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The New Deal was a series of domestic programs enacted in the United States between 1933 and 1938, and a few that came later. They included both laws passed by Congress as well as presidential executive orders during the first term (1933–37) of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The programs were in response to the Great Depression, and focused on what historians call the "3 Rs": Relief, Recovery, and Reform. That is Relief for the unemployed and poor; Recovery of the economy to normal levels; and Reform of the financial system to prevent a repeat depression.
The New Deal produced a political realignment, making the Democratic Party the majority (as well as the party that held the White House for seven out of nine Presidential terms from 1933 to 1969), with its base in liberal ideas, the white South, traditional Democrats, big city machines, and the newly empowered labor unions and ethnic minorities. The Republicans were split, with conservatives opposing the entire New Deal as an enemy of business and growth, and liberals accepting some of it and promising to make it more efficient. The realignment crystallized into the New Deal Coalition that dominated most presidential elections into the 1960s, while the opposition Conservative Coalition largely controlled Congress from 1937 to 1963. By 1936 the term "liberal" typically was used for supporters of the New Deal, and "conservative" for its opponents.
Many historians distinguish between a "First New Deal" (1933–34) and a "Second New Deal" (1935–38), with the second one more liberal and more controversial. The "First New Deal" (1933–34) dealt with the pressing banking crises through the Emergency Banking Act and the 1933 Banking Act. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided $500 million for relief operations by states and cities, while the short-lived CWA (Civil Works Administration) gave localities money to operate make-work projects in 1933–34. The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to prevent a repeated stock market crash. The controversial work of the National Recovery Administration was also part of the First New Deal.
The "Second New Deal" in 1935–38 included the Wagner Act to promote labor unions, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) relief program (which made the federal government by far the largest single employer in the nation), the Social Security Act, and new programs to aid tenant farmers and migrant workers. The final major items of New Deal legislation were the creation of the United States Housing Authority and Farm Security Administration, both in 1937, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which set maximum hours and minimum wages for most categories of workers.
The economic downturn of 1937–38, and the bitter split between the AFL and CIO labor unions led to major Republican gains in Congress in 1938. Conservative Republicans and Democrats in Congress joined in the informal Conservative Coalition. By 1942–43 they shut down relief programs such as the WPA and CCC and blocked major liberal proposals. Roosevelt himself turned his attention to the war effort, and won reelection in 1940 and 1944. The Supreme Court declared the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the first version of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) unconstitutional, however the AAA was rewritten and then upheld. As the first Republican president elected after FDR, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61) left the New Deal largely intact, even expanding it in some areas. In the 1960s, Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society used the New Deal as inspiration for a dramatic expansion of liberal programs, which Republican Richard M. Nixon generally retained. After 1974, however, the call for deregulation of the economy gained bipartisan support. The New Deal regulation of banking (Glass–Steagall Act) was suspended in the 1990s.
Many New Deal programs remain active, with some still operating under the original names, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The largest programs still in existence today are the Social Security System and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
- 1 Origins
- 2 First New Deal (1933–1934)
- 2.1 The First Hundred Days (1933)
- 2.2 Relief
- 2.3 Recovery
- 2.4 Reform
- 3 Second New Deal (1935–1938)
- 4 Court-packing plan and jurisprudential shift
- 5 Recession of 1937 and recovery
- 6 World War II and full employment
- 7 Legacy
- 8 Historiography and evaluation of New Deal policies
- 8.1 Fiscal policy
- 8.2 Relief
- 8.3 Recovery
- 8.3.1 Keynesian interpretation
- 8.3.2 Monetarist interpretation
- 8.3.3 Economic growth and unemployment (1933–1941)
- 8.3.4 Opinions on the Effect on the Depression
- 8.4 Reform
- 8.5 Impact on federal government and states
- 8.6 Race and gender
- 9 Charges
- 10 Political metaphor
- 11 The works of art and music
- 12 New Deal Programs
- 13 Statistics
- 14 See also
- 15 References
- 16 Further reading
- 17 External links
Economic collapse (1929–1933)
From 1929 to 1933 manufacturing output decreased by one third. Prices fell by 20%, causing deflation that made repaying debts much harder. Unemployment in the U.S. increased from 4% to 25%. Additionally, one-third of all employed persons were downgraded to working part-time on much smaller paychecks. In the aggregate, almost 50% of the nation's human work-power was going unused.
Before the New Deal, there was no insurance on deposits at banks. When thousands of banks closed, depositors lost their savings. At that time there was no national safety net, no public unemployment insurance, and no Social Security. Relief for the poor was the responsibility of families, private charity, and local governments, but as conditions worsened year by year, demand skyrocketed and their combined resources increasingly fell far short of demand.
The depression had devastated the nation. As Roosevelt took the oath of office at noon on March 4, 1933, all state governors had authorized bank holidays or restricted withdrawals; many Americans had little or no access to their bank accounts. The unemployment rate was about 25% and higher in major industrial and mining centers. Farm income had fallen by over 50% since 1929. 844,000 nonfarm mortgages had been foreclosed, 1930–33, out of five million in all. Political and business leaders feared revolution and anarchy. Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., who remained wealthy during the Depression, stated years later that "in those days I felt and said I would be willing to part with half of what I had if I could be sure of keeping, under law and order, the other half".
New Deal (1933–1938)
|“||Throughout the nation men and women, forgotten in the political philosophy of the Government, look to us here for guidance and for more equitable opportunity to share in the distribution of national wealth... I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people. This is more than a political campaign. It is a call to arms.||”|
Roosevelt entered office without a specific set of plans for dealing with the Great Depression; so he improvised as Congress listened to a very wide variety of voices. Among Roosevelt's more famous advisers was an informal "Brain Trust": a group that tended to view pragmatic government intervention in the economy positively. His choice for Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, greatly influenced his initiatives. Her list of what her priorities would be if she took the job illustrates: "a forty-hour workweek, a minimum wage, worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, a federal law banning child labor, direct federal aid for unemployment relief, Social Security, a revitalized public employment service and health insurance."
The New Deal policies drew from many different ideas proposed earlier in the 20th century. Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold led efforts that hearkened back to an anti-monopoly tradition rooted in American politics by figures such as Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, an influential adviser to many New Dealers, argued that "bigness" (referring, presumably, to corporations) was a negative economic force, producing waste and inefficiency. However, the anti-monopoly group never had a major impact on New Deal policy. Other leaders such as Hugh S. Johnson of the NRA took ideas from the Woodrow Wilson Administration, advocating techniques used to mobilize the economy for World War I. They brought ideas and experience from the government controls and spending of 1917–18. Other New Deal planners revived experiments suggested in the 1920s, such as the TVA.
The "First New Deal" (1933–34) encompassed the proposals offered by a wide spectrum of groups. (Not included was the Socialist Party, whose influence was all but destroyed.) This first phase of the New Deal was also characterized by fiscal conservatism (see Economy Act, below) and experimentation with several different, sometimes contradictory, cures for economic ills. The consequences were uneven. Some programs, especially the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the silver program, have been widely seen as failures. Other programs lasted about a decade; some became permanent. The economy shot upward, with FDR's first term marking one of the fastest periods of GDP growth in history. Though a downturn in 1937–38 raised questions about just how successful the policies were, the great majority of economists and historians agree that they were an overall benefit.
The New Deal faced some vocal conservative opposition. The first organized opposition in 1934 came from the American Liberty League led by conservative Democrats such as 1924 and 1928 presidential candidates John W. Davis and Al Smith. There was also a large but loosely affiliated group of New Deal opponents, who are commonly called the Old Right. This group included politicians, intellectuals, writers, and newspaper editors of various philosophical persuasions including classical liberals and conservatives, both Democrats and Republicans.
The New Deal represented a significant shift in politics and domestic policy. It especially led to greatly increased federal regulation of the economy. It also marked the beginning of complex social programs and growing power of labor unions. The effects of the New Deal remain a source of controversy and debate among economists and historians.
First New Deal (1933–1934)
There were dozens of new agencies created by Roosevelt through Executive Orders. They are Typically known by their alphabetical initials.
The First Hundred Days (1933)
The American people were generally extremely dissatisfied with the crumbling economy, mass unemployment, declining wages and profits and especially Hoover's policies such as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act and the Revenue Act of 1932. Roosevelt entered office with enormous political capital. Americans of all political persuasions were demanding immediate action, and Roosevelt responded with a remarkable series of new programs in the "first hundred days" of the administration, in which he met with Congress for 100 days. During those 100 days of lawmaking, Congress granted every request Roosevelt asked, and passed a few programs (such as the FDIC to insure bank accounts) that he opposed. Ever since, presidents have been judged against FDR for what they accomplished in their first 100 days. Walter Lippmann famously noted:
At the end of February we were a congeries of disorderly panic-stricken mobs and factions. In the hundred days from March to June we became again an organized nation confident of our power to provide for our own security and to control our own destiny.
The economy had hit bottom in March 1933 and then started to expand. Economic indicators show the economy reached nadir in the first days of March, then began a steady, sharp upward recovery. Thus the Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production sank to its lowest point of 52.8 in July 1932 (with 1935–39 = 100) and was practically unchanged at 54.3 in March 1933; however by July 1933, it reached 85.5, a dramatic rebound of 57% in four months. Recovery was steady and strong until 1937. Except for employment, the economy by 1937 surpassed the levels of the late 1920s. The Recession of 1937 was a temporary downturn. Private sector employment, especially in manufacturing, recovered to the level of the 1920s but failed to advance further until the war. Chart 2 shows the growth in employment without adjusting for population growth. The U.S. population was 124,840,471 in 1932 and 128,824,829 in 1937, an increase of 3,984,468. The ratio of these numbers, times the number of jobs in 1932, means there was a need for 938,000 more 1937 jobs to maintain the same employment level.
The Economy Act, drafted by Budget Director Lewis Williams Douglas, was passed on March 14, 1933. The act proposed to balance the "regular" (non-emergency) federal budget by cutting the salaries of government employees and cutting pensions to veterans by fifteen percent. It saved $500 million per year and reassured deficit hawks, such as Douglas, that the new President was fiscally conservative. Roosevelt argued there were two budgets: the "regular" federal budget, which he balanced, and the emergency budget, which was needed to defeat the depression. It was imbalanced on a temporary basis.
Roosevelt initially favored balancing the budget, but soon found himself running spending deficits to fund his numerous programs. Douglas, however—rejecting the distinction between a regular and emergency budget—resigned in 1934 and became an outspoken critic of the New Deal. Roosevelt strenuously opposed the Bonus Bill that would give World War I veterans a cash bonus. Congress finally passed it over his veto in 1936, and the Treasury distributed $1.5 billion in cash as bonus welfare benefits to 4 million veterans just before the 1936 election.
New Dealers never accepted the Keynesian argument for government spending as a vehicle for recovery. Most economists of the era, along with Henry Morgenthau of the Treasury Department, rejected Keynesian solutions and favored balanced budgets.
Roosevelt's first Fireside Chat on the Banking Crisis (March 12, 1933)
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At the beginning of the Great Depression the economy was destabilized by bank failures followed by credit crunches. The initial reasons were substantial losses in investment banking, followed by bank runs. (Bank runs occurred when a large number of customers withdrew their deposits because they believed the bank might become insolvent. As the bank run progressed, it generated a self-fulfilling prophecy: as more people withdrew their deposits, the likelihood of default increased, and this encouraged further withdrawals.) Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz have argued that the drain of money out of the banking system caused the monetary supply to shrink, forcing the economy to likewise shrink. As credit and economic activity diminished, price deflation followed, causing further economic contraction with disastrous impact on banks. Between 1929 and 1933 40% of all banks (9.490 out of 23.697 banks) failed. Much of the Great Depression's economic damage was caused directly by bank runs.
Herbert Hoover had already considered a bank holiday to prevent further bank runs, but rejected the idea because he was afraid to trip a panic. Roosevelt, however, gave a radio address, held in the atmosphere of a Fireside Chat, and explained to the public in simple terms the causes of the banking crisis, what the government will do and how the population could help. He closed all the banks in the country and kept them all closed until he could pass new legislation.
On March 9, Roosevelt sent to Congress the Emergency Banking Act, drafted in large part by Hoover's top advisors. The act was passed and signed into law the same day. It provided for a system of reopening sound banks under Treasury supervision, with federal loans available if needed. Three-quarters of the banks in the Federal Reserve System reopened within the next three days. Billions of dollars in hoarded currency and gold flowed back into them within a month, thus stabilizing the banking system. By the end of 1933, 4,004 small local banks were permanently closed and merged into larger banks. Their deposits totalled $3.6 billion; depositors lost a total of $540 million, and eventually received on average 85 cents on the dollar of their deposits; it is a common myth that they received nothing back. The Glass–Steagall Act limited commercial bank securities activities and affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms to regulate speculations. It also established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insured deposits for up to $2,500, ending the risk of runs on banks.
This banking reform offered unprecedented stability: While throughout the 1920s more than five hundred banks failed per year; it was less than ten banks per year after 1933.
Under the gold standard, the United States kept the Dollar convertible to gold. The Federal Reserve would have had to execute an expansionary monetary policy to fight the deflation and to inject liquidity into the banking system to prevent it from crumbling—but lower interest rates would have led to a gold outflow. Under the gold standards price–specie flow mechanism countries that lost gold but nevertheless wanted to maintain the gold standard had to permit their money supply to decrease and the domestic price level to decline (deflation). As long as the Federal Reserve had to defend the gold parity of the Dollar it had to sit idle while the banking system crumbled.
In March and April in a series of laws and executive orders, the government suspended the gold standard. Roosevelt stopped the outflow of gold by forbidding the export of gold except under license from the Treasury. Anyone holding significant amounts of gold coinage was mandated to exchange it for the existing fixed price of US dollars. The Treasury no longer paid out gold in exchange for dollars, and gold would no longer be considered valid legal tender for debts in private and public contracts.
The dollar was allowed to float freely on foreign exchange markets with no guaranteed price in gold. With the passage of the Gold Reserve Act in 1934 the nominal price of gold was changed from $20.67 per troy ounce to $35. These measures enabled the Federal Reserve to increase the amount of money in circulation to the level the economy needed. Markets immediately responded well to the suspension, in the hope that the decline in prices would finally end. In her work What ended the Great Depression? (1992) Christina Romer argued that this policy raised industrial production by 25% until 1937 and by 50% until 1942.
Before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, there was no regulation of securities at the federal level. Even firms whose securities were publicly traded published no regular reports or even worse rather misleading reports based on arbitrarily selected data. To avoid another Wall Street Crash the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted. It required the disclosure of the balance sheet, profit and loss statement, the names and compensations of corporate officers, about firms whose securities were traded. Additionally those reports had to be verified by independent auditors. In 1934 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was established to regulate the stock market and prevent corporate abuses relating to the sale of securities and corporate reporting.
