Talk:HMS Tireless (S88)

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Fallen Crewmembers[edit]

I added the names of the crewmen who died, but it's just too complicated to figure out all the tags for citing the reference on Wiki (and I'm a bit lazy). This URL can be used for reference: http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.8513 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.104.144.250 (talk) 08:48, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

Surfacing at the North Pole[edit]

It now reads: On 19 April 2004, Tireless and USS Hampton (SSN-767) rendezvoused under the Arctic ice and surfaced together at the North Pole. Surfacing at the North Pole? Probably a mis-writing, because the North Pole needs more ice-breaking gear to surface, I think? -DePiep (talk) 08:41, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

No see [1]. Justin talk 17:41, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

Cause of explosion[edit]

The text now reads "... were killed in an explosion onboard, apparently caused by an oxygen generator candle in the forward section of the submarine. " This still leaves a degree of uncertainty. On June 12 2008 the UK MoD published the Board of Inquiry (BOI) report detailing the results of its inquiry. This leaves not much room for uncertainty since Self Contained Oxygen Generators (SCOG's) are clearly identified as having caused the explosion. BTW, the redacted BOI report can be can be downloaded here from the UK MoD website: [2]

I just thought this would be a valuable addition to this wikipage.

I am new to the editing of wiki pages. Any help will be appreciated.

I am unfamiliar with how to implement these changes, other that discuss the possibility to include new text and references, as I did above.

Yours sincerely,

WikiPyroEngineer —Preceding unsigned comment added by WikiPyroEngineer (talkcontribs) 12:04, 9 May 2010 (UTC)

Serious?[edit]

Serious struck me as a WP:PEACOCK term and as a recent change I've challenged it. My understanding was that the leak itself was minor and contained by the safety systems on board and that the crew's actions prevented any serious consequence. As written it implies a dangerous leak of radioactive material which didn't occur and its therefore misleading. Repeatedly removing a fact tag against contentious material is not helpful. We have a talk page if you have concerns. Justin talk 12:48, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

Ref 2 looks clear to me. The ref said the fault was serious, & the RN reacted accordingly. Yes, you should have taken it to the talk page, rather than repeating your edit. David Biddulph (talk) 12:56, 24 May 2010 (UTC)
Indeed, the reference attached is pretty straightforward:
The fault in the reactor primary circuit of Tireless was first detected by the leak-before-break systems on board the submarine when she was submerged. The leak was located in the immediate locality of the welded pintle tee-junction of the pressuriser surge pipe and the main outlet pipe feeding from the reactor to one of the steam generators. The reactor was shut down following prescribed procedures, and the leakage rate estimated. It was then decided at high level within Ministry of Defence (MoD) and communicated back to the boat that the reactor could be restarted and the boat continue nuclear operations. However, after a few hours of running the leakage increased to an intolerable rate, suggesting rapid development of the leakage path, so much so that the nuclear plant was shut down again with the primary circuit being progressively depressurised whilst Tireless made for the Port of Gibraltar under her standby diesel plant.
If the fault had been allowed to develop further then Tireless would have been at very real risk of catastrophic failure of the surge pipe junction which, being located inboard of the primary circuit isolation valves, could allow the reactor pressure vessel to rapidly depressurise and starve of coolant. Uncontrolled loss of coolant at this locality could have resulted in boiling of the coolant remaining in the reactor vessel, overheating of the nuclear fuel (even with the nuclear process shut down because of the continuing residual heat from fuel decay), the possibility of fuel melting and, in the a radioactive release within a few minutes.
The challenge for the forensic analysis was that the inspections had to be undertaken in a radioactive environment, with the sources of radioactivity being deposited layers of radioactive crud4 adhering to the inner surfaces of the pipework, together with the intensely radioactive fuel core that could not be removed, having to remain in situ within a meter or so of the fault location. In ideal circumstances, the investigation and repairs would have been completed in a refit dockyard, such as Devonport, where the fuel could have been removed and the magnetite-based crud scoured out by an acid etch solution.
Moreover, work in earnest could not begin until the decay heat in the fuel core had reduced sufficiently to permit the reactor primary circuit to be drained down to a level to empty the main pipe at the pressuriser junction and isolate it by insertion of an inflatable bladder.5 For the reactor fuel to sufficiently decay to reach thermal rollover, the point in time at which the residual heat could be dissipated by natural heat loss, 40 days passed during which very little non-destructive and no intrusive examination could be undertaken. However, there was a great deal to do during this period, particularly in developing the nuclear safety case between the navy’s nuclear regulator (CNNRP)6 and the design authority (Rolls Royce Marine), and the Expert Panel of specialists7 acting on behalf of the Government of Gibraltar had to be satisfied that the in-port repair and eventual restart of the reactor would be safe (of acceptably low risk).
In fact, throughout this cool down and preparatory period the assumption had been that the fault was a single crack originating and confined within the pintle weld, that had grown from a flaw overlooked in the original build NDE radiographed certification of the weld and, importantly, that for the repair it would be sufficient to remove and replace just the pintle of the smaller diameter pressuriser surge pipe. However, once access for an in-pipe cctv viewing system had been established, the cracking was discovered to be very much more extensive, comprising two distinct centimetres long vertical fractures originating in the parent metal of the larger primary circuit pipework, and spreading upwards and outwards into the wall of the main pipe and pintle weld. The extent of the cracking required approximately one-quarter of the uppermost section of the primary circuit pipe at the cracked junction to be trepanned out resulting in the need for a complete in situ reconstruction of the surge pipe junction.
The qualifier is more than supported by a reliable source.
Last, but not least: User:Justin A Kuntz really should avoid editing "articles concerning the history, people, and political status of Gibraltar, broadly construed".
This paragraph: "In May 2000, Tireless developed a serious leak in the nuclear reactor primary cooling circuit. The nuclear propulsion system was shut down and using backup diesel power Tireless made way to Gibraltar. The damage was found to be more extensive than first hoped, and the boat remained at Gibraltar, creating diplomatic tensions between Spain and Britain, until she left on 7 May 2001, nearly a year later following extensive repairs. During that year, all Trafalgar-class submarines were inspected for similar problems" is not an exception. If this editor persists, please point it out to any admin. Cremallera (talk) 19:11, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

Justin, I do see your point that the current wording could be construed as a leak to the environment. I will look at rewording it, but am busy for a couple of days. I was just looking for most concise wording for a leak that the source says was a "serious fault". We probably need something longer. Rwendland (talk) 01:00, 26 May 2010 (UTC)

Thank you for listening, and it is of no relevance to my topic ban. My suggestion was simply to say it was a potentially serious leak but the safety systems alerted the crew before it became dangerous and no radioactivity was released to the environment - all of which is supported by the quoted source. And before a false allegation of a COI is made, yes I work for BAE Systems on the installation of Aster missiles on the Type 45, nothing to do with nuclear submarines. Justin talk 08:13, 26 May 2010 (UTC)