Talk:Battle of Moscow
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I think it would be a good idea to merge the Operation Typhoon page here and redirect it. There isn't much content on the other page beyond background and after-effects, so it's mostly redundant with this page already. — B.Bryant 04:29, 30 Apr 2005 (UTC)
- A bit too late to oppose (4 years!), IMHO instead of merging Operation Typhoon it should have been expanded. I intend to re-create that wikiarticle with better, comprehensive content and no redundancy, as the topic is notable per se to have a dedicated article. Kind regards, DPdH (talk) 08:33, 3 October 2009 (UTC)
It looks like the counteroffensive involved a lot more then just Moscow, shouldn't there be a separate article for it? Oberiko 20:10, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
- The article is due for a major rewrite and restructuring. I think it was a mistake to merge Typhoon into this article because it now represents one German and one Soviet strategic offensives, and one Soviet strategic defensive operations--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 08:53, 28 March 2008 (UTC)
German Planning section
I believe this section needs to be relooked at, it goes from discussing the plan of attack to summerising what happened and anyalsing the battle; surely that should be left for latter sections. I would attempt to do this myself however i just dont have the time.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:36, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
Moscow encyclopedy is available online  and it does not do any casualties estimates. It gives only Soviet and German official numbers of casualties. So I see no purpose for citing Moscow encyclopedy rather than official data from Wehrmacht and Soviet sources (wehrmacht data btw does not include casualties of SS and Germany's allies).--Dojarca (talk) 09:41, 2 October 2009 (UTC)
-50 C in early December?
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by Russian standards, dropped as low as twenty to fifty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather.
- I think the -50C number needs a strong reference. Maybe it is the "-30C" misspelled? --CopperKettle 13:11, 12 November 2009 (UTC)
- I quote from Boris Shaposhnikov's "Battle for Moscow":
Средняя температура для Московского района: ноябрь – 3°, декабрь – 8°, январь – 11° ниже нуля. Однако зима 1941/42 года была очень суровой, с большим снежным покровом. Средняя температура зимой 1941/42 года была следующей: в ноябре – 5°, в декабре – 12°, в январе – 19° ниже нуля. В отдельные периоды морозы в январе доходили до минус 35 – минус 40°. Толщина снежного покрова достигала 50–65 см.
The mean temperature in the Moscow Region are for November: -3, for December: -8, for January: -11 C. However, the winter season of 1941/1942 was very harsh, with ample show covering. Mean temperatures for 1941/42 winter were as follows: -5 C in November, -12 C in December, -19 C in January. The temperatures at some time periods fell as low as -35 - -40 C. Snow cover reached 50-65 cm in depth.
- A book on Rokossovsky gives the -31C number as the lowest point for December 1941. --CopperKettle 13:30, 12 November 2009 (UTC)
- For example: I lived in Noyabrsk for 10+ years, and January temperatures there fell to -40C and little below that, but I do not remember -50C. --CopperKettle 13:44, 12 November 2009 (UTC)
- What do you mean, a death tool? --CopperKettle 16:14, 11 December 2009 (UTC)
I am missing a unit in:
"... the temperatures, dropped as low as twenty to fifty below zero."
- did you know that the coordinates at the top of the Battle of Moscow point to a corner of the Rocket Force Academy building?
Does a battle that spanned hundreds of kilometers in width and depth need coordinates, at all? East of Borschov 15:05, 10 August 2010 (UTC)
Despite the defeat near Aleksino, the Wehrmacht still possessed an overall superiority in manpower and land forces over the Red Army. The German divisions committed to the final assault on Moscow numbered 1,943,000 men, 1,500 tanks, while Soviet forces were reduced to a shadow of their former selves, with barely 500,000 men, 890 tanks.
The only source given for this is the Russian encyclopedia, which basically rehashes Soviet-era propaganda regarding German strength. The 1,943,000 figure counts every single person in Army Group center, including air force personnel. In addition, it ignores the reinforcements available to the Red Army during the battle.