Repeal of Prohibition
In a measure that garnered substantial popular support for his New Deal, Roosevelt moved to put to rest one of the most divisive cultural issues of the 1920s. He signed the bill to legalize the manufacture and sale of alcohol, an interim measure pending the repeal of Prohibition, for which a constitutional amendment of repeal (the 21st) was already in process. The repeal amendment was ratified later in 1933. States and cities gained additional new revenue, and Roosevelt secured his popularity especially in the cities and ethnic areas by helping the beer start flowing. 
Relief was the immediate effort to help the one-third of the population that was hardest hit by the depression. Also, relief was aimed at providing temporary help to suffering and unemployed Americans.
To prime the pump and cut unemployment, the NIRA created the Public Works Administration (PWA), a major program of public works, which organized and provided funds for the building of useful works such as government buildings, airports, hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, and dams. From 1933 to 1935 PWA spent $3.3 billion with private companies to build 34,599 projects, many of them quite large.
Under Roosevelt, many unemployed persons were put to work on a wide range of government financed public works projects, building bridges, airports, dams, post offices, courthouses, and thousands of miles of road. Through reforestation and flood control, they reclaimed millions of hectares of soil from erosion and devastation. As noted by one authority, Roosevelt's New Deal "was literally stamped on the American landscape".
Farm and rural programs
Rural America was a high priority for Roosevelt and his energetic Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace. FDR believed that full economic recovery depended upon the recovery of agriculture, and raising farm prices was a major tool, even though it meant higher food prices for the poor living in cities.
Many rural people lived in severe poverty, especially in the South. Major programs addressed to their needs included the Resettlement Administration (RA), the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), rural welfare projects sponsored by the WPA, National Youth Administration (NYA), Forest Service and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), including school lunches, building new schools, opening roads in remote areas, reforestation, and purchase of marginal lands to enlarge national forests. In 1933, the Administration launched the Tennessee Valley Authority, a project involving dam construction planning on an unprecedented scale to curb flooding, generate electricity, and modernize poor farms in the Tennessee Valley region of the Southern United States. Under the Farmers' Relief Act of 1933, the government paid compensation to farmers who reduced output, thereby rising prices. As a result of this legislation, the average income of farmers almost doubled by 1937.
In the 1920s farm production had increased dramatically thanks to mechanization, more potent insecticides and increased use of fertilizer. Due to an overproduction of agricultural products farmers faced a severe and chronic agricultural depression throughout the 1920s. The Depression even worsened the agricultural crises. At the beginning of 1933 agricultural markets nearly faced collapse. Farm prices were so low that for example in Montana wheat was rotting in the fields because it could not be profitably harvested. In Oregon sheep were slaughtered and left to the buzzards because meat prices were not sufficient to warrant transportation to markets.
Roosevelt was keenly interested in farm issues and believed that true prosperity would not return until farming was prosperous. Many different programs were directed at farmers. The first 100 days produced the Farm Security Act to raise farm incomes by raising the prices farmers received, which was achieved by reducing total farm output. The Agricultural Adjustment Act created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) in May 1933. The act reflected the demands of leaders of major farm organizations, especially the Farm Bureau, and reflected debates among Roosevelt's farm advisers such as Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, M.L. Wilson, Rexford Tugwell, and George Peek.
The AAA aimed to raise prices for commodities through artificial scarcity. The AAA used a system of domestic allotments, setting total output of corn, cotton, dairy products, hogs, rice, tobacco, and wheat. The farmers themselves had a voice in the process of using government to benefit their incomes. The AAA paid land owners subsidies for leaving some of their land idle with funds provided by a new tax on food processing. To force up farm prices to the point of "parity" 10 million acres (40,000 km2) of growing cotton was plowed up, bountiful crops were left to rot, and six million piglets were killed and discarded.
The idea was to give farmers a "fair exchange value" for their products in relation to the general economy ("parity level"). Farm incomes and the income for the general population recovered fast since the Beginning of 1933. Still, food prices remained well below the 1929 peak.
The AAA established an important and long-lasting federal role in the planning on the entire agricultural sector of the economy and was the first program on such a scale on behalf of the troubled agricultural economy. The original AAA did not provide for any sharecroppers or tenants or farm laborers who might become unemployed, but there were other New Deal programs especially for them.
A Gallup Poll printed in the Washington Post revealed that a majority of the American public opposed the AAA. In 1936, the Supreme Court declared the AAA to be unconstitutional, stating that "a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, [is] a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government". The AAA was replaced by a similar program that did win Court approval. Instead of paying farmers for letting fields lie barren, this program instead subsidized them for planting soil enriching crops such as alfalfa that would not be sold on the market. Federal regulation of agricultural production has been modified many times since then, but together with large subsidies is still in effect in 2012.
The Farm Tenancy Act in 1937 was the last major New Deal legislation that concerned farming. It, in turn, created the Farm Security Administration (FSA), which replaced the Resettlement Administration.
The Food Stamp Plan—a major new welfare program for urban poor—was established in 1939 to provide stamps to poor people who could use them to purchase food at retail outlets. The program ended during wartime prosperity in 1943, but was restored in 1961. It survived into the 21st century with little controversy because it was seen to benefit the urban poor, food producers, grocers and wholesalers, as well as farmers. Thus it gained support from both liberal and conservative Congressmen. In 2013, however, Tea Party activists in the House tried to end the program, now known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, while the Senate fought to preserve it.
Recovery was the effort in numerous programs to restore the economy to normal health. By most economic indicators this was achieved by 1937—except for unemployment, which remained stubbornly high until World War II began. Recovery was designed to help the economy bounce back from depression.
NRA "Blue Eagle" campaign
Roosevelt's advisers believed that excessive competition and technical progress had led to overproduction and lowered wages and prices, which they believed lowered demand and employment (Deflation). He argued that government economic planning was necessary to remedy this:
...A mere builder of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad systems, an organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger as a help. Our task is not ... necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand.
From 1929 to 1933, the industrial economy had been suffering from a vicious cycle of deflation. Since 1931, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the voice of the nation's organized business, promoted an anti-deflationary scheme that would permit trade associations to cooperate in government-instigated cartels to stabilize prices within their industries. While existing antitrust laws clearly forbade such practices, organized business found a receptive ear in the Roosevelt Administration.
New Deal economists argued that cut-throat competition had hurt many businesses and that with prices having fallen 20% and more, "deflation" exacerbated the burden of debt and would delay recovery. They rejected a strong move in Congress to limit the workweek to 30 hours. Instead their remedy, designed in cooperation with big business, was the NIRA. It included stimulus funds for the WPA to spend, and sought to raise prices, give more bargaining power for unions (so the workers could purchase more) and reduce harmful competition. At the center of the NIRA was the National Recovery Administration (NRA), headed by former General Hugh S. Johnson, who had been a senior economic official in World War I. Johnson called on every business establishment in the nation to accept a stopgap "blanket code": a minimum wage of between 20 and 45 cents per hour, a maximum workweek of 35–45 hours, and the abolition of child labor. Johnson and Roosevelt contended that the "blanket code" would raise consumer purchasing power and increase employment.
To mobilize political support for the NRA, Johnson launched the "NRA Blue Eagle" publicity campaign to boost what he called "industrial self-government". The NRA brought together leaders in each industry to design specific sets of codes for that industry; the most important provisions were anti-deflationary floors below which no company would lower prices or wages, and agreements on maintaining employment and production. In a remarkably short time, the NRA announced agreements from almost every major industry in the nation. By March 1934, industrial production was 45% higher than in March 1933. Donald Richberg, who soon replaced Johnson as the head of the NRA, said:
There is no choice presented to American business between intelligently planned and uncontrolled industrial operations and a return to the gold-plated anarchy that masqueraded as "rugged individualism" ... Unless industry is sufficiently socialized by its private owners and managers so that great essential industries are operated under public obligation appropriate to the public interest in them, the advance of political control over private industry is inevitable.
By the time NRA ended in May 1935, industrial production was 55% higher than in May 1933. In addition, well over 2 million employers accepted the new standards laid down by the NRA, which had introduced a minimum wage and an eight-hour workday, together with abolishing child labor. On May 27, 1935, the NRA was found to be unconstitutional by a unanimous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Schechter v. United States. On that same day, the Court unanimously struck down the Frazier-Lemke Act portion of the New Deal as unconstitutional. After the end of the NRA quotas in the oil industry were fixed by the Railroad Commission of Texas with Tom Connally's federal Hot Oil Act of 1935, which guaranteed that illegal "hot oil" would not be sold.
Employment in private sector factories recovered to the level of the late 1920s by 1937 but did not grow much bigger until the war came and manufacturing employment leaped from 11 million in 1940 to 18 million in 1943.
The New Deal had an important impact in the housing field. The New Deal followed and increased President Hoover's lead and seek measures. The New Deal sought to stimulate the private home building industry and increase the number of individuals who owned homes. The New Deal implemented two new housing agencies; Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). HOLC set uniform national appraisal methods and simplified the mortgage process. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) created national standards for home construction.
The New Deal helped increase the number of Americans who owned homes. Before the New Deal only four out of 10 Americans owned homes; this was because the standard mortgage lasted only five to 10 years and had interest as high as 8%. These conditions severely limited the accessibility to housing for most Americans. Under the New Deal, Americans had access to 30-year mortgages, and the standardized appraisal and construction processes helped open up the housing market to more Americans.
Reform was based on the assumption that the depression was caused by the inherent instability of the market and that government intervention was necessary to rationalize and stabilize the economy, and to balance the interests of farmers, business and labor. Reforms targeted the causes of the depression and sought to prevent a crisis like it from happening again. In other words, financially rebuilding the U.S. while ensuring not to repeat history.
There is consensus amongst economic historians that protectionist policies, culminating in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 worsened the Depression. Franklin D. Roosevelt already spoke against the act while campaigning for president during 1932. In 1934 the Reciprocal Tariff Act was drafted by Cordell Hull. It gave the president power to negotiate bilateral, reciprocal trade agreements with other countries. The act enabled Roosevelt to liberalize American trade policy around the globe. It is widely credited with ushering in the era of liberal trade policy that persists to this day.
A separate set of programs operated in Puerto Rico, headed by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. It promoted land reform and helped small farms; it set up farm cooperatives, promoted crop diversification, and helped local industry. The Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration was directed by Juan Pablo Montoya Sr. from 1935 to 1937.
Second New Deal (1935–1938)
In the spring of 1935, responding to the setbacks in the Court, a new skepticism in Congress, and the growing popular clamour for more dramatic action, the Administration proposed or endorsed several important new initiatives. Historians refer to them as the "Second New Deal" and note that it was more liberal and more controversial than the "First New Deal" of 1933–34.
Social Security Act
Until 1935 there were just a dozen states that had old age insurance laws but these programs were woefully underfunded and therefore almost worthless. Just one state (Wisconsin) had an insurance program. The United States was the only modern industrial country, where people faced the Depression without any national system of social security. Even the work programs of the "First New Deal" were just meant as immediate relief, destined to run less than a decade.
The most important program of 1935, and perhaps the New Deal as a whole, was the Social Security Act, drafted by Frances Perkins. It established a permanent system of universal retirement pensions (Social Security), unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits for the handicapped and needy children in families without father present. It established the framework for the U.S. welfare system. Roosevelt insisted that it should be funded by payroll taxes rather than from the general fund; he said, "We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program."
Compared with the social security systems in western European countries, the Social Security Act of 1935 was rather conservative. But for the first time the federal government took responsibility for the economic security of the aged, the temporarily unemployed, dependent children and the handicapped.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, finally guaranteed workers the rights to collective bargaining through unions of their own choice. The Act also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to facilitate wage agreements and to suppress the repeated labor disturbances. The Wagner Act did not compel employers to reach agreement with their employees, but it opened possibilities for American labor. The result was a tremendous growth of membership in the labor unions, especially in the mass-production sector, composing the American Federation of Labor. Labor thus became a major component of the New Deal political coalition.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 set maximum hours (44 per week) and minimum wages (25 cents per hour) for most categories of workers. Child labour of children under the age of 16 was forbidden, children under 18 years were forbidden to work in hazardous employment. As a result the wages of 300,000 people were increased and the hours of 1.3 million were reduced. It was the last major New Deal legislation that Roosevelt succeeded in enacting into law before the Conservative Coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats won control of Congress that year. While he could usually use the veto to restrain Congress, it could block any Roosevelt legislation it disliked.
Works Progress Administration
Roosevelt nationalized unemployment relief through the Works Progress Administration (WPA), headed by close friend Harry Hopkins. Roosevelt had insisted that the projects had to be costly in terms of labor, long-term beneficial, and the WPA was forbidden to compete with private enterprises (therefore the workers had to be paid smaller wages). The Works Progress Administration (WPA) was created to return the unemployed to the work force. The WPA financed a variety of projects such as hospitals, schools, and roads, and employed more than 8.5 million workers who built 650,000 miles of highways and roads, 125,000 public buildings, as well as bridges, reservoirs, irrigation systems, parks, playgrounds and so on.
Prominent projects were the Lincoln Tunnel, the Triborough Bridge, the LaGuardia Airport, the Overseas Highway and the San Francisco – Oakland Bay Bridge. The Rural Electrification Administration used co-ops to bring electricity to rural areas, many of which still operate. The National Youth Administration was another the semi-autonomous WPA program for youth. Its Texas director, Lyndon Baines Johnson, later used the NYA as a model for some of his Great Society programs in the 1960s. The WPA was organized by states, but New York City had its own branch Federal One, which created jobs for writers, musicians, artists, and theater personnel. It became a hunting ground for conservatives searching for Communist employees.
The Federal Writers' Project operated in every state, where it created a famous guide book; it also catalogued local archives and hired many writers, including Margaret Walker, Zora Neale Hurston, and Anzia Yezierska, to document folklore. Other writers interviewed elderly ex-slaves and recorded their stories. Under the Federal Theater Project, headed by charismatic Hallie Flanagan, actresses and actors, technicians, writers, and directors put on stage productions. The tickets were inexpensive or sometimes free, making theater available to audiences unaccustomed to attending plays. One Federal Art Project paid 162 trained woman artists on relief to paint murals or create statues for newly built post offices and courthouses. Many of these works of art can still be seen in public buildings around the country, along with murals sponsored by the Treasury Relief Art Project of the Treasury Department. During its existence, the Federal Theatre Project provided jobs for circus people, musicians, actors, artists, and playwrights, together with increasing public appreciation of the arts.
In 1935, Roosevelt called for a tax program called the Wealth Tax Act (Revenue Act of 1935) to redistribute wealth. But there was more rhetoric than revenue in that proposal. The bill imposed an income tax of 79% on incomes over $5 million. Since that was an extraordinary high income in the 1930s, the highest tax rate actually covered just one individual – John D. Rockefeller. The bill was expected to raise only about $250 million in additional funds, so revenue was not the primary goal. Morgenthau called it "more or less a campaign document". In a private conversation with Raymond Moley, Roosevelt admitted that the purpose of the bill was "stealing Huey Long's thunder" by making Long's supporters his own. At the same time, it raised the bitterness of the rich who called Roosevelt "a traitor to his class" and the wealth tax act a "soak the rich tax".
