Talk:Breakup of Yugoslavia

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Serbs as a "constitutional nation" in Croatia[edit]

Is there a source for the claim that "status of ethnic Serbs of Croatia being changed from "constitutional nation" to "national minority""? Serbs did indeed became a national minority in the new constitution however there is no reference to them as "constitutional nation" in the old constitution. They where mentioned seperatly from the other ethnic groups but nowhere are they called "constitutional nation" or given more rights then ethnic groups.--78.1.116.135 (talk) 15:09, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

That is indeed quite often repeated statement from Serbian [nationalist] circles, but I've never seen the proof either. Googling reveals only the repetition of the said assertion, but no serious analysis; on the Croatian side, I find only the assertion that "Serbs have never been a 'constitutional nation'". Here are 1991 amendments to the constitution [1][2], but due to their "incremental" nature it is hard to see which text was actually deleted. I'd really like to see an analysis to that in a reliable, preferably foreign, source. No such user (talk) 15:37, 12 January 2012 (UTC)
On the Croatian war of Independence, it is sourced from Milan Martić case at ICTY, p.46 [3], which reads:

On 22 December 1990, the Parliament of Croatia adopted a new constitution, wherein

Croatia was defined as “the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are citizens: Serbs […] who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality […]”.252 The Serb population in the Krajina region considered that by the adoption of the new constitution, they had been deprived of the right to be a constituent nation in

Croatia, which would include the right of self-determination.253
No such user (talk) 15:41, 12 January 2012 (UTC)
There is no doubt that they considered they have been deprived of that right but that does not mean they actually had that right. Text doesn't say that a right was removed or denied but merely that they felt it was. In fact as far as I know law of SFRY did not have a category of "constitutional nation".--78.1.116.135 (talk) 16:33, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The first Narodne novine reference says:

AMANDMAN LIX
1. U Saboru se osniva Komisija za zaštitu i unapređivanje ravnopravnosti naroda i narodnosti. [...] Kada je na dnevnom redu vijeća Sabora prijedlog akta ili drugo pitanje od interesa za ravnopravnost naroda i narodnosti, nadležno vijeće, na zahtjev Komisije ili na zahtjev deset zastupnika, ovakvom prijedlogu ili pitanju odlučuje dvotrećinskom većinom ukupnog broja svojih članova. Na zahtjev Komisije nadležno vijeće Sabora odgodit će odlučivanje o prijedlogu akta ili drugom pitanju za koje komisija smatra da je od interesa za ravnopravnost naroda i narodnosti. [...]

The ICTY reference is to three testimonies, so we can read them too:

Q. Just before the break, and we are about to break shortly, I will put another question to you. Is it possible to give a common feature of the parties which in their name had the term "Croatian"? What was the common political feature and what was the common political goal of these parties which were founded in the course of 1989?
A. The common feature of all Croatian political parties was Croato-centricism and Serbo-phobia. Croato-centricism was manifested through the fact that all of these political parties, Croatian political parties, wanted to redefine Croatian political reality. The Socialist Republic of Croatia, up until that time, was in the constitution defined as a state of two peoples, and Serbian peoples. All of these political parties advocated that the constitutional status granted to the Serb people be terminated.
I'm not quoting all the relevant text from it, there's a big discussion and dispute over procedure as well as facts, both with the prosecutor, the defence lawyers and the judge, and in it, the witness ultimately discusses the "Commission on the Equality of Nations and Minorities, or ethnicities, within Croatia" (exactly like above), clarifies that he's not a lawyer and he can't quote a constitution or a law that supports his opinion, instead saying This is my position, and that was the position of all Serbs, the majority of Serbs.
Pages 7530-7621 redacted. Closed session.

IMO all this in turn supports a limited reading of the Trial Chamber's conclusion, so the anonymous above is correct in the absence of contradictory evidence. The idea was based on perception, a political argument. All Croatian-prefixed parties are painted in a negative light by their political opponent, but on the face of it, it's clear that the parliamentary majority delayed the formation of this commission between February 1990 and December 1990 (per witness Ličina), and removed it in the December 1990 Christmas Constitution (per lack of mention in the text there). Now if a secondary source delved into detail about this, we could actually include something sensible in the article, but at this point, we're down to a single sentence in a first-degree court verdict. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 08:32, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

Also, somehow, the reference on the war article seems to point instead to http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/22/world/crisis-in-the-kremlin-croatia-takes-right-to-secede.html?ref=croatia which is an AP story in the NY Times from December 1990 that says:

The new Constitution provides for Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia if two-thirds of the legislature and a simple majority of the electorate approve such a proposal.

