The Guns of August

The Guns of August
Author(s)	Barbara Tuchman
Country	United States
Language	English
Genre(s)	Military history, history
Publisher	Random House
Publication date	1962
Media type	Print (Paperback)
ISBN	ISBN 0-345-38623-X also ISBN 0-345-47609-3
OCLC Number	30087894
Dewey Decimal	940.4/144 20
LC Classification	D530 .T8 1994

The Guns of August, also published as August 1914 (1962), is a military history book written by Barbara Tuchman. It primarily describes in great detail the events of the first month of World War I, which for most of the great powers involved in the war was August 1914. The book was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-fiction for publication year 1963.

The focus of The Guns of August is to provide the history of the early stages of World War I, from the declaration of war to the start of the Franco-British offensive that stopped the German advance through France. The book provides a brief history of the plans, strategies, world events, and international sentiments prior to and during the war.

Tuchman covers the two most widely known theatres in Europe and the Mediterranean, the European (or Western) front and the Russian (or Eastern) front. The war in the Balkans is largely omitted, excepting one chapter discussing the pursuit of the German battlecruiser Goeben by Allied forces in the Mediterranean. In addition, this chapter explains how the events of the pursuit helped trigger the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, and how this in turn led to the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign.

Tuchman would later return to a subject she had touched upon in The Guns of August, the social attitudes and issues that existed prior to World War I, in a collection of eight essays published in 1966 under the title The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914 (1966).

Outbreak

These chapters discuss from June 28, 1914 (the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie) through August 3, 1914, and play out the opening days of the war—the commencement of France's offensive Plan XVII, the struggle by Russia to ensure her ally (France) would join in the war, and France's attempts to win a guarantee from Britain of her involvement, as well as Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

Battle

The remainder of the book is essentially devoted to the battles and tactical planning on the two fronts. Intertwined with this are the effects of leaders' egos and insubordination, as well as the perceptions of the rest of the world, including the events that cemented these views.

Tuchman continues by covering the two major theatres of war, the Western Front and the Russian Eastern Front, but starts the section by covering the search for the German battlecruiser Goeben by Allied forces in the Mediterranean. Goeben finally took refuge in the Dardanelles while Turkey was still neutral, which precipitated its entry into the war on the side of Germany, cutting off Russian import/export through the year-round ports of the Black Sea.

Front in France

As they crossed the Belgian frontier into France, the German armies were engaged by seven French armies and four British divisions known as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The French were labouring under the delusion that Gallic élan and derring-do would prove decisive in countering any action the Germans might mount against them. The French High Command had made few plans for dealing with such a large massed attack quickly bearing down on them. It was only through the actions of one corps commander, who (without permission from Joffre, who repeatedly ignored his frantic pleas) withdrew his forces from certain envelopment and redeployed them into a more tenable position, that the entire French line was saved from complete collapse.

The Battle of the Frontiers was brutal, and the Allies were forced to slowly retreat under the German onslaught until finally the Germans were within 40 miles of Paris. The city was saved through the courage and verve of a semi-retired territorial general, Joseph Gallieni, who brilliantly marshaled his limited resources and saved the day. The city was preparing for siege and possible complete destruction and the government had fled south, when two divisions of reserves suddenly arrived and were rushed to the front by the city's fleet of 600 taxi cabs. Tuchman cynically notes that Joffre later took complete credit for saving Paris and the French army—after having the commander who ordered the tactical retreat, Charles Lanrezac, relieved of duty, and the older commander and his former superior, Joseph Gallieni, pushed back into obscurity.

Tuchman is also careful to point out that, although many of Joffre's actions were shameful, when he was finally pushed into action he showed great skill in guiding the hastily improvised counter-blow that crashed into the invader's flank. The Germans greatly contributed to their own undoing by out-running their supply lines, pushing their infantry to the point of physical collapse, and deviating from the original invasion plan, which called for the right flank to be protected from counterattack. Both sides were plagued by poor communication and general staffs that were heavily invested with politics and sycophancy. Dire warnings from commanders in the field were ignored when they did not fit preconceived notions of quick victory at low cost (a recurring problem that has beset armies up to this day).

