Panic of 1819
The Panic of 1819 was the first major peacetime financial crisis in the United States  followed by a general collapse of the American economy persisting through 1821. The Panic announced the transition of the nation from its colonial commercial status with Europe  toward a dynamic economy, increasingly characterized by the financial and industrial imperatives of laissez-faire capitalism - and susceptible to boom and bust cycles.
Though driven by global market adjustments in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the severity of the downturn was compounded by excessive speculation in public lands, fueled by the unrestrained issue of paper money from banks and business concerns.
The Second Bank of the United States (BUS), itself deeply enmeshed in these inflationary practices, sought to compensate for its laxness in regulating the state bank credit market by initiating a sharp curtailment in loans by its western branches, beginning in 1818. Failing to provide metallic currency when presented with their own bank notes by the BUS, the state-chartered banks began foreclosing on the heavily mortgaged farms and business properties they had financed. The ensuing financial panic, in conjunction with a sudden recovery in European agricultural production in 1817 led to widespread bankruptcies and mass unemployment.
The financial disaster and depression provoked popular resentment against banking and business enterprise, and a general belief that federal government economic policy was fundamentally flawed. Americans, many for the first time, became politically engaged so as to defend their local economic interests.
This widespread discontent would be mobilized by Democratic-Republicans in alliance with "Old" Republicans, and a return to the Jeffersonian principles of limited government, strict construction of the Constitution and Southern preeminence. The Panic of 1819 marked the end of the Era of Good Feelings  and the rise of Jacksonian nationalism.
- 1 Post-war European Readjustments and the American Economy: 1815 - 1818
- 2 Unregulated Banking and the Imperatives of Republican Enterprise
- 3 Resurrection of the Bank of the United States
- 4 Prelude to Panic: 1816 – 1818
- 5 Panic “Precipitated”
- 6 Responses to the Crisis
- 7 Long-term Impacts
- 8 Economic Interpretations
- 9 Notes
- 10 See also
- 11 References
- 12 Further reading
- 13 External links
Post-war European Readjustments and the American Economy: 1815 - 1818
The United States and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814, ending the War of 1812. The British government effectively relinquished its mercantilist policies towards the United States, preparing the way for the development of free trade and the opening of America’s vast western frontier.
Europe was undergoing a period of disorganization as it readjusted to peacetime production and commerce in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. The general effect was a decline in prices throughout the Western world, due to a scarcity of metallic sources of currency (i.e. gold and silver). Britain had advanced its industrial capacity to fully meet its wartime demands, but post-war continental Europe was temporarily too devastated to absorb Britain’s surplus manufactured goods. Moreover, European agriculture production, exhausted by years of warfare, was unable to feed its own population. The economy of the United States was not immune to the chaos that afflicted Europe, and therein lay the roots of the Panic of 1819.
American manufacturers faced US markets swamped with British products, produced by low-paid workers and priced well below competitive rates and forcing may factories out of business. Continental Europe, its agrarian output crippled by the recent war, offered new markets for American staple crops, particularly cotton, wheat, corn and tobacco. As prices soared for agricultural goods, a speculative agrarian land boom ensued in the South and West United States, encouraged by liberal terms for government public land sales. “The entire postwar American economy” observed historian George Dangerfield was “based on a land boom”. The inflationary bubble grew from 1815 to 1818, obscuring the general deflationary trends in world prices.
Unregulated Banking and the Imperatives of Republican Enterprise
With the failure to recharter the First Bank of the United States in 1811, regulatory influence over state banks ceased. Credit-friendly Republicans – entrepreneurs, bankers, farmers – adapted the imperatives of laissez-faire finance to the precepts of Jeffersonian libertarianism - equating land speculation with "rugged individualism" and the frontier spirit. Private banking interests and their allies sought to evade or resist any threat to the profitability of their local enterprises, including the regulatory influence of a government bank limiting easy credit. There followed an enormous expansion in state-chartered banking, with chartered institutions increasing from 88 in 1811 to 208 in 1815, mostly in the mid-Atlantic states.
During the war with Great Britain (1812 – 1815), the American government turned to these new banks for loans, encouraging a proliferation of paper money. This practice tended to shift specie into the more conservatively lending New England banking apparatus, depleting the newer banks of their hard money reserves. In response, the US government acquiesced in a suspension of specie payments from state banks in order to prolong the wartime lending. The arrangement persisted in the war’s aftermath, allowing old and new banks to profitably lend without regard to their metallic currency reserves. A speculative bubble formed as a result of these inflationary practices threatening the health of the economy.
