|WikiProject Game theory||(Rated Start-class, Low-importance)|
suggest another diagram
"But occasionally players who defect against cooperators are punished for their defection. For instance, if the expected punishment is -2, then the imposition of this punishment turns the above prisoner's dilemma into the stag hunt given at the introduction."
It would be helpful to see the result of the -2 applied to the PD diagram - I can't quite understand the argument, but a diagram would really help. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 184.108.40.206 (talk) 06:30, 29 January 2010 (UTC)
Douglas Hofstadter's "Wolf's Dilemma" is essentially the same problem, but with many players(usually around 30) instead of just two. Any thoughts on whether this should be mentioned on this page? I'm inclined to add some lines about it, but I'm not sure the what the consensus on noteworthiness would be. --220.127.116.11 22:41, 9 September 2007 (UTC)
- This is just another name for the same thing, if you're describing it correctly. Rousseau's original example was not supposed to be a 2-player interaction (the idea is that you need to have a bunch of guys surrounding a stag so that whichever way it runs its surrounded!) 18.104.22.168 (talk) 04:08, 28 May 2009 (UTC)
"The stag hunt differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma in that the greatest potential payoff is both players cooperating, whereas in the prisoners Dilemma, the greatest payoff is in one player cooperating, and the other defecting." This statement is poorly worded. In the PD, each prisoner can only control his/her own choice. Therefore, the greatest payoff comes from defecting, no matter what the other prisoner chooses. This payoff is only maximized if the other prisoner cooperates, but it's still better than your alternative choice. Applejuicefool (talk) 17:37, 18 December 2007 (UTC) kblkl/kb/nknknn,mknlkb — Preceding unsigned comment added by 22.214.171.124 (talk) 03:30, 27 October 2013 (UTC)
It's not clear to me that Hume's examples fit here, even if they can plausibly be modeled to fit Nash's definition. Rousseau's point, and the point that the Stag Hunt is normally used to make, is that under certain sort satisficing or risk-averse evaluations the rabbit may seem preferable (because the rabbit meets your dietary needs just as well as a share of the stag). Hume's point, though, is that it is never reasonable to, e.g., not row, because none of you will go anywhere. Unless someone objects I'm removing the discussion of Hume. 126.96.36.199 (talk) 04:08, 28 May 2009 (UTC)
"... no longer risk dominant." Really?
Could someone please confirm this (or tell me where I went wrong)?
The article mentions an example of a stag hunt that is not formally one, but that many people would call one nonetheless.
"Often, games with a similar structure but without a risk dominant Nash equilibrium are called stag hunts. For instance if a=2, b=1, c=0, and d=1. While (Hare, Hare) remains a Nash equilibrium, it is no longer risk dominant. Nonetheless many would call this game a stag hunt."
It think that's not correct. For values: a=2, b=1, c=0, and d=1, (Hare, Hare) /is/ in fact still risk dominant, no?
Never mind. I mixed up risk dominance and maximin. My mistake.
How many hares?
The initial text suggests that both participants can go hare hunting, scoring one point each. But the more descriptive version at the end of the article suggests that there is only one hare; if one hunter goes for it, the others starve. Which is correct? Stevage 00:52, 9 September 2011 (UTC)
Answer: (edited/corrected from my previous deleted answer) Skyrms' Stag Hunt book, p.3: "Suppose that hunting hare has an expected payoff of 3, no matter what the other does. (...)". There are enough hares for anyone who wants to hunt them. You may have misunderstood the following point: the other gets 0 if decides to the stag while the other dont (ie. whatever the number of hares available).