Tuchman carefully introduces us to all the key players, both the Allied (French, Russian, and British) and German commanders. With her characteristic attention to detail, we learn of their personalities, strengths, and weaknesses.

• Joseph Joffre, the French General;
• Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister;
• Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff;
• Alexander von Kluck, commander of the German far right wing.

Some of the names remain familiar to the average reader: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, French President Raymond Poincaré, Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, and a young soldier named Charles de Gaulle who fought for France (given only honorable mention), among others.

Front with Russia

Only two chapters are devoted to the Eastern Front. These chapters center on the Russian invasion of East Prussia and the German reaction to it, culminating in the battle of Tannenberg. Tuchman further completely ignores the front between Austria and Russia and Austria and Serbia: in her original author's note, she explains that a review of events on these fronts would have taken the work beyond its intended chronological scope of the first thirty days of the war.

In these chapters, Tuchman covers the series of errors, faulty plans, poor communications, and poor logistics which decidedly helped the French by causing the Germans to transfer two corps (yet another error) to defend against what the book refers to as the 'Russian Steam Roller'. It only hints at the follow-on misery of the eastern front.

Flames of Louvain

Woven into the section on battle are threads of the later formation of world opinion that Germany had been the aggressor nation, with implications that would greatly affect the future involvement of the United States. In the chapter The Flames of Louvain, Tuchman uses a variety of sources to convey the aims and desires of the German Empire and what appears to be the majority view of its people. She cites the writing of Thomas Mann [page 348], saying the goal was "the establishment of the German idea in history, the enthronement of Kultur, the fulfillment of Germany's historical mission". Further on she recounts reporter Irvin S. Cobb's account of an interview with a German scientist: "Germany [is] for progress. German Kultur will enlighten the world and after this war there will be no other."

This chapter continues to detail the "German theory of terror" [page 350] inflicted on the citizens of Belgium in a failed attempt to suppress the franc-tireur. The factual account leaves little doubt of the ferocity for which the world would condemn the reprisals of the German forces.

The book ends with the beginning of the First Battle of the Marne, as the French and British forces, united at last, fall on von Kluck's exposed right flank, in what would be the first successful offensive by the Allies. In the subsequent attack, the Germans were forced back north, with both sides suffering terrible losses. While Paris had been saved, the war took on a new cast, with both sides settling into a defensive trench system that cut across France and Belgium from the Channel to Switzerland. This became known as the Western Front, and over the next four years it would consume a generation of young men.

Critical Analysis

Throughout the aforementioned narrative, Tuchman constantly brings up the numerous misconceptions, miscalculations, and mistakes that she believed resulted in the tragedy of trench warfare. Among these were:

• Economic miscalculation. In Tuchman's view, both European intellectuals and leaders overestimated the power of free trade. These individuals believed that the interconnection of European nations due to this trade would stop a continent-wide war from breaking out, as the economic consequences would be too great. However, this assumption was incorrect. For example, Tuchman noted that Moltke, when warned of such consequences, refused to even consider them in his plans, arguing he was a "soldier," not an "economist."
• Unfounded belief in quick warfare. Except for a very few politicians (who were at the time ridiculed and excluded because of their views), all the leaders of the major combatants believed the war would be concluded in a matter of weeks, by the end of 1914 at the absolute latest. Tuchman recounted the story of a British statesman who, after he warned others that the war might last two or three years, was branded a "pessimist." This false assumption had disastrous effects, especially on logistics (see below).
• Over-reliance on morale and the offensive. Tuchman details, in depth, how the leaders of the major powers, before the war, developed a philosophy of warfare based almost entirely on morale, a constant offensive, and retaining the initiative. Joffre, in particular, refused to consider going on the defensive — or even to slow the offensive — even when the realities of the battlefield demonstrated that this approach was not working.
• Failure to consider political backlash. Many war planners did not take into consideration the political and treaty-based consequences of their offensive actions. As Tuchman argues, the German leaders in particular refused to consider the consequences of moving their armies into Belgium, despite that country's neutrality. Despite Moltke's concerns, German generals insisted on moving through Belgium because they needed to maneuver. They failed (or refused) to realize that by invading Belgium they effectively forced Britain to declare war because of existing treaties and national honor.
• Outdated forms of wartime etiquette. Although the technology, aims, methods, and plans of World War I were drastically different from earlier wars, military leaders continued to insist upon a form of martial etiquette from civilians which increased resentment between the countries. To illustrate, Tuchman regularly quotes from the diaries of German generals who commandeered the homes and supplies of civilians. One recurrent theme within their diary entries was that they simply couldn't understand why the property owners refused to fully cooperate, in line with past wartime courtesy. In a somewhat comical passage, Tuchman even quotes from a general who criticized the master of a Belgian house for failing to sit with him at dinner and observe proper mealtime etiquette, despite the fact that the Germans had violated his country's neutrality, taken over his house, and stolen or destroyed much of his property.

