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Seems biased and NPOV
- Why? You changed the name to "Arab Uprising", but this is the name that everybody, including the government of Jordan, uses for this war. There is another event called the Arab Uprising or Great Uprising. Changing names of wars because you don't like them is original research. But please provide some information on the material you would like to change. --Goodoldpolonius2 15:08, 10 February 2006 (UTC)
This article could be better
This item would present a more accurate view of the Arab Revolt if it conveyed more of the sense of profound betrayal and dissatisfaction which arose among the Arabs when forced to accept the Western Allies' postwar arrangements for the newly "liberated" Ottoman territories.
I don't know how this can be done without abandoning a neutral point of view, but perhaps a more complete listing of the explicit official promises made repeatedly by the British and French to their Arab allies during World War I - and more detail concerning who those allies were (besides the Sharif's family) - along with a more detailed and complete description of the substance of the promises made (which can be summed up in five words: Arab unity and immediate independence), would go a long way towards correcting the deficiency.
The documentary record should include the Damascus Protocol of May 1915, which presented the conditions under which the underground Arab nationalist societies of greater Syria would join a pro-British alliance with Sharif Hussein of the Hejaz, a more complete description of the July 1915-Jan 1916 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and Agreement, the Wingate Telegram of December 1917, which denied the substance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide Arab territory between France, Britain, and other Allies after the war, the Hogarth Message of January 1918, stating that the Balfour Declaration would not infringe upon Arab political or economic rights, or upon Arab independence and sovreignty in Palestine, the Basset Communique of Feb 8, 1918, reiterating the Wingate telegram while adding a restatement of British pledges to support Arab unity and immediate independence, June 16, 1918's Declaration to the Seven Syrians of Cairo translating the Allies' promises to support Arab unity and independence into Wilsonian terms through the inclusion of phrases like "consent of the governed" and "self-determination", and Nov 7, 1918's Anglo-French Declaration, a very explicit French endorsement of the promises of Arab independence and unity that the British had included them in all along - when talking to the Arabs. General Maude's official public statement to the people of Baghdad upon the liberation of that city also essentially includes Iraq in the terms of the Hussein-McMahon Agreements.
Sharif Feisal's attempts to uphold the Arab cause in the diplomatic manouverings at the Paris Peace Conference, leading up to the creation of what became the King-Crane Commission, and that Commission's findings (which were ignored and suppressed), are essential to the story. The history of the short-lived democratic Kingdom of (united) Syria and the documents produced by its National Congress should not be neglected, nor should Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations be ignored.
In contrast to all of this, the postwar partition and imposition of various neo-colonial schemes upon the Arabs which occured under the terms of the San Remo and Cairo Conferences, as well as by the terms of the Treaty of Sevres should be described. (Sharif Hussein's Mar 10, 1921 Memorandum to the Conference of the Allied Powers, protesting the Treaty of Sevres is one of the most succinct and eloquent restatements of the Arab case).
The presentation of all this material should allow the reader to understand how the Allies left the leaders of the Arab states they created with such a legacy of powerlessness and illegitimacy, the bitterness and problems arising from it, and an inkling of what might have been if the Allies had been true to their word.
In The Seven Pillars Lawrence describes his first meeting with Feisal:
"I felt at first glance that this was the man I had come to Arabia to seek - the leader who would bring the ARAB REVOLT to full glory. Feisal looked very tall and pillar like, very slender, in his long white silk robes and his brown head cloth... His eyelids were dropped; and his black beard and colourless face were like a mask against the strange, still watchfulness of his body."
I tried to make this article closer to neutral. Did not quite know what to do about the adjective "stunning."