By 1814, calls for a new central bank and a resumption of regulatory controls were heard from powerful capitalists and economic nationalists in the Republican party leadership.
Resurrection of the Bank of the United States
The "American System"
The Republican party found itself in control of the national government with the collapse of the Federalist party at the end of the War of 1812. Some of the traditional Jeffersonian agrarian precepts – especially strict construction of the Constitution – had softened due to difficulties during the war arising from a lack of infrastructure, unregulated banking and a shortage of manufactured materiel, as well as the prospect of developing the vast natural resources with westward expansion. A mild nationalist outlook took hold among the “New Republicans”, neofederalists led by Speaker of the House Henry Clay and Congressman John C. Calhoun. A three-part program dubbed the American System, incorporating some the Hamiltonian projects championed by the Federalists, proposed “to create a stable economy through a centralized banking system, stimulated by an ever widening web of transportation and communication, through which domestic manufactures could eventually reach all parts of the Union.”
Advocates for the American System called for a protective tariff to encourage manufacturing, a federally funded program for internal improvements and a revival of the First Bank of the United States to regulate finance.
The “Capitalists”: Astor, Girard, Parish
In the crucible of the War of 1812, the Treasury of the United States had been compelled to offer $16 million in government war bonds in order to stave off bankruptcy due to military costs and wartime loss of revenue. Financier Stephen Girard, business magnate John Jacob Astor and merchant David Parish bought up these government securities and rescued the nation’s credit. Through their influence, and in alliance with Republican Congressmen John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, they sought to augment their investment by proposing that the securities be exchangeable for stock in a new Bank of the United States.
Secretary of State James Monroe supported the Bank’s revival, wishing to bind these highly regarded and pro-Republican business figures to government financial operations. Republicans in the South and West joined with monied interests in the mid-Atlantic states to support Hamiltonian banking mechanisms for the purpose of democratizing a national system of currency and credit.
Pro-BUS Congressman John C. Calhoun argued forcefully that the federal government had a constitutional obligation to regulate bank credit as part of the national money supply. In January 1816, he introduced a bill of incorporation in the House of Representatives for a government bank. The measure was passed by Congress and signed by President James Madison in April 1816.
Opposition to the Bank came from two fronts: the orthodox ”Old Republicans” who regarded an enlargement of the central government as an assault on personal liberty and a violation of Jeffersonian agrarianism, and state chartered private banking interests, who favored paper money, but considered federal regulation of local banking operations to be anti-Republican. These ideologies and interests would be arrayed against the central bank during the Andrew Jackson administration (1829-1837) and would destroy the institution by 1833.
Neofederalist Expectations for the Central Bank
The revival of the Bank of the United States had two primary objectives: first, to reverse the post-war inflationary practices of state-chartered banks by inducing resumption of convertibility, and second, to expand the opportunities for the common man to acquire bank credit, promoting enterprise and an orderly and profitable westward expansion.
The regulatory mechanism of the BUS resided in its fiscal duties as depository for the US Department of the Treasury. As such, the Bank accepted circulating state bank paper money from individuals, businesses and importers when they paid taxes or custom duty fees. The central bank immediately credited these payments to the US Treasury with its own metallic reserves. The BUS, in turn, anticipated that the state banks which had issued the paper money would, upon demand, redeem their currency with gold and silver – “convertibility” - reimbursing the government bank.
In order to remain solvent, the state banks would, ideally, constrain their lending of paper money – however profitable – so as not to allow the BUS to become a significant creditor and deplete their species reserves. Failing this, the Second Bank of the United States would, in theory, cease to honor the bank notes of those financial institutions that refused to promptly settle their government accounts with hard money – a recipe for bankruptcy.
The central bank’s direct influence on inflationary lending was limited to those chartered banks whose paper currency was extensively used to remit funds to the government (i.e. tax and duty payments). The BUS and its branches had little or no direct control over commercial paper emitted by unchartered lending outfits: “All that was necessary to start a bank…was plates, presses and paper; ‘a church, a tavern, a blacksmith shop’ would be a suitable site.”  These unregulated credit operations would “to some extent interpenetrate” the regulated banking system, especially in the regions of wildcat banking.
Prelude to Panic: 1816 – 1818
President of the United States James Madison and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas fully approved the elevation of William Jones – one of the federally appointed Bank directors – to BUS President in October 1816. Jones, formerly a member of Madison’s cabinet, owed his promotion more to his political acumen than his skills as a banker. Financier and co-director Stephen Girard was troubled at Jones’ promotion, concerned that he could never provide disinterested leadership for the Bank, and businessman John Jacob Astor doubted Jones' ability to wield the Bank’s regulatory powers effectively.
