|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Start-class, Mid-importance)|
The WHOLE article seems like a criticism to essentialism, with almost no charitable account. Maybe someone could rename this page as "criticism of essentialism", or at least try to be less biased. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.108.40.206 (talk) 21:23, 16 July 2011 (UTC)
The article about philosopher Gilles Deleuze links here. Since that article lists Spinoza and Nietzsche as being influenced by essentialism I feel the topic as being too much reduced to harsh social phenomenons like sexism or racism.
- Wikipedia articles are editable by anyone. So you don't have to suggest changes on article talk pages, you can change the article itself. I'd suggest having a quick look at Wikipedia:Welcome, newcomers first though. Cheers, snoyes 16:22, 1 Dec 2003 (UTC)
Plato didn't believe that 'you can define the essence of something by way of a finite list of characteristics', he believed that the essence of something was not definable, but he did believe ideas had essences anyway (this is discussed by Wittgenstein also). People who argue anti-essentialism understand this, but often try to make the case that in order to have an essence something has to be able to have a finite description. I believe the way this article defines the debate is poor; and probably written someone who is against essentialism. brianshapiro 16:51, 4 Sept 2005
From what I've been reading, it is not correct to talk about essentailism if you are just categorizing things - "essences" must result in properties of the object. I changed "An essence characterizes" to "An essence effects". And then changed it back, and rephrased what I ws trying to add. I hope that this is OK. Also, it may be important to note that an essential property of an object is a property the object has in every possible world. Medin and Ortony 1989 might be a good reference for psychological essentailism??
"Feminist" use of Essentialism
I have more or less reverted the below paragraph to let discussion of it take place here in the talk page for NPOV reasons:
In feminism, Yashar Keramati (who is not a well-known figure or authority in feminism and seems to be (ab)using wikipedia to get his/her name out there) understands that essentialism constitutes that women have pre-determined characteristics. This goes beyond simple body parts, those being the sex organs and secondary sex characteristics. Rather, this means that women are born 'emotional,' 'inferior,' 'irrational' and so on. Therefore, essentialism could circulate false information about women which results in lowering their status. Though this necessarily depends upon the value judgements a society adheres to. It also depends upon the supposition that these qualities are negative and don't possess the ability to be sublimated -- just like the lower qualities in the male sex. Essentialism can also be taken to an extreme by characterizing different races in such a way -- though it is true that every school of thought is subject to distortion.
Having had a few quarters in and around the women studies department at Portland State University in Oregon, I have heard more than one instructor and/or PhD use the phrase with reference to sociological essentialism vis-a-vis race and gender roles, so do not think this is an unusual or fringe view within feminism. Can we work this out here on the talk page? Thanks! - Rorybowman 15:46, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
- Okay, I lied. I ended up removing the above paragraph completely (discuss it here) and introducing the nature versus nurture discussion generally in the "essentialism and society" section. The clearest example is, I think, the sociological distinction between biological sex and gender role but other examples exist regarding race and similar social issues. As it relates to essentialism I don't think that this is the place to discuss all the ways the term is used in every conceivable discipline and that the nature versus nurture article nicely gives the flavor of most "controversies" around essentialism. Please discuss. 8^) _Rorybowman 16:00, 8 January 2006 (UTC)
Contemporary proponents of identity politics including feminism, gay rights, and anti-racist activists generally take constructionist viewpoints. However, these proponents have taken various positions including essentialist ones.
Maybe differentiating the kinds of gay rights, feminism etc that actually take constructionist viewpoints would make this sound better.
"... including equity feminists etc etc morally take constructionist viewpoints."
I find the use of generalizing ironic since it is essentialism stance against it!
I quite frankly don't understand why a citation is needed to assert that contemporary feminism rejects essentialism. It absolutely does and is so commonly understood that I think you would be hard pressed to find a source that explicitly says so.220.127.116.11 (talk) 08:08, 4 December 2010 (UTC)
The whole social and political section needs addressing. It needs citations, for one. For two, it needs to be about essentialism in the social sciences/humanities, not "here's what feminists think." That's POV. Even with citations and reworked language (which I did a little of), it would be POV due to undue weighting of one perspective. The last paragraph in the section is a decent example of what the rest of the section could be. Dan Cottrell (talk) 04:23, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
The paragraph here is grossly simplistic and in my view false. The medieval naturalists were not slavish followers of Aristotle - Frederick II in fact criticises Aristotle on natural history (which had only just been translated by Michael Scot), and none of the literature refers to the causal or generative essences of biological species at any time from the classical period until after Darwin. The myth appears to have arisen some time around the centenary of the Origin, in 1959, based on a passing comment in H. W. Joseph's Introduction to Logic in 1916.
There was, and still is, a taxonomic essentialism, in which the defining characters of a species or higher taxon are listed in describing it, but that is not the sort of essentialism attacked in the essentialism story. Types were always "more or less", and what was held to be essential to a species was the ability of the organisms to generate more like them. Morphology was only ever used for identification. I would go so far as to say that biological essentialism doesn't arise until, at the earliest, the 1890s, and probably, due to the ambiguity of the so-called essentialists' writings, not until the mid-1930s (Agnes Arber and H. R. Thompson). In short, it is based on a historical misreading.