A tax called the undistributed profits tax was enacted in 1936. This time the primary purpose was revenue, since Congress had enacted the Adjusted Compensation Payment Act, calling for payments of $2 billion to World War I veterans. The bill established the persisting principle that retained corporate earnings could be taxed. Paid dividends were tax deductible by corporations. Its proponents intended the bill to replace all other corporation taxes—believing this would stimulate corporations to distribute earnings and thus put more cash and spending power in the hands of individuals. In the end, Congress watered down the bill, setting the tax rates at 7 to 27% and largely exempting small enterprises. Facing widespread and fierce criticism, the tax deduction of paid dividends was repealed in 1938.
Housing Act of 1937
The United States Housing Act of 1937 created the United States Housing Authority within the U.S. Department of the Interior. It was one of the last New Deal agencies created. The bill passed in 1937 with some Republican support to abolish slums.
Court-packing plan and jurisprudential shift
When Roosevelt took office a majority of the nine judges of the Supreme Court were appointed by Republican Party Presidents. Four especially conservative judges (nicknamed the Four Horsemen) often managed to convince the fifth judge Owen Roberts to strike down progressive legislation. Roosevelt increasingly saw the issue of the Supreme Court as one of unelected officials stifling the work of a democratically elected government. Early in the year 1937, he asked Congress to pass the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937. That proposal would have given the president the power to appoint a new justice whenever an existing judge reached the age of 70 and failed to retire within six months. In that way Roosevelt hoped to preserve the New Deal legislation. But he had stirred up a hornet`s nest since many congressmen feared he might start to retire them at 70 next. Many congressmen considered the proposal unconstitutional. In the end the proposal failed.
In one sense, however, it succeeded: Justice Owen Roberts switched positions and began voting to uphold New Deal measures, effectively creating a liberal majority in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, thus departing from the Lochner v. New York era and giving the government more power in questions of economic policies. Journalists called this change "the switch in time that saved nine". Recent scholars have noted that since the vote in Parrish took place several months before the court-packing plan was announced, other factors, like evolving jurisprudence, must have contributed to the Court's swing. The opinions handed down in the spring of 1937, favorable to the government, also contributed to the downfall of the plan. In any case, the "court packing plan", as it was known, did lasting political damage to Roosevelt.
With the retirement of Justice Willis Van Devanter, the Court's composition began to move solidly in support of Roosevelt's legislative agenda. In the end Roosevelt had lost the battle for the Judiciary Reorganization Bill but won the war for control of the Supreme Court in a constitutional way. Since he managed to serve in office for more than twelve years he got the chance to appoint eight of the nine Justices of the Court. Former Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that in this way the Constitution provides for ultimate responsibility of the Court to the political branches of government.
Recession of 1937 and recovery
The Roosevelt Administration was under assault during FDR's second term, which presided over a new dip in the Great Depression in the fall of 1937 that continued until most of 1938. Production and profits declined sharply. Unemployment jumped from 14.3% in 1937 to 19.0% in 1938. The downturn was perhaps due to nothing more than the familiar rhythms of the business cycle. But until 1937 Roosevelt had claimed responsibility for the excellent economic performance. That backfired in the recession and the heated political atmosphere of 1937.
Business-oriented conservatives explained the recession by arguing that the New Deal had been very hostile to business expansion in 1935–37, had threatened massive anti-trust legal attacks on big corporations and by the huge strikes caused by the organizing activities of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The recovery was explained by the conservatives in terms of the diminishing of those threats sharply after 1938. For example, the antitrust efforts fizzled out without major cases. The CIO and AFL unions started battling each other more than corporations, and tax policy became more favorable to long-term growth.
"When The Gallup Organization's poll in 1939 asked, 'Do you think the attitude of the Roosevelt administration toward business is delaying business recovery?' the American people responded 'yes' by a margin of more than two-to-one. The business community felt even more strongly so." Fortune's Roper poll found in May 1939 that 39% of Americans thought the administration had been delaying recovery by undermining business confidence, while 37% thought it had not. But it also found that opinions on the issue were highly polarized by economic status and occupation. In addition, AIPO found in the same time that 57% believed that business attitudes toward the administration were delaying recovery, while 26% thought they were not, emphasizing that fairly subtle differences in wording can evoke substantially different polling responses.
Keynesian economists stated that the recession of 1937 was a result of a premature effort to curb government spending and balance the budget.
Roosevelt had been cautious not to run large deficits. In 1937 he actually achieved a balanced budget. Therefore he did not fully utilize deficit spending. Between 1933 and 1941 the average federal budget deficit was 3% per year.
In November 1937 Roosevelt decided that big business were trying to ruin the New Deal by causing another depression that voters would react against by voting Republican. It was a "capital strike" said Roosevelt, and he ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to look for a criminal conspiracy (they found none). Roosevelt moved left and unleashed a rhetorical campaign against monopoly power, which was cast as the cause of the new crisis. Ickes attacked automaker Henry Ford, steelmaker Tom Girdler, and the super rich "Sixty Families" who supposedly comprised "the living center of the modern industrial oligarchy which dominates the United States".
Left unchecked, Ickes warned, they would create "big-business Fascist America—an enslaved America". The President appointed Robert Jackson as the aggressive new director of the antitrust division of the Justice Department, but this effort lost its effectiveness once World War II began and big business was urgently needed to produce war supplies. But the Administration's other response to the 1937 dip that stalled recovery from the Great Depression had more tangible results.
Ignoring the requests of the Treasury Department and responding to the urgings of the converts to Keynesian economics and others in his Administration, Roosevelt embarked on an antidote to the depression, reluctantly abandoning his efforts to balance the budget and launching a $5 billion spending program in the spring of 1938, an effort to increase mass purchasing power. Roosevelt explained his program in a fireside chat in which he told the American people that it was up to the government to "create an economic upturn" by making "additions to the purchasing power of the nation".
World War II and full employment
The U.S. reached full employment after entering World War II in December 1941. Under the special circumstances of war mobilization, massive war spending doubled the GNP (Gross National Product). Military Keynesianism brought full employment. Federal contracts were cost-plus. Instead of competitive bidding to get lower prices, the government gave out contracts that promised to pay all the expenses plus a modest profit. Factories hired everyone they could find regardless of their lack of skills; they simplified work tasks and trained the workers, with the federal government paying all the costs. Millions of farmers left marginal operations, students quit school, and housewives joined the labor force.
The emphasis was for war supplies as soon as possible, regardless of cost and inefficiencies. Industry quickly absorbed the slack in the labor force, and the tables turned such that employers needed to actively and aggressively recruit workers. As the military grew, new labor sources were needed to replace the 12 million men serving in the military. Propaganda campaigns pleading for people to work in the war factories. The barriers for married women, the old, the unskilled—and (in the North and West) the barriers for racial minorities—were lowered.
In 1929, federal expenditures accounted for only 3% of GNP. Between 1933 and 1939, federal expenditures tripled, but the national debt as a percent of GNP showed little change. Spending on the war effort quickly eclipsed spending on New Deal programs. In 1944 government spending on the war effort exceeded 40% of GNP. The US economy experienced dramatic growth during the Second World War mostly due to the deemphasis of free enterprise in favor of the imposition of strict controls on prices and wages. These controls shared broad support among Labor and Business, resulting in cooperation between the two groups and the Federal Government. This cooperation resulted in the government subsidizing business and labor through both direct and indirect methods.
Despite conservative domination of Congress during the early 1940s, a number of progressive measures supported by business in the name of efficiency and safety were legislated. The Coal Mines Inspection and Investigation Act of 1941 significantly reduced fatality rates in the coal-mining industry, while the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942 provided family allowances for dependents of enlisted men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, while emergency grants to States were authorized that same year for programs for day care for children of working mothers. In 1944, pensions were authorized for all physically or mentally helpless children of deceased veterans regardless of the age of the child at the date the claim was filed or at the time of the veteran's death, provided the child was disabled at the age of sixteen and that the disability continued to the date of the claim. The Public Health Service Act, which was passed that same year, expanded Federal-State public health programs, and increased the annual amount for grants for public health services. In response to the March on Washington Movement led by A. Philip Randolph, Roosevelt promulgated Executive Order 8802 in June 1941, which established the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) "to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination" so that "there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin." The Community Facilities Act of 1941 (the Lanham Act) provided federal funds to defense-impacted communities for the building of recreational facilities, water and sanitation plants, hospitals, day care centers, schools, and houses, while the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program, introduced in March 1943, provided free maternity care and medical treatment during an infant’s first year “for the wives and children of military personnel in the four lowest enlisted pay grades.”
The New Dealers wanted benefits for everyone according to need. Conservatives, however, proposed benefits based on national service, and their approach won out. The "G.I. Bill" (Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944) was a landmark piece of legislation, providing 16 million returning veterans with benefits such as housing, educational, and unemployment assistance, and played a major role in the postwar expansion of the American middle class.
A major result of the full employment at high wages was a sharp, long lasting decrease in the level of income inequality (Great Compression). The gap between rich and poor narrowed dramatically in the area of nutrition, because food rationing and price controls provided a reasonably priced diet to everyone. White collar workers did not typically receive overtime and therefore the gap between white collar and blue collar income narrowed. Large families that had been poor during the 1930s had four or more wage earners, and these families shot to the top one-third income bracket. Overtime provided large paychecks in war industries, and average living standards rose steadily, with real wages rising by 44% in the four years of war, while the percentage of families with an annual income of less than $2,000 fell from 75% to 25% of the population.
In 1941, 40% of all American families lived on less than the $1,500 per year defined as necessary by the Works Progress Administration for a modest standard of living. The median income stood at $2,000 a year, while 8 million workers earnt below the legal minimum. From 1939 to 1944, however, wages and salaries more than doubled, with overtime pay and the expansion of jobs leading to a 70% rise in average weekly earnings during the course of the war. Membership in organized labor increased by 50% between 1941 and 1945, and because the War Labor Board sought labor-management peace, new workers were encouraged to participate in the existing labor organizations, thereby receiving all the benefits of union membership such as improved working conditions, better fringe benefits, and higher wages. As noted by William H. Chafe
"with full employment, higher wages and social welfare benefits provided under government regulations, American workers experienced a level of well-being that, for many, had never occurred before."
As a result of the new prosperity, consumer expenditures rose by nearly 50%, from $61.7 billion at the start of the war to $98.5 billion by 1944. Individual savings accounts climbed almost sevenfold during the course of the war. The share of total income held by the top 5% of wage earners fell from 22% to 17%, while the bottom 40% increased their share of the economic pie. In addition, during the course of the war, the proportion of the American population earning less than $3,000 (in 1968 dollars) fell by half.
Analysts agree the New Deal produced a new political coalition that sustained the Democratic Party as the majority party in national politics into the 1960s.
However there is disagreement about whether it marked a permanent change in values. Cowie and Salvatore in 2008 argued that it was a response to depression and did not mark a commitment to a welfare state because America has always been too individualistic. MacLean rejected the idea of a definitive political culture. She says they overemphasized individualism and ignored the enormous power that big capital wields, the Constitutional restraints on radicalism, and the role of racism, antifeminism, and homophobia. She warns that accepting Cowie and Salvatore's argument that conservatism's ascendancy is inevitable would dismay and discourage activists on the left. Klein responds that the New Deal did not die a natural death; it was killed off in the 1970s by a business coalition mobilized by such groups as the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, trade organizations, conservative think tanks, and decades of sustained legal and political attacks.
Historians generally agree that during Roosevelt's 12 years in office, there was a dramatic increase in the power of the federal government as a whole. Roosevelt also established the presidency as the prominent center of authority within the federal government. Roosevelt created a large array of agencies protecting various groups of citizens—workers, farmers, and others—who suffered from the crisis, and thus enabled them to challenge the powers of the corporations. In this way, the Roosevelt Administration generated a set of political ideas—known as New Deal liberalism—that remained a source of inspiration and controversy for decades. New Deal liberalism lay the foundation of a new consensus. Between 1940 and 1980 there was the liberal consensus about the prospects for the widespread distribution of prosperity within an expanding capitalist economy. Especially Harry S. Trumans Fair Deal and in the 1960s, Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society used the New Deal as inspiration for a dramatic expansion of liberal programs.
The New Deal's enduring appeal on voters fostered its acceptance by moderate and liberal Republicans.
As the first Republican president elected after FDR, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61) built on the New Deal in a manner that embodied his thoughts on efficiency and cost-effectiveness. He sanctioned a major expansion of Social Security by a self-financed program. He supported such New Deal programs as the minimum wage and public housing; he greatly expanded federal aid to education and built the Interstate Highway system primarily as defense programs (rather than jobs program). In a private letter Eisenhower wrote:
Should any party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history. There is a tiny splinter group of course, that believes you can do these things ... Their number is negligible and they are stupid.
In 1964 Barry Goldwater, an unreconstructed anti-New Dealer, was the Republican presidential candidate on a platform that attacked the New Deal. The Democrats under Lyndon B. Johnson won a massive landslide and Johnson's Great Society programs extended the New Deal. However the supporters of Goldwater formed the New Right which helped to bring Ronald Reagan into the White House in the 1980 presidential election. Reagan, at the time an ardent New Dealer, had turned against the New Deal and moved the nation in new directions, with his emphasis on government as the problem, not the solution.
Historiography and evaluation of New Deal policies
Historians debating the New Deal have generally divided between liberals who support it, conservatives who oppose it, and some New Left historians who complain it was too favorable to capitalism and did too little for minorities. There is consensus on only a few points, with most commentators favorable toward the CCC and hostile toward the NRA.
- believed that the prosperity and apparent class harmony of the post-World War II era reflected a return to the true Americanism rooted in liberal capitalism and the pursuit of individual opportunity that had made fundamental conflicts over resources a thing of the past. They argued that the New Deal was a conservative movement that built a welfare state, guided by experts, that saved rather than transformed liberal capitalism.
Liberal historians argue that Roosevelt restored hope and self-respect to tens of millions of desperate people, built labor unions, upgraded the national infrastructure and saved capitalism in his first term when he could have destroyed it and easily nationalized the banks and the railroads. Historians generally agree that, apart from building up labor unions, the New Deal did not substantially alter the distribution of power within American capitalism. "The New Deal brought about limited change in the nation's power structure." The New Deal preserved democracy in the United States in a historic period of uncertainty and crises when in many other countries democracy failed.