Jones extended the institution’s resources liberally in accordance with the post-war “national exuberance”, generating large dividends for its stockholders. His administration of the Bank resonated with Secretary Crawford’s lenient policy with regard to public land receipts in the form of chartered-bank script when species was scarce nationally.
Setbacks and Compromises for the BUS
The Second Bank of the United States began operations in January 1817  as fiscal agent of the United States Treasury. After February 20, 1817, the BUS was scheduled by to begin to receive all government revenue in legal tender as required by its charter.
Hard money shortages prevailed because US exports exceeded imports  and Peruvian and Mexican gold and silver sources failed to replenish species reserves. Due to this scarcity, the terms of the Bank’s incorporation provided for private subscribers to invest with a combination of metallic currency and government stock. Further, they were granted an indulgence by Bank directors that effectively waived the species requirement: ultimately, investors were allowed to purchase Bank shares on the security of the stock itself. Under its charter guidelines, the BUS was expected to acquire species totaling $28 million by the time it opened for business; but with only $2 million secured when it commenced operations, the Bank was compelled to purchase species at usurious rates from the London financial markets in 1817 and 1818, overburdening BUS credit.
As the February 20 deadline approached to resume convertibility, the private (i.e. state-chartered) banks withheld cooperation from BUS officials, loath to submit to the regulatory influence of the central bank – and diminish the large profits derived from the issue of unredeemable paper. On February 1, 1817, an association of bankers from Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland and Virginia met with the new Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford and BUS President William Jones, arranging a compromise which undermined the ability of the central bank to assert its role as creditor to the private banks.
The directors of the BUS, with Secretary Crawford’s imprimatur, promised to refrain from collecting public deposits held in state banks until July 1, 1817. Moreover, they agreed to greatly expand the Bank’s credit – at a discount of $6 million – before proceeding to collect public debt from the state institutions. In effect, the central bank transformed the private banks into its creditors, inviting them to draw species from BUS reserves months before the Bank of the United States assumed its regulatory functions. Under these “ominous terms” the Bank was launched - its operational success already at risk.
BUS Branch Office Lending and the Frontier Land Boom
The eighteen branch offices of the BUS in 1817 operated with little oversight from the Philadelphia headquarters, nor from the US Treasury. This policy stemmed in part from a social philosophy that prevailed among Republicans during the Era of Good Feelings that wished to Republicanize credit practices and encourage westward migration.
The United States government encouraged settlement of these lands by offering public land at $2 per acre (160-acre minimum), though auctioneering tended to retard sales and raised prices slightly. The terms required a down payment of one-fourth of the total cost and the balance in four annual payments. Failure to pay in full in five years meant forfeiture. Public land debt ballooned from $3 million in 1815 to $17 million in 1818.
The US Treasury accepted land payments in the form of bank notes issued by western and southern state banks. These institutions often lacked sufficient specie reserves to back up their vastly over-extended credit. As long as the land boom continued, the Treasury Department was compelled to accept depreciated bank notes for its public land sales, undermining government efforts to pay down the war debt, but serving to stave off private bank failures.
As the branch offices in the West and Southwest over-issued their BUS notes to land boom farmers and speculators, they sought to restock their species reserves by redeeming their own notes for hard money at the BUS branch offices in the North and East, to fuel another cycle of excessive lending.
The BUS branch banks, emulating their wildcat counterparts, injected so much of their own paper money into circulation that they cancelled their regulatory capacity: they could not with impunity demand species payments from state banks that held public deposits without being presented with their own script for convertibility in return. These precarious economic conditions - a manifestation of “rapid expansion, speculation and wildcat banking” - prevailed in the South and West prior to the Panic, where the economic collapse would be most severe.
By July 1818, the Second Bank of the United States had demand liabilities exceeding $22.4 million, whereas its species fund stood at $2.4 million – a 10:1 ratio  and double the 5:1 ration considered sustainable.
The onset of the financial panic has been variously described as “triggered”, “pricked”, or “precipitated”  by the Second Bank of the United States when it initiated a sharp credit contraction beginning the summer of 1818.
The link between the frontier land boom and overseas markets for staple goods was dramatically revealed when Europe finally recovered from its post-war harvest shortages and began producing bumper crops in 1817. American planters and farmers, who had expanded production to exploit the European demand, discovered agricultural prices declining by half, even as production increased. Southwestern plantations were devastated when Britain began to increase its imports of East India cotton as a means to avoid purchasing the high-priced US cotton. Cotton value began to waver in 1818 and threaten to burst the speculative bubble. A general contraction in lending was indicated in response to these developments in Europe.