That's actually not in conflict with the former Commission, a two-third majority requirement is a common thread. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 08:35, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

I've cited a secondary source at Croatian War of Independence#cite_note-FOOTNOTEPe.C5.A1i.C4.87199610.E2.80.9311-86, which supports this by saying, among other things:

In some cases, these ethnic diaspora communities viewed the constitutive nature of Yugoslav nationhood as giving them the right to extend the sovereignty of their national “homeland” to the territories they inhabited.

--Joy [shallot] (talk) 09:09, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

That reference should be used here, too. Given some more free time, I'll add it. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 10:46, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

Personal testimony regarding "Dissolution of Yugoslavia"[edit]

I am working with the Global Lives Project. There is a video of a Serbian man providing his perspective regarding the Dissolution of Yugoslavia that I would like to add to this page. The video is here, I am in the process of editing out the topics in the video that are not related to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. Does this seem appropriate? Thoughts? Peter Hogue (talk) 19:01, 8 June 2012 (UTC)

I can't see a video of a random individual talking about the subject being a good addition. -- ◅PRODUCER (TALK) 19:17, 8 June 2012 (UTC)
Thank you for this very nice video. I think that it can be added to this page within External links section based on common sense.--Antidiskriminator (talk) 20:19, 8 June 2012 (UTC)

Disputed RoK[edit]

This is not acceptable. RoK is not part of Breakup of Yugoslavia, and you should not propose that. Also, dont mislead the editors, we have independent sources for a lot of things, but we must follow guidelines and consenuses to edit wikipedia in normal neutral manner, without national pretensions. RoK sovereignty is disputed, and we MUST follow that throughout wikipedia. --WhiteWriterspeaks 17:04, 21 November 2012 (UTC)

The way I've always seen it is that the Break up of Yugoslavia took place from 1991 to 1995, the secessions of Montenegro and Kosovo took place in the aftermath of the Break-up of Yugoslavia; though not directly apart of the break up of Yugoslavia they still remain relevant. However we should not portray Mont and Kos as apart of the original break up of Yugoslavia as they came later and portraying them as such would mislead our readers. Mont's and Kos's secessions belong in the aftermath section. IJA (talk) 17:42, 21 November 2012 (UTC)
Wait, what? Kosovo is not connected to the breakup of Yugoslavia? Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, now it's not; simple. I realise some editors may be fond of the current content which only describes Kosovo as a province of Serbia, but the encyclopædia must reflect reality.
Reliable sources discuss the Kosovo issue as part of the breakup of Yugoslavia. For instance, this. I can bring more sources if necessary. bobrayner (talk) 09:42, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
Read Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, especially opinion number 8 (the dissolution of the SFRY had completed). It is wrong and against NPOV to include Kosovo in this process.--Antidiskriminator (talk) 09:57, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
Are you thinking only of SFRY here? That is not the only meaning of "Yugoslavia", alas. Other sources discussing the breakup of Yugoslavia do not stop with Badinter committee; Kosovo is mentioned as part of the breakup.
At this moment we have editors insistent on portraying actions in Kosovo in 1998-1999 as Yugoslav actions, even though the sources in those articles mostly talk about Serbs. (example) Whitewriter, how do you feel about Antidiskriminator's comment? Did Yugoslavia cease to exist earlier in the 1990s, or not, in your opinion? bobrayner (talk) 15:24, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
It is not about what I think. It is about the topic of this article which is the dissolution of the SFRY: "The breakup of Yugoslavia (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, also known as "SFR Yugoslavia" or "SFRY") occurred as a result of a series of political upheavals and conflicts during the early 1990s.". There were several different Yugoslavias who broke apart. This article deals with SFRY.--Antidiskriminator (talk) 16:59, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
Other sources frame the breakup differently; surely sources take precedence over existing wording in this article...? It would still be helpful to get WhiteWriter's response, anyway. I'm not interested in yet another article which retells a controversial topic in detail - better to link to existing (and more specific) articles, in general - but if sources written post-Badinter treat the Kosovo problem as part of the breakup of Yugoslavia, then this article should comply, I think. bobrayner (talk) 17:16, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
The process of dissolution of SFRY ended in 1992. When the independence of Kosovo was proclaimed in 2008 SFRY did not exist for 16 years. Even if somebody decides to create an article which deals with the dissolution of both SFRY and FRY it also wouldn't include Kosovo issue because the dissolution of FRY happened in 2006, two years before proclamation of Kosovo's independence.--Antidiskriminator (talk) 17:56, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
Thanks to the another POV pushing traveling circus process here on wiki, article that deals with the Yugoslavia ends with SFRY (for now). Therefore, if you somehow include all three Yugoslavia in article about it, as i think it should be, we can talk about inclusion of Kosovo in this. But, Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia is unfortunately insurmountable barrier for any logical continuation of Breakup of Yugoslavia after early 1990s. --WhiteWriterspeaks
Antidiskriminator, you keep on commenting in terms of SFRY, but the article title is "Breakup of Yugoslavia". If you're taking the stance that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its breakup - involving entities that were in the SFRY until recently - should not be covered in the "Breakup of Yugoslavia" article, then I am... shocked. Is that really your stance, or is there a nuance that I have missed? bobrayner (talk) 16:12, 28 November 2012 (UTC)
Actually, it was state union of Serbia and Montenegro which fall apart in 2006, 15 years after the breakup of Yugoslavia. --Antidiskriminator (talk) 00:26, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