The most common arguments can be summarized as follows:
- The New Deal greatly increased the national debt (Billington and Ridge) while liberal Keynesians criticize that the federal deficit between 1933 and 1939 averaged only 3.7% which was not enough to offset the reduction in private sector spending during the Great Depression
- caused a growth of class consciousness among farmers and manual workers (Billington and Ridge)
- promoted bureaucracy and inefficiency (Billington and Ridge) and enlarged the powers of the federal government
- slowed the merit system and civil service by adding many jobs outside the system (Billington and Ridge)
- infringed on the rights of businessmen (Billington and Ridge)
- raise the issue of how far economic regulation can be extended without sacrificing the liberties of the people (Billington and Ridge)
- rescued capitalism when the opportunity was at hand to nationalize banking, railroads and other industries (New Left critique)
- the nation came through its greatest depression without undermining the capitalist system (Billington and Ridge)
- making the capitalist system more beneficial by enacting banking and stock market regulations to avoid abuses and providing greater financial security through, for example the introduction of Social Security or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (David M. Kennedy)
- created a better balance among labor, agriculture and industry (Billington and Ridge)
- produced a more equal distribution of wealth (Billington and Ridge)
- help conserve natural resources (Billington and Ridge)
- permanently established the principle that the national government should take action to rehabilitate and preserve America's human resources (Billington and Ridge)
Julian Zelizer (2000) has argued that fiscal conservatism was a key component of the New Deal. A fiscally conservative approach was supported by Wall Street and local investors and most of the business community; mainstream academic economists believed in it, as apparently did the majority of the public. Conservative southern Democrats, who favored balanced budgets and opposed new taxes, controlled Congress and its major committees. Even liberal Democrats at the time regarded balanced budgets as essential to economic stability in the long run, although they were more willing to accept short-term deficits. As Zelizer notes, public opinion polls consistently showed public opposition to deficits and debt. Throughout his terms, Roosevelt recruited fiscal conservatives to serve in his Administration, most notably Lewis Douglas the Director of Budget in 1933–1934, and Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from 1934 to 1945. They defined policy in terms of budgetary cost and tax burdens rather than needs, rights, obligations, or political benefits. Personally the President embraced their fiscal conservatism. Politically, he realized that fiscal conservatism enjoyed a strong wide base of support among voters, leading Democrats, and businessmen. On the other hand, there was enormous pressure to act – and spending money on high visibility work programs with millions of paychecks a week.
Douglas proved too inflexible, and he quit in 1934. Morgenthau made it his highest priority to stay close to Roosevelt, no matter what. Douglas's position, like many of the Old Right, was grounded in a basic distrust of politicians and the deeply ingrained fear that government spending always involved a degree of patronage and corruption that offended his Progressive sense of efficiency. The Economy Act of 1933, passed early in the Hundred Days, was Douglas's great achievement. It reduced federal expenditures by $500 million, to be achieved by reducing veterans' payments and federal salaries. Douglas cut government spending through executive orders that cut the military budget by $125 million, $75 million from the Post Office, $12 million from Commerce, $75 million from government salaries, and $100 million from staff layoffs. As Freidel concludes, "The economy program was not a minor aberration of the spring of 1933, or a hypocritical concession to delighted conservatives. Rather it was an integral part of Roosevelt's overall New Deal."
Revenues were so low that borrowing was necessary (only the richest 3% paid any income tax between 1926 and 1940). Douglas therefore hated the relief programs, which he said reduced business confidence, threatened the government's future credit, and had the "destructive psychological effects of making mendicants of self-respecting American citizens". Roosevelt was pulled toward greater spending by Hopkins and Ickes, and as the 1936 election approached he decided to gain votes by attacking big business.
Morgenthau shifted with FDR, but at all times tried to inject fiscal responsibility; he deeply believed in balanced budgets, stable currency, reduction of the national debt, and the need for more private investment. The Wagner Act met Morgenthau's requirement because it strengthened the party's political base and involved no new spending. In contrast to Douglas, Morgenthau accepted Roosevelt's double budget as legitimate – that is a balanced regular budget, and an "emergency" budget for agencies, like the WPA, PWA and CCC, that would be temporary until full recovery was at hand. He fought against the veterans' bonus until Congress finally overrode Roosevelt's veto and gave out $2.2 billion in 1936. His biggest success was the new Social Security program; he managed to reverse the proposals to fund it from general revenue and insisted it be funded by new taxes on employees. It was Morgenthau who insisted on excluding farm workers and domestic servants from Social Security because workers outside industry would not be paying their way.
The New Deal expanded the role of the federal government, particularly to help the poor, the unemployed, youth, the elderly, and stranded rural communities. The Hoover administration started the system of funding state relief programs, whereby the states hired people on relief. With the CCC in 1933 and the WPA in 1935 the federal government now became involved in directly hiring people on relief. in granting direct relief or benefits. Total federal, state and local spending on relief rose from 3.9% of GNP in 1929, to 6.4% in 1932, and 9.7% in 1934; the return of prosperity in 1944 lowered the rate to 4.1%. In 1935–40, welfare spending accounted for 49% of the federal, state and local government budgets. In his memoirs, Milton Friedman said that the New Deal relief programs were an appropriate response. He and his wife were not on relief but they were employed by the WPA as statisticians. Friedman said that programs like the CCC and WPA were justified as temporary responses to an emergency. Friedman said that Roosevelt deserved considerable credit for relieving immediate distress and restoring confidence.
At the beginning of the Great Depression many economists traditionally argued against deficit spending that government spending would "crowd out" private investment and spending and thus not have any effect on the economy, a proposition known as the Treasury view. Keynesian economics rejected that view. They argued that by spending vastly more money—using fiscal policy—the government could provide the needed stimulus through the multiplier effect. Without that stimulus business simply would not hire more people, especially the low skilled and supposedly "untrainable" men who had been unemployed for years and lost any job skill they once had. Keynes visited the White House in 1934 to urge President Roosevelt to increase deficit spending. Roosevelt afterwards complained that, "he left a whole rigmarole of figures – he must be a mathematician rather than a political economist."
The New Deal tried public works, farm subsidies, and other devices to reduce unemployment, but Roosevelt never completely gave up trying to balance the budget. Between 1933 and 1941 the average federal budget deficit was 3% per year. Roosevelt did not fully utilize deficit spending. The effects of federal public works spending were largely offset by Herbert Hoovers large tax increase in 1932, whose full effects for the first time were felt in 1933, and it was undercut by spending cuts especially the economy act. According to Keynesians like Paul Krugman the New Deal therefore was not as successful in the short run as it was in the long run.
In recent years more influential among economists has been the monetarist interpretation of Milton Friedman, which did include a full-scale monetary history of what he calls the "Great Contraction". Friedman concentrated on the failures before 1933. He pointed out that between 1929 and 1932, the Federal Reserve allowed the money supply to fall by a third which is seen as the major cause that turned a normal recession into a Great Depression. Friedman specially criticized the decisions of Hoover and the Fed not to save banks going bankrupt. Monetarists state that the banking and monetary reforms were a necessary and sufficient response to the crises. They reject the approach of Keynesian deficit spending.
Economic growth and unemployment (1933–1941)
In the years 1933 to 1941 the economy expanded at an average rate of 7.7% per year. Despite high economic growth, unemployment rates fell slowly.
|Workers in job creation programs counted as Unemployed||24.9%||21.7%||20.1%||16.9%||14.3%||19.0%||17.2%||14.6%||9.9%|
|Workers in job creation programs counted as employed||20.6%||16.0%||14.2%||9.9%||9.1%||12.5%||11.3%||9.5%||8.0%|
John Maynard Keynes explained that situation as an Underemployment equilibrium where skeptic business prospects prevent companies from hiring new employees. It was seen as a form of cyclical unemployment.
There are different assumptions as well. According to Richard L. Jensen cyclical unemployment was a grave matter primarily until 1935. Between 1935 und 1941 structural unemployment became the bigger problem. Especially the unions successes in demanding higher wages pushed management into introducing new efficiency-oriented hiring standards. It ended inefficient labor such as child labor, casual unskilled work for subminimum wages, and sweatshop conditions. In the long term the shift to efficiancy wages led to high productivity, high wages and a high standard of living. But it necessitated a well-educated, well-trained, hard-working labor force. It was not before war time brought full employment that the supply of unskilled labor (that caused structural unemployment) downsized.
Opinions on the Effect on the Depression
There are different assumptions on the impact of the New Deal on the Great Depression.
Halted the collapse but lacked Keynesian deficit spending
Following the Keynesian consensus (that lasted until the 1970s) the traditional view was that federal deficit spending associated with the war brought full-employment output while monetary policy was just aiding the process. In this view the New Deal did not end the Great Depression but halted the economic collapse and ameliorated the worst of the crises.
Cleared the way for a natural recovery
Ben Bernanke and Martin Parkinson declared in "Unemployment, Inflation, and Wages in the American Depression" (1989) that ″the New Deal is better characterized as having cleared the way for a natural recovery (for example, by ending deflation and rehabilitating the financial system) rather than as being the engine of recovery itself.″
Crucial source of recovery
Challenging the traditional view monetarists and New Keynesians like J. Bradford DeLong, Lawrence Summers and Christina Romer argued that recovery was essentially complete prior to 1942 and that monetary policy was the crucial source of pre-1942 recovery. The extraordinary growth in money supply beginning in 1933 lowered real interest rates and stimulated investment spending. According to Bernanke there was also a debt-deflation effect of the depression which was clearly offset by a reflation through the growth in money supply. But before 1992 scholars did not realize that the New Deal provided for a huge aggregate demand stimulus through a de facto easing of monetary policy. While Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued in "Monetary History of the United States" (1963) that the Federal Reserve System had made no attempt to increase the quantity in high-powered money and thus failed to foster recovery they somehow did not investigate the impact of the monetary policy of the New Deal. In 1992 Christina Romer explained in "What Ended the Great Depression?" that the rapid growth in money supply beginning in 1933 can be traced back to a large unsterilized gold inflow to the US which was partly due to political instability in Europe but to a larger degree to the revaluation of gold through the Gold Reserve Act. The Roosevelt administration had chosen not to sterilize the gold inflow precisely because they hoped that the growth of money supply would stimulate the economy.
Replying to DeLong et al. in the Journal of Economic History, J.R. Vernon argues that deficit spending leading up to and during World War II still played a large part in the overall recovery, according to his study "half or more of the recovery occurred during 1941 and 1942."
According to Peter Temin, Barry Wigmore, Gauti B. Eggertsson and Christina Romer the biggest primary impact of the New Deal on the economy and the key to recovery and to end the Great Depression was brought about by a successful management of public expectations. The thesis is based on the observation that after years of deflation and a very severe recession important economic indiucators turned positive just in March 1933 when Roosevelt took office. Consumer prices turned from deflation to a mild inflation, industrial production bottomed out in March 1933, investment doubled in 1933 with a turnaround in March 1933. There were no monetary forces to explain that tournaround. Money supply was still falling and short term interest rates remained close to zero. Before March 1933 people expected a further deflation and recession so that even interest rates at zero did not stimulate investment. But when Roosevelt announced major regime changes people began to expect inflation and an economic expansion. With that expectations interest rates at zero began to stimulate investment just as they were expected to do. Roosevelt's fiscal and monetary policy regime change helped to make his policy objectives credible. The expectation of higher future income and higher future inflation stimulated demand and investments. The analysis suggests that the elimination of the policy dogmas of the gold standard, a balanced budget in times of crises and small government led endogenously to a large shift in expectation that accounts for about 70–80 percent of the recovery of output and prices from 1933 to 1937. If the regime change had not happened and the Hoover policy had continued, the economy would have continued its free fall in 1933, and output would have been 30 percent lower in 1937 than in 1933.
Others believe that the New Deal caused the Depression to persist longer than it would otherwise have. Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian claimed that FDR's policies prolonged the Depression by 7 years. According to their study the "New Deal labor and industrial policies did not lift the economy out of the Depression but that the "New Deal policies are an important contributing factor to the persistence of the Great Depression." They claim that the New Deal "cartelization policies are a key factor behind the weak recovery". They say that the "abandonment of these policies coincided with the strong economic recovery of the 1940s". The study by Cole and Ohanian is based on a Real business cycle theory model. The underlying assumptions of this theory are subject to numerous criticism and the theory is unable to find convincing explanations for the initial causes of the great depression. Laurence Seidman noted that according to the assumptions of Cole and Ohanian the labor market clears instantaneously which leads to the incredible conclusion that the surge in unemployment between 1929 and 1932 (before the New Deal) was in their opinion both optimal and solely based on voluntary unemployment. Additionally, Cole and Ohanian's argument relies on hypotheticals, including an unprecedented growth rate necessary to end the Depression by 1936, and by not counting workers employed through New Deal programs. Such programs built or renovated 2,500 hospitals, 45,000 schools, 13,000 parks and playgrounds, 7,800 bridges, 700,000 miles (1,100,000 km) of roads, 1,000 airfields and employed 50,000 teachers through programs that rebuilt the country's entire rural school system. Lowell E. Gallaway and Richard K. Vedder argue on basis of Austrian school theory that the Great Depression was caused by too high wages which they say had caused a loss of depositor confidence which caused the bank runs. They further conclude that the "Great Depression was very significantly prolonged in both its duration and its magnitude by the impact of New Deal programs." They suggest that without Social Security, work relief, unemployment insurance, mandatory minimum wages, and without special government-granted privileges for labor unions, business would have hired more workers and the unemployment rate during the New Deal years would have been 6.7% instead of 17.2%. In reply, economic historian Brad DeLong wrote that there is "literally nothing" to the arguments made by Gallaway and Vedder, and the duo made "flawed conclusions" based on "flawed foundations", and the entire foundation "is made out of mud". Amity Shlaes wrote that “from 1929 to 1940, from Hoover to Roosevelt, government intervention helped to make the Depression Great.” Shlaes said that the NRA was misguided because it used price setting to fix monetary problems. According to Shlaes, Roosevelt’s experimentation frightened business into inaction and prevented recovery. Eric Rauchway showed that Shlaes tried to diminish the economic growth by referring to the unrepresentative Dow Jones Industrial Average. He continued that usually a historian or economist would have referred to the gross domestic product which according to the Historical Statistics of the United States grew impressively by 9% annually during Roosevelts first term and by 11% annually after the short recession of 1937-38.
In a survey of economic historians conducted by Robert Whaples, Professor of Economics at Wake Forest University, anonymous questionnaires were sent to members of the Economic History Association. Members were asked to either disagree, agree, or agree with provisos with the statement that read: "Taken as a whole, government policies of the New Deal served to lengthen and deepen the Great Depression." While only 6% of economic historians who worked in the history department of their universities agreed with the statement, 27% of those that work in the economics department agreed. Almost an identical percent of the two groups (21% and 22%) agreed with the statement "with provisos" (a conditional stipulation), while 74% of those who worked in the history department, and 51% in the economic department disagreed with the statement outright.
The economic reforms were mainly intended to rescue the capitalist system by providing a more rational framework in which it could operate. The banking system was made less vulnerable. The regulation of the stock market and the prevention of some corporate abuses relating to the sale of securities and corporate reporting addressed the worst excesses. Roosevelt allowed trade unions to take their place in labor relations and created the triangular partnership between employers, employees and government.
Paul Krugman stated that the institutions built by the New Deal remain the bedrock of the United States economic stability. Against the background of the 2007–2012 global financial crisis he explained that the financial crises would have been much worse if the New Deals Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had not insured most bank deposits and older Americans would have felt much more insecure without Social Security. Libertarian economist Milton Friedman after 1960 attacked Social Security from a free market view stating that it had created welfare dependency.
