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the sources quoted as saying that SAS were used to detect indon forces moving into Sab/Sar so that they could be ambushed in Kalimantan or on the border is nonsense, suggest the quoted sources don't geddit. For starters it was impossible time-wise (particularly if they were adhering to the golden rules about 2 wks planning and reheasal!). It's likely they're confusing SAS xborder recce with detection of indon forces who had entered sab/sar and the rapid deployment of ambush and other patrols into likely areas by helicopter. Such detection was actually more likely by locals and Border Scouts than by SF. The nearest SF might get to spotting impending incursions would be through sustained recce and recognising when the Indon pattern of routine behavior changed in a particular place, this would then need to be intelligence assesed. Pocock makes clear that Walker was planning clarets to keep the indons off balance on the entire length of the border, he was not responding to hints of impending offensivce action by and against particular indon units. If the quotes are correct then I don't think Dennis, etc, are reliable sources.Nfe (talk) 11:23, 3 August 2009 (UTC)