I actually agree with Tweedledee and Tweedledum here :). "Yugoslavia" is a term that does not really apply to Serbia and Montenegro/FR Yugoslavia, and that's the consensus on the relevant article. "Breakup of Yugoslavia" should not refer to events that concern the successor states. When Yugoslavia broke-up in 1992 - it broke up. Possibly we could add the wars that began during that process of dissolution into the scope, but not wars and states that took place/were declared years and years after Yugoslavia had disappeared. -- Director (talk) 01:03, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

No Montenegro and Kosovo aren't part of the break up of Yugoslavia as Yugoslavia ceased to be a country in 2003. Montenegro ended the state union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo broke away from Serbia in 2008. Mont and Kos aren't part of the original break up of Yugoslavia which took place 1991-1995. Lets say Tatarstan became independent from Russia tomorrow, it'd be like trying to incude Tatarstan as part of the break up of the USSR. IJA (talk) 21:23, 29 November 2012 (UTC)
Yugoslavia ceased to be a country in 1992. FR Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro is one of its five successor states. The implementation of the 2003 constitution in Serbia and Montenegro is not the event that ended Yugoslavia. It is merely the delayed acknowledgement on the part of one successor state that it is not, in fact, the (sole) continuation of Yugoslavia. A position which was held by every other country in the world since 1992. -- Director (talk) 21:47, 29 November 2012 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── I also concur with the complaint, we should restore the mention of APs because that's the starting position. We shouldn't entirely censor the story about FRY, obviously, but its final circumstances shouldn't be conflated in the lead section. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 08:59, 30 November 2012 (UTC)

Merge[edit]

The Dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro should be merged into this article, it's part of the same context and is small enough to fit. Charles Essie (talk) 20:44, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Thanks for spotting that article. However, it is not really in the same context -- it occurred fifteen years later; basically, we have a consensus in the thread above not to include too much information about breakup of Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo). The Dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro article is an unnecessary 2-paragraph content fork created in January, so I redirected it to Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, I'll also remove the merge tag from this article. No such user (talk) 07:19, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Neutrality[edit]

I think that this article does not follow the WP:NPOV policy because:

  1. It fails to present important view about external causes of the breakup (significant influence from outside of Yugoslavia which some authors say was the major cause of the breakup)
  2. It gives undue weight to history of ethnic animosity which mostly deal with events that happened more than 50 years before this breakup and were mostly irrelevant for the breakup. After all those events there was a period of 50 years of Brotherhood and Unity in Yugoslavia. It is completely irrelevant for this breakup if Kingdom of Yugoslavia was demographically dominated by Serbs, what orders Draža Mihailović issued or if Croats and Slovenes enjoyed in Austria-Hungary and did not enjoy in Yugoslavia.
  3. It gives undue weight to nationalism in SR Serbia and to figure of Slobodan Milošević. Nationalism rose in all former Yugoslav republics (not only Serbia) and all presidents of former Yugoslav republics had a role in the breakup (some of them even initiated secession of their republics).

Any thoughts?--Antidiskriminator (talk) 11:01, 5 June 2013 (UTC)

If you consider this is the case, please add the material from the "some authors" you allude to (assuming they are RS). Your second and third points are merely your assertions unless supported by RS, but of course if RS exist for your assertions I encourage you to add that material to the article. Regards, Peacemaker67 (send... over) 11:10, 5 June 2013 (UTC)
I'd actually agree that the "history of ethnic animosity" section should be part of a "Background" section, as opposed to a "Causes" section. It's a valid part of the background of this kind of a complex article, but the inference that Yugoslavia broke up because of 1930s and 1940s in an equal manner to the events of the 1980s and 1990s would indeed be farfetched.
External causes are actually discussed already - the loans and debt stuff - but not sufficiently. For example, the description of the period of hyperinflation appears to be missing.
I don't generally agree that the role of Milošević is exaggerated - the general consensus is that he was the protagonist. You'd have to provide examples of the specific exaggerations in the article. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 09:41, 7 August 2013 (UTC)