The New Deal banking reform was weakened since the 1980s. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 allowed the shadow banking system to grow rapidly. Since it was neither regulated nor covered by a financial safety net the shadow banking system was central to the Financial crisis of 2007–08 and the subsequent Great Recession.
Impact on federal government and states
While it is essentially consensus among historians and academics that the New Deal brought about a large increase in the power of the federal government, there has been some scholarly debate concerning the results of this federal expansion. Historians like Arthur M. Schlesinger and James T. Patterson have argued that the augmentation of the federal government exacerbated tensions between the federal and state governments. However, contemporaries such as Ira Katznelson have suggested that, due to certain conditions on the allocation of federal funds, namely that the individual states get to control them, the federal government managed to avoid any tension with states over their rights. This is a prominent debate concerning the historiography of federalism in the United States and, as Schlesinger and Patterson have observed, the New Deal marked an era when the federal-state power balance shifted further in favor of the federal government, which heightened tensions between the two levels of government in the United States.
Ira Katznelson has argued that although the federal government expanded its power and began providing welfare benefits on a scale previously unknown in the United States, it often allowed individual states to control the allocation of the funds provided for such welfare. This meant that the states controlled who had access to these funds, which in turn meant many southern states were able to racially segregate – or in some cases, like a number of counties in Georgia, completely exclude African-Americans – the allocation of federal funds. This enabled these states to continue to relatively exercise their rights and also to preserve the institutionalization of the racist order of their societies. While Katznelson has conceded that the expansion of the federal government had the potential to lead to federal-state tension, he has argued it was avoided as these states managed to retain some control. As Katznelson has observed, “furthermore, they [state governments in the South] had to manage the strain that potentially might be placed on local practices by investing authority in federal bureaucracies… To guard against this outcome, they key mechanism deployed was a separation of the source of funding from decisions about how to spend the new monies.”
However, Schlesinger has disputed Katznelson’s claim and has argued that the increase in the power of the federal government was perceived to come at the cost of states’ rights, thereby aggravating state governments, which exacerbated federal-state tensions. Schlesinger has utilized quotes from the time to highlight this point, for example, Schlesinger has observed, “the actions of the New Deal, [Ogden L.] Mills said, “abolish the sovereignty of the States. They make of a government of limited powers one of unlimited authority over the lives of us all.”
Moreover, Schlesinger has argued that this federal-state tension was not a one-way street, and that the federal government became just as aggravated with the state governments, as they did with it. State governments were often guilty of inhibiting or delaying federal policies. Whether through intentional methods, like sabotage, or unintentional ones, like simple administrative overload; either way these problems aggravated the federal government and thus heightened federal-state tensions. As Schlesinger has also noted, “students of public administration have never taken sufficient account of the capacity of lower levels of government to sabotage or defy even a masterful President.”
James T. Patterson has reiterated this argument, however he observes that this increased tension can be accounted for not just from a political perspective, but from an economic one, too. Patterson has argued that the tension between the federal and state governments also, at least partly, resulted from the economic strain under which the states had been put by the federal government’s various policies and agencies. Some states were either simply unable to cope with the federal government’s demand, and thus refused to work with them, or admonished the economic restraints and actively decided to sabotage federal policies. This was demonstrated, Patterson has noted, with the handling of federal relief money by Ohio governor, Martin L. Davey. The case in Ohio became so detrimental to the federal government that Harry Hopkins, supervisor of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, had to federalize Ohio relief. Although this argument differs somewhat from Schlesinger’s, the source of federal-state tension remained the growth of the federal government. As Patterson has asserted, “though the record of the FERA was remarkably good – almost revolutionary – in these respects, it was inevitable, given the financial requirements imposed on deficit-ridden states, that friction would develop between governors and federal officials.”
In this dispute it can be inferred that Katznelson and, Schlesinger and Patterson, have only disagreed on their inference of the historical evidence. While both parties have agreed that the federal government expanded and, even, that states had a degree of control over the allocation of federal funds, they have disputed the consequences of these claims. Katznelson has asserted that it created mutual acquiescence between the levels of government, while Schlesinger and Patterson have suggested that it provoked contempt for the state governments on the part of the federal government, and vice versa, thus exacerbating their relations. In short, irrespective of the interpretation this era marked an important time in the historiography of federalism and also nevertheless provided some narrative on the legacy of federal-state relations.
Race and gender
While many Americans suffered economically during the Great Depression, African Americans also had to deal with social ills, such as racism, discrimination, and segregation. Black workers were especially vulnerable to the economic downturn since most of them worked the most marginal jobs such as unskilled or service-oriented work. Therefore they were the first to be discharged. Additionally many employers preferred white workers. When jobs were scarce some employers even dismissed blacks to create jobs for whites. In the end there were three times more African American workers on public assistance or relief than white workers.
The WPA, NYA, and CCC relief programs allocated 10% of their budgets to blacks (who comprised about 10% of the total population, and 20% of the poor). They operated separate all-black units with the same pay and conditions as white units. Some leading white New Dealers, especially Eleanor Roosevelt, Harold Ickes, and Aubrey Williams worked to ensure blacks received at least 10% of welfare assistance payments. However, these benefits were small in comparison to the economic and political advantages that whites received. Most unions excluded blacks from joining. Enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in the South was virtually impossible, especially since most blacks worked in hospitality and agricultural sectors.
The New Deal programs put millions of Americans immediately back to work or at least helped them to survive. The programs were not specifically targeted to alleviate the much higher unemployment rate of blacks. Some aspects of the programs were even unfavorable to blacks. The Agricultural Adjustment Acts for example helped farmers which were predominantly white but reduced the need of farmers to hire tenant farmers or sharecroppers which were predominantely black. While the AAA stipulated that a farmer had to share the payments with those who worked the land this policy was never enforced. The Farm Service Agency (FSA), a government relief agency for tenant farmers, created in 1937, made efforts to empower African Americans by appointing them to agency committees in the South. Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina raised opposition to the appointments because he stood for white farmers who were threatened by an agency that could organize and empower tenant farmers. Initially, the FSA stood behind their appointments, but after feeling national pressure FSA was forced to release the African Americans of their positions. The goals of the FSA were notoriously liberal and not cohesive with the southern voting elite. Some New Deal measures inadvertently discriminated against harmed blacks. Thousands of blacks were thrown out of work and replaced by whites on jobs where they were paid less than the NRA’s wage minimums because some white employers considered the NRA’s minimum wage “too much money for Negroes.” By August 1933, blacks called the NRA the “Negro Removal Act.” An NRA study found that the NIRA put 500,000 African Americans out of work.
But since blacks felt the sting of the depression´s wrath even more severely than whites they welcomed any help. Until 1936 almost all African Americans (and many whites) shifted from the "Party of Lincoln" to the Democratic Party. This was a sharp realignment from 1932, when most African Americans voted the Republican ticket. New Deal policies helped establish a political alliance between blacks and the Democratic Party that survives into the 21st century.
There was no attempt whatsoever to end segregation, or to increase black rights in the South. Roosevelt appointed an unprecedented number of blacks to second-level positions in his administration; these appointees were collectively called the Black Cabinet.
The wartime FEPC executive orders that forbade job discrimination against African Americans, women, and ethnic groups was a major breakthrough that brought better jobs and pay to millions of minority Americans. Historians usually treat FEPC as part of the war effort and not part of the New Deal itself.
Women and the New Deal
At first the New Deal created programs primarily for men. It was assumed that the husband was the "breadwinner" (the provider) and if they had jobs, whole families would benefit. It was the social norm for women to give up jobs when they married; in many states there were laws that prevented both husband and wife holding regular jobs with the government. So too in the relief world, it was rare for both husband and wife to have a relief job on FERA or the WPA. This prevailing social norm of the breadwinner failed to take into account the numerous households headed by women, but it soon became clear that the government needed to help women as well.
Many women were employed on FERA projects run by the states with federal funds. The first New Deal program to directly assist women was the Works Progress Administration (WPA), begun in 1935. It hired single women, widows, or women with disabled or absent husbands. While men were given unskilled manual labor jobs, usually on construction projects, women were assigned mostly to sewing projects. They made clothing and bedding to be given away to charities and hospitals. Women also were hired for the WPA's school lunch program.
Both men and women were hired for the arts programs (such as music, theater and writing). The Social Security program was designed to help retired workers and widows, but did not include domestic workers, farmers or farm laborers, the jobs most often held by blacks. Social Security however was not a relief program and it was not designed for short-term needs, as very few people received benefits before 1942.
Charges of fascism
Worldwide, the Great Depression had the most profound impact in the German Reich and the United States. In both countries the pressure to reform and the perception of the economic crisis were strikingly similar. When Hitler came to power he was faced with exactly the same task that faced Roosevelt, overcoming mass unemployment and the global Depression. The political responses to the crises were essentially different: while American democracy remained strong, Germany replaced democracy with a Nazi dictatorship.
The initial perception of the New Deal was mixed. On the one hand the eyes of the world were upon America, because many democrats in Europe and the United States saw in Roosevelt´s reform program a positive counterweight to the seductive powers of the two great alternative systems, communism and fascism. As the historian Isaiah Berlin wrote in 1955, ″The only light in the darkness was the administration of Mr. Roosevelt and the New Deal in the United States.″
By contrast, enemies of the New Deal sometimes called it "fascist", but they meant very different things. Communists denounced the New Deal in 1933 and 1934 as fascist, meaning it was under the control of big business. They dropped that line of thought when Stalin switched to the "Popular Front" plan of cooperation with liberals. Libertarian Murray Rothbard described the NRA as fascist because it imposed "compulsory cartelization of American business."[disputed ][contradiction]
In 1934, Roosevelt defended himself against those critics in a "fireside chat". Some people, he said:
[Some] will try to give you new and strange names for what we are doing. Sometimes they will call it 'Fascism', sometimes 'Communism', sometimes 'Regimentation', sometimes 'Socialism'. But, in so doing, they are trying to make very complex and theoretical something that is really very simple and very practical.... Plausible self-seekers and theoretical die-hards will tell you of the loss of individual liberty. Answer this question out of the facts of your own life. Have you lost any of your rights or liberty or constitutional freedom of action and choice?
After 1945 only few observers continued to see similarities. Later on some scholars such as Kiran Klaus Patel, Heinrich August Winkler and John Garraty came to the conclusion that comparisons of the alternative systems don´t have to end in an apology for Nazism since comparisons rely on the examination of both similarities and differences. Their preliminary studies on the origins of the fascist dictatorships and the American (reformed) democracy came to the conclusion that besides essential differences "the crises led to a limited degree of convergence" on the level of economic and social policy.[disputed ] The most important cause was the growth of state interventionism since in the face of the catastrophic economic situation both societies no longer counted on the power of the market to heal itself.
John Garraty wrote that the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was based on economic experiments in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, without establishing a totalitarian dictatorship. Contrary to that historians such as Hawley have examined the origins of the NRA in detail, showing the main inspiration came from Senators Hugo Black and Robert F. Wagner and from American business leaders such as the Chamber of Commerce. The model for the NRA was Woodrow Wilson's War Industries Board, in which Johnson had been involved too. Historians argue that direct comparisons between Fascism and New Deal are invalid since there is no distinctive form of fascist economic organization. Gerald Feldman wrote that fascism has not contributed anything to economic thought and had no original vision of a new economic order replacing capitalism. His argument correlates with Mason´s that economic factors alone are an insufficient approach to understand fascism and that decisions taken by fascists in power cannot be explained within a logical economic framework. In economic terms both ideas were within the general tendency of the 1930s to intervene in the free-market capitalist economy, at the price of its laissez-faire character, "to protect the capitalist structure endangered by endogenous crises tendencies and processes of impaired self-regulation".
Stanley Payne, a historian of fascism, examined possible fascist influences in the United States by looking at the KKK and its offshoots, and movements led by Father Coughlin and Huey Long. He concluded that "the various populist, nativist, and rightist movements in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s fell distinctly short of fascism." According to Kevin Passmore, lecturer in History at Cardiff University, the failure of fascism in the United States was due to the social policies of the New Deal that channelled anti-establishment populism into the left rather than the extreme right.
Charges of conservatism
For decades the New Deal was generally held in very high regard in the scholarship and the textbooks. That changed in the 1960s when New Left historians began a revisionist critique that said the New Deal was a bandaid for a patient that needed radical surgery to reform capitalism, put private property in its place, and lift up workers, women and minorities. The New Left believed in participatory democracy and therefore rejected the autocratic machine politics typical of the big city Democratic organizations.
In the 1960s, "New Left" historians have been among the New Deal's harsh critics. Barton J. Bernstein, in a 1968 essay, compiled a chronicle of missed opportunities and inadequate responses to problems. The New Deal may have saved capitalism from itself, Bernstein charged, but it had failed to help – and in many cases actually harmed – those groups most in need of assistance. Paul K. Conkin in The New Deal (1967) similarly chastised the government of the 1930s for its weak policies toward marginal farmers, for its failure to institute sufficiently progressive tax reform, and its excessive generosity toward select business interests. Howard Zinn, in 1966, criticized the New Deal for working actively to actually preserve the worst evils of capitalism.
By the 1970s liberal historians were responding with a defense of the New Deal based on numerous local and microscopic studies. Praise increasingly focused on Eleanor Roosevelt, seen as a more appropriate crusading reformer than her husband. Since then research on the New Deal has been less interested in the question of whether the New Deal was a "conservative", "liberal", or "revolutionary" phenomenon than in the question of constraints within which it was operating.
Political sociologist Theda Skocpol, in a series of articles, has emphasized the issue of "state capacity" as an often-crippling constraint. Ambitious reform ideas often failed, she argued, because of the absence of a government bureaucracy with significant strength and expertise to administer them. Other more recent works have stressed the political constraints that the New Deal encountered. Conservative skepticism about the efficacy of government was strong both in Congress and among many citizens. Thus some scholars have stressed that the New Deal was not just a product of its liberal backers, but also a product of the pressures of its conservative opponents.
Communists in government
During the New Deal the Communists established a network of a dozen or so members working for the government. Harold Ware led the largest group which worked in the Agriculture Adjustment Administration (AAA). Secretary of Agriculture Wallace got rid of them all in a famous purge in 1935. Ware died in 1935 and some individuals such as Alger Hiss moved to other government jobs. Other Communists worked for the National Labor Relations Board, the National Youth Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Federal Theater Project, the Treasury, and the Department of State.