Overall, Tuchman argued that none of the war's major combatants wanted a prolonged war, but the above factors caused it nonetheless. Likewise, she argued that even successes, such as the First Battle of the Marne (a French victory), were to some extent accidental victories that were won despite, not because of, military leadership or strategy.

Cultural Effects

The book was an immediate bestseller and was on the New York Times best-seller list for 42 consecutive weeks. The Pulitzer Prize nomination committee was unable to award it the prize for outstanding history because Joseph Pulitzer's will specifically stated that the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for history must be a book on American history. Instead, Tuchman was given the prize for general non-fiction.

According to the cover notes of an audio version of The Guns of August, "[President John F. Kennedy] was so impressed by the book, he gave copies to his cabinet and principal military advisers, and commanded them to read it." In One Minute to Midnight on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Michael Dobbs notes the deep impression Guns had on Kennedy. He often quoted from it and wanted "every officer in the Army" to read it as well. Subsequently, "[t]he secretary of the Army sent copies to every U.S. military base in the world. Kennedy drew from The Guns of August to help in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, including the profound and unpredictable implications a rapid escalation of the situation could have.

The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who had served on the Western Front during the First World War, was also profoundly affected by the book. In his diary for Monday, 22 October 1962, he wrote:

Washington, in a rather panicky way, have been urging a NATO 'alert' with all that this implies (in our case, a Royal Proclamation and the call up of Reservists). I told him that we do not repeat not agree at this stage. N. General Norstad agreed with this and said he thought NATO powers would take the same view. I said that 'mobilization' had sometimes caused war. Here it was absurd since the additional forces made available by 'Alert' had no military significance.

Graham Allison, a political scientist who covered the Cuban Missile Crisis in Essence of Decision, noted the effect of the Tuchman's book on Kennedy, but also its implications for the proper study of decision-making and warfare. Allison created an entire model of decision-making, which he called the "Organizational Process Model," based on such issues as those covered by Tuchman, a model which directly countered game theory and other rationalistic means of explaining events.

Barbara Tuchman's Personal Involvement

While she did not explicitly mention this in The Guns of August, Barbara Tuchman was a witness to one of the pivotal events of the book: the pursuit of the German battle cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau. In her account of this pursuit she writes: "That morning [August 10, 1914] there arrived in Constantinople the small Italian passenger steamer which had witnessed the Gloucester's action against Goeben and Breslau. Among its passengers were the daughter, son-in-law and three grandchildren of the American ambassador Mr. Henry Morgenthau." As she was a grandchild of Henry Morgenthau, one suspects that she is referring to herself. This is confirmed in her later book Practicing History, in which she tells the story of her father, Maurice Wertheim, traveling from Constantinople to Jerusalem on August 29th, 1914, to deliver funds to the Jewish community there. Thus, at age two, Barbara Tuchman was a first-hand witness to the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, which she documented 48 years later.