When you hear that events of the 1930s and 1940s were the reason of the breakup of The Yugoslavia on par with economic reasons and political, ( either internal like re-awakening of the nationalisms, or external like the fall of the Berlin wall, or the dissolution of the USSR), it seems a little "farfetched" as somebody put it, but if you give it a second thought, it actually does go on par with aforementioned events. It matters in the context of the Serbian rebellion against Croatian authority.

Exactly these events( The Jasenovac labor camp of 1940s etc.) were decisive factor in the mind of the Serbs in Croatia in causing the fear of the than re-emerging Croatian nationalism, which they viewed as a continuation of the Fascist Croatian "legacy" even thinking that Croats are to reopen the concentration camps and simply continue the politics of the Croatian puppet state of the 1940s, and that in turn made them completely support their political leadership(that probably didn't have these delusions) in turning down all of the Croatian calls for peaceful resolution. Such horrific scenario was also lauded by Serbian media, as well as politicians from Belgrade.

What we need to understand is that the fear of the concentracion camps and even outright slaughter at the hands of the newly established Croatian authority, has, among other things moved the Serbs the most to try to secede from Croatia - to avoid extinction - as they feared. If These events of inter ethnic crimes weren't so grave in it's brutality and scope, during the WWII, the Yugoslavian wars might have taken a different, less genocidal route. See Macedonian secession.

Offcourse in that mix, the desire for a revenge was thrown too. Serbs(many of the common people) wanted to avenge their kiled by the hands of the former Ustashe regime of the 1940s, which they counted around million - which was largely exaggerated, but believed nonetheless. Also on Croatian side a theme of revenge for the Chetnik crimes was lingering in the subconsciences of far right para-military organizations, but was never openly expressed, and was practiced only sporadically during the war.

So to conclude I feel that these past events should be named as one of the REASONS of the conflict though, it should be explained in which way were they causes of the conflict. Also it shouldn't be put on the first place among the reasons of the conflict as it is right now. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 31.147.42.118 (talk) 22:23, 25 October 2013 (UTC)

I've moved the bulk of this text to the Background section, and it seems to me that point #2 in the original complaint is addressed now. Does anyone support points #1 and #3? --Joy [shallot] (talk) 19:23, 27 October 2013 (UTC)


I agree with both of the points(1, and 3), because only when USSR started to change under perestroika, and when communist governments were overthrown in Warsaw pact countries, conditions for free democratic elections in Yugoslav republics were created. Besides this article itself claims that:

"After the death of Tito with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, the West felt secure enough in the USSR’s intentions that Yugoslavia was no longer of pivotal strategic importance ... The external status quo, which the Communist Party had depended upon to remain viable was thus beginning to disappear."

Thus implying that external reasons were pretty much important in breaking Yugoslavia's economic power - which led to you know the breakup of Yugoslavia.

It seems to be a great injustice to objective informing that the fact of external causes wasn't even mentioned in the "Causes" section.


Third point is also valid in my opinion, since it is very hard to predict the behavior of the Slovene and Croat democratically elected nationalistic governments, in some imagined case of pro Yugoslavian leadership of SR Serbia. Would they accepted some loosened federation or confederation - it is very hard to tell. But when they saw that Serbian leadership had no intentions of preserving Yugoslavia, The only viable way of these republics was secession. Thus the argument could be made that they were pressured into secession by the threat of the overwhelming Serbian hegemony in Yugoslavia, though independence was probably their most preferred outcome.


And one more thing. In the "Causes" section there is hardly even a mention of the nationalism - which was the main cause of the breakup in the first place.

The following section "Death of Tito and the weakening of Communism (1980–87)" could easily be included/merged with "Causes" section. If not, we get into this funny situation where we name the most important reasons for the event of the breakup,and than go on to never again mention them in the whole article at all (because they obviously weren't all that important in the first place).