The issue of Communists in government became a favorite conservative attacking point in the late 1930s. In 1938 Congressman Martin Dies, a Texas Democrat, and his newly created House Un-American Activities Committee investigated Communist subversion of labor unions and gained national headlines. In 1935–39, American Communist followed Stalin's "Popular front" approach and supported the New Deal. The Party's membership grew as it exercised greater influence and achieved new acceptance; it operated as a pressure group on the New Deal political coalition. The most important Party base in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), but by 1937 the CIO was spending much of its energy battling the older, more conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL). Klehr (1984) argues that the American Communist Party of the 1930s obediently followed directives from Moscow and suppressed individual initiative. In 1939 the Communists suddenly reversed course within days of the agreement between Hitler and Stalin in August that signaled friendship between the two bitter enemies. The Communists now denounced all enemies of Hitler and especially attacked President Roosevelt as a war-monger for his support for Britain in its war against Germany. Many members quit the Party in disgust.
Since 1933, politicians and pundits have often called for a "new deal" regarding an object. That is, they demand a completely new, large-scale approach to a project. As Arthur A. Ekirch Jr. (1971) has shown, the New Deal stimulated utopianism in American political and social thought on a wide range of issues. In Canada, Conservative Prime Minister Richard B. Bennett in 1935 proposed a "new deal" of regulation, taxation, and social insurance that was a copy of the American program; Bennett's proposals were not enacted, and he was defeated for reelection in October 1935. In accordance with the rise of the use of U.S. political phraseology in Britain, the Labour Government of Tony Blair has termed some of its employment programs "new deal", in contrast to the Conservative Party's promise of the 'British Dream'.
The works of art and music
The Works Progress Administration subsidized artists, musicians, painters and writers on relief with a group of projects called Federal One. While the WPA program was by far the most widespread, it was preceded by three programs administered by the US Treasury which hired commercial artists at usual commissions to add murals and sculptures to federal buildings. The first of these efforts was the short-lived Public Works of Art Project, organized by Edward Bruce, an American businessman and artist. Bruce also led the Treasury Department's Section of Painting and Sculpture (later renamed the Section of Fine Arts) and the Treasury Relief Art Project (TRAP). The Resettlement Administration (RA) and Farm Security Administration (FSA) had major photography programs. The New Deal arts programs emphasized regionalism, social realism, class conflict, proletarian interpretations, and audience participation. The unstoppable collective powers of common man, contrasted to the failure of individualism, was a favorite theme.
Post Office murals and other public art, painted by artists in this time, can still be found at many locations around the U.S. The New Deal particularly helped American novelists. For journalists, and the novelists who wrote non-fiction, the agencies and programs that the New Deal provided, allowed these writers to describe about what they really saw around the country.
Many writers chose to write about the New Deal, and whether they were for or against it, and if it was helping the country out. Some of these writers were Ruth McKenney, Edmund Wilson, and Scott Fitzgerald. Another subject that was very popular for novelists was the condition of labor. They ranged from subjects on social protest, to strikes.
Under the WPA, the Federal Theatre project flourished. Countless theatre productions around the country were staged. This allowed thousands of actors and directors to be employed, among them were Orson Welles, and John Huston.
The FSA photography project is most responsible for creating the image of the Depression in the U.S. Many of the images appeared in popular magazines. The photographers were under instruction from Washington as to what overall impression the New Deal wanted to give out. Director Roy Stryker's agenda focused on his faith in social engineering, the poor conditions among cotton tenant farmers, and the very poor conditions among migrant farm workers; above all he was committed to social reform through New Deal intervention in people's lives. Stryker demanded photographs that "related people to the land and vice versa" because these photographs reinforced the RA's position that poverty could be controlled by "changing land practices". Though Stryker did not dictate to his photographers how they should compose the shots, he did send them lists of desirable themes, such as "church", "court day", "barns".
Films of the late New Deal era such as Citizen Kane (1941) ridiculed so-called "great men", while the heroism of the common man appeared in numerous movies, such as The Grapes of Wrath (1940). Thus in Frank Capra's famous films, including Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939), Meet John Doe (1941) and It's a Wonderful Life (1946), the common people come together to battle and overcome villains who are corrupt politicians controlled by very rich, greedy capitalists.
By contrast there was also a smaller but influential stream of anti-New Deal art. Thus Gutzon Borglum's sculptures on Mount Rushmore emphasized great men in history (his designs had the approval of Calvin Coolidge). Gertrude Stein and Ernest Hemingway disliked the New Deal and celebrated the organic autonomy of perfected written work in opposition to the New Deal trope of writing as performative labor. The Southern Agrarians celebrated a premodern regionalism and opposed the TVA as a modernizing, disruptive force. Cass Gilbert, a conservative who believed architecture should reflect historic traditions and the established social order, designed the new Supreme Court building (1935). Its classical lines and small size contrasted sharply with the gargantuan modernistic federal buildings going up in the Washington Mall that he detested. Hollywood managed to synthesize liberal and conservative streams, as in Busby Berkeley's Gold Digger musicals, where the storylines exalt individual autonomy while the spectacular musical numbers show abstract populations of interchangeable dancers securely contained within patterns beyond their control.
New Deal Programs
The New Deal had many programs and new agencies, most of which were universally known by their initials. Most were abolished during World War II; others remain in operation today. They included the following:
- National Youth Administration (NYA)
- Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) a Hoover agency expanded under Jesse Holman Jones to make large loans to big business. Ended in 1954.
- Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) a Hoover program to create unskilled jobs for relief; expanded by FDR and Harry Hopkins; replaced by WPA in 1935.
- United States bank holiday, 1933: closed all banks until they became certified by federal reviewers
- Abandonment of gold standard, 1933: gold reserves no longer backed currency; still exists
- Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 1933–1942: employed young men to perform unskilled work in rural areas; under United States Army supervision; separate program for Native Americans
- Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC) helped people keep their homes, the government bought properties from the bank allowing people to pay the government instead of the banks in installments they could afford, keeping people in their homes and banks afloat.
- Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 1933: effort to modernize very poor region (most of Tennessee), centered on dams that generated electricity on the Tennessee River; still exists
- Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), 1933: raised farm prices by cutting total farm output of major crops and livestock; replaced by a new AAA because the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional.
- National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 1933: industries set up codes to reduce unfair competition, raise wages and prices; ended 1935. The US Supreme Court ruled the NIRA unconstitutional
- Public Works Administration (PWA), 1933: built large public works projects; used private contractors (did not directly hire unemployed). Ended 1938.
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures bank deposits and supervises state banks; still exists
- Glass–Steagall Act regulates investment banking; repealed 1999
- Securities Act of 1933, created the SEC, 1933: codified standards for sale and purchase of stock, required awareness of investments to be accurately disclosed; still exists
- Civil Works Administration (CWA), 1933–34: provided temporary jobs to millions of unemployed
- Indian Reorganization Act, 1934: moved away from assimilation; policy dropped
- Social Security Act (SSA), 1935: provided financial assistance to: elderly, handicapped, paid for by employee and employer payroll contributions; required 7 years contributions, so first payouts were in 1942; still exists
- Works Progress Administration (WPA), 1935: a national labor program for more than 2 million unemployed; created useful construction work for unskilled men; also sewing projects for women and arts projects for unemployed artists, musicians and writers; ended 1943.
- National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) / Wagner Act, 1935: set up National Labor Relations Board to supervise labor-management relations; In the 1930s, it strongly favored labor unions. Modified by the Taft-Hartley Act (1947); still exists
- Judicial Reorganization Bill, 1937: gave the President power to appoint a new Supreme Court judge for every judge 70 years or older; failed to pass Congress
- Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), 1938: Insures crops and livestock against loss of production or revenue. Was restructured during the creation of the Risk Management Agency in 1996 but continues to exist.
- Surplus Commodities Program (1936); gives away food to poor; still exists as Food Stamp Program
- Fair Labor Standards Act 1938: established a maximum normal work week of 44 hours and a minimum wage of 40 cents/hour and outlawed most forms of child labor; still exists, hours have been lowered to 40 hours over the years.
- Rural Electrification Administration (REA), one of the federal executive departments of the United States government charged with providing public utilities (electricity, telephone, water, sewer) to rural areas in the U.S. via public-private partnerships. still exists.
- Resettlement Administration (RA), Resettled poor tenant farmers; replaced by Farm Security Administration in 1935.
- Farm Security Administration (FSA), Helped poor farmers by a variety of economic and educational programs; some programs still exists as part of the Farmers Home Administration.
"Most indexes worsened until the summer of 1932, which may be called the low point of the depression economically and psychologically." Economic indicators show the American economy reached nadir in summer 1932 to February 1933, then began recovering until the recession of 1937–1938. Thus the Federal Reserve Industrial Production Index hit its low of 52.8 on 1932-07-01 and was practically unchanged at 54.3 on 1933-03-01; however by 1933-07-01, it reached 85.5 (with 1935–39 = 100, and for comparison 2005 = 1,342). In Roosevelt's 12 years in office, the economy had an 8.5% compound annual growth of GDP, the highest growth rate in the history of any industrial country, however, recovery was slow; by 1939, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per adult was still 27% below trend.
|Real Gross National Product (GNP) (1)||101.4||84.3||68.3||103.9||96.7||113.0|
|Consumer Price Index (2)||122.5||108.7||92.4||102.7||99.4||100.2|
|Index of Industrial Production (2)||109||75||69||112||89||126|
|Money Supply M2 ($ billions)||46.6||42.7||32.2||45.7||49.3||55.2|
|Exports ($ billions)||5.24||2.42||1.67||3.35||3.18||4.02|
|Unemployment (% of civilian work force)||3.1||16.1||25.2||13.8||16.5||13.9|
- (1) in 1929 dollars
- (2) 1935–39 = 100
- Darby counts WPA workers as employed; Lebergott as unemployed
- Source: Historical Statistics US (1976) series D-86; Smiley 1983
|CCC and NYA||712||801||643||793||877||919|
|Other federal work projects||554||663||452||488||468||681|
|Public assistance cases:|
|Social security programs||602||1,306||1,852||2,132||2,308||2,517|
|Total families helped||5,886||5,660||5,474||6,751||5,860||5,167|
|Unemployed workers (Bur Lab Stat)||9,030||7,700||10,390||9,480||8,120||5,560|
- Arthurdale, West Virginia, New Deal planned community.
- Liberalism in the United States
- Living New Deal, a research project about the impact of the New Deal
- Modern liberalism in the United States
- The New Deal and the arts in New Mexico
- Timeline of the Great Depression
- United States welfare state
- Carol Berkin et al. (2011). Making America, Volume 2: A History of the United States: Since 1865. Cengage Learning. pp. 629–32. ISBN 0495915246.
- Elliot A. Rosen, The Republican Party in the Age of Roosevelt: Sources of Anti-Government Conservatism in the United States (2014)
- David Edwin "Eddie" Harrell et al. (2005). Unto A Good Land: A History Of The American People. Wm. B. Eerdmans. pp. 902–. ISBN 0802837182.
- Alonzo L. Hamby (2004). For the Survival of Democracy: Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s. Simon and Schuster. p. 418. ISBN 9780684843407.
- Kennedy, Freedom from Fear (1999) ch 12
- Roderick P. Hart (2001). Politics, Discourse, and American Society: New Agendas. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 46. ISBN 0742500713.
- Martha Derthick, The Politics of Deregulation (1985), p. 5-8
- A.E. Safarian (1970). The Canadian Economy. books.google.com. ISBN 9780773584358.
- United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; Robert VanGiezen, Albert E. Schwenk (January 30, 2003). "Compensation from before World War I through the Great Depression". bls.gov.
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear (1999) p. 87
- National Archives and Records Administration (1995). "Records of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC]". archives.gov.
- Mary Beth Norton et al. (2009). A People and a Nation: A History of the United States. Since 1865. Cengage. p. 656. ISBN 0547175604.
- Robert L. Fuller, "Phantom of Fear" The Banking Panic of 1933 (2011)pp. 156-57
- March 4 was a Saturday and banks were not open on weekends. On Monday FDR officially closed all banks. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The Coming of the New Deal (1959), p. 3; Brands, Traitor to his class (2008) p. 288.
- Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR's Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope, esp. ch 31. (2007); Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (1977) series K220, N301.
- Laurence Leamer (2001). The Kennedy Men: 1901–1963. HarperCollins. p. 86.
- The phrase was perhaps borrowed from the title of Stuart Chase's book A New Deal published in February 1932 and serialized in the New Republic that summer. Gary Dean Best, Peddling panaceas: popular economists in the New Deal era (2005) p. 117
- The phrase was also used by Gifford Pinchot in 1910, when he said, in a speech rallying young men to political action to remove special interests from politics, that "The people of the United States demand a new deal and a square deal." Address by Gifford Pinchot before the Roosevelt Club of St. Paul, Minnesota, June 11, 1910
- "The Roosevelt Week", Time, New York, July 11, 1932
- Leuchtenburg pp 33–35.
- Leuchtenburg p. 58.
- Downey, Kirstin (2009). The Woman Behind the New Deal; The Life of Frances Perkins, FDR's Secretary of Labor and His Moral Conscience. New York: Nan A. Talese, an imprint of The Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.,. p. 1. ISBN 978-0-385-51365-4.
- Leuchtenburg p. 34.
- Leuchtenburg p. 188.
- Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA (1975)
- Arthur Crawford, Monetary management under the new deal (1940) p 240
- Herman, Arthur. Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II, pp. 68–75, 119, 254, 329–30, 340–341, Random House, New York, NY, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4000-6964-4.
- Parker, Dana T. Building Victory: Aircraft Production in the Los Angeles Area in World War II, p. 8, Cypress, CA, 2013. ISBN 978-0-9897906-0-4.
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear (1999) p 364
- Arthur M. Schlesinger, The coming of the New Deal, 1933–1935, Houghton Mifflin, 2003, ISBN 978-0-618-34086-6, S. 22
- "NPG Historical U.S. Population Growth: 1900–1998".
- Leuchtenburg p. 45–46; Robert Paul Browder and Thomas G. Smith, Independent: A Biography of Lewis W. Douglass (1986)
- Leuchtenburg p. 171; Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (1966)
- Leuchtenburg p. 171, 245–6; Herbert Stein, Presidential economics: The making of economic policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and beyond (1984)
- Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (1963) pp. 340-43
- R. W. Hafer, The Federal Reserve System (Greenwood, 2005) p 18
- Ben Bernanke, "Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the Great Depression", (1983) American Economic Review . Am 73#3 257–76.
- "THE PRESIDENCY: Bottom". Time. March 13, 1933. Retrieved October 11, 2008.(subscription required)
- Milton Friedman; Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Princeton University Press. pp. 438–9. ISBN 978-0-691-00354-2.
- Susan E. Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933 (1973)
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear (1999) pp. 65, 366
- Randall E. Parker, Reflections on the Great Depression, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003, ISBN 9781843765509, p. 20
- Randall E. Parker, Reflections on the Great Depression, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003, ISBN 9781843765509, p. 16
- Meltzer, Allan H. (2004). "A History of the Federal Reserve: 1913–1951". pp. 442–446.
