Task Force Hawk
|Task Force Hawk|
|Active||5 April 1999 – 24 June 1999|
|Country||United States of America|
|Branch||United States Army|
|Engagements||NATO bombing of Yugoslavia|
|Decorations||Kosovo Campaign Medal
Air and Space Campaign Medal
|Task Force Hawk Commander||John W. Hendrix|
Task Force Hawk was a U.S. military unit constructed and deployed by General Wesley Clark to provide additional support to NATO's Operation Allied Force against the Yugoslavian government during the 1999 unrest in Kosovo. The task force was to operate from the March 1999 until June 1999 when Slobodan Milošević withdrew the Yugoslavian Army from Kosovo.
Task Force Hawk, which never fired a round, has been hailed as both one of the largest blunders and largest successes by the U.S. military in recent years. This action has been reviewed and analyzed from every angle to determine what went right and what went wrong.
Planning / pre-deployment
Planning for Task Force Hawk didn't start until 20 March 1999 in Grafenwohr, Germany; even though, the planning for Operation Allied Force had begun in the winter of 1998. Gen Clark and Admiral James O. Ellis, while at the Warfighter Exercise, discussed how to utilize the Apaches to augment the Air Force assets posed to strike in 4 days . The Army's planners would be strapped for time to put together a plan to deploy a mission that had never been employed by an AH-64 Apache unit. Instead of supporting ground troops the Apaches would be supporting Air Force missions. Gen. Clark's vision for the unit was to destroy the Yugoslavian units stationed in Kosovo supporting the Serbian police force. The Yugoslavian units were not formed in the company or battalion sized formations but rather spread out through the countryside. This made acquiring the targets and relaying the information to bomber units who couldn't spot them easily. It was projected that the Apache units would be able to identify and eliminate these targets more efficiently, due to their effectiveness in the first Gulf War. The Apaches would be supported by MLRS units conducting SEAD missions. Gen. Clark's hope was that by eliminating a large enough portion of the Serbian forces would force Yugoslavian government to end the conflict. Gen. Clark would face opposition to this opinion from several members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
By 22 March 1999, the planners would be finished with the initial plans for operation. These plans projected that the forces would be deployed to Macedonia, but the Macedonian government refused to allow offensive NATO operations to be speared from their country. "Army planners in Germany learned the mission would probably be cancelled on the Friday before Easter." Many soldiers would be given their first day off in weeks due to the Warfighter Exercise, hasty redeployment from Grafenwohr, and preparations for deployment on Task Force Hawk; however, on 3 April, Gen. Clark would decide to deploy the task force. It was announced on 4 April 1999 by the Department of Defense that Task Force Hawk would be deployed to Albania to assist in Operation Allied Force. The original size of the task force was estimated at 2000 but had to be increased due to the lack of force protection that was present in Macedonia.
Many units would begin the movement to Ramstein Air Base in Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany, the main departure point as many of the units were part of V Corps. The airlift was directed by the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) at the Ramstein Air Base, who was also coordinating the relief effect flights to Rinas. The Air Force would utilize the C-17 Globemaster III instead of C-5 Galaxy to deploy the Task Force to Tirana's Rinas Mother Teresa Airport airfield due to the runaway length, taxiway, and ramp requirements. The short runaway length would not be the only challenge for the deployment at Rinas. Operation Shining Hope was also utilizing the airfield to spearhead the humanitarian effects for the refugees of the war. The limited number of runaways would only allow 20 sorties to be flown in the base per day. It would take 200 sorties to deploy full complement of equipment. Despite this being the first time that the United States Transportation Command "gave a theater tactical control of a significant number of strategic airlift aircraft for a specific deployment, Gen Montegomery C. Meigs later called one of the most successful airlift operations in history."