Now imagine that Yugoslavia didn't have these "nationalisms feature". Would these "Causes" really caused civil war in the country? Or interstate conflict? No, these "causes" would have caused only fall of the communism - as it has been the case in all of the Warsaw pact states. Every communist multi ethnic state of Europe has dissolved, while none of the homogenous states have experienced any kind of territory loss (except Moldova, but again reason is nationalism) on ideological, political, economical or even religious diversity grounds. Overwhelming reason in every each case of state dissolution was in fact nationalism. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 31.147.22.222 (talk) 23:24, 29 October 2013 (UTC)

The external economic reasons are indeed part of the causes section. Regarding Milošević, I think you actually described a disagreement with the original poster's point #3. They're saying Milošević wasn't pivotal, but you are.
I agree that pre-Milošević stuff doesn't necessarily belong to the breakup itself - changed. I suppose we could say that the death of Tito, the 1981 protests in Kosovo, the SANU memorandum, and the "developed north" stuff, each by itself, weren't a sign of an unavoidable breakup. This change also starts to clarify that the spread of nationalism was among the causes of the breakup.
--Joy [shallot] (talk) 19:10, 31 October 2013 (UTC)
Lacking further discussion or editing, I'm removing the POV tag. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 20:01, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
I object. The discussion is not dormant. As one of main contributors to the existing non-neutral text of this article it was particularly wrong to remove the tag yourself Joy. Please revert yourself--Antidiskriminator (talk) 20:08, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
Sure, but based on what? Your unwillingness to elaborate the problem you seem to have - since June? --Joy [shallot] (talk) 23:34, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
Points "#2" & "#3" are mostly bogus, particularly "#3" (Serbian nationalism, riled up by the 1974 constitution and Albanian atrocities in Kosovo, came before all others and directly caused the surge of Croatian and Muslim nationalism; Slovenia can arguably be said to have caused trouble as well, but there we have more secessionism for economic reasons, rather than nationalism). But "#1" has some grounds to it, I believe I read some theories about external factors.. The trouble is Antidiskriminator doesn't do the whole "sources thing". -- Director (talk) 14:16, 18 November 2013 (UTC)
Of course, any source that disagrees with Judah must be gleefully seized upon, regardless of quality!
The same eminent historian insisted that Bosnia would die within a year of its birth. Heh. bobrayner (talk) 00:05, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
That single quote hardly proves your entire point. Heck, the mere notion that several sources are explicitly discussing the idea that Milošević's role was paramount constitutes a valid reason to think that this is a topic that is important to the topic. Why not start by using the existing section that introduces him to also elaborate these conflicting viewpoints about him? --Joy [shallot] (talk) 20:01, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

I agree with the concerns of Antidiskriminator, specially the points 1 and 3, while the second point can be better worked out. For instance, it is correct that pre WWII period was dominated by Serbs in most apects, but also the entire country was hostage of Serbian-Croatian continous negotiations. However, the Tito Yugoslavia is definitelly marked by much paranoia and dissatisfaction from both sides. While you can hear nowadays many non-Serbs claiming Tito Yugoslavia was (again) Serb-dominated, Serbs however feel victims and claim Serb lands were divided and much more investment was going to other regions rather than Serbia. Regarding the foregn influence, one cannot escape the fact that Germany and others at one point started to support the break-up of Yugoslavia and support the seccessionist movements against the Federal governament. Also, one crutial fact was when the creation of political parties was done on regional level, and not national: instead of having all Yugoslavs choosing between the CPY and some sort of Democratic Yugoslav Party or other "Yugoslav parties", the elections were held regionally with people basically choosing between the old communsts against seccessionist nationalists in each republic, and that basically marked the point of no return. Now obviously all this needs to be sourced. FkpCascais (talk) 01:58, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