- Olivier Blanchard und Gerhard Illing, Makroökonomie, Pearson Studium, 5. Auflage, 2009, ISBN 978-3827373632, p. 696
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear (1999) p. 367
- Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal pp 46–47
- Mastering Modern World History by Norman Lowe, second edition, P.117
- Leuchtenburg p. 70, 133–34; Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933–1956 (2005)
- Time-Life Books, Library of Nations: United States, Sixth European English language printing, 1989[page needed]
- Paul S. Boyer, The Oxford Companion to United States History, Oxford University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-19-508209-5, p. 20, 21
- Peter Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954, Hodder Education, 2008, ISBN 978-0-340-965887, p. 106
- Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal p p27–84
- Ronald L. Heinemann, Depression and New Deal in Virginia. (1983) p. 107
- Paul S. Boyder, The Oxford Companion to United States History, Oxford University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-19-508209-5, p. 21
- "Average Income in the United States (1913–2006)—Visualizing Economics". Visualizingeconomics.com. 2008-05-03. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
- Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954 p. 137
- Badger, New Deal pp 89. 153–57. for price data and farm income see Statistical Abstract 1940 online
- Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court (1998) p. 34
- Rachel Louise Moran, "Consuming Relief: Food Stamps and the New Welfare of the New Deal," Journal of American History, March 2011, Vol. 97 Issue 4, pp 1001–1022 online
- Alan Bjerga & Derek Wallbank, "Food Stamps Loom Over Negotiations to Pass Farm Bill," BloombergOct 30, 2013
- Data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract and converted into SVG format by me. The numbers come from this U.S. Census document, page 17, column 127. Note that the graph only covers factory employment.
- Gene Smiley, The Great Depression. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.
- Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the NRA, (1976)
- Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The Coming of the New Deal (1959), 87–135
- Federal Reserve System, National Summary of Business Conditions (1936)
- Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Jr. The Coming of the New Deal, Houghton Mifflin Books (2003), p. 115
- The Handbook of Texas Online: Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935[dead link]
- David Kennedy, "What the New Deal Did". Political Science Quarterly (1969 124, no. 2: 251–268.
- Robert Whaples, "Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions", Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), S. 139–154 in JSTOR
- "The Battle of Smoot-Hawley". The Economist. December 18, 2008
- Hiscox, Michael J. (Autumn 1999). "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization". International Organization 53 (4): 669–698. doi:10.1162/002081899551039.
- David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945, (1999) p. 260
- David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945, (1999) p. 258
- Sitkoff, ed. Fifty Years Later: The New Deal Evaluated (1984)
- Social Security History. Ssa.gov. Retrieved on 2013-07-14.
- Mary Beth Norton et al. (2009). A People and a Nation: A History of the United States. Since 1865. Cengage. p. 670. ISBN 0547175604.
- David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945, Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-19-503834-7, p. 291
- Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America, 1920–1935, Cambridge University Press, 1. Auflage 1994, ISBN 978-0521457552, p. 225
- Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954 p. 109
- Lubell, Samuel (1955). The Future of American Politics. Anchor Press. p. 13.
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear pp 250–252
- Peter Fearon, War, Prosperity, and Depression (1987)
- Mary Beth Norton et al. (2009). A People and a Nation: A History of the United States. Since 1865. Cengage. p. 669. ISBN 0547175604.
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear p. 252
- Deward Clayton Brown, Electricity for Rural America: The Fight for the REA (1980)
- Lorraine Brown, "Federal Theatre: Melodrama, Social Protest, and Genius," U.S. Library of Congress Quarterly Journal, 1979, Vol. 36 Issue 1, pp 18–37
- William D. Pederson (2011). A Companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Wiley. p. 224. ISBN 9781444395174.
- Hemming, Heidi and Julie Hemming Savage, Women Making America, Clotho Press, 2009, pp. 243–44.
- Sue Bridwell Beckham, Depression Post Office Murals and Southern Culture: A Gentle Reconstruction (1989)
- David M. Kennedy. Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945. Oxford University Press. pp. 275, 276. ISBN 0-19-503834-7.
- John K. McNulty, "Unintegrated Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: USA", in: Paul Kirchhof et al., International and Comparative Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2002, ISBN 90-411-9841-5, p. 173
- David M. Kennedy. Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945. Oxford University Press. p. 280. ISBN 0-19-503834-7.
- Benjamin Graham. Security Analysis: The Classic 1940 Edition. McGraw-Hill Professional, 2002. pp. 386–287
- R. Alan Lawson, A Commonwealth of Hope: The New Deal Response to Crisis, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, ISBN 978-0801884061, S. 165
- Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954 p. 172
- Leuchtenburg, William E. (1995). The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 156–161. ISBN 978-0-19-511131-6.
- Rehnquist, William H. (2004). "Judicial Independence Dedicated to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico: Symposium Remarks". University of Richmond Law Review 38: 579–596 .
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear p. 352
- Leuchtenburg pp. 242–3, 272–74
- Reed, Lawrence W. Great Myths of the Great Depression Mackinac Center for Public Policy.
- Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion, 1935–1946 (Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 61–64.
- Leuchtenburg p. 242–3
- Marie Bussing-Burks, Deficit: Why Should I Care?, Apress, ISBN 978-1430236597, p.46
- Government Spending Chart: United States 1900–2016 – Federal State Local Data. Usgovernmentdebt.us. Retrieved on 2013-07-14.
- Kennedy, Freedom From Fear p 352
- Kennedy p 352
- Leuchtenburg p. 244–46
- Leuchtenburg p. 256–7
- GNP was $99.7 billion in 1940 and $210.1 billion in 1944. Historical Statistics (1976) series F1.
- Richard J. Jensen, "The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression", Journal of Interdisciplinary History (1989) 19#4 pp 553–83. in JSTOR
- D'Ann Campbell (1984). Women at war with America: private lives in a patriotic era. Harvard University Press. pp. 110–15. ISBN 9780674954755.
- Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II
- Curtis E. Harvey, Coal in Appalachia: an economic analysis
- "Social Security Online". Ssa.gov. Retrieved April 5, 2012.
- The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II by William H. Chafe
- June Axinn and Herman Levin, Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need, Second Edition
- Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America (1999)
- Kennedy, Freedom from Fear ch 18
- America in our time: from World War II to Nixon—what happened and why by Godfrey Hodgson
- Morgan, Iwan W. (1994). Beyond the Liberal Consensus: Political History of the United States Since 1965. C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 12. ISBN 978-1850652045.
- Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore, "The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History," International Labor & Working-Class History, (2008) 74:3–32
- Nancy MacLean, "Getting New Deal History Wrong," International Labor & Working-Class History(2008) 74:49–55
- Klein, Jennifer (August 2008). "A New Deal Restoration: Individuals, Communities, and the Long Struggle for the Collective Good". International Labor & Working-Class History 74 (1): 42–48. doi:10.1017/S0147547908000148. ISSN 1471-6445. Retrieved February 15, 2013.
- Morgan, Iwan W. (1994). Beyond the Liberal Consensus: Political History of the United States Since 1965. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 14. ISBN 978-1850652045.
- Morgan, Iwan W. (1994). Beyond the Liberal Consensus: Political History of the United States Since 1965. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p. 17. ISBN 978-1850652045.
- Mayer, Michael S. (2009). The Eisenhower Years. p. xii. ISBN 978-0-8160-5387-2.
- Browne, Blaine T.; Cottrell, Robert C. (2008). Modern American Lives: Individuals and Issues in American History Since 1945. M.E. Sharpe, Inc. p. 164. ISBN 978-0-7656-2222-8.
- Lary May, "Review," Journal of American History (December 2010) 97#3 p 765
- Sitkoff (1984)
- Quote from Mary Beth Norton, et al. A People and a Nation: A History of the United States (1994), 2:783. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The Coming of the New Deal, 1933–1935 (1958) p. ix; Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, "How FDR Saved Capitalism", in It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States (2001); Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression and the New Deal (2007), p. 86, 93–7; Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution, (2006) pp 129–30; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1959) 272–74; David Edwin Harrell, Jr. et al. Unto a Good Land: A History of the American People (2005) p. 921; William Leuchtenburg, The White House Looks South (2005) p. 121; Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941 (1993) p. 168; Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents (1998) p. 66.
- Mary Beth Norton, Carol Sheriff und David M. Katzman, A People and a Nation: A History of the United States, Volume II: Since 1865, Wadsworth Inc Fulfillment, 2011, ISBN 978-0495915904, p. 681
- Ray Allen Billington; Martin Ridge (1981). American History After 1865. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 193.
- Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954 p. 205
- Ira Katznelson and Mark Kesselman, The Politics of Power, 1975
- Paul K. Conkin
- as summarized by Clemens, Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal: The USA 1890–1954 p. 219
- Julian E. Zelizer, "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933‐1938," Presidential Studies Quarterly, (2000) 30#2. pp 331+ online
- Zelizer, "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933‐1938"
- Freidel 1990, p. 96
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1946. p. 321.
- Zelizer, "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal"
- Zelizer, "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism; Savage 1998
- Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (1975) p. 340 series H1 and H2
- Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1999). Two Lucky People: Memoirs. U. of Chicago Press. p. 59. ISBN 9780226264158.
- Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1981). Free to Choose. Avon Books. p. 85. ISBN 0-380-52548-8.
- W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History (2004) p, 103
- New York Times, Paul Krugman, Franklin Delano Obama?, November 10, 2008
- Bureau of the Census (1975). Historical statistics of the United States, colonial times to 1970. pp. 217–8.
- Gene Smiley, "Recent Unemployment Rate Estimates for the 1920s and 1930s", Journal of Economic History (1983) 43#2 pp. 487–93. In JSTOR
- David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929–1945, Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-19-503834-7, p. 249
- Jensen, Richard J. "The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression", Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19 (1989) 553–83. in JSTOR
- Jason Scott Smith, A Concise History of the New Deal, Cambridge University Press, 2014, ISBN 9781139991698, p. 2
- Romer, Christina (December 1992). "What Ended the Great Depression?". The Journal of Economic History 52 (4): 757–784. Retrieved 13 September 2014 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Bernanke, Ben (May 1989). "Unemployment, Inflation, and Wages in the American Depression: Are There Lessons for Europe?". The American Economic Review 79 (2): 210–214. Retrieved 4 January 2015 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- DeLong, J. Bradford, Lawrence H. Summers, N. Gregory Mankiw, and Christina D. Romer. "How does macroeconomic policy affect output?." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988): 467.
- Vernon, J. R. (December 1994). "World War II fiscal policies and the end of the Great Depression". Journal of Economic History 54 (4): 850–868. Retrieved 13 August 2014 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Gauti B. Eggertsson, Great Expectations and the End of the Depression, American Economic Review 2008, 98:4, 1476–1516
- The New York Times, Christina Romer, The Fiscal Stimulus, Flawed but Valuable, October 20, 2012
- Peter Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression, MIT Press, 1992, ISBN 9780262261197, p. 87-101
- FDR's Policies Prolonged Depression by 7 Years, UCLA Economists Calculate, ucla.edu, 8/10/2004
- Cole, Harold L and Ohanian, Lee E. New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 2004.
- Snowden, Brian (Fall 2007). "The New Classical Counter-Revolution: False Path or Illuminating Complement?". Eastern Economic Journal 33 (4): 541–562. Retrieved 2014-12-13 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Seidman, Laurence (Fall 2007). "Reply to: "The New Classical Counter-Revolution: False Path or Illuminating Complement?"". Eastern Economic Journal 33 (4): 563–565. Retrieved 2014-12-13 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Rosenberg, Paul. "A Brief Peek At UCLA's Anti-FDR Propaganda". Open Left. Retrieved September 11, 2010.
- Rosenberg, Paul. "More Perspective On Great Depression / FDR". Open Left. Retrieved September 11, 2010.
- "The right-wing New Deal conniption fit SalonRevisionist historians and economists keep trying to stomp on FDR's legacy. But declaring that WPA workers were unemployed is just silly". Salon.com. February 2, 2009. Retrieved September 11, 2010.
- "Darby, Michael R. "Three-And-A-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, An Explanation of Unemployment, 1934–1941", Journal of Political Economy (1976) 84#1 pp. 1–16" (PDF). Retrieved April 5, 2012.
- Benjamin, Daniel (1994). "Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America by Richard K. Vedder; Lowell E. Gallaway". Public Choice 79 (3/4): 373–375. Retrieved 2014-12-13 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Gallaway, Lowell E. and Vedder, Richard K. Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America, New York University Press; Updated edition (July 1997).
- "It Doesn't Work:A Review of Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America". Econ161.berkeley.edu. Retrieved September 11, 2010.
- Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2007. Kindle location 170 – 229.
- Politiko, Matthew Dallek, Revisionists' blind view of New Deal, February 13, 2009
- Robert Whaples, "Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions", Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 139–154 in JSTOR
- David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, The American People in Depression and War 1929 – 1945 (Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 363
- Milton Friedman; Rose D. Friedman (1962). Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. U. of Chicago Press. pp. 182–87. ISBN 9780226264189.
- Nicholas Crafts, Peter Fearon, The Great Depression of the 1930s: Lessons for Today, Oxford University Press, 2013, ISBN 9780199663187, p. 202
- Katznelson, Ira (2005). When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 37.
- Katznelson, Ira (2005). When Affirmative Action was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America. New York: W. W. Norton 7 Company. p. 40.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1958). The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal. Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press. p. 473.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1958). The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal. Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press. p. 536.
- Patterson, James T. (1969). The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 62.
- Patterson, James T. (1969). The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p. 52.
- Hamilton Cravens, Great Depression: People and Perspectives, ABC-CLIO, 2009, ISBN 9781598840933, p. 106
- Sitkoff (2008)
- Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action was White (2005).
- Hamilton Cravens, Great Depression: People and Perspectives, ABC-CLIO, 2009, ISBN 9781598840933, p. 105, 108
- Hamilton Cravens, Great Depression: People and Perspectives, ABC-CLIO, 2009, ISBN 9781598840933, p. 108
- Hamilton Cravens, Great Depression: People and Perspectives, ABC-CLIO, 2009, ISBN 9781598840933, p. 113
- Philip S. Foner. Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1981 (New York: International Publishers, 1981), p. 200.
- Bruce Bartlett. Wrong on Race: The Democratic Party's Buried Past. (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008), Kindle location 2459.
- Sitkoff (2008); Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR (1983)
- Children in the family were allowed to hold CCC or NYA jobs—indeed, CCC jobs were normally given to young men whose fathers were on relief. Young women were eligible for NYA jobs which began in 1935.
- Susan Ware, Beyond Suffrage: Women in the New Deal (1987)
- Kiran Klaus Patel, Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933–1945 Cambridge University Press 2005, pp. 3–5
- Kiran Klaus Patel, Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933–1945, ISBN 978-0-521-83416-2, Cambridge University Press 2005, p.6
- Isaiah Berlin, "The Natural" (1955). Atlantic Monthly. pp. 230–.
- Fraser M. Ottanelli (1991). The Communist Party of the United States: From the Depression to World War II. Rutgers University Press. p. 70.
- Rothbard (1963), p. 151.
- Franklin Delano Roosevelt; edited by Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (1992). Fdr's Fireside Chats. University of Oklahoma Press. p. 51. ISBN 0806123702.