The Apaches self deployed from Illesheim, Germany in support of Task Force Hawk. The route taken was dictated by the fact that Austria and Switzerland would not allow use of their airspace due to the aircraft deploying to an armed conflict. The aircraft had to circumnavigate those two countries by first flying west into France around the western end of the Alps. From the southeast corner of France the flight turned south towards the Mediterranean Sea to follow the coast into northwest Italy where the aircraft and crews were made to wait for several days until the assembly area at Tirana airport was prepared for their arrival. (The ground was very soft and became quite muddy when driven over by army vehicles. The assembly area was not on a hard surface, positioned immediately west of the runway in the grass. The aircraft would have sunk up to their bellys if perforated steel planking had not been laid down. A mile long wood sidewalk had to be constructed to allow the flight and maintenance crews to walk from the assembly area to the aircraft parking area without sinking in the mud.)
Once the assembly area was built up enough to support the aircraft, the crews were given the go-ahead to continue south, down and across the Italian peninsula to the Brindisi airport where the aircraft were armed, and provisions made for the crews, for the 90-nautical-mile (170 km) flight over the open water of the Adriatic sea to Tirana.
Soldiers from the Task Force were also tasked with providing base security, establishing two Forward Operating Bases. The exact function of these FOB's are not quite known other by the military personnel stationed on them.
- Task Force Command Group (V Corps Headquarters)
- V Corps Artillery Headquarters
- U.S. 41st Field Artillery Brigade – Headquarters
- 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS)
- A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 212th Brigade (MLRS)
- U.S. 41st Field Artillery Brigade – Headquarters
- 12th Aviation Brigade
- 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (Two squadrons of Apache pilots, one squadron of AH-64A Apache Attack Helicopters)
- 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (minus) - UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and aviation maintenance/support
- 4th Air Support Operations Squadron - Air Force Liaison Element to V Corps
- A Company, 3rd Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment - Air Traffic Services personnel
- 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division
- C Company, 47th Forward Support Battalion (FSB)
- 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized)
- C Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment
- A Battery, 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, (M109A6)
- Field Artillery Target Acquisition Section, 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment,
- 2nd Platoon, B Battery, 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment
- D Battery, 1st Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (Avenger)
- 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, augmented by:
- A and C Company, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment
- C Battery, 1st Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, (M119)
- 2nd Platoon, C Company, 307th Engineer Battalion,82nd Airborne Division
- 7th Corps Support Group
- 32nd Signal Battalion – D Company (Long Haul Platoons), LEN and SEN Platoons, A Company (Node Center 2).
- 615th Military Police Company
- 3rd Platoon, 212th Military Police Company
- Psychological Operations Detachment
- Special Operations Command and Control Element
- V Corps Artillery Headquarters
|This section requires expansion. (February 2013)|
There were many lessons learned from this operation. These challenges can be broken into two large categories: how the army deploys its troops and how the air force and the army work jointly together.
- Hollis, Patrecia Slayden (May–June 2000). "Transforming the Army to Meet the 21st Century Threat" (PDF). Field Artillery. May–June 2000 (3): 4–6. ISSN 0899-2525.
- Nardulli, Bruce; Perry, Walter L.; Pirnie, Bruce R.; Gordon, John IV; McGinn, John G. (2001). Disjointed War – Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. pp. 57–97. ISBN 0-8330-3096-5.
- Gordon, John IV; Nardulli, Bruce; Perry, Walter L. (January 2002). "The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (Institute for National Strategic Studies). Autumn/Winter 2001–2002 (29): 52–57. ISSN 1070-0692.
- Curtin, Neal P. (March 2001). "KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS – Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter" (PDF). United States General Accounting Office.
- "U.S. ATTACK HELICOPTERS AND MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS TO DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE No. 145-99" (Press release). U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). 4 April 1999.
- Clinton, William J. (5 April 1999). "Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, April 5, 1999". United States State Department. p. 1.
- United States Department of Defense (1 January 2000). "Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report" (PDF). United States Department of Defense.
- Lambeth, Benjamin S. (February 2002). "Task Force Hawk" (PDF). Air Force Magazine (Air Force Association) 85 (02): 78–83.