Moreover, Aristotle was not a fixist. He accepted new species through hybridisation. Fixism arose in the mid-17th century with John Ray, and it was always based on pitey and doctrine rather than any philosophical foundation.
I now think there never was any kind of constitutive essentialism in biology (it was always a matter of identification or diagnosis). I argue this in my book, coming out this year. Obviously as thi sis my own research I can't put it on this page, but when it is out, someone else might like to address it.
The following sentence is an abomination, and almost impossible to make sense of:
"Mary P. Winsor, Ron Amundson and Staffan Müller-Wille have each argued that in fact the usual suspects (such as Linnaeus and the Ideal Morphologists) were very far from being essentialists, and it appears that the so-called "essentialism story" (or "myth") in biology is a result of conflating the views expressed by philosophers from Aristotle onwards through to John Stuart Mill and William Whewell in the immediately pre-Darwinian period, using biological examples, with the use of terms in biology like species."
I've seen these terms used as rough synonyms for "essentialist," particularly in anthropological study of religion. I wonder if this article, particularly the "Essentialism in history" section, should draw this distinction somewhere. (Much of the article appears to be referring to something other than the Aristotelian essence vs. accident distinction.) From what I gather, monothetic definitions can be either essentialist or functionalist. Also, it's not an easy pejorative, as "essentialist" can be.
Does anyone know about this? --WadeMcR 08:28, 1 November 2006 (UTC)
For what reason was the psychological essentialism deleted? I don't have anything handy to check it with, but it would seem ok.
Given the generalist audience for whom Wikipedia is designed, the All or part of this article may be confusing or unclear tag requires addressing. I therefore added a plain English introduction, and some resources with better readability.--Mgoodyear (talk) 14:15, 3 June 2008 (UTC)
The lead definitely needs work. In particular, I think it overstates the strength of the position, and as noted, it isn't clear. It reads,
- In philosophy, essentialism is the view that, for any specific kind of entity, there is a set of characteristics or properties all of which any entity of that kind must possess. Therefore all things can be precisely defined or described. In this view, it follows that terms or words should have a single definition and meaning.
I don't think this is exactly correct (It's close). The view doesn't necessarily hold for "any specific kind of entity", but a certain set of entities, depending on the particular flavor of essentialism (strong or weak, for example). The SEP article on Essential vs. Accidental Properties says,
- "Essentialism in general may be characterized as the doctrine that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties."
There are other, more specific definitions, e.g.,
- "the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental."
- "(at least some) objects have (at least some) non-trivial essential properties and (at least some) objects have (at least some) accidental properties."
So maybe a simple, clear explanation would be better. The position isn't very obscure, many people seem to hold some form of essentialism (e.g., many people believe something like being a person or not being a lump of clay is essential to who they are). I think the lead right now misleads the reader into thinking its a much weirder or stronger position than it really is.
- "Therefore all things can be precisely defined or described. In this view, it follows that terms or words should have a single definition and meaning."
Although this may be a consequence of essentialism, I think there's reason to doubt its relevance here in the lead. Is this a big thing for essentialists? Is it one of the main features of their view? We might consider removing this part from the lead to increase clarity, since its more likely to confuse than inform, even more so if it's not an important thesis for essentialists.
I understand the role of the first, but not the second "that" in the following sentence: "According to essentialism, a member of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor preclude its membership, but that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects; essences must result in properties of the object." Unfree (talk) 20:57, 28 June 2009 (UTC)
As the word "incidental" is synonymous with "accidental" in this context (for general reader and philosopher alike, I believe), its use in the lead sentence creates a confusing contradiction in terms: "In philosophy, essentialism is the view that, for any specific entity (such as a group of people), there is a set of incidental attributes all of which are necessary to its identity and function." The last clause is thus equivalent to "...there is a set of accidental attributes which are not accidental"!18.104.22.168 (talk) 09:45, 9 April 2013 (UTC)
History of Neoplatonism
It isn't correct that Neoplatonism died out in A.D. 476. Neoplatonic ideas remained central to Latin Christianity until the re-introduction of Aristotle by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Extant parts of Plotinus, and authors influenced by him, were among the most widely-read works during the Middle Ages. Even then we ought to consider that Aquinas, in his Summa Theologiae, quoted Neoplatonic sources as authorities more than he quoted Aristotle. Catholic mystical theology and liturgy, to this day, is very heavily influenced by Neoplatonism. Also, Orthodox and other Eastern Rite Christians have used it continuously to the present, having been little influenced by Aristotle. Marcusscotus1 (talk) 02:45, 5 April 2011 (UTC)(note: dates on Plotinus's birth/death incorrect)
A little bit of Ludwig Wittgenstein
I thought that Ludwig Wittgenstein's ramblings about family resemblence were a critism of and present an alternative to essentialism. "Non-essentialism" just denies essentialism, but Wittgenstein offers a sensible, pragmatic alternative: we group things together when we feel that they bear a family resemblence. --Timtak (talk) 03:17, 19 July 2011 (UTC)
I removed the copyedit tag from the Essentialism and society and politics section. If anyone reviews it and still sees problems they can add it back or bring them up here. HotshotCleaner (talk) 23:21, 2 November 2011 (UTC)