Talk:Idealism

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Alternative Phrasing[edit]

Would it not be more appropriate to rephrase? :

Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism is approximately as to whether the substance of the world is at base mental or physical — it has nothing to do with thinking that things should be idealized, or with coveting goods.)

As:

Note that this contrast between idealism and materialism is approximately as to whether the substance of the world is at base meta-physical or physical — it has nothing to do with thinking that things should be idealized, or with coveting goods.)
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I don't see why that change from "mental" to "meta-physical" is useful. "Meta-physical" carries a lot more connotations than does "mental". Why do you think the change is needed? 67.79.7.18 (talk) 21:18, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

Restructuring of article[edit]

Might I suggest a new way of organizing the article? Let me know what you think of this hierarchy and sequence of sections, and feel free to criticize my understanding of the terms involved:

  1. Asian idealism
    1. Yogācāra
  2. Early European idealism
    1. Neoplatonism
  3. Modern European idealism
    1. Subjective idealism: Reality is a cluster of different minds' immediate experiences, which aren't necessarily unified in any absolute mind, nor do they exist prior to anyone becoming aware of them.
      1. Phenomenalism: Reality is nothing but our own experiences, and the possibility of such experiences.
    2. Transcendental idealism: Mind-independent reality exists but is unknowable, because our experience is generated by our cognitive apparatus.
    3. Objective idealism: There is an objectively knowable universe 'out there' in some strong sense, which exists before we come to perceive it; but this universe is inextricably bound up with objectively existent mental or spiritual structure.
      1. Absolute idealism: There is some singular, all-encompassing mental entity of which all individual minds are merely aspects.
      2. Pluralistic idealism and panpsychism: There is a fundamentally and constitutively mental dimension to a plurality of distinct and discrete mind-independent objects.
  4. Idealism in the philosophy of science

Am I missing anything? Conflating or divorcing anything overmuch? -Silence (talk) 06:37, 23 November 2011 (UTC)

Berkeley[edit]

Berkeley was not a subjective idealist. That idea has been refuted many, many times. GeneCallahan (talk) 00:09, 8 February 2012 (UTC)

Berkeley was a subjective idealist you obviously may be confused on this issue, refuted many, many times? Are you joking? I have read 100s of books about Berkeley, see the works on Berkeley by A. A. Luce. Luce spent most of his life studying the philosophy of Berkeley and even Luce classified him as a subjective idealist. GreenUniverse (talk) 15:35, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

Yogacara Buddhism[edit]

I found the inclusion of Yogacara Buddhism in the lede to be intriguing, and I wanted to ask if anyone had a source on comparing it Idealism. The interesting point here is that Yogacara was a major influence on Zen Buddhism, where I think there may be an even stronger comparison to be made. Right now, the sentence places Yogacara in contrast to other religious idealism, and I would like to discuss whether that is wholly accurate as well. Anyone interested in a comparative discussion here? —Zujine|talk 14:14, 21 May 2012 (UTC)

90.245.0.125 uncited discussion of Bertrand Russell moved here[edit]

User 90.245.0.125 has reversed the current meaning of the section on Bertrand Russell's discussion of idealism, but with no citations given to support this view and it reads as a personal diatribe. I have reverted these changes and copied them here- if anyone has references to an analysis of a similar viewpoint, then such a discussion could be added as a *separate* paragraph. 121.45.223.217 (talk) 21:56, 24 February 2013 (UTC)

Added text follows (first paragraph only- see history for additional paragraphs)" Bertrand Russell's popular book The Problems of Philosophy highlights how philosophers of the second rank commonly misunderstand Berkeley and his reasoning. Russell claims, "If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either un-duly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by 'in the mind' the same as by 'before the mind', i.e. if we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'idea'-i.e. the objects apprehended-must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever. Hence his grounds in favour of the idealism may be dismissed."