In August 1818, its credit dangerously overextended, William Jones ordered BUS branch offices to reject all state-chartered bank notes, with the exception of those used as revenue payments to the US Treasury. In October 1818, The US Treasury demanded a transfer of $2 million in species from the BUS to redeem bonds on the Louisiana Purchase.
State banks in the West and South, unable to provide the required species, began to call in their loans on the heavily mortgaged lands they had financed. Cash poor farmers and speculations found their land values dropping 50% to 75%. Banks began foreclosing on the properties and transferring them to their creditor: the Second Bank of the United States.
When news arrived in January 1819 that the value of cotton had broke - dropping 25% in a single day - the ensuing panic drove the country into recession. Williams Jones resigned from his position as BUS president and was replaced by South Carolinian Langdon Cheves.
BUS Reaction to the Panic
The limited curtailment policy initiated by William Jones was rigorously applied by his successor, former Congressman from South Carolina, Langdon Cheves. Among his promoters were US President James Monroe, BUS directors Stephen Girard and Nicholas Biddle and those stockholders who wanted Bank leadership that was fiscally conservative and immune to political influence.
The tight money policy Cheves implemented – a principled effort to cope with the financial disaster – had the effect of deepening the depression, undermining the recovery that was already underway. Through public land debt relief legislation, Cheves managed to reduce the Bank’s land debt by $6 million within a year of assuming his position as BUS President. Specie drain was also reversed to a great extent, increasing from $2.5 million in 1819 to $3.4 million by 1820. It further rose to $8 million by 1821. As an added consequence, bank notes in circulation were reduced by about $23 million within a span of four years from 1816 – 1820.
Employing these “stern procedures”  Cheves placed the Bank on sound footing in early 1819. A leading critic of the Second Bank of the United States during the Bank War would observe: “The Bank was saved, and the people were ruined.” 
The Culpability of the BUS in the Panic
Despite the Second Bank of the United States’ inept management under the Jones-Cheves administrations, it was not the causative agent in the Panic of 1819 or its aftermath. The historical processes contributing to the panic and depression were beyond the Bank’s control, including the European market fluctuations, obstruction from the numerous private banks to federal regulations  and the widespread ignorance among lenders and borrowers as to the new financial mechanisms that made possible the credit expansion and land boom.
The Bank’s role was properly one of restraint, so as to automatically suppress the volatility in financial markets – but not to prevent these boom-bust episodes. “If the [Second Bank of the United States] had been wisely managed from the beginning” writes historian George Dangerfield, “it could not have prevented the panic; it could only have modified its effects.” 
“The Panic of 1819…was compounded by many factors – overexpansion of credit during the post-war years, the collapse of the export market after the bumper crop of 1817 in Europe, low prices of imports from Europe which forced American manufacturers to close, financial instability resulting from both the excessive expansion of state banking after 1811 and the unsound policies of the Second Bank of the United States, and widespread unemployment.” 
Historian Harry Ammons, from James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (1971)
Responses to the Crisis
President Monroe, interpreting the economic crisis in the narrow monetary terms then current, limited governmental action to economizing and ensuring fiscal stability. He acquiesced in suspending specie payments to bank depositors, setting a precedent for the Panics of 1837 & 1857. Although Monroe agreed that improved transportation facilities were needed, he refused the approve appropriations for internal improvements without Constitutional amendments.
In 1821, Congress passed the Relief for Public Land Debtors Act. The bill allowed debtors who owed money on land purchased from the government to keep the part of land they had already paid for and relinquish the remaining amount. It further extended the schedule of payments by several years, with a discount for quick payment. With the exception of New England states, most of the country strongly supported the measure. Many state legislatures, particularly in rural western states, passed extra relief measures for debtors.
Another response to the panic was monetary expansion, primarily at the state level. In Tennessee, Kentucky and Illinois, state banks suspended specie payments and issued large amounts of inconvertible notes. However, most other states avoided inflationist policies and enforced the payment of specie. Every state witnessed vigorous debate on the merits of each policy. Treasury Secretary Crawford advocated restricting bank credit as a measure to prevent a future crisis. Banking regulation was seen as primarily a state responsibility, and several states passed regulations in the years following the panic that required banks to maintain certain fixed ratios of capital to ensure their ability to convert to specie.
