Ten Great Campaigns

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Ten Great Campaigns
Battle of Khurungui.jpg
A Chinese army fighting the Dzungars
Date 1755- 1789
Location Sichuan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam
Result Qing victory (except in Burma and Vietnam)
Belligerents
Qing Dynasty Qing Empire Dzungars
Jinchuan
Flag of the Alaungpaya Dynasty of Myanmar.svg Konbaung dynasty
Gurkha
Tay Son Dynasty
Commanders and leaders
Qing Dynasty Qianlong
Qing Dynasty Jiaqing
Lê Mẫn Đế
Flag of the Alaungpaya Dynasty of Myanmar.svg Hsinbyushin
Nguyễn Huệ
Various Others
Strength
~260,000 men[citation needed] ~600,000 men[citation needed]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Unknown

The Ten Great Campaigns (Chinese: 十全武功; pinyin: shí quán wǔ gōng) were a series of wars fought during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, much celebrated in the official Qing Dynasty annals. They included three to enlarge the area of Qing control in Central Asia: two against the Dzungars (1755–1757) and the pacification of Xinjiang (1758–1759). The other seven campaigns were more in the nature of police actions on frontiers already established - two wars to suppress the Jinchuan rebels in Sichuan, another to suppress rebels in Taiwan (1787–1788), and four expeditions abroad against the Burmese (1765–1769), the Vietnamese (1788–1789), and the warlike Gurkhas in Nepal on the border between Tibet and India (1790–1792), the last counting as two.

Contents

[edit] The Dzungars and pacification of Xinjiang (1755 - 1757)

Arigun bringing reinforcements to General Zhaohui to lift the siege of the Black River fort, 1759.

Of the ten campaigns, the final destruction of the Dzungars[1] was the most significant. It secured the northern and western boundaries of Xinjiang and eliminated rivalry for control over the Dalai Lama in Tibet, and thereby the elimination of rival influence in Mongolia. It also led to the pacification of the Islamicised, Turkic-speaking southern half of Xinjiang immediately thereafter.[2] To commemorate this victory, Qianlong had the Puning Temple of Chengde constructed, home to the world's tallest wooden sculpture of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara and hence its alternate name, the 'Big Buddha Temple'.

[edit] Suppression of the Jinchuan hill peoples (1747-1749, 1771-1776)

The suppression of the Jinchuan hill people was the costliest and most difficult, and also the most destructive. The Jinchuan (literally "Golden Stream") was northwest of Chengdu in western Sichuan. The tribal peoples there were related to the Tibetans of the Amdo. The first campaign in 1747-1749 was a simple affair; with little use of force the Manchu general induced the native chieftains to accept a peace plan, and departed.

Interethnic conflict brought the Manchus back after twenty years. The result was the Qing expeditionary force being forced to fight a protracted war of attrition costing the Qing treasury several times the amounts expended on the earlier conquests of the Dzungars and Xinjiang. The resisting tribes retreated to their stone towers and forts in steep mountains and could only be dislodged by cannon. The Manchu generals were ruthless in annihilating the rebellious tribes, then reorganised the region in a military prefecture and repopulated it with more cooperative inhabitants.[2]

[edit] The Burmese Campaigns (1765-1769)

The Qianlong Emperor launched four invasions of Burma between 1765 and 1769. The war claimed the lives of over 70,000 Chinese soldiers and four commanders,[3] and is sometimes described as "the most disastrous frontier war that the Qing Dynasty had ever waged",[4] and one that "assured Burmese independence and probably the independence of other states in Southeast Asia".[5] Burma's successful defense laid the foundation for the present-day boundary between the two countries.[3]

At first, Qianlong envisaged an easy war, and sent in only the Green Standard troops stationed in Yunnan. The Qing invasion came as the majority of Burmese forces were deployed in the Burmese invasion of Siam. Nonetheless, battle-hardened Burmese troops defeated the first two invasions of 1765 and 1766 at the border. The regional conflict now escalated to a major war that involved military maneuvers nationwide in both countries. The third invasion (1767–1768) led by the elite Manchu Bannermen nearly succeeded, penetrating deep into central Burma within a few days' march from the capital, Ava.[6] But the Bannermen of northern China could not cope with unfamiliar tropical terrains and lethal endemic diseases, and were driven back with heavy losses.[3] After the close-call, King Hsinbyushin redeployed most of the Burmese armies from Siam to the Chinese border. The fourth and largest invasion got bogged down at the frontier. With the Qing forces completely encircled, a truce was reached between the field commanders of the two sides in December 1769.[4][7]

The Qing kept a heavy military lineup in the border areas of Yunnan for about one decade in an attempt to wage another war while imposing a ban on inter-border trade for two decades. The Burmese too were preoccupied with another impending invasion by the Chinese, and kept a series of garrisons along the border. Twenty years later, Burma and China resumed a diplomatic relationship in 1790. To the Burmese the resumption was on equal terms. But Qianlong unilaterally interpreted the act as Burmese submission, and claimed victory.[4] Ironically, the main beneficiaries of this war were the Siamese. After having lost their capital Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1767, they regrouped in the absence of large Burmese armies, and reclaimed their territories in the next two years.[6]

[edit] The Gurkha Campaigns (1790-1792)

The Gurkha wars display the Qing court's continuing sensitivity to conditions in Tibet. The late 1760s saw the creation of a strong state in Nepal and the involvement in the region of a new foreign power, Britain, through their British East India Company. The rash Gurkha rulers of Nepal decided to invade southern Tibet in 1788.

