of the AP, I might say it is meaningless. I personally do not think the WAP is meaningless, because if we made the observation that the Universe is 10 million years old, we would have trouble explaining it. Also, the SAP is hardly tautological; it says something that could be controversial and controversial statements are decidedly not tautological. 70.109.187.107 (talk) 17:32, 19 December 2011 (UTC)

Well, thanks for your input. I kind of liked "boring" because it emphasizes the subjective nature of it. Highlander (talk) 22:34, 22 December 2011 (UTC)

Natural complement of the PAP

Here are two reliable sources: In 2005 the PAP receives its natural extension: "The mission of the senders consists in delivery of consciousness into the Universe". In other words, intelligence in a position to decide whether to fill the Universe with reasonable low-entropy signals. Here are TWO reliable sources:

1) May 2005 The Drake Equation: Adding a METI Factor and

2) (in Russian): Уравнение Дрейка с METI-коэффициентом in Vestn. SETI, No 9/26, 2005, ISSN 1994-3016. METIfan (talk) 01:08, 8 January 2012 (UTC)METIfan (talk) 01:17, 8 January 2012 (UTC)METIfan (talk) 01:18, 8 January 2012 (UTC) METIfan (talk) 07:00, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

1) is not an WP:RS and both apparently fail WP:V although, frankly, I'm not really sure what you're even trying to say.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 20:46, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

Here is what I, Highlander, think about the topic:

I find that even the term participatory universe and as such a participatory anthropic principle are not well documented, and surely not here on Wikipedia. The link in this article for participatory universe goes to Digital_physics, where only the sentence "all things physical are information-theoretic in origin" gives an explanation, which is then followed by a link to this article. That is very odd.

I would suggest that before you add information related to a participatory anthropic principle, you first make sure that the concept of a PAP is defined clearly on Wikipedia. Also, explain how METI is complementary to the PAP. Or is it an addendum, not a complement?

The SETI effort is relevant to the Anthropic principle insofar that if we make contact with an alien species remote from Earth, some sentences will have to be rewritten to consider that both our and the aliens position in the Universe are privileged enough to allow life and even sentient life. A METI effort in this respect is only relevant when the recipient chooses to reply to our messages in some way.

Regarding a participatory principle (based on information/observers) embodied in the Universe, I can offer some original thoughts on how I see that, if you want, as a short but necessarily incomplete essay on the matter. Just say so. I think a Wikipedia talk page is not the place for it.

Highlander (talk) 22:42, 8 January 2012 (UTC)

To clarify, METIfan has attempted to add this (the non-bold text) to the article four times. METI is certainly not an addendum to PAP. Contrary to what METIfan is attempting to add, it's not a “natural extension”, (nor is this claim found on either web page). Of course, whether or not METI might be somehow “complementary” to PAP in someone's opinion, isn't relevant unless a better source actually addresses that more specifically.

Please feel free to start a separate PAP discussion so that the topic won't be confused with this particular issue. Thanks.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:02, 9 January 2012 (UTC)