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Connecting this issue to Bostrom's Simulation Argument is uncited. The citations given contain nothing about the Fermi Paradox, and in my previous reading about the SimArg and web search before making this edit, Bostrom never links them. He discusses the FermiP in the context of the Great Filter, etc.
And in any case, the SimArg is a particular argument for the Simulation hypothesis; the SimArg in its particular detail would be hard to connect to the FermiP at all.
As best i understand it without current access to Baxter's paper, the point of the PlanetariumHyp is that we ourselves (and some of our environment?) are not simulated; it is our experience of the "outside" universe (where that begins isn't clear) that is simulated. Hence the image of a planetarium. Thus much of even SimHyp is irrelevant.
I removed the Bryce/quantum information because, though the source does mention Baxter/PlanetHyp, Bryce's material about quantum phenomenon as a test of being in a simulation is not clearly related to the PlanetHyp. Obviously not in the case that worldly (quantum and other) experiments are not simulated, but only astronomical data.