The Chinese army storming the Gurkha defenses at Xiebulu.

The two Manchu resident agents in Lhasa (Ambans) made no attempt at defense or resistance. Instead they took the child Panchen Lama to safety when the Nepalese troops came through and plundered the rich monastery at Shigatse on their way to Lhasa. Upon hearing of the first Nepalese incursions, the Qianlong Emperor commanded troops from Sichuan to proceed to Lhasa and restore order. By the time they reached southern Tibet, the Gurkhas had already withdrawn. This counted as the first of two wars with the Gurkhas.

In 1791 the Gurkhas returned in force. Qianlong urgently dispatched an army of 10,000 men. It was made up of around 6,000 Manchu and Mongol forces supplemented by tribal soldiers under the able general Fukang'an, with Hailancha as his deputy. They entered Tibet from Xining (Qinghai) in the north, shortening the march but making it in the dead of winter 1791-1792, crossing high mountain passes in deep snow and cold. They reached central Tibet in the summer of 1792 and within two or three months could report that they had won a decisive series of encounters that pushed the Gurkha armies across the crest of the Himalaya and back into the valley of Kathmandu. Fukang'an fought on into 1793, when he forced the battered Gurkhas to sign a treaty on Manchu terms which forced Gurkhas to pay tax every five years.[2]

[edit] The Campaign in Vietnam (1788-1789)

Chinese officials receiving the deposed Emperor Lê Chiêu Thống.

For most of her history, the Vietnamese rulers sometimes recognized the Chinese Emperor as their feudal lord, while ruling independently in their own land. This had been the case throughout the reign of the Later Lê Dynasty. This changed however when the brothers of Tây Sơn, leading a national uprising, defeated the feuding Trịnh and Nguyễn lords and overthrew the last Lê ruler, Emperor Lê Chiêu Thống.

Emperor Lê Chiêu Thống fled to China and appealed to Emperor Qianlong (Vietnamese: Càn Long) for help. In 1788 a large Qing army was sent south to restore Lê Mẫn Đế to the throne. They succeeded in taking Thăng Long (Hà Nội) and putting Emperor Chiêu Thống back on the throne, but many of his supporters were angered by their subservient position. Chiêu Thống was treated as a vassal king by Qianlong and all edicts had to be authorized by the Qing before becoming official. In any event, the situation did not last long as the Tây Sơn leader, Nguyễn Huệ, launched a surprise attack against the Qing forces while they were celebrating the Chinese New Year festival of the year 1789. The Chinese were unprepared but fought for five days before being defeated at Battle of Đống Đa. Chiêu Thống fled back to China as Nguyễn Huệ was proclaimed Emperor Quang Trung.[8] Although Nguyễn Huệ won this battle, he eventually submitted himself as vassal of Qing China and agreed to pay tribute annually.

[edit] The Campaigns in Perspective

In his later years, Qianlong referred to himself with the grandiose style name of "Old Man of the Ten Completed [Great Campaigns]" (十全老人). He also wrote an essay enumerating the victories in 1792 entitled "Record of Ten Completions" (十全记).[9]

The campaigns were major financial drain on Qing, costing more than 151 million taels of silver.[10]

  • The tribes at Jinchuan numbered less than 30,000 households and took five years to pacify.
  • Nearly 1.5 million piculs (1 picul = 100 catty) were transported for the Taiwan campaigns.
  • Instead of restoring Emperor Lê Mẫn Đế to the throne as the Vietnam campaign was intended, Qianlong ended up settling with the new Nguyen dynasty, and even arranging for imperial marriage between Qing and Nguyen.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica online entry on Kazakhstan, page 19 of 22
  2. ^ a b c F.W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 936-939
  3. ^ a b c Charles Patterson Giersch (2006). Asian borderlands: the transformation of Qing China's Yunnan frontier. Harvard University Press. pp. 101–110. ISBN 10: 0674021711. 
  4. ^ a b c Yingcong Dai (2004). "A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty". Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge University Press): 145. 
  5. ^ Marvin C. Whiting (2002). Imperial Chinese Military History: 8000 BC - 1912 AD. iUniverse. pp. 480–481. ISBN 0595221343, 9780595221349. 
  6. ^ a b DGE Hall (1960). Burma (3rd edition ed.). Hutchinson University Library. pp. 27–29. ISBN 978-1406735031. 
  7. ^ GE Harvey (1925). History of Burma. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.. pp. 254–258. 
  8. ^ A History of Vietnam: From Hong Bang to Tu Duc, Chapter 6 The Nguyen Hue Epic, pages 153-159, by Oscar Chapuis, Greenwood Publishing Group (1995), ISBN 0313296227
  9. ^ Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch`ien-lung Reign. by Harold L. Kahn, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Feb., 1972), pp. 393-394
  10. ^ Zhuang Jifa, Qing Gaozong Shiquan Wugong Yanjiu (Taipei, 1982), p.494. (庄吉发, 《清高宗十全武功研究》)
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