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[edit] Background
The main article has notes which may mislead readers and researchers. It would be desireable to take the following points into account when revising the article as has been suggested --
- Location – Aksai Chin lies between Xinjiang region of China to the north, Tibet to the east and south and the state of Jammu and Kashmir of India to the west. The eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border stretches from Bhutan in the east to Burma in the east with Tibet to the north and the state of Arunachal Pradesh of India to the south.
- Background – The dispute arose not over the issue of “sovereignty” of Aksai Chin as is claimed, but over the alignment of the border between Tibet and the Aksai chin region of Kashmir, and the northern border of Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet (although China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was part of its territory while India – and earlier the Ahom kingdom of Assam - had exercised political and administrative control over this area since long)
- The Johnson Line – To quote George Patterson that the Indian evidence on the boundary was “dubious” is to overlook entirely the documentation by L. Petech, Dr. Alistair Lamb, Margaret Fisher, Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh and other authorities. Their findings should also be quoted.
- The Macmahon Line – For about 30 years prior to the Simla Agreement of 1914 there had been wars and skirmishes between Tibet and China on the eastern provinces of Tibet and the Simla Conference was held to settle to borders between Tibet and China. British India, Tibet and China sent ambassadors with plenipotentiary powers for the Simla Conference and a tripartite agreement was initialed and sealed by all three. Within 48 hours China repudiated this Agreement (which was to have settled the Outer Tibet-Inner Tibet boundary between Tibet and China) for reasons best known to them and thus forfeited any right to participate or intervene in the subsequent India-Tibet Agreement on the border (the Macmahon Line). The issue was whether in the preceding 30 years (or for that matter the preceding 50 years) and in 1914 China had exercised any sovereignty or suzerainty over Tibet. For all practical purposes, China had little or no influence on the policies and administration in Tibet in that period.
- Tibet and the Border Dispute – At least three times between 1870’s and 1914, the British Indian administration tried to get Tibet and China to discuss and settle the boundary and to arrange for its demarcation. These efforts futile. Leaving aside the issue if the Tibetan people wanted “liberation”, the point of note is that from about 1870s till 1951 when the Peoples Republic of China entered Tibet under an Agreement for “Peaceful Liberation” there was peace and tranquility on the Macmahon Line and in Aksai Chin. The problems started since about 1954/55 when China started to build a road from Xinjiang to Tibet through a portion of Aksai Chin without consulting or even informing India in what was an undemarcated boundary. India’s reasoning fell on deaf ears and China then raised the issue of the Macmahon Line and claimed that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was within its territory. The rest is history.
Pidiji (talk) 03:21, 10 November 2011 (UTC)
- I think the focus on the border dispute aspect of the war is misdirected. Mao wasn't interested in the Johnson Line or NEFA. This war was one of a series of international crises that he provoked to strengthen his hand domestically. So he didn't need much of a pretext in terms of territory or treaties. The McMahon line issue applied equally to Burma, so why India? Mao had a grudge against Nehru because India had given the Dalai Lama sanctuary in 1959. In July 1962, Washington told Beijing that Taiwan would no longer conduct major military operations against the mainland. So a brief window of opportunity opened for Mao. The timing of the attack was determined by the need to act before India received MiG-21s from Russia. Kauffner (talk) 11:03, 14 November 2011 (UTC)
- About the other states that inherited the McMahon line, China resolved its border issue with Burma in October 1960, and with Nepal one year later, in both cases with China giving up the vast majority of the disputed land. China was also willing to recognize India's control of South Tibet (a bigger and more populous territory) in return for India's recognition of Chinese control in Aksai Chin. There Nehru declined and "the rest is history". Quigley (talk) 19:52, 14 November 2011 (UTC)
- China has accepted the McMahon Line as a "line of actual control" all along. So Zhou was asking India to drop its claim to Aksai Chin in exchange for nothing. Nehru presented a map with the McMahon Line on it to Zhou at the 1954 conference, and there was no objection. In 1956, Zhou stated that China had no claims on Indian-controlled territory. But when the military balance shifted, nothing that had been agreed to earlier mattered to Mao. There were some border incidents in 1959. These convinced Mao that a large-scale offensive was feasible. So when Zhou visited India in 1960 and made his offer, the Chinese army was already preparing for war. Kauffner (talk) 00:44, 15 November 2011 (UTC)