A further effect of the Panic of 1819 was increased support for protective tariffs for American industry. Vocal protectionists, such as Philadelphia printer Matthew Carrey, blamed free trade for the depression and argued that tariffs would protect American prosperity. In general, support for tariffs was strongest in the mid-Atlantic states and was opposed by export-heavy southern states.
The Panic brought attention, for the first time, to issues regarding debt relief policy, as well as poor relief. City and state governances began to more effectively approach the public policy reform issues surrounding the poor—a classification system was also created (able-bodied vs. disabled, temporary vs. long-term, etc.). Public attention to solving poverty issues consequently led to public education systems.
Public support was great once again for protective tariffs. However, when the “Tariff of Abominations” was implemented in 1828, regional discontent led to the outbreak of Nullification Crisis. The Crisis is seen as a “critical precedent for democratic action."
On a more contemporary note, many economic historians today agree that the Panic of 1819 marked the United States’ entrance into the modern business cycle.
Different economic schools of thought have offered explanations for the Panic of 1819.
Austrian school economists view the nationwide recession resulting from the Panic of 1819 as the first failure of expansionary monetary policy. This explanation is based on the Austrian theory of the business cycle. The US Government borrowed heavily to finance the War of 1812, which caused tremendous strain on the banks’ reserves of specie, leading to a suspension of specie payments in 1814, and then again during the recession of 1819-1821, violating contractual rights of depositors. The suspension of the obligation to redeem greatly spurred the establishment of new banks and the expansion of bank note issues, and this inflation of money encouraged unsustainable investments to take place. It soon became clear the monetary situation was threatening, and the Second Bank of the United States was forced to call a halt to its expansion and launch a painful process of contraction. There was a wave of bankruptcies, bank failures, and bank runs; prices dropped and wide-scale urban unemployment began. By 1819, land measures in the U.S. had also reached 3,500,000 acres (14,000 km2), and many Americans did not have enough money to pay off their loans.
Economists who adhere to Keynesian economic theory suggest the Panic of 1819 was the early Republic's first experience with the boom-bust cycles common to all modern economies. Clyde Haulman, Professor of Economics at the College of William and Mary, argues the Panic was partly caused by a decision to call in loans of the Second Bank of the US. Combined with the issue of the depression and overspeculation, the Panic marked the beginning of a new phase of American economic history, where mature market institutions would continue to move cyclically from boom to bust.
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- Panic of 1819 - Ohio History Central - A product of the Ohio Historical Society
- List of recessions in the United States
- Panic of 1857
- Business cycle
- Keynesian economics
- Monetary policy
- Austrian business cycle theory
Cited in footnotes
- Ammon, Harry. 1971. James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity. New York: McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Ammon, Harry. 2002. Presidents: A Reference History The Gale Group, Inc. Farmington Hills, Michigan
- Dangerfield, George. 1965. The Awakening of American Nationalism: 1815-1828. Harper & Row. New York.
- Hammond, Bray. 1947. Jackson, Biddle, and the Bank of the United States. Journal of Economic History, VIII (May 1947), I-23.
- Hammond, Bray. 1956. Jackson’s Fight with the Money Power. American Heritage, June 1956, Volume VII, Number 4. American Heritage Publishing Company.
- Hammond, Bray. 1957. Banks and Politics in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War. Princeton, Princeton University Press
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1948. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Malone, Dumas and Rauch, Basil. 1960. Empire for Liberty: The Genesis and Growth of the United States of America. Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc. New York.
- Meyers, Marvin. 1953. The Jacksonian Persuasion. American Quarterly Vol. 5 No. 1 (Spring, 1953) in Essays on Jacksonian America, Ed. Frank Otto Gatell. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York.
- Miller, John C. 1960. The Federalists: 1789-1801. Harper & Row, New York. ISBN 13- 9781577660316
- Remini, Robert V. 1981. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832. Harper & Row, New York.
- Remini, Robert V. 1984. Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1833-1845. Harper & Row, New York.
- Remini, Robert. V. 1993. Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union. W. W. Norton & Company, New York.
- Rothbard, Murray. 1962. The Panic of 1819: Reactions and Policies. Columbia University Press, New York. 
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1945. The Age of Jackson. Little, Brown and Company (1953). Boston, Massachusetts.
- Wilentz, Sean. 2008. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. W.W. Horton and Company. New York.
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- Blackson, Robert M. (1989). "Pennsylvania Banks and the Panic of 1819: A Reinterpretation". Journal of the Early Republic (Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 9, No. 3) 9 (3): 335–358. doi:10.2307/3123593. JSTOR 3123593.
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