Point #3 is nonsense. Slobodan Milosevic and the resurgence of Kosovo-caused Serbian nationalism (aiming to establish a hegemony in the country through the "Antibureaucratic Revolution" and gathering 4 out of 8 votes in the presidency), is widely regarded as the #1 cause of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Nationalism elsewhere came much later and was a reaction. Not even going to discuss this without a source explicitly stating otherwise... -- Director (talk) 02:33, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
I presented the source explicitly stating otherwise in my above comment. Ignoring comments of other editors and referring to their comments as nonsense is not constructive. --Antidiskriminator (talk) 07:36, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
Of course you didn't. -- Director (talk) 14:23, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
In the lead-up to the breakup of Yugoslavia it's big stretch to say that Germany was a driving force for the breakup when it itself had to undergo the German reunification. Yes, certainly Germany had the same foreign minister throughout the period (Hans-Dietrich Genscher), and they played an obvious and important role in late 1991, but at that point, the breakup of Yugoslavia was no longer in question. The causes for the breakup can only be discussed for the period well prior to October 1991, which is when 1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia#Reduced objectives came about. To say that Germany caused the breakup of Yugoslavia requires you to correlate their actions in the earlier period - 1990, 1989, ... AFAIK this only exists in very tendentious, fringe, entirely unreliable sources - a quick google brings up [4], [5], [6], ... not for the faint of heart.
Elections in each of the republics can't have been a huge deviation from SFR Yugoslav standards - you had elections in each socialist republic earlier, too - see elections in Yugoslavia. Also, you had the Union of Reform Forces which represented a federal idea I believe. Its failure to gain traction was not caused by the elections being per-republic - it's not like they had a plurality in the big republics that would have trumped small majorities of other parties in the small republics had the votes been combined.
So, in conclusion, yes, you really do have to source these things explicitly, because our existing sources don't seem to support your reasoning. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 20:01, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
I pointed to the neutrality issue of this article and many editors agreed about it. I think #1 argument probably gained a consensus. Until the criteria for the removal of neutrality tag are met (link), I think you should revert yourself and restore it. This topic is not within the main scope of my interest so I don't think I am able to continue helping with this issue much further. If I was wrong and if all arguments I presented are not valid, I sincerely apologize. If not, I am glad I could help. All the best! --Antidiskriminator (talk) 22:47, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
Sorry, I'm just plain not seeing this consensus you speak of. Is the consensus that the article is slanted because it lacks additional content about external factors? I don't think so, and I don't see any actual proof otherwise. What purpose would the generic tag serve, other than to teach the controversy? Why are you not using inline tags, or at least per-section tags? --Joy [shallot] (talk) 13:47, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
  • No problem. That can happen to anybody.
  • Comments of (I think majority) editors who I think more or less agreed with argument #1:
    1. Antidiskriminator "this article does not follow the WP:NPOV policy because #1 It fails to present important view about external causes of the breakup (significant influence from outside of Yugoslavia which some authors say was the major cause of the breakup)
    2. IP editor "I agree with both of the points(1, and 3)"
    3. DIREKTOR "But "#1" has some grounds to it"
    4. Janjušević "Maybe a new section within the upper half would be best, maybe a heading such as "Root analysis" or "Alternative views" would introduce the details."
    5. FkpCascais "I agree with the concerns of Antidiskriminator, specially the points 1 and 3"
  • I think that other editors who participated in this discussion did not explicitly reject the argument #1 (except one disruptive editor who earned a warning) but requested sources which support it. That is why I supported argument #1 with two sources:
    1. Charles W. Ingrao; Thomas Allan Emmert (15 September 2012). Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative. Purdue University Press. p. 155. ISBN 978-1-55753-617-4. Retrieved 5 June 2013. Some authors, such as Russian historian Elena Guskova and Polish political scientist Marek Waldenberg, blame the West not only for the dissolution, but also for the violent nature of the breakup. 
    2. Matjaž Klemenčić (2003). Raju G. C. Thomas, ed. Yugoslavia unraveled: sovereignty, self-determination, intervention. Lexington Books. p. 254. ISBN 978-0-7391-0517-7. The wars were a "catastrophe that Slobodan Milosevic unleashed" (Tim Judah, Times [London], June 29, 2001). This is comic book history, that follows the standard demonization process, and is refuted by every serious historian dealing with the area (Susan Woodward, Robert Hayden, David Chandler, Lenard Cohen, Raymond Kent, Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup). 
  • You can find the explanation about the purpose of the neutrality tag here: link. The same link and the section below it explains why you should revert yourself and restore the tag you removed.
I hope this clarifies and explains the situation. I am always willing to help. If I made mistake with something I sincerely apologize. All the best! --Antidiskriminator (talk) 16:42, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
Re #1, why don't you write up a nice, neat edit right here on talk so we can discuss it. And post the page number of the source you got it from.. plus a brief quote if you really want to end it all quick. -- Director (talk) 16:54, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
  • The page numbers were already given. I presented the full quotes now. The text of the source num.1 can be also found at this link, p 153.
  • The point here is not a single "nice, neat edit" which would be lost within seven thousand words of this article. I think that this article has serious neutrality problem and needs to be substantially reconstructed. This topic is not within the main scope of my interest so I am uncertain if I am able to do it alone. That requires a team work. That was the purpose of addition of the neutrality tag. To "attract editors with different viewpoints to the article". --Antidiskriminator (talk) 17:40, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
My point was that you should write up an edit. Something you rarely do. And then present the sources that support that specific wording.
This isn't a forum, either propose specific edits or stop wasting users' time with vague complaints. -- Director (talk) 18:38, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
Almost every comment you write to me is unnecessary harsh. That made editing of many articles (including this one) unpleasant for me and discouraged me from further editing. This is my last comment in this talk page. All the best! --Antidiskriminator (talk) 19:13, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
We didn't just meet, Antidiskriminator. I know you like to talk at huge length while avoiding to write up specific edits like the plague for some reason. That's just not a productive way to discuss. -- Director (talk) 19:31, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
What Direktor said. Anti, I don't like personalizing discussions, but I've seen your modus operandi so many times, too: a series of broad and vague complaints on talk pages, without ever offering anything substantial to discuss about. Yes, this article lacks a section about scholarly and political opinions of the ground causes of the breakup. However, this does not make it non-neutral, it just makes it incomplete... like 90% of Wikipedia articles. If you don't like that, try writing one instead of expecting somebody else to do it. Hint: writing isolated sentences about minority opinions in an inappropriate place (2nd sentence of the lead) does not count as a honest attempt. You've wasted so much of your own and our time in this debate, which could be devoted to expanding the article instead.
I plead guilty for tagging the article with "insufficient lead", which it obviously has; to my defense, I've had a lot of RL obligations recently and haven't found the time to address it. But I really plan to, soon. But, no offense, I don't recall you ever trying to address a tag you generously slap on any article. No such user (talk) 20:16, 20 November 2013 (UTC)
Reluctantly, I must agree with No such user and DIREKTOR. bobrayner (talk) 20:25, 20 November 2013 (UTC)