[edit] Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai rumour is uncited and likely wrong
Please read this Indian Express article. It states that Nehru found the hindi chini bhai bhai idea stupid and did not trust the Chinese one bit. “So, GP, when has the foreign office told you Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai? Don’t you believe it. I don’t trust the Chinese one bit, despite Panchsheel and all that. The Chinese are arrogant, devious, hypocritical and thoroughly unreliable,” the diary entry says, quoting Nehru during the meeting on March 18, 1958.[1] --71.17.188.133 (talk) 19:48, 18 December 2011 (UTC)
[edit] Background
The "Talk" has highlighted different points of view about the "Background". The point has been made that China has recognised the McMahon Line between Tibet and the state of Arunachal Pradesh of India (some have in fact named this Indian portion of territory as "South Tibet" - on what basis or authority is unknown)as the Line of Actual Control and in return has sought India's recogniton of China's control over Aksai Chin. The Points for consideration are (a) whether China was able at all to excerise suzerainty over Tibet between 1870 and 1950 - that is to be able to guide, influence or exert any real authority over Tibet's policies and administration in any significant fashion over these 80 years (published historical records do not suggest this) ; (b) if at all China did exercise this suzerainty over Tibet then why the skirmishes and fights between CVhinese and Tibetan forces on the Tibet's eastern borders with China between 1900 and 1918, by which time the Republican Revolution had swept China under Sun-Yat-sen and Yuan-Shih-kai? (c) what is the validity of "plenipotentiary powers" granted to an ambassdor (here, Ambassador Ivan Chen of China) if his givernment repudiates the agreement initialled and sealed as happened at Simla in 1914? (d) whether it was proper diplomatic and friendly practice for China to occupy the territory in Aksai Chin that has been known since about early 19th century (but not demarcated), build a road there to suit its strategic purposes and then to claim a trade-off with reconition of the McMahon Line in return for Indian recognition of "actual control" by China of portions of Aksai Chin? Such a step would be like a "bazaar trade" and not be in accordance with established history, records, practice and customs. Pidiji (talk) 03:20, 23 December 2011 (UTC)
- My view is that the pre-1950 stuff should be deleted and that the "Background" section should focus on 1959-1962. The highway issue certainly deserves a mention, but I find the war-for-the-highway theory to be quite a stretch. Now the narrative begins in 1834, which gets us even further afield. Kauffner (talk) 04:06, 23 December 2011 (UTC)
[edit] Background
Deleting the pre-1950 stuff is one way to handle this, but it would take the moves by India and China in the post 1950 period out-of-context. Because the claims and counter-claims are rooted in history. It may be more informative to readers to provide reference material from a wider range of sources such as L. Petech (on Tibetan history and its relations with India and China), Dr. Alastair Lamb, Dorothy Woodman, Report on the Officials of India and the Peoples Republic of China February 1961, Charles Bell, K.S. Latourette (Chinese history), The Cambridge History of China, Amar Kaur jasbir Singh and others. It needs to be kept in mind that prior to 1911, China was under an Emperor with its distinctive administrative system, from 1912 to 1940 when China was affected by a number of local war-lords and the invasion by Japan, between 1942 and 1949 when it was an ally in the war against Japanese militarism in the east, and that after 1949, China has been under the Communist Party of China.Pidiji (talk) 02:09, 26 December 2011 (UTC)
[edit] New section
The article seems to be written by some pro-chinese folks and tells a one sided story and hence grossly incorrect. I wonder how wikipedia is fine with it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 117.195.43.213 (talk) 11:03, 1 February 2012 (UTC)
- I did a quick check on the 74 sources quoted in the article: there are about 40 or so Western sources, 30 or so Indian, and 2 or 3 Chinese sources. How can you tell a one-sided Chinese story with barely any Chinese source? --Zanhe (talk) 01:22, 2 February 2012 (UTC)
[edit] Sources for Article
There have many sources about the immediate cause of the Sino-Indian cionflict and its immediate fall-out, etc. But fewer sources have been mentioned about the historical background and differences in perception on either side that gradually built up to the conflict. It has been mentioned by some that there are many Western sources, some Indian sources but few Chinese sources cited for the article and the "Talk" section. This may be due to linguistic problem or a politcal or diplomatic problem. The lack of more Chinese sources has been observed and remarked on by several in the "Talk" in the last 2-3 years. Whether such Chinese sources would add anything basically to the present knowledge of the origins and causes of the conflict is a moot point; as they may well be expected unreservedly to put forward the Chinese view-point. But still we may get know their view point better. Lets give it a try! - Pidiji (talk) 02:54, 16 February 2012 (UTC)
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