Soviet postwar accounts treat the strengths of both sides' forces on the eve of the counterattack as a matter of outstanding historical significance. They emphasize that, as of 5 December, German forces outnumbered Soviet in the Moscow sector. However, the figures they employ vary and in the aggregate do not substantiate the existence of an actual Soviet numerical inferiority. The latest, hence presumably most authoritative figures, those given in the History of the Second World War, are 1,708,000 German and 1,100,000 Soviet troops on the approaches to Moscow.73 The numbers used in earlier Soviet works were 800,000 or "more than 800,000" German and between 719,000 and 760,000 Soviet troops.74 The German strength as it appears in the History of the Second World War comprises all personnel assigned to Army Group Center including air force troops.75 The Soviet strength is that of the forces assigned to the counterattack.76 The strengths given in the other works are said to be those of the divisions and brigades in Army Group Center and those of the Soviet fronts, in other words, the combat strengths for the two sides.77 None of the Soviet strengths given include the eight armies still in the Stavka reserve, a total of about eight hundred thousand men.
It is clear that, even without the reserve armies, the Soviet forces opposing Army Group Center were relatively stronger on 5 December than they had been in October when Operation TAIFUN began. While Army Group Center had not been able to replace its losses in troops and equipment, the Soviet armies in the Moscow sector had acquired a third more rifle divisions, five times more cavalry divisions, twice as many artillery regiments, and two-and-a-half times as many tank brigades by 5 December than they had had on 2 October.78
- Yes thats right, thats a bad comparision. I changed it. StoneProphet (talk) 11:55, 11 November 2011 (UTC)
The number for German tank strenght cant be correct for 1 October. The Germans had ~1,700 on the whole Eastern Front in October 1941, therefore the number of tanks available for Army Group Centre for the Moscow attack must be smaller. StoneProphet (talk) 11:26, 4 June 2012 (UTC)
- 1,700 was a Soviet estimate, changed it to the correct number. StoneProphet (talk) 16:45, 4 June 2012 (UTC)
German planning section (again)
The current German planning section is uncited except for 1 reference. It also repeats content covered in later sections. The FA version did not include a section like this. The section seems to have been added in late March 2008. Here's a version just before that. Since this is a Featured article, I suggest removing this section. Maybe move some details to later in the article where references cover it. -Fnlayson (talk) 08:57, 5 December 2012 (UTC)
- The fact that a high proportion (and what appears to be the majority) of the article's citations are to the memoirs of the senior generals is also a major problem - these aren't reliable sources for a topic such as this, especially in light of the large number of recent and high-quality secondary sources which cover the battle. This article should probably go to a FAR in light of the extent of the problems with sourcing alone (note I haven't read a word of the article yet). Nick-D (talk) 11:03, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
- I have not looked at that aspect. I'll go ahead with my change in a couple days if no one has valid objection. -Fnlayson (talk) 15:47, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
- That cited paragraph in the "German planning" [starts with "Katukov concealed his armor.."] is partially repeated later in the "Vyazma and Bryansk pockets" section. If you want move and combine the text, that'd be a good improvement. -Fnlayson (talk) 16:49, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
I combined the cited text with similar text later in the article. The paragraph I moved to the top of the Background section should be reworked to fit in better with the rest of the section and article as a whole. The previous version of the article is here if anyone wants to readd some text with references. Good luck. -Fnlayson (talk) 18:38, 17 December 2012 (UTC)
- I think the text starting with "Elsewhere, the German advance was also bogged down..." and ending with "All possible preparations were done...; today starts the last battle of the year..."" can be removed because it essentially reproduces what Wilt says, but it goes into the details that are hardly relevant to this article. In addition, it is based mostly on primary sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:47, 18 December 2012 (UTC)
Under the section Plans "For Hitler, Moscow was the most important military and political target, as he anticipated that the city's surrender would shortly afterwards lead to the general collapse of the Soviet Union. As Franz Halder, head of the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army General Staff), wrote in 1940, "The best solution would be a direct offensive towards Moscow."
This conflicts with a statement in the article on Barbarossa theat Hitlers objectives were Lennengrad first, then the south then Moscow. My understanding is that this is correct. Hitlers staff mostly wanted to go for Moscow first, but Hitler opposed them. von Rundstadt wanted to do Leningrad first, secure the south and then reassess the situation and start operations on Moscow if the situation permitted it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 22.214.171.124 (talk) 21:04, 6 February 2013 (UTC)