- Kiran Klaus Patel, Soldiers of Labor: Labor Service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933–1945, ISBN 978-0-521-83416-2, Cambridge University Press 2005, p.5, 6
- Garraty, John A. The American Nation: A History of the United States Since 1865. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers (1979), p. 656 ISBN 0-06-042268-8.
- Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, Princeton University Press, 1966, ISBN 0-8232-1609-8, p. 23
- Daniel Woodley, Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology, Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2010, ISBN 978-0-203-87157-7, p.160, 161
- Stanley G. Payne (1996). A History of Fascism, 1914–1945. University of Wisconsin Pres. p. 350. ISBN 0299148734.
- Kevin Passmore, Fascism: A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 6, Oxford University Press, 2002
- Jerold S. Auerbach, "New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal: Some Thoughts on New Left Historiography," Journal of Southern History (1969) 35#1 pp. 18–30 in JSTOR
- For a list of relevant works, see the list of suggested readings appearing toward the bottom of the article.
- Thomas A. Krueger, "New Deal Historiography at Forty," Reviews in American History (1975) 3#4 pp. 483–488 in JSTOR
- Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. (1959). The Age of Roosevelt: The coming of New Deal, 1933–1935. Houghton Mifflin. pp. 78–80. ISBN 0618340866.
- Aaron D. Purcell (2011). White Collar Radicals: TVA's Knoxville Fifteen, the New Deal, and the McCarthy Era. U. of Tennessee. ISBN 9781572336834.
- Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr. The Age of Roosevelt: The coming of New Deal, 1933–1935. p. 54.
- Arthur Herman (2000). Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator. The Free Press. p. 104.
- Malcolm Sylvers, "American Communists in the Popular Front Period: Reorganization or Disorganization?" Journal of American Studies (1989) 23#3 pp 375–393
- Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (1984)
- Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919–1957) (1957)
- Mathews 1975
- William E. Leuchtenbrg. The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and his Legacy(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 243.
- M.J.Heale. Franklin. D. Roosevelt: The New Deal and War (London, 1999)36
- John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, David Brody. The New Deal: The National Level (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975)310.
- John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, David Brody. The New Deal: The National Level (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975)312.
- John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, David Brody. The New Deal: The National Level (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975)314.
- Cara A. Finnegan. Picturing Poverty: Print Culture and FSA Photographs (Smithsonian Books, 2003) pp 43–44
- Harry M. Benshoff, Sean Griffin, America on film: representing race, class, gender, and sexuality at the movies (2003) pp 172–4
- Geoffrey Blodgett, "Cass Gilbert, Architect: Conservative at Bay," Journal of American History, December 1985, Vol. 72 Issue 3, pp 615–636 in JSTOR
- Szalay 2000
- Mitchell, p. 404.
- "Industrial Production Index". Retrieved September 11, 2010.
- Historical Statistics of the United States (1976) series F31
- Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (OECD 2003); Japan is close, see p 174
- U.S. Dept of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts Real GDP and GNP; Mitchell 446, 449, 451;Consumer Price Index AND M2 Money Supply: 1800–2003
- Smiley, Gene, "Recent Unemployment Rate Estimates for the 1920s and 1930s", Journal of Economic History, June 1983, 43, 487–93.
- Badger, Anthony J. The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933–1940. (2002) general survey from British perspective
- Chafe, William H. ed. The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and its Legacies (2003)
- Conkin, Paul K. The New Deal. (1967), a brief New Left critique.
- Dubofsky, Melvyn, ed. The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives. (1992), reader
- Eden, Robert, ed. New Deal and Its Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal (1989), essays by scholars
- Hiltzik, Michael. The New Deal: A Modern History (2011), popular history by journalist; 512pp
- Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940. (1963). A standard interpretive history.
- Kennedy, David M. "What the New Deal Did," Political Science Quarterly, 124 (Summer 2009), 251–68.
- Kennedy, David M. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945. (1999), survey; Pulitzer Prize
- Kirkendall, Richard S. "The New Deal As Watershed: The Recent Literature", The Journal of American History, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Mar., 1968), pp. 839–852. in JSTOR, historiography
- McElvaine Robert S. The Great Depression 2nd ed (1993), social history
- Polenberg, Richard. "The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1933–1945 A Brief History with Documents" ISBN 0-312-13310-3
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 3 vols, (1957–1960), the classic narrative history.
- Sheila Collins, Gertrude Goldberg, When Government Helped: Learning from the Successes and Failures of the New Deal, Oxford University Press, (2014), ISBN 9780199990696
- Sitkoff, Harvard. ed. Fifty Years Later: The New Deal Evaluated. (1984). A friendly liberal evaluation.
- Smith, Jason Scott. A Concise History of the New Deal (2014)
- Beasley, Maurine H., Holly C. Shulman, Henry R. Beasley. The Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia (2001)
- Brands, H.W. Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (2008)
- Charles, Searle F. Minister of Relief: Harry Hopkins and the Depression (1963)
- Cohen, Adam, Nothing to Fear: FDR's Inner Circle and the Hundred Days that Created Modern America (2009)
- Graham, Otis L. and Meghan Robinson Wander, eds. Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times. (1985). An encyclopedic reference.
- Ingalls, Robert P. Herbert H. Lehman and New York's Little New Deal (1975)
- Pederson, William D. ed. A Companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Blackwell Companions to American History) (2011); 35 essays by scholars; many deal with politics
Economics, farms, labor, relief
- Bernstein, Irving. Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941 (1970), cover labor unions
- Best, Gary Dean. Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt Versus Recovery, 1933–1938. (1990) ISBN 0-275-93524-8; conservative perspective
- Blumberg Barbara. The New Deal and the Unemployed: The View from New York City (1977).
- Bremer William W. "Along the American Way: The New Deal's Work Relief Programs for the Unemployed". Journal of American History 62 (December 1975): 636–652. in JSTOR
- Brock William R. Welfare, Democracy and the New Deal (1988), a British view
- Burns, Helen M. The American Banking Community and New Deal Banking Reforms, 1933–1935 (1974)
- Folsom, Burton. New Deal or Raw Deal? : How FDR's Economic Legacy has Damaged America (2008) ISBN 1-4165-9222-9, conservative interpretation
- Fox, Cybelle. Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (2012) excerpt and text search
- Gordon, Colin. New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics, 1920–1935 (1994)
- Grant, Michael Johnston. Down and Out on the Family Farm: Rural Rehabilitation in the Great Plains, 1929–1945 (2002)
- Hawley, Ellis W. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (1966)
- Howard, Donald S. The WPA and Federal Relief Policy (1943)
- Huibregtse, Jon R. American Railroad Labor and the Genesis of the New Deal, 1919–1935; (University Press of Florida; 2010; 172 pages)
- Jensen, Richard J. "The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression", Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19 (1989) 553–83. in JSTOR
- Leff, Mark H. The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and Taxation (1984)
- Lindley, Betty Grimes and Ernest K. Lindley. A New Deal for Youth: The Story of the National Youth Administration (1938)
- Malamud; Deborah C. "'Who They Are—or Were': Middle-Class Welfare in the Early New Deal" University of Pennsylvania Law Review v 151 No. 6 2003. pp 2019+.
- Meriam; Lewis. Relief and Social Security The Brookings Institution. 1946. Highly detailed analysis and statistical summary of all New Deal relief programs
- Mitchell, Broadus. Depression Decade: From New Era through New Deal, 1929–1941 (1947), survey by economic historian
- Parker, Randall E. Reflections on the Great Depression (2002) interviews with 11 leading economists
- Powell, Jim FDR's Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression (2003) ISBN 0-7615-0165-7
- Rosenof, Theodore. Economics in the Long Run: New Deal Theorists and Their Legacies, 1933–1993 (1997)
- Rosen, Elliot A. Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery (2005) ISBN 0-8139-2368-9
- Rothbard, Murray. America's Great Depression (1963).
- Saloutos, Theodore. The American Farmer and the New Deal (1982).
- Schwartz, Bonnie Fox. The Civil works administration, 1933-1934: the business of emergency employment in the New Deal (Princeton University Press, 2014)
- Singleton, Jeff. The American Dole: Unemployment Relief and the Welfare State in the Great Depression (2000)
- Skocpol, Theda, and Kenneth Finegold. "State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal". Political Science Quarterly 97 (1982): 255–78. at JSTOR
- Skocpol, Theda, and Kenneth Finegold. "Explaining New Deal Labor Policy" American Political Science Review (1977) 84:1297–1304 in JSTOR
- Zelizer; Julian E. "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933–1938" Presidential Studies Quarterly (2000) 30#2 pp: 331+.
Social and cultural history
- Best, Gary Dean. The Nickel and Dime Decade: American Popular Culture during the 1930s (1993) online
- Cooney, Terry A. Balancing Acts: American Thought and Culture in the 1930s (Twayne, 1995)
- Dickstein, Morris. Dancing in the Dark: A Cultural History of the Great Depression (2009)
- Eldridge, David Nicholas. American Culture in the 1930s (Edinburgh University Press, 2008) online
- McKinzie, Richard. The New Deal for Artists (1984), well illustrated scholarly study
- Mathews, Jane De Hart. "Arts and the People: The New Deal Quest for a Cultural Democracy", Journal of American History 62 (1975): 316–39, in JSTOR
- Pells, Richard. Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years (1973).
- Roddick, Nick. A New Deal in Entertainment: Warner Brothers in the 1930s (London, BFI, 1983).
- Shlaes, Amity. The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression (2007), a conservative approach
- Shindler, Colin. Hollywood in Crisis: Cinema and American Society, 1929–1939 (Routledge, 1996).
- Stott, William. Documentary Expression and Thirties America (University of Chicago Press, 1973).
- Wecter, Dixon. The Age of the Great Depression, 1929–1941 (1948), social history
- Alswang, John. The New Deal and American Politics (1978), voting analysis
- Alter, Jonathan. The Defining Moment: FDR's Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope (2006), popular account
- Badger, Anthony J. FDR: The First Hundred Days (2008)
- Badger, Anthony J. New Deal / New South: An Anthony J. Badger Reader (2007)
- Bernstein, Barton J. "The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform". In Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History, pp. 263–88. (1968), an influential New Left attack on the New Deal.
- Best, Gary Dean. The Critical Press and the New Deal: The Press Versus Presidential Power, 1933–1938 (1993) ISBN 0-275-94350-X
- Best, Gary Dean. Retreat from Liberalism: Collectivists versus Progressives in the New Deal Years (2002) ISBN 0-275-94656-8
- Brinkley, Alan. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War. (1995) what happened after 1937
- Cobb, James and Michael Namaroto, eds. The New Deal and the South (1984).
- Conklin, Paul K. "The Myth of New Deal Radicalism" in Myth America: A Historical Anthology, Volume II. 1997. Gerster, Patrick, and Cords, Nicholas. (editors.) Brandywine Press, ISBN 1-881089-97-5
- Domhoff, G. William, and Michael J. Webber. Class and Power in the New Deal: Corporate Moderates, Southern Democrats, and the Liberal-Labor Coalition (Stanford University Press; 2011) 304 pages; uses class dominance theory to examine the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act.
- Ekirch Jr., Arthur A. Ideologies and Utopias: The Impact of the New Deal on American Thought (1971)
- Fraser, Steve and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, (1989), essays focused on the long-term results.
- Garraty, John A. "The New Deal, National Socialism, and the Great Depression", American Historical Review, (1973) 78#4 pp. 907–44. in JSTOR
- Higgs, Robert. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (1987), libertarian critique
- Ladd, Everett Carll and Charles D. Hadley. Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s (1975), voting behavior
- Lowitt, Richard. The New Deal and the West (1984).
- Manza; Jeff. "Political Sociological Models of the U.S. New Deal" Annual Review of Sociology: 2000, 26 (2000): 297–322.
- Milkis, Sidney M. and Jerome M. Mileur, eds. The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (2002)
- Patterson, James T. The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (Princeton UP, 1969).
- Rosen, Eliot A. The Republican Party in the Age of Roosevelt: Sources of Anti-Government Conservatism in the United States (2014)
- Sitkoff, Harvard. A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue: The Depression Decade (2008)
- Smith, Jason Scott. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933–1956 (2005).
- Sternsher, Bernard ed., Hitting Home: The Great Depression in Town and Country (1970), essays by scholars on local history
- Szalay, Michael. New Deal Modernism: American Literature and the Invention of the Welfare State (2000)
- Tindall George B. The Emergence of the New South, 1915–1945 (1967). survey of entire South
- Trout Charles H. Boston, the Great Depression, and the New Deal (1977)
- Venn, Fiona (1998). The New Deal. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 1-57958-145-5.
- Ware, Susan. Beyond Suffrage: Women and the New Deal (1981)
- Williams, Gloria-Yvonne. (2014). “African-Americans and the Politics of Race During the New Deal.” In The New Deal and the Great Depression (pp. 131-144). Kent, OH:Kent State University Press. on academia.edu author's page
- Williams, Mason B. City of Ambition: FDR, La Guardia, and the Making of Modern New York (2013)
- Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1951 (1951) full of useful data; online
- Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (1976) part 1 online; part 2 online
- Cantril, Hadley and Mildred Strunk, eds. Public Opinion, 1935–1946 (1951), massive compilation of many public opinion polls
- Carter, Susan B. et al. eds. The Historical Statistics of the United States (6 vol: Cambridge UP, 2006); huge compilation of statistical data; online at some universities
- Gallup, George Horace, ed. The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion, 1935–1971 3 vol (1972) summarizes results of each poll.
- Lowitt, Richard and Beardsley Maurice, eds. One Third of a Nation: Lorena Hickock Reports on the Great Depression (1981)
- Moley, Raymond. After Seven Years (1939), conservative memoir by ex-Brain Truster
- Nixon, Edgar B. ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (3 vol 1969), covers 1933–37. 2nd series 1937–39 available on microfiche and in a 14 vol print edition at some academic libraries.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Rosenman, Samuel Irving, ed. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vol, 1938, 1945); public material only (no letters); covers 1928–1945.
- Zinn, Howard, ed. New Deal Thought (1966), a compilation of primary sources.
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- The Living New Deal Project, a digital database of the lasting effects of the New Deal founded in the Department of Geography at the University of California, Berkeley
- The Smithsonian American Art Museum's Exhibition "1934: A New Deal for Artists"
- The New Deal Original reports and pictures from The Times
- Art, Culture, and Government: The New Deal at 75 Library of Congress, American Folklife Center Documentation of March 13–14, 2008 Symposium including webcasts of presentations
- Hannsgen, Greg E.and Papadimitriou, Dimitri B. Lessons from the New Deal: Did the New Deal Prolong or Worsen the Great Depression? Working Paper No. 581, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. October 2009
- New Deal by Alan Brinkley on History.com
- Robert E. Burke Collection. 1892–1994. 60.42 cubic feet (68 boxes plus 2 oversize folders and one oversize vertical file). At the Labor Archives of Washington, University of Washington Libraries Special Collections. Contains material collected by Robert E. Burke on the New Deal from 1932 to 1959.