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This article should include its among critics, "Turks who want to go to war Greece" and "Greeks who want to go to war with Turkey". The point being can something not be said for NATO keeping the peace in Europe (among its member states) for the last seventy years?
The first sentence of your comment doesn't make grammatical sense so I'm not sure what you're driving at. Are you trying to argue that NATO has preserved the peace between Greece and Turkey? That's a very superficial argument, because I have to ask: "At what cost?" Turkey expelled vast numbers of Greeks in 1955, attempted to invade Cyprus in 1964 and 1967, did invade in 1974 under American cover, and has made an ever-increasing number of territorial claims against Greece since the 1970s. Sure, there technically hasn't been a war over this, but if you ask the Greek people whether NATO has helped their cause, I suspect the majority will tell you squarely "no", because NATO is perceived there (quite rightly, I think) to be supportive of Turkey. Therefore the Greek state spends large amounts on a very large military to defend against what should be an ally, and when there are incidents (some of which have cost lives), the resolution is always against Greece's interests. This enforced "peace" is hardly beneficial. It has just emboldened Turkey over the years (which is why their claims have become more elaborate) and has led to a stagnant status quo in which Greece cannot find solutions to any of its territorial problems. In this context, I would suggest to you that the lack of outright war between the two countries since NATO's formation does not mean a big war isn't in the cards at some point in the future. It may come, it may not. Certainly there will continue to be a steady blood-letting until the substantive issues actually get resolved. So.... how do you want to incorporate THAT in the article? ;) 188.8.131.52 (talk) 01:57, 12 December 2014 (UTC)
Non-NATO member nations of the EU have a sui generis partnership relationship with NATO distinct from and more significant than the other Partnership for Peace nations. The EU itself is a significant and multifaceted partner of NATO. The two organizations have an extensive web of bilateral obligations and cooperations. 
Sweden and Finland are approaching de facto NATO membership. The evolution of this relationship has accelerated since the Ukraine War. Opinion polls in both countries now favor official NATO membership.  NATO distinguishes Sweden's relationship as unparalleled among partners, "Sweden (has) reached a new level of partnership, which has no parallels among partner states."  Russia has recognized the acceleration of ties between Sweden, Finland and NATO and warned against official membership. 
Austria has increased its ties to NATO over and above those that exist through the EU-NATO treaties as well as Austria's Partnership for Peace obligations. 7o62x39 (talk) 15:22, 31 October 2014 (UTC)
"there are diverging views on whether negotiators gave commitments regarding further NATO expansion east"
I think this sentence was written without fully reading or understanding the text given as the source. Apart from the "non-information" in this quote it is not the essence of Elise Sarotte's article.
Sarotte's article is the answer to the question she puts forward at the beginning: "What, exactly, had been agreed about the future of NATO? Had the United States formally promised the Soviet Union that the alliance would not expand eastward as part of the deal?" and she has two answers:
a) "The evidence demonstrates that contrary to the conventional wisdom in Washington, the issue of NATO’s future in not only East Germany but also eastern Europe arose soon after the Berlin Wall opened, as early as February 1990. U.S. officials, working closely with West German leaders, hinted to Moscow during negotiations that month that the alliance might not expand, not even to the eastern half of a soon-to-be-reunited Germany." Most of her detailed analysis deals with the newly revealed and formerly secret documents that prove the promises given to Gorbatschow and Sarotte reveals also the motives behind the different moves (reunification, Bush's policies, Gorbatschow's economic problems etc.). All of this seems to be, at least to me, quite new information, based on facts, not on points of view, claryfying the question of how, by whom, why and for what purpose, the eastward expansion of NATO had been prepared, thereby intentionally ignoring Russian interests, their wish even to join NATO or a pan-European security system.
b) Sarotte's second answer is that there has never been a formal written agreement. So, in referring to Sarotte as a valuable source to the question whether there had been a promise or not, it would be misleading to simply write she states "diverging views", because doing so would mean withholding the very essence of her analysis.
Apart from the two answers ("Yes, there were purposeful and partly well-meant oral promises to Gorbatschev to get him to approve of reunification"; "No, there was no formal agreement") she presents a very interesting conclusion: Even if you cannot charge the US/EU of a broken formal promise it is understandable that the effect of what Sarotte says ("U.S. officials and their West German counterparts had expertly outmaneuvered Gorbachev") was a deep mistrust and bitterness on the Russian side, containing "the seeds of a future problem" (Baker).
If, as I hope, my analysis of Sarotte's article should be convincing, I would propose to cut out the meaningless phrase stating "diverging views" and replace by something like that: "... due to resarch into formerly secret documents, there are clear proofs of oral promises given by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Kohl and James Baker not to expand the NATO "one inch eastward". The sentence as it is now is not based on the subject of the text indicated in the source. Gabel1960 (talk) 21:07, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 27 February 2015
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This is actually a little tricky. NATO doesn't include Colombia on its list of "Partners across the globe," but Colombia did sign an "Agreement on Security of Information" in 2013 that was described as a "partnership." This has since become political in Colombia, as the congress there rejected the president's proposed "communication alliance" with NATO last year that would be another step toward closer ties. So I'm not sure where this stands now, and whether we should limit the map/chart here to just the countries on NATO's list, or include one like Colombia that has other agreements with NATO.-- Patrick, oѺ∞ 18:08, 27 February 2015 (UTC)
Budget and comparison to other countries'military spendings
Seems like a relevant yet to be developed chapter? Kick off: