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|Service branches|| Myanmar Army
|Commander-in-Chief||Senior General Min Aung Hlaing|
|Minister of Defense||Lieutenant General Wai Lwin |
|Deputy Commander-in-Chief||Vice-Senior General Soe Win|
|Military age||16 to 49 years of age|
|14,747,845 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.),
14,710,871 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.)
|10,451,515 males, age 15–49 (2010 est.),
11,181,537 females, age 15–49 (2010 est.)
|522,478 males (2010 est.),
506,388 females (2010 est.)
|Active personnel||492,000 (ranked 9th)|
|Reserve personnel||72,000 (Paramilitary)|
|Budget||$2.04 billion (2011)|
|Percent of GDP||4.75% (2011)|
|Domestic suppliers||KaPaSa Industries (Myanmar Defence Industries)|
|Foreign suppliers|| People's Republic of China
|Seats in the Parliaments|
The Myanmar Armed Forces, officially known as Tatmadaw (Burmese: တပ်မတော်; MLCTS: tap ma. taw, IPA: [taʔmədɔ̀]) is the military organization of Burma, also known as Myanmar. The armed forces are administered by the Ministry of Defense and are composed of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Auxiliary services include Myanmar Police Force, People Militia Units and Frontier Forces, locally known as Na Sa Kha.
Currently, the draft is officially revived. In the past, all service personnel were volunteers in theory, although the government was empowered to undertake conscription if considered necessary for Myanmar's defense. In practice, it has been claimed that the Tatmadaw regularly kidnap and conscript children and use civilians as forced labour and human mine-sweepers. The Tatmadaw has been engaged in a bitter battle with ethnic insurgents, political dissidents and the narco-armies since the country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1948.
An official publication has revealed that almost one-quarter of Myanmar's new national budget will be allocated to defense. The Government Gazette reports that 1.8 trillion kyat (about $2 billion at free market rates of exchange), or 23.6% of the 2011 budget will go to defense.
The Royal Armed Forces, was the armed forces of the Burmese monarchy from the 9th to 19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Pagan Dynasty, the Ava Kingdom, the Toungoo Dynasty and the Konbaung Dynasty in chronological order. The army was one of the major armed forces of Southeast Asia until it was defeated by the British over a six-decade span in the 19th century.
The army was organized into a small standing army of a few thousand, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the ahmudan system, which required local chiefs to supply their predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population in times of war. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery and naval units.
Firearms, first introduced from China in the late 14th century, became integrated into strategy only gradually over many centuries. The first special musket and artillery units, equipped with Portuguese matchlocks and cannon, were formed in the 16th century. Outside the special firearm units, there was no formal training program for the regular conscripts, who were expected to have a basic knowledge of self-defense, and how to operate the musket on their own. As the technological gap between European powers widened in the 18th century, the army was dependent on Europeans' willingness to sell more sophisticated weaponry.
While the army had held its own against the armies of the kingdom's neighbors, its performance against more technologically advanced European armies deteriorated over time. While it defeated the Portuguese and French intrusions in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively, the army could not stop the advance of the British Empire in the 19th century, losing all three Anglo-Burmese wars. On 1 January 1886, the millennium-old Burmese monarchy and its military arm, the Royal Burmese Army, were formally abolished by the British.
Colonial period (1824–1948)
The British used mainly Indian and Gurkha troops to conquer and pacify the country. In a divide-and-rule maneuver, the British enforced their rule in the province of Burma mainly with Indian troops later joined by indigenous military units of three indigenous ethnic minorities: Karens, Kachins and Chins. The British did not trust the Burmans. Before 1937, with few exceptions, no Burmans were allowed to serve in the military.
At the beginning of World War I, the only indigenous military regiment in the British India army, the 70th Burma Rifles, consisted of three battalions, made up of Karens, Kachins and Chins. During the war, the British relaxed the ban, raising a Burman battalion in the 70th Burma Rifles, a Burman company in the 85th Burma Rifles, and seven Burman Mechanical Transport companies. In addition, three companies of Burma Sappers and Miners, made up of mostly Burmans, and a company of Labour Corps, made up of Chins and Burmans, were also raised. All these units began their overseas assignment in 1917. The 70th Burma Rifles served in Egypt for garrison duties while the Burmese Labour Corps served in France. One company of Burma Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves in Mesopotamia at the crossing the Tigris.
After the war, the British stopped recruiting Burmans, and discharged all but one Burman companies had been abolished by 1925. The last Burman company of Burma Sappers and Miners too was disbanded in 1929. The British used Indian and ethnic minority dominated troops to ruthlessly put down ethnic majority dominated rebellions such as Saya San's peasant rebellion in 1930–1931. These policies would lead to long-term negative tensions among the country's ethnic groups. On 1 April 1937, Burma was made a separate colony, and Burmans were now eligible to join the army. But few Burmans bothered to join. Before World War II began, the British Burma Army consisted of Karen (27.8%), Chin (22.6%), Kachin (22.9%), and Burman 12.3%, without counting their British officer corps.
In December 1942, a group of Burmese independence activists founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) with Japanese help. The army led by Aung San fought in the Burma Campaign on the side of the Imperial Japanese Army. Thousands of young men joined its ranks—reliable estimates range from 15,000 to 23,000. The great majority of the recruits were Burman, with little ethnic minority representation. Many of the fresh recruits lacked discipline. At Myaungmya in the Irrawaddy delta, an ethnic war broke out between Burman BIA men and Karens, with both sides responsible for massacres. The BIA was soon replaced with the Burma Defense Army, founded on 26 August 1942 with three thousand BIA veterans. The army became Burma National Army with Ne Win as its commander on 1 August 1943 when Burma received nominal independence. In late 1944, it had a strength of approximately 15,000.
Disillusioned by the Japanese occupation, the BNA switched sides, and joined the allied forces on 27 March 1945.
Modern era (1948–present)
At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of ethnic background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. Its unity and operational efficiency was further weakened by the interference of civilians and politicians in military affairs, and the perception gap between the staff officers and field commanders. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Burman officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF).
In accordance with agreement reached at the Kandy Conference in September 1945, the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Force. The officer corps shared by ex-PBF officers and officers from the British Burma Army and Army of Burma Reserve Organisation (ARBO). The British also decided to form what were known as "Class Battalions" based on ethnicity. There were a total of 15 rifle battalions at the time of independence and four of them were made up of former members of PBF. None of the influential positions within the War Office and commands were manned with former PBF Officers. All services including military engineers, supply and transport, ordnance and medical services, Navy and Air Force were commanded by former Officers from ABRO and British Burma Army.
|No. 1 Burma Rifles||Bamar (Military Police)|
|No. 2 Burma Rifles||Karen majority + other non-Bamar Nationalities|
|No. 3 Burma Rifles||Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force|
|No. 4 Burma Rifles||Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force - Commanded by the then Lieutenant Colonel Ne Win|
|No. 5 Burma Rifles||Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force|
|No. 6 Burma Rifles||Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force|
|No. 1 Karen Rifles||Karen / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 2 Karen Rifles||Karen / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 3 Karen Rifles||Karen / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 1 Kachin Rifles||Kachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 2 Kachin Rifles||Kachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 1 Chin Rifles||Chin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 2 Chin Rifles||Chin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO|
|No. 4 Burma Regiment||Gorkha|
|Chin Hill Battalion||Chin|
The War Office was officially opened on 8 May 1948 under the Ministry of Defence and managed by a War Office Council chaired by the Minister of Defence. At the head of War Office was Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. Vice Chief of Staff, who was also Chief of Army Staff and the head of General Staff Office. VCS oversee General Staff matters and there were three branch offices: GS-1 Operation and Training, GS-2 Staff Duty and Planning; GS-3 Intelligence. Signal Corps and Field Engineering Corps are also under the command of General Staff Office.
According to the war establishment adopted on 14 April 1948, Chief of Staff was under the War Office with the rank of Major General. It was subsequently upgraded to a Lieutenant General. Vice Chief of Staff was a Brigadier General. The Chief of Staff was staffed with GSO-I with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, three GSO-II with the rank of Major, four GSO-III with the rank of captain for operation, training, planning and intelligence, and one Intelligence Officer (IO). The Chief of Staff office also had one GSO-II and one GSO-III for field engineering, and the Chief Signal Officer and a GSO-II for signal. Directorate of Signal and Directorate Field Engineering are also under General Staff Office.
Under Adjutant General Office were Judge Advocate General, Military Secretary, Vice Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (AG) was a Brigadier General whereas the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Secretary (MS) and Vice Adjutant General (VAG) were Colonels. VAG handles adjutant staff matters and there were also three branch offices; AG-1 planning, recruitment and transfer; AG-2 discipline, moral, welfare, and education; AG-3 salary, pension, and other financial matters. The Medical Corps and the Provost Marshall Office were under the Adjutant General Office.
The Quarter Master General office also had three branch offices: QG-1 planning, procurement, and budget; QG-2 maintenance, construction, and cantonment; and QG-3 transportation. Under the QMG office were Garrison Engineering Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps, Military Ordnance Corps, and the Supply and Transport Corps.
Both AG and QMG office similar structure to the General Staff Office, but they only had three ASO-III and three QSO-III respectively.
The Navy and Air Force were separate services under the War office but under the Chief of Staff.
|Post||Name and Rank||Ethnicity|
|Chief of Staff||Lieutenant General Smith Dun BC 5106||Karen|
|Chief of Army Staff||Brigadier General Saw Kyar Doe BC 5107||Karen|
|Chief of Air Staff||Lieutenant Colonel Saw Shi Sho||Karen|
|Chief of Naval Staff||Commander Khin Maung Bo||Bamar|
|North Burma Sub District Commander||Brigadier General Ne Win BC 3502||Bamar|
|South Burma Sub District Commander||Brigadier General Aung Thin BC 5015||Bamar|
|1st Infantry Division||Brigadier General Saw Chit Khin||Karen|
|Adjutant General||Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Win||Bamar|
|Judge Advocate General||Colonel Maung Maung (Bull dog) BC 4034||Bamar|
|Quarter Master General||Lieutenant Colonel Saw Donny||Karen|
Reorganization in 1956
As per War Office order No. (9) 1955 on 28 September 1955, the Chief of Staff become Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Army), the Chief of Naval Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Navy) and the Chief of Air Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Air).
On 1 Jaunuary 1956, War Office was officially renamed as Ministry of Defence. General Ne Win became the first Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) to command all three services - Army, Navy and Airforce - under a single unified command for the first time.
Brigadier General Aung Gyi was given the post of Vice Chief of Staff (Army). Brigadier General D. A Blake became commander of South Burma Subdistrict Command (SBSD) and Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw, a member of the Thirty Comrades, became Commander of North Burma Subdistrict Command (NBSD).
Due to deteroriating political situations in 1957, the then Prime minister of Burma, U Nu invited General Ne Win to form a "Caretaker Government" and handed over power on 28 October 1958. Under the stewardship of the Military Caretaker Government, parliamentary elections were held in February 1960. Several high-ranking and senior officers were dismissed due to their involvement and supporting various political parties.
|Serial||Name and Rank||Command||Date||Notes|
|BC3505||Brigadier General Aung Shwe||Southern Burma Sub-District Command||13-2-1961|
|BC3507||Brigadier General Maung Maung||Directorate of Military Training / Commandant National Defence College||13-2-1961|
|BC3512||Colonel Aye Maung||No. 2 Infantry Brigade||13-2-1961|
|BC3517||Colonel Tin Maung||No. 12 Infantry Brigade||13-2-1961|
|BC3570||Colonel Hla Maw||No. 5 Infantry Brigade||13-2-1961||Father of Thein Hla Maw|
|BC3572||Colonel Kyi Win||No. 7 Infantry Brigade||8-3-1961|
|BC3647||Colonel Thein Tote||No. 4 Infantry Brigade||13-2-1961|
|BC3181||Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Myint||23-6-1962|
|BC3649||Lieutenant Colonel Chit Khaing||Combat Forces School||13-2-1962|
1962 Coup d'etat
The elections of 1960 had put U Nu back as the Prime Minister and Pyidaungsu Party (Union Party) led civilian government resume control of the country.
On 2 March 1962, the then Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, General Ne Win staged a coup d'état and formed the "Union Revolutionary Council". Around midnight the troops began to move into Yangon to take up strategic position. Prime Minister U Nu and his cabinet ministers were taken into protective custody. At 8:50 am, General Ne Win announce the coup over the radio. He said "I have to inform you, citizens of the Union that Armed Forces have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety, owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions of the Union." 
|Name and Rank||Military Position||RC Position||Date|
|General Ne Win BC 3502||Chief of Staff of Armed Forces||Chairman||2-3-1962 to 1-3-1974|
|Brigadier General Aung Gyi BC 5458||Vice Chief of Staff (Army)||Member||2-3-1962 to 7-2-1963|
|Brigadier General Than Phay||Vice Chief of Staff (Navy)||Member||2-3-1962 to 22-5-1962|
|Brigadier General Tin Phay BC 3508||Chairman of Forestry||Member||2-3-1962 to 14-11-1970|
|Brigadier General Tommy Clift||Vice Chief of Staff (Air)||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-11-1964|
|Brigadier General San Yu BC 3569||North Western Regional Military Command||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-3-1974|
|Brigadier General Sein Win BC 3525||Central Regional Military Command||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-3-1974|
|Colonel Kyi Maung BC 3516||South Western Regional Military Command||Member||2-3-1962 to 12-3-1963|
|Colonel Maung Shwe BC 3575||Eastern Regional Military Command||Member||2-3-1962 to 22-9-1972|
|Colonel Thaung Kyi BC 3523||South Eastern Regional Military Command||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-3-1974|
|Colonel Than Sein BC 3574||Colonel General Staff||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-3-1974|
|Colonel Kyaw Soe BC 3526||Military Appointment Secretary||Member||2-3-1962 to 2-3-1974|
|Colonel Saw Myint BC 3518||Director - Border Troops||Member||2-3-1962 to 17-8-1964|
|Colonel Chit Myaing BC 3520||Member||2-3-1962 to 31-3-1964|
|Colonel Khin Nyo BC 3537||Director - Military Training||Member||2-3-1962 to 9-6-1965|
|Colonel Tan Yu Saing BC 5090||Member||2-3-1962 to 6-10-1970|
|Colonel Lun Tin BC 3610||Commander - No. 7 Infantry Brigade||Member||5-7-1962 to 9-7-1971|
|Colonel Maung Lwin||Member||12-9-1964 to 2-3-1974|
|Colonel Tin Oo BC 3651||South Western Regional Command||Member||12-9-1964 to 2-3-1974|
|U Ba Nyein||Member||9-7-1971 to 2-3-1974|
|Dr. Maung Maung||Member||9-7-1971 to 2-3-1974|
|Mahn Thar Myaing||Member||9-7-1971 to 2-3-1974|
The country would be ruled by the military for the next 12 years. The Burma Socialist Programme Party became the sole political party and it the majority of its full members were military. Government servants underwent military training and the Military Intelligence Service functioned as the secret police of the state.
1988 Coup d'etat
At the height of the Four Eights Uprising against the socialist government, Former General Ne Win, who at the time was Chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), issued a warning against potential protestors during a televised speech. He stated that if the "disturbances" continued the "Army would have to be called and I would like to make it clear that if the Army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the Air, it would shoot straight to hit".
Subsequently, the 22 Light Infantry Division, 33 Light Infantry Division and the 44 Light Infantry Division were redeployed to Yangon from front line fighting against ethnic insurgents in the Karen states. Battalions from three Light Infantry Divisions, augmented by infantry battalions under Yangon Regional Military Command and supporting units from Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps were deployed during the suppression of protests in and around the then capital city of Yangon. Initially, these troops were deployed in support of the then People's Police Force (now known as Myanmar Police Force) security battalions and to patrol the streets of the capital and to guard government offices and building. However, at midnight of 8 August 1988 troops from 22 Light Infantry Division guarding Yangon City Hall opened fire on unarmed protesters as the crack down against the protests begin.
The armed forces under General Saw Maung formed a State Law and Order Restoration Council, repealed the constitution and declared martial law on 18 September 1988. By late September the military had complete control of the country.
First phase (post-independence/civil war era)
The first phase of the doctrine was developed in early 1950s to cope with external threats from more powerful enemies with a strategy of Strategic Denial under conventional warfare. The perception of threats to state security was more external than internal threats. The internal threat to state security was managed through the use of a mixture of force and political persuasion. Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung drew up defence doctrine based on conventional warfare concepts, with large infantry divisions, armoured brigades, tanks and motorised war with mass mobilisation for the war effort being the important element of the doctrine. The objective was to contain the offensive of the invading forces at the border for at least three months, while waiting for the arrival of international forces, similar to the police action by international intervention forces under the directive of United Nations during the war on Korean peninsula. However, the conventional strategy under the concept of total war was undermined by the lack of appropriate command and control system, proper logistical support structure, sound economic bases and efficient civil defence organisations.
At the beginning of 1950s, while Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mai, with support from United States, invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against People's Republic of China, which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February 1953 against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from United States and as a result it failed to deliver the objectives and ended in humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw. The then Tatmadaw leadership argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example, Brigadier General Maung Maung pointed out that newspapers, such as the "Nation", carried reports detailing the training and troops positioning, even went as far to the name and social background of the commanders who are leading the operation thus losing the element of surprise. Colonel Saw Myint, who was second in command for the operation, also complained about the long lines of communications and the excessive pressure imposed upon the units for public relations activities in order to prove that the support of the people was behind the operation.
Second phase (KMT invasion/BSPP era)
Despite failure, Tatmadaw continued to rely on this doctrine until the mid-1960s. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late 1950s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late 1950s as the insurgents and KMT changed their positional warfare strategy to hit and run guerrilla warfare. At the 1958 Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, Colonel Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with insurgents', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were guerrilla fighters during the anti-British and Japanese campaigns during the Second World War, they had very little knowledge of anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. Based upon Colonel Kyi Win's report, Tatmadaw begin developing an appropriate military doctrine and strategy to meet the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare.
This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress insurgency with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the foreign policy based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable, therefore counterinsurgency became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1961, the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of conflicts, collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion. In 1962, as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and counterinsurgency-training courses were delivered at the training schools. The new doctrine laid out three potential enemies and they are internal insurgents, historical enemies with roughly an equal strength (i.e. Thailand), and enemies with greater strength. It states that in suppressing insurgencies, Tatmadaw must be trained to conduct long-range penetration with a tactic of continuous search and destroy. Reconnaissance, Ambush and all weather day and night offensive and attack capabilities along with winning the hearts and minds of people are important parts of anti-guerrilla warfare. For countering an historical enemy with equal strength, Tatmadaw should fight a conventional warfare under total war strategy, without giving up an inch of its territory to the enemy. For powerful enemy and foreign invaders, Tatmadaw should engage in total people's war, with a special focus on guerrilla strategy.
To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine, Brigadier General San Yu, the then Vice Chief of Staff (Army), sent a delegation led by Lieutenant Colonel Thura Tun Tin was sent to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in July 1964 to study organisation structure, armaments, training, territorial organisation and strategy of people's militias. A research team was also formed at General Staff Office within the War Office to study defence capabilities and militia formations of neighbouring countries.
The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active foreign policy, total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences. The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space (du-thone-du) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale (Panama-lay-yat). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its guerrilla strategy to counter any form of foreign invasion. The overall counterinsurgency strategy included not only elimination of insurgents and their support bases with the 'four cut' strategy, but also the building and designation of 'white area' and 'black area' as well.
In April 1968, Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush, counterinsurgency weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, commando tactics, and reconnaissance. Battalion size operations were also practised in the South West Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in 1971. BSPP laid down directives for "complete annihilation of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making.
Throughout BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In 1985, the then Lieutenant General Saw Maung, Vice-Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw reminded his commanders during his speech at the Command and General Staff College:
In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about 0.01%. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops... therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. In order to defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war.
Third phase (SLORC/SPDC era)
The third phase of doctrinal development of Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988 as part of armed forces modernization programme. The development was the reflection of sensitivity towards direct foreign invasion or invasion by proxy state during the turbulent years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example: the unauthorized presence of a US aircraft carrier Battle Group in Myanmar's territorial waters during the 1988 political uprising as evidence of an infringement of Myanmar's sovereignty. Also, the Tatmadaw leadership was concerned that foreign powers might arm the insurgents on the border to exploit the political situation and tensions in the country. This new threat perception, previously insignificant under the nation's isolationist foreign policy, led Tatmadaw leaders to review the defense capability and doctrine of the Tatmadaw.
The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing human rights violations, religious suppression and ethnic cleansing, remains high.
Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats. Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence. It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people militias and dispersed regular troops which would eventually wear down the invading forces, both physically and psychologically, and leave it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. If the conventional strategy of strategic denial fails, then the Tatmadaw and its auxiliary forces will follow Mao's strategic concepts of 'strategic defensive', 'strategic stalemate' and 'strategic offensive'.
Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine.
Organizational, Command and Control structure
Overall command of Tatmadaw (armed forces) rested with the country's highest-ranking military officer, a General, who acted concurrently as Defence Minister and Chief of Staff of Defence Services. He thus exercised supreme operational control over all three services, under the direction of the President, State Council and Council of Ministers. There was also a National Security Council which acted in advisory capacity. The Defence Minister cum Chief-of-Staff of Defence Services exercised day-to-day control of the armed forces and assisted by three Vice-Chiefs of Staff, one each for the army, navy and air force. These officers also acted as Deputy Ministers of Defence and commanders of their respective Services. They were all based at Ministry of Defence (Kakweyay Wungyi Htana) in Rangoon/Yangon. It served as a government ministry as well as joint military operations headquarters.
The Joint Staff within the Ministry of Defence consisted of three major branches, one each for Army, Navy and Air Force, along with a number of independent departments. The Army Office had three major departments; the General (G) Staff to oversee operations, the Adjutant General's (A) Staff administration and the Quartermaster General's (Q) Staff to handle logistics. The General Staff consisted two Bureaus of Special Operations (BSO), which were created in April 1978 and June 1979 respectively. These BSO are similar to "Army Groups" in Western armies, high level staff units formed to manage different theatres of military operations. They were responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the Regional Military Commands (RMC) with BSO-1 covering Northern Command (NC), North Eastern Command (NEC), North Western Command (NWC), Western Command (WC) and Eastern Command (EC). BSO-2 responsible for South Eastern Command (SEC), South Western Command (SWC), Western Command (WC) and Central Command (CC). The Army's elite mobile Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were managed separately under a Staff Colonel. Under G Staff, there were also a number of directorates which corresponded to the Army's functional corps, such as Intelligence, Signals, Training, Armour and Artillery. The A Staff was responsible for the Adjutant General, Directorate of Medical Services and the Provost Marshal's Office. The Q Staff included the Directorates of Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Military Engineers.
The Navy and Air Force Offices within the Ministry were headed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff for those Services. Each was supported by a staff officer at full Colonel level. All these officers were responsible for the overall management of the various naval and air bases around the country, and the broader administrative functions such as recruitment and training.
Operational Command in the field was exercised through a framework of Regional Military Commands (RMC), the boundaries of which corresponded with the country's Seven States and Seven Divisions. The Regional Military Commanders, all senior army officers, usually of Brigadier General rank, were responsible for the conduct of military operations in their respective RMC areas. Depending on the size of RMC and its operational requirements, Regional Military Commanders have at their disposal 10 or more infantry battalions (Kha La Ya).
1988 to 2005
The Tatmadaw's organizational and command structure dramatically changed after the military coup in 1988. In 1990, the country's most senior army officer become a Senior General (equivalent to Field Marshal rank in Western armies) and held the positions of Chairman of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Prime Minister and Defence Minister, as well as being appointed Commander in Chief of the Defence Services. He thus exercised both political and operational control over the entire country and armed forces.
From 1989, each Service has had its own Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff. The Army Commander in Chief is now elevated to full General (Bo gyoke Kyii) rank and also acted as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Defence Services. The C-in-C of the Air Force and Navy hold the equivalent of Lieutenant General rank, while all three Service Chiefs of Staff were raised to Major General level. Chiefs of Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), the heads of Q and A Staffs and the Director of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) were also elevated to Lieutenant General rank. The reorganization of the armed forces after 1988 resulted in the upgrading by two ranks of most of the senior positions.
A new command structure was introduced at the Ministry of Defence level in 2002.The most important position created is the Joint Chief of Staff (Army,Navy, Air Force)that commands commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Air Force.
The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS, or Sit Maha Byuha Leilaryay Htana) was formed around 1994 and charged with formulating defence policies, and planning and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The OSS was commanded by Lieutenant Geneneral Khin Nyunt, who is also the Director of Defence Service Intelligence (DDSI). Regional Military Commands (RMC) and Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were also reorganized, and LIDs are now directly answerable to Commander in Chief of the Army.
A number of new subordinate command headquarters were formed in response to the growth and reorganization of the Army. These include Regional Operation Commands (ROC, or Da Ka Sa), which are subordinate to RMCs, and Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha), which are equivalent to Western infantry divisions.
The Chief of Staff (Army) retained control of the Directorates of Signals, Directorate of Armour Corps, Directorate of Artillery Corps, Defence Industries, Security Printing, Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, and Military Engineering (field section),People's Militias and Border Troops, Directorate of Defence Services Computers (DDSC), the Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.
Under the Adjutant General Office, there are three directorates: Medical Services, Resettlement, and Provost Martial. Under the Quartermaster General Office are the directorates of Military Engineering (garrison section), Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, and Electricaland Mechanical Engineering.
Other independent department within the Ministry of Defence are Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Military Appointment General, Directorate of Procurement, Record Office, Central Military Accounting, and Camp Commandant.
All RMC Commander positions were raised to the level of Major General and also serve as appointed Chairmen of the State- and Division-level Law and Order Restoration Committees. They were formally responsible for both military and civil administrative functions for their command areas. Also, three additional regional military commands were created. In early 1990, a new RMC was formed in Burma's north west, facing India. In 1996, the Eastern Command in Shan State was split into two RMCs, and South Eastern Command was divided to create a new RMC in country's far south coastal regions.
In 1997, the SLORC was abolished and the military government created the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The council includes all senior military officers and commanders of the RMCs. A new Ministry of Military Affairs was established and headed by a Lieutenant General. This new ministry was abolished after its minister Lt. Gen. Tin Hla was sacked in 2001.
2005 to 2010
In 18 October 2004, the OSS and DDSI were abolished during the purge of General Khin Nyint and military intelligence units. OSS ordered 4 regiment to raid in DDSI HeadQuarter in Yangon. At the same time, all of the MIU in the whole country were raided and arrested by OSS corps. Nearly two thirds of MIU officers were arrested for long years. A new military intelligence unit called Military Affairs Security (MAS) was formed to take over the functions of the DDSI, but MAS units were much fewer than DDSI's and MAS was under control by local Division commander.
In early 2006, a new Regional Military Command (RMC) was created at the newly formed administrative capital, Naypyidaw.
Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of Myanmar Armed Forces (from 1945 onwards)
|Serial||Rank and Name||Dates||Notes|
|Major General Aung San||1945 – 19/07/1947||Founder of Myanmar Armed Forces, Leader of Thirty Comrades,
father of Pro-Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi
|BC 3501||Major General Let Yar||1947 – 1948||Member of Thirty Comrades, later Minister of Defence|
|BC5106||Lieutenant General Smith Dun||04/01/1948 – 31/01/1949||Karen Officer, Forced to retire due to civil war with Karen|
|BC3502||General Ne Win||01/02/1949 – 20/04/1972||Later became President and Chairman of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP)|
|BC3569||General San Yu||20/04/1972 – 01/03/1974||Later became President|
|BC3651||General Thura Tin Oo||01/03/1974 – 06/03/1976||Later became Vice-Chairman of National League for Democracy|
|BC5332||General Thura Kyaw Htin||06/03/1976 – 03/11/1985||Retired at age 60.|
|BC6187||Senior General Saw Maung||04/11/1985 – 22/04/1992||Retired for health reasons|
|BC6710||Senior General Than Shwe||22/04/1992 – 30-03/2011||Retired but remains behind the curtains|
|BC14232||Senior General Min Aung Hlaing||30/03/2011 – Present|
Myanmar army ranks and insignia
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Myanmar air force ranks and insignia
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Myanmar army (Tatmadaw Kyee)
The Myanmar Army has always been by far the largest service and has always received the lion's share of Burma's defence budget. It has played the most prominent part in Burma's struggle against the 40 or more insurgent groups since 1948 and acquired a reputation as a tough and resourceful military force. In 1981, it was described as "probably the best [army] in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam's". The judgment was echoed in 1983, when another observer noted that "Myanmar's infantry is generally rated as one of the toughest, most combat seasoned in Southeast Asia".
Myanmar air force (Tatmadaw Lei)
Personnel: 23,000 
The Myanmar Air Force was formed on 16 January 1947, while Myanmar (also known as Burma) was still under British rule. By 1948, the new air force fleet included 40 Airspeed Oxfords, 16 de Havilland Tiger Moths, 4 Austers and 3 Supermarine Spitfires transferred from Royal Air Force with a few hundred personnel. The primary mission of Myanmar Air Force since its inception has been to provide transport, logistical, and close air support to Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations.
The Myanmar Navy is the naval branch of the armed forces of Burma with estimated 19,000 men and women. The Myanmar Navy was formed in 1940 and, although very small, played an active part in Allied operations against the Japanese during the Second World War. The Myanmar Navy currently operates more than 122 vessels. Before 1988, the Myanmar Navy was small and its role in the many counterinsurgency operations was much less conspicuous than those of the army and air force. Yet the navy has always been, and remains, an important factor in Burma's security and it was dramatically expanded in recent years to a provide blue water capability and external threat defense role in Burma's territorial waters. Its personnel number 19,000 (including two naval infantry battalions).
Myanmar police force (Myanmar Ye Tat Hpwe)
The Myanmar Police Force, formally known as The People's Police Force (Burmese: ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့; MLCTS: Pyi Thu Yae Tup Pwe), was established in 1964 as independent department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was reorganised on 1 October 1995 and informally become part of Tatmadaw. Current Director General of Myanmar Police Force is Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun with its headquarters at Naypyidaw. Its command structure is based on established civil jurisdictions. Each of Burma's seven states and seven divisions has their own Police Forces with headquarters in the respective capital cities. Israel and Australia often provide specialists to enhance the training of Burma's police. Personnel: 72,000 (including 4,500 Combat/SWAT Police)
Myanmar Frontier Forces (Na Sa Ka)
The Frontier Forces (abbreviation: Na Sa Ka, နယ္စပ္ေဒသ လံုၿခံဳေရးႏွင့္ ကြပ္ကဲေရး - နစက) are now found on all five of Burma's international borders. They consist primarily of Tatmadaw personnel (including intelligence officers) assisted by members of the Myanmar Police Force, Immigration and Custom officials. Its total strength is unknown.
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Human rights abuses
According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions several hundred thousand men, women, children and elderly people are forced to work against their will by the Burmese army. Individuals refusing to work may be victims of torture, rape or murder. The International Labour Organization has continuously called on Burma to end the practice of forced labour since the 1960s. In June 2000, the ILO Conference adopted a resolution calling on governments to cease any relations with the country that might aid the junta to continue the use of forced labour.
Torture and rape
A 2002 report by The Shan Human Rights Foundation and The Shan Women's Action Network, Licence to rape, details 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence, involving 625 girls and women, committed by Burmese army troops in Shan State, mostly between 1996 and 2001. The authors note that the figures are likely to be far lower than the reality. According to the report, "the Burmese military regime is allowing its troops systematically and on a widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State. The report illustrates there is a strong case that war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the form of sexual violence, have occurred and continue to occur in Shan State. The report gives clear evidence that rape is officially condoned as a 'weapon of war' against the civilian populations in Shan State." Furthermore, the report states that "25% of the rapes resulted in death, in some incidences with bodies being deliberately displayed to local communities. 61% were gang-rapes; women were raped within military bases, and in some cases women were detained and raped repeatedly for periods of up to 4 months."
In a 2003 report, "No Safe Place: Burma's Army and the Rape of Ethnic Women", Refugees International document the widespread use of rape by Burma’s soldiers to brutalize women from five different ethnic nationalities.
According to Human Rights Watch , recruiting and kidnapping of children to the military is commonplace. An estimated 70,000 of the country’s 350,000-400,000 soldiers are children. There are also multiple reports of widespread child labour.
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The Myanmar Defence Industries (DI) consists of 13 major factories throughout the country that produce approximately 70 major products for Army, Navy and Air Force. The main products include automatic rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, complete range of mortar and artillery ammunition, aircraft and anti aircraft ammunition, tank and anti-tank ammunition, bombs, grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines such as the M14 pyrotechnics, commercial explosives and commercial products, and rockets and so forth. DI have produced new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler & Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Burma's army since the 1960s.
The major factories of the DI are the following:
- Weapons Factory
- Bombs & Grenades Factory
- Tungsten Carbide Factory
- Machine Gun Factory
- Filling Factory
- Propellants Factory
- Heavy Artillery Ammo Factory
- Small Arms Ammo Factory
- Brass Mills
- Tungsten Alloy Factory
- Tank Ammo Factory
- Explosives Factory
- Medium Artillery Ammo Factory
Heavy Industries were established with Ukrainian assistance mainly to assemble the BTR-3U fleet of the Myanmar Army. Total of 1,000 BTR-3U wheeled APCs are to be assembled in Burma over the next 10 years from parts sent by Ukraine. The BTR-3U is fitted with a number of modern weapon systems including 30 mm gun, 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher and anti-tank guided weapons. HI has also built APC/IFV such as MAV 1, MAV 2 and BAAC APCs. Little is known about MAV infantry fighting vehicles but it appeared that only 60% of the components are produced locally and some vital components such as fire control systems, turrets, engines and transmissions are imported from China NORINCO industries. Apart from BTR 3Us, MAVs and BAACs, HI is also producing a number of military trucks and jeeps for the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Products of DI are as follow:-
- BTR3U (180 nos/yr)
- MAV-1 IFV (20 nos/yr)
- Heavy Truck (400 nos/yr)
- 4x4 6 tons truck (400 nos/yr)
- Humvee (prototypes)(first seen in the 61st Armed Forces Day Parade)
- 105 mm Howitzers (production started in 2006 with the help of Singaporean technicians)
- 120 mm mortar MA 6 (50 nos/yr)
- 14.5 mm AAA (50 nos/yr)
- 12.7 mm HMG (200 nos/yr)
- 0.5" HMG (150 nos/yr)
- MA series small arms (60,000 nos/yr)
- RPG (1,500 nos/yr)
- Grenade Launcher (7,000 nos/yr)
- 81/60 mm mortars (1,200 nos/yr)
- 155/130/122/105 mm ammunitions
- 120/81/60 mm mortar bombs
- small arms ammunitions (60 millions nos/yr)
- 57/77/122 mm rockets and up to 500 kg dumb bombs for Air Force
- 25/37/40/57 mm ammunitions for navy
- Bell, Thomas (30 October 2007). "Burmese army 'abducts thousands of children'". The Daily Telegraph (London).
- Steinberg 2009: 37
- Hack, Retig 2006: 186
- Dun 1980: 104
- Steinberg 2009: 29
- Seekins 2006: 124–126
- DSHMRI Archives
- Andrew Selth: Power Without Glory
- Maung Aung Myoe: Building of Tatmadaw
- Maung Aung Myoe: Building the Tatmadaw
- Mya Win - Leaders of Tatmadaw
- Mya Win: Leaders of Tatmadaw
- Dr. Maung Maung: General Ne Win and Burma
- Martin Smith (1991). Burma - Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
- Aung San Thuriya Hla Thaung (Armanthit Sarpay, Yangon, 1999)
- In Defiance of the Storm (Myawaddy Press, Yangon, 1997
- Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region (St. Martin's Press)
- Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces
- Andrew Selth: Transforming the Tatmadaw
- Maung Aung Myoe: Building the Tatmadaw, p.26
- See order of battle for further details
- see Order of Battle for further details
- Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw, Appendix (6)
- Working Papers – Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU
- Andrew Selth: Power Without Glory
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May 1981
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1983
- Myoe, Maung Aung: Building Tatmadaw
- Myoe, Maung Aung: Building the Tatmadaw
- Dun, Smith (1980). Memoirs of the Four-Foot Colonel, Volumes 113–116. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University SEAP Publications. ISBN 978-0-87727-113-0.
- Hack, Karl; Tobias Rettig (2006). Colonial armies in Southeast Asia (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. ISBN 0-415-33413-6, 9780415334136 Check
- Seekins, Donald M. (2006). Historical dictionary of Burma (Myanmar), vol. 59 of Asian/Oceanian historical dictionaries 59 (Illustrated ed.). Sacredcrow Press. ISBN 978-0-8108-5476-5.
- Steinberg, David I. (2009). Burma/Myanmar: what everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-539068-7, 9780195390681 Check