external factors[edit]

The reference Antidiskriminator added,

...is actually quite decent, it's just that we need to report on the entirety of Matjaž Klemenčič's treatise, not just this one sentence. I don't blame No such user for reverting the edit, it was easily considered tendentious. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 19:06, 18 November 2013 (UTC)

Despite not moving the piece, No Such User's concern was the placement of the information which is that is does not belong to the opening lines. In fairness that seems reasonable. I mean yes it could, but the article is written in such a way that as it stands, it appears somewhat out of context. I was looking for somewhere farther down but even I don't know where to place it. Maybe a new section within the upper half would be best, maybe a heading such as "Root analysis" or "Alternative views" would introduce the details. Janjušević (talk) 01:56, 19 November 2013 (UTC) Struck out comments by sockpuppet. bobrayner (talk) 21:52, 26 November 2013 (UTC)
I agree. If No Such User was concerned about the placement of the information they should move it, not remove it, although their opinion about information being minority view is debatable.--Antidiskriminator (talk) 07:38, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
Nope. I'd like to remind you that Wikipedia is not a platform for minority conspiracy theories. All of the reliable mainstream sources as well as the prominent historians are totally agreed that the breakup of Yugoslavia was entirely down to Serb aggression. Cognoscerapo (talk) 14:05, 19 November 2013 (UTC) Struck out comments by sockpuppet. --Joy [shallot] (talk) 14:11, 1 January 2014 (UTC)
That isn't entirely correct. Rather than aggression, its Milosevich's move to reform the country as a Serb-dominated state that directly caused the collapse of Yugoslavia. Before aggression came the grab for dominance, which caused the move towards secession in Croatia, and that caused aggression. By the time any "aggression" came about you already have a secessionist party in place in Croatia, whose ascendancy to power has much to do with fear of Milosevich.
Mostly the collapse of Yugoslavia has to do with the causes for the secession of Croatia, without which a Yugoslav state isn't viable (Croatian secession inexorably carries with it the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina). A Yugoslavia sans Slovenia or Macedonia, or even Montenegro, is still viable, but the secession of Serbia or Croatia inevitably collapses the country (the secession of Bosnia isn't a realistic prospect). -- Director (talk) 14:31, 19 November 2013 (UTC)
Interesting points here. Certainly well analysed on how the structure of a unified Yugoslavia stands but there is slightly more to the breakup than the actions of one party and the desired dominance of one nation. The idea that the other leaders could not continue to operate as part of the same regime leaves a lacuna. That in itself can neither cause nor contribute to the dismantling of a country. Naturally, if the Milošević ideas were unacceptable then war was inevitable. However, the opponents who so believed in a continued state could have expended the very same military effort they used for independence/rebel fighting to fight against loyalists to Milošević. And after all, if "independence" was the answer for them, then surely if would have been for Serbia too (even if it meant taking Serb-populated areas from the other republics). Hindsight is a beautiful thing and every half-intelligent person knows that the Slovenian/Croatian proposals for greater autonomy were a cover-up to "fall out" with Serbia but if they didn't do this, instead opting to fight a civil war akin to Gaddafi's opposition in Libya in 2011, something tells me that Milošević would have fought but would at no time have ever suggested taking Serbia out of the union. Sadly, war ends with conquest, you either win or you lose. But if those delegates honestly believed what they preached before promoting independence, then that's what they would have fought for. You see, Tito's Yugoslavia faced three ideological threats which would have derailed the system enough to oust the regime. Now about Bosnia alone not wanting to go, not so as I shall explain. One threat to SFRJ came from figures within all of the nations living within it apart from Serbs, and these were people within the state and among the diaspora who supported independence for their respective nation; there were Bosniaks too who wanted a Bosnia out of Yugoslavia. One success alone would not have brought an end to the Slavic state (as demonstrated by the fact that Bulgaria didn't become a member despite three times being on the cards), but the attitude was, "I don't care if Yugoslavia exists, as long as my nation isn't in it". But Serbs themselves also found their way to Goli Otok as some of them also posed a threat to Titoism, but as you know it wasn't to break up Yugoslavia, merely to centralise the state or turn in into a one Yugoslav nation-state similar to Italy, Germany and Poland all of whom historically comprise populations as different from each other as Yugoslavia's constituent peoples; more extreme elements would have reintroduced the monarchy. Then of course there was the third ideology not so relevant here which was all for Communist Yugoslavia but a pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact Yugoslavia and these figures (such as Panko Brašnarov) became treacherous to Tito after his own falling out with Stalin. Now to whichever nation and ideology you align yourself, somebody from the others is a radical opponent and you don't represent the same regime. As such, a Yugoslavist who believes even in the loosest of federations is still a Yugoslavist and somebody pushing for his nation's independence is just as treacherous as one lobbying to centralise the state/install a monarch as head of state. Concerning the nations who left Yugoslavia, among them there were long-standing figures who may have been persecuted and incarcerated in SFRJ or who operated below the radar from other countries all for independence of their nation, nobody can accuse these people of hypocrisy. But this doesn't explain how they came to be joined by yesterday's regime figures whose job it had been to suppress the very same movement. Something happened, and there is no ignoring it. --Janjušević (talk) 19:11, 24 November 2013 (UTC) Struck out comments by sockpuppet. bobrayner (talk) 21:52, 26 November 2013 (UTC)

