The Case for Animal Rights

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The Case for Animal Rights
The Case for Animal Rights.JPG
The 2004 paperback edition
Author Tom Regan
Country United States
Subject Animal rights, moral philosophy
Publisher University of California Press
Publication date
1983
Pages 474 (2004 paperback edition)
ISBN 978-0520243866
Preceded by All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics
Followed by Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science

The Case for Animal Rights is a 1983 book by the American philosopher, Tom Regan, and a canonical text within animal rights theory. The book argues that at least some kinds of non-human animals have moral rights because they are the "subjects-of-a-life," and that these rights adhere to them whether or not they are recognized.[1]

Arguments[edit]

Regan's position is Kantian (though Kant himself did not apply it to non-humans), namely that all subjects-of-a life possess intrinsic value and must be treated as ends-in-themselves, never as a means to an end. He also argues that, while being the subject-of-a-life is a sufficient condition for having intrinsic value, it is not a necessary one: an individual might not be the subject-of-a-life yet still possess intrinsic value.[2]

The argument is a deontological one, as opposed to consequentialist. If an individual possesses a moral right, that right may not be sacrificed even if the consequences of doing so are appealing.[3] He describes his "subject-of-a-life criterion" as follows:

[It] involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious. ... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value – inherent value – and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles."[4]

He argues that normally mental mammals over a year old satisfy the conditions, including most human beings, with the possible exception of those in persistent vegetative states, as do several species of birds, and possibly fish.[1] The key attribute is that – following Thomas Nagel's What Is it Like to Be a Bat? (1974) – there is something that it is like to be those individuals; they are the subjects of experience whose lives matter to them, even if they do not matter to anyone else.[5]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ a b Rowlands 1998, pp. 59–60.
  2. ^ Rowlands 1998, p. 61.
  3. ^ Francione 1996, p. 14.
  4. ^ Regan 1983, p. 243.
  5. ^ Regan 1989.

References[edit]

  • Francione, Gary. Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. Temple University Press, 1996.
  • Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press, 1983.
  • Regan, Tom. "The Case for Animal Rights", in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Prentice Hall, 1976.
  • Rowlands, Mark. Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave MacMillan, 1998.

Further reading[edit]