Talk:Models of scientific inquiry
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Notes & Queries
Jon Awbrey 11:00, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
JA: This article arose as an offshoot of the article on scientific method when it became clear that the section of different models of scientific explanation was about to expand beyond what would fit comfortably in that space. It is not primarily about the different types of inference, as we already have numerous articles devoted to those, and so it will be necessary to make only incidental mention of those topics and issues here. Jon Awbrey 12:42, 1 May 2006 (UTC) bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbtttttttttttttt
this article is messed up
A model of scientific inquiry has two functions, first, to provide a descriptive account of how scientific inquiry is carried out in practice, second, to provide an explanatory account of why scientific inquiry succeeds as well as it appears to do in arriving at genuine knowledge of its objects. money and cheese header 1 header 2 header 3 row 1, cell 1 row 1, cell 2 row 1, cell 3 row 2, cell 1 row 2, cell 2 row 2, cell 3
What is reference for Salmon, 1990?
Some of the text cites Salmon, 1990. Does anyone know wheter this refers to the following book chapter?
Wesley C. Salmon, 'Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes,' pg. 175-204. In: C. Wade Savage (ed.), "Scientific Theories," University of Minnesota Press, 1990. ISBN 0816618011, 9780816618019
Black box experiments and models/modeling
Looking for something to feed one of my students, I checked Wikipedia for a couple of related ideas that are mentioned in The Philosophy of Science by Philipp Frank. One of the difficulties pertaining to some topics in science is that it is possible to know inputs into an experimental apparatus and to measure outputs from that experimental apparatus, but it is for some reason impossible to get any pertinent data from within the apparatus that is any different from the inputs and the outputs. In other words, the experimental apparatus functions as a "black box" that is impenetrable to the researchers. Faced with that situation, the researchers may then imagine various possible processes that could be going on within the box and that would plausibly explain the outputs observed. These activities are often described in terms of "models," and some have described the accounts of what presumably goes on within the black box as "convenient fictions."
In a culture where science is often discounted by ordinary voters "because they tell us one thing is true one year and reverse themselves the next year," it is very important to convey to the average citizen that science does not promise true statements but a collection of theories, conclusions, etc. that have been well supported by repeated experiments yet might turn out to be falsified by the next experiment. Giving greater prominence to the provisional nature of "models" and "convenient fictions" could be very helpful. (Note also, however, that ideas can get distorted as has the idea of "black swans.")P0M (talk) 21:21, 27 October 2009 (UTC)
unsourced statement at beginning of article
The following is currently at the start of the article: "Such accounts tend to reflect different philosophical positions in epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge." There is no reference to justify this. As best I can understand this I think it means that the various approaches to scientific models are divided along lines of epistemology. I'm not sure what that means but its nothing I've ever heard regarding scientific models and I don't think it belongs here unless someone can come up with a good reference. I plan to change it unless someone wants to discuss. MadScientistX11 (talk) 01:41, 31 July 2013 (UTC)