Janjušević my buddy; you said:"...slightly more to the breakup than the actions of one party and the desired dominance of one nation" And I agree with this sentence with the emphasis on slightly, if there wasn't that desire of one nation to dominate whole federation than... Well than who knows what would have been. Surely nationalistic forces wouldn't have had gained that much popularity... But you obviously ignore the internal situation that was developing in the country long before nineties, namely Serb dominated state apparatus, In all republics (except Slovenia)including heavily Serb dominated security apparatus, and so not to exploit that opportunity would actually be very hard for any nation that would have found itself with it. And almost logically - Serbian leadership tried to do so. It's actually quite simple. You mention that other republics did have the option of waging a civil war ala Lybia 2011, with aim of toppling the current federal authority and replacing it with another more attentive to their own interests. Now I really wouldn't like to be arrogant or inappropriate but dude, you should really check out things around you more often, since you seem to have lost it ... The 4th army in Europe was in hands of Serbs, and they have had the full support of the Serbian population that wasn't dis incentivized as were the western Lybians to fight for the government, that they have rightfully perceived as their own. Now territory of Yugoslavia isn't as sparsely populated as is Lybian so that you can advance for hundreds of kilometers unopposed... You stumble on every village that usually has stiff, and determined resistance as a rule. Now for Croatia only to fend off Serb forces and secure it's geostrategic position it took years. Not to mention what would it be like to invade Serbia and somehow "topple" some kind of government that after all these years wasn't even federal any more. Also Slovenia would never support no invasion of Serbia, nor would Muslims in Bosnia or Macedonians - nor Croats would ever have such a stupid idea on their mind in a first place. Easterners did not invade western Lybia, it was their country - different tribe(s) - but same nation still, and there were pockets of resistance to Ghadaffi rule in west too. Do not forget that easterners also got direct western military assistance which Croats or anybody else anti Serbian could have never hoped for in that time. Such scenario was impossible even in the aftermath of the operation Storm. If Americans didn't stopped it and even if the whole Bosnian Posavina fell to the Croat - Muslim alliance such an action would have been impossible. At that time there even was no entity of Tito's Yugoslavia anymore. Now please refrain from "but if these population wasn't so nationalistic blalbla..." because that's out of any meaningful talk. Thank you for your Lybia try it was really imaginative, but ultimately out of rality... cheers.

P.S. I think that Milosevic even said somewhere that his desire is to use Yugoslavian institutions for the creation of Great Serbia... lol why isn't that even obvious to some people even without plainly stating it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 31.147.23.24 (talk) 15:34, 22 April 2014 (UTC)