|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Start-class, Mid-importance)|
|WikiProject Neuroscience||(Rated Start-class, Mid-importance)|
I could use some help with this if anyone wants to contribute. KSchutte 20:38, 10 July 2005 (UTC)
Clean up and Elaboration
This page needs a lot of cleaning up and elaboration. At the moment, everything posted here is pure speculation. The links and available information posted are inadequate to prove that this is in fact a scientific field of study at all. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jansandaas (talk • contribs) 19:23, 19 September 2008 (UTC)
"This scientific approach contrasts strongly with idealism, and/or the appeal to the existence of a Platonic soul that thinks, feels and desires." This is a complete misrepresentation of philosophy of mind proponents contrary to neurophilosophy. 18.104.22.168 (talk) 00:22, 15 October 2008 (UTC) 22.214.171.124 (talk) 00:21, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
It's technically accurate. Theories in neurophilosophy do contrast with idealism (nature of reality is based on minds and ideas) as well as Plato's dualism (the immaterial soul/mind is separate from the material body). I agree that it sounds a little biased, so I'm going to take out "scientific", which is implicitly arguing that the facts support neurophilosophy (which may be true, but is beyond the scope of this sentence about contrasts between the approaches). Hopefully this resolves the minor NPOV issue. (It's important to have that contrast; all such contrasts are fundamental if you're taking university-level philosophy of mind, so it should be included in the article.) DoItAgain (talk) 14:10, 16 February 2010 (UTC)
Neurophilosophy and the Churchland's: Planned Update
I second the idea that neurophilosophy is not in contention with any philosophy of the soul. There aren't any serious 21st century philosophers contending that there is a soul or that it is the source of free will. Neurophilosophy is largely aligned against functionalist theories of cognitive philosophy that want to make use of our folk psychology (our intuitive understanding of things like beliefs and desires). Dennett refers to it as the intentional stance. In fact, I don't think Daniel Dennett should be listed here as a proponent of neurophilosophy either; he is mainly a functionalist. Neurophilosophy is an eliminative reductionist position that contends (in brief) that folk psychology is not a theory and is not true; that the only useful language that can come about to discuss mental states will be one based on an understanding of the fundamental physical characteristics of the brain. I'm currently reading the Churchlands' works and if no one objects I would definitely like to fix this page a bit. Another excellent resource on this matter (for anyone who would like to contribute) is the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (consider reading this passage on eliminative materialism - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/)
- Yes, Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland are more relevant figures than Dennett to neurophilosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a great source. By all means please edit this article. I'll do my best to pitch in over the next few weeks. Shanata (talk) 14:10, 11 March 2009 (UTC)
I have added some bits and removed others where I found it necessary. I think I am able to justify these removals, so please inquire if you feel something of the old text is missing.
Prominence of philosophers is redundant and often highly subjective. A list of names has been provided instead.
The rewrite also includes an attempt at adressing the POV dispute. The eliminative materialist view has been eliminated from the article. It is not a central tenet to the philosophy of neuroscience. It may be added later though as an example of a particular viewpoint. Dualist neurophilosophers do exist, for instance: John Carew Eccles. The notice has been kept though.