This article seems to me, rather biased against the Arab Revolt. So because tens of thousands of people didn't die in the Arab Revolt, it wasn't important? Please explain that reasoning. --18.104.22.168 13:22, 28 November 2006 (UTC)
Entry into Damascus
I removed the fact tag on the date and manner of the entry into Damascus; waiting until the next day to enter is discussed by Lawrence in chapter CXIX, around page 644 in my edition. The date is evident from Appendix II, where he gives a list of locations and dates; Damascus is listed as October 1st. Brianyoumans 16:48, 11 July 2007 (UTC)
I modified this passage, mentioning the arrival of Nuri Sha'lan and Sharif Naser prior to the Australian cavalry's entry. My authority for this is "The Arab Awakaning" by George Antonius. His personal acquaintance with, and extensive research of the events and persons supporting and opposing (Arabs, British, French, Turks and Germans), the Arab Revolt make him the best and most important source. This timeline of 'who got there first' is reiterated in former British SAS officer Michael Asher's Lawrence biography "T E Lawrence, the Uncrowned King of Arabia". I wouldn't be surprised if the recent authorized Lawrence biography by Wilson documents this sequence of events as well. For the Asher and Antonius books I only have my notes which don't include page numbers.But I will find the publisher and date of "The Arab Awakening" and add it to "Recommended Reading".22.214.171.124 (talk) 04:45, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
Ottoman's view of their own significance to Islam
I think the article could be improved by giving some discussion of how the Ottoman's viewed themselves as protectors of Islam. The way the article currently reads, with statements like this, "The dethroned Sultan attempted to regain the Caliphate by putting an end to the secular policies of the Young Turks, but was in turn driven away to exile in Selanik by the 31 March Incident and was eventually replaced by his brother Mehmed V Reşad." you almost get the feeling that the new government was more indifferent to Islam than the Sultan, though it seems the Young Turks saw the war as a jihad  and even withdrew quality troops from strategic locations in their creation of an 'Army of Islam' Does anyone have more insight into Turkish or Arab views of Islam and their respective relationship to it during this period? Brando130 (talk) 17:56, 15 April 2008 (UTC)
To try to answer to the basic import of "Brando"'s questions by referring to Antonius's account: Early in the war - in the 1914-15 period - both the Turkish and the British sides exploited Islam in their propaganda. The Shaikh al Islam in Istanbul issued a 'fatwa' authorizing all Muslims to fight the Allies and support the German/Austrian side. The anti-European stuggles of the Sanussis in Libya and the Sultan of Darfur received the of the Ottoman imprimatur as "jihads". Ottoman and German agents appealed to Islamic sentiment while inciting unrest among Britain's Muslim colonial subjects in India and Afghanistan as well as in British influenced Persia.
On the British side, Secretary of War Kitchener urged the Sharif of Mecca to claim the title of Caliph for himself, and distribution of Arab nationalist leaflets with an Islamist slant was done by the British and French in early 1915. The idea of being Caliph had some appeal to Sharif Hussein. However, once the alliance between the Hashemites and the Arab nationalists of Greater Syria and Iraq was formalized by the Damascus Protocol, the Islamist aspect of the Arab Revolt was dropped due to the fact that the Syrian/Iraqi branch of Arab nationalism had been influenced by European concepts of nationalism, as well as by that of the Young Turk movement, and hence was essentially secular. Also, many of the Arab nationalists of Greater Syria were Christians or from minority sects of Islam, and their goal was that the future Arab state be secular or at least non-sectarian.126.96.36.199 (talk) 17:28, 24 April 2009 (UTC)
This is about tag cleanup. As all of the tags are more than a year old, there is no current discussion relating to them, and there is a great deal of editing done since the tags were placed, or perhaps there is a consensus on the discussion page, they will be removed. This is not a judgement of content. If there is cause to re-tag, then that of course may be done, with the necessary posting of a discussion as to why, and what improvements could be made. This is only an effort to clean out old tags, and permit them to be updated with current issues if warranted.Jjdon (talk) 21:23, 30 April 2008 (UTC)
Emirate of Jabal Shammar
I think the Rashidans had been absorbed by Ibn Saud at this point. Also, the commander listed in the infographic died in 1906. I also recall that Rashidans were pro Ottoman and were fierce enemies of Ibn Saud. Can someone referee this? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.8.131.52 (talk) 21:06, 28 December 2011 (UTC)
- No, Ibn Saud didn't conquer the Hali until 1921, so the Rashidans were very much around at this point. The Kingdom by Ronald Lacey has some detail about the Saud and the Arab Revolt. Yes, the Rashid family were the archenemies of the al-Saud and tended to be pro-Ottoman --A.S. Brown (talk) 22:43, 3 April 2012 (UTC)-
Ibn Saud shouldn't be listed as co-belligerent of Arab Revolt. Indeed Ibn Saud was pro-British and fought a battle against pro-Ottoman Rashids in 1915. But this battle happened before the Arab Revolt. Ibn Saud didn't joined the Hashemite-lead revolt. Actually they fight each other from 1917 to 1919.
Ibn Rashid's role claimed by Murphey should be crosschecked with other sources. I doubt that the Rashids had in this time the military power to do any actions against the Arab revolt. --Arturius001 (talk) 15:04, 14 August 2014 (UTC)