|This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Off-the-Record Messaging article.|
|This article is of interest to the following WikiProjects:|
Move to "Off-the-Record Messaging" (caps)
I think the article should be moved back to a capitalized title, "Off-the-Record Messaging", as the article documents a specific encryption protocol, not "off the record messaging" in general; "Off-the-Record" is merely a name. All official sources also capitalize the name. Any agreements/disagreements? -- intgr 09:11, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
You are right. --Liebeskind 19:47, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
OTR - Deniable encryption?
As far as I can tell, OTR doesn't have deniable encryption, just deniable authentication. I think the article intro should be changed in accordance with the Implementation section, which has it correct. Unless, of course, a cryptographer can explain otherwise. — metaprimer (talk) 12:48, 16 September 2007 (UTC)
Instead of complicated computer jargon, I tried to explain the difference between OTR and ordinary cryptography software using a picture of signed writing v. private conversation. Seems more understandable to me. Ceplm (talk) 21:17, 13 March 2008 (UTC)
- For Gajim (http://gajim.org/) OTR support has been introduced in the development version (http://trac.gajim.org/wiki/OTR) and will probably soon be availiable with a coming release.
- For Psi there exists a plugin: http://public.tfh-berlin.de/~s717689/ Currently you need to patch Psi, but this will allegedly vanish with continuing development of the plugin interface.
These two implementations are not yet stable but will become so. I don't know how to best insert this into the article conforming to Wikipedia standards, since this is no "install and use" kind of software yet. I consider it important, because these two are the most popular and feature rich jabber clients (note I have no hard evidence, though). --188.8.131.52 (talk) 21:15, 25 May 2008 (UTC)
Somehow I do not understand the example picture, there are 2 windows on one machine (they have a common background) and they should be the same conversation - one "normal" the other "raw". But why is in the raw only macskeeball speaking, and why are there 6 messages and in the normal only 2 from him and 3 from "me"
majority of cryptography tools indicate topic?
Quoting from the 2nd paragraph: "This is in contrast with the majority of cryptography tools which resemble more a signed writing on paper, which can be later used as a record to demonstrate the communication event, the participants, and the topic of communication."
- The topic isn't recorded but it could be used to surmise evidence. For example, if a suspected terrorist has their hard drive seized, encrypted communications found on it could be used in court as evidence suggestive of plotting, especially if the date and other participants are also suggestive... I've changed it to "possible evidence of the topic of communication." ··gracefool☺ 01:19, 12 May 2011 (UTC)
origin of the name
- Its name is a reference to a convention in journalism. Say a politician wants to discuss something controversial with a journalist, without being recorded, transcribed, or having what he says published. He first requests to speak "off the record". It's a matter of convention, which has existed for many decades before OTR Messaging was invented, but journalists generally hold conventions pretty high. There are exceptions, though.
- It's "off-the-record" because, after the conversation has taken place, it can't be proven that any single person has sent any single message, because they might have just as well been forged (see how the article describes 'deniable authentication'). Another reason it might be called 'off-the-record' is because there is, in most scenarios, no central authority that keeps record of the cleartext messages as they arrive. That's because of the perfect forward secrecy - the server relaying the message can't see what's being said. Even if a key were to be found, previous conversations would not be compromised. One key is used for each message.
- In this way, nobody can know what is being said, apart from the participants in the conversation. After the conversation happens, and one party leaks the conversation, it's not possible to pin what was said in the conversation on any party, because the messages might as well have been forged, because it's possible to do so with the deniable authentication.
- All this is already mentioned in the article. --BurritoBazooka (talk) 01:36, 9 May 2013 (UTC)