Thomas Snow (British Army officer)
|Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow|
Lt-Gen Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow
5 May 1858|
Newton Valence, Hampshire
|Died||30 August 1940
Kensington Gate, London
|Years of service||1879 - 1920|
|Commands held||British 4th Division
British 27th Division
|Awards||Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath
Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
Mention in Despatches (8)
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow KCB, KCMG (5 May 1858 – 30 August 1940) was a British General on the Western Front in the First World War. He played an important role leading 4th Division in the retreat of August 1914, and commanding VII Corps at the unsuccessful Gommecourt diversion on the First Day of the Somme (1 July 1916) and at the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. He had several nicknames, ‘Slush’, ‘Snowball’ and 'Polar Bear', all plays on his surname and his physical size and height.
Education and early military career
Snow obtained a commission in the 13th Regiment of Foot in 1879, taking part in the Anglo-Zulu War in South Africa the same year. In 1884–1885, having transferred to the Mounted Infantry Regiment of the Camel Corps, Snow fought with them in the Nile Expedition of the Mahdist War at the Battle of Abu Klea and the Battle of El Gubat (Abu Kru) (19 January 1885), where he was severely wounded.
In 1887, he was promoted to captain and studied at the Staff College, Camberley from 1892 to 1893. Snow was promoted in 1895 to Brigade Major at Aldershot and further in 1897 to Major in the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Snow was Brigade Major for Major-General Gatacre in the Nile campaign of 1898, fighting at the Battle of Atbara and the Siege of Khartoum. He was promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel. In April 1899, he became the second-in-command of the 2nd Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regiment, spending time in India. In March 1903, he was promoted to substantive lieutenant-colonel and in June 1903 he was further promoted to colonel and appointed assistant quartermaster-general of the 4th corps (which later became Eastern Command). He stayed there being promoted to assistant adjutant-general (1905), brigadier-general, general staff (1906), and commander 11th Infantry Brigade (October 1909).
Snow was then promoted to major-general in March 1910. Snow became the General Officer Commanding of the 4th Division, Eastern Command in early 1911. In 1912, as commander of the 4th Division, Snow took part in the Army Manoeuvres of 1912, the last major manoeuvres before the First World War, as part of the 'Blue Force' under Sir James Grierson which gained a clear 'victory' over the 'Red Force' of Douglas Haig. According to Edmonds, who served under him, his only practice at division command was three or four days at army manoeuvres, which were not practical as General Sir Charles Douglas had forbidden retreats to be practiced. 
World War I
On the outbreak of the First World War, Snow was in command of 4th Division. When the division arrived at the front (25 August) Snow’s orders were to help prepare a defensive position on the Cambrai-Le Cateau position, as GHQ had no idea of the seriousness of the situation facing II Corps (this being at a time when I and II Corps were retreating on opposite sides of the Forest of Mormal, and the BEF Chief of Staff Murray was about to collapse from strain and overwork). Snow was in time to take part in the Battle of Le Cateau. The 4th Division covered the left flank of II Corps and successfully retired. The diary of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien recorded:
I learned in the course of the morning that the 4th Division (General Snow, now Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow) had reached Le Cateau from England, and was delighted to hear that the Chief [that is, Sir John French ] had immediately pushed it out to Solesmes, about seven miles north-west of Le Cateau, to cover the retirement of the Cavalry and 3rd Division.
Both GHQ and the French were left with an exaggerated impression of the losses suffered at Le Cateau. Wilson, BEF Sub Chief of Staff, issued the infamous “sauve qui peut” order (27 August), ordering Snow to dump unnecessary ammunition and officers’ kits so that tired and wounded soldiers could be carried. Smith-Dorrien was later rebuked by Sir John French for countermanding the order. Snow later wrote “the retreat of 1914 was not, as is now imagined, a great military achievement, but rather a badly bungled affair only prevented from being a disaster of the first magnitude by the grit displayed by the officers and the men”. 
Aylmer Haldane, who commanded 10th Infantry Brigade under Snow in 1914, was highly critical of him, although he also thought many other officers of the division not up to the standards of competence required in war. By September 1914 three out of four battalion CO’s had been “sent home”, and Snow was lucky to retain his command.  Snow later revisited some places from the Retreat from Mons with Haldane, who recorded in his diary (10 November 1917) “Though he is an old friend of mine I have never felt the same towards him since that time … when he showed what a poor spirited man he was when troublous times were upon us”. 
In September, during the First Battle of the Marne, Snow was hospitalised, badly injured with a cracked pelvis, after his horse fell and rolled on him. In November, after partially recovering (he required further treatment for the rest of the war), he took command of British 27th Division.
In June, General Lambton, the British Commander in Chief's Military Secretary, wrote to King George V recommending Generals Julian Byng, Thomas Snow and Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, as candidates for command of the proposed Canadian Corps. However, General Alderson was appointed to command the Canadian Corps and, on 15 July, Snow became commander of VII Corps.
He did not think Gommecourt a good place for a feint, and protested to Third Army, but GHQ insisted the attack go ahead.  Edmonds later wrote that Snow was more scared of Haig than of the enemy. 
A senior officer of 46th Division later wrote that Snow “had purposely taken no care” to keep preparations secret. Although the attack was intended as a diversion the intent was to pinch off the German salient and then beat off counterattacks. He was hampered by the fact that most of the German artillery was hidden behind Gommecourt Wood, out of range of all but the heaviest British guns, whilst there was insufficient British artillery (16x18 pounder guns and 4x4.5’’ howitzers per brigade). 56th Division captured the German first line before being beaten back. 46th Division attack failed. The latter failure was blamed on Stuart-Wortley, who was later sacked – although there was a consensus that he was a poor general, he may also have been something of a scapegoat to protect Snow (or even Allenby, GOC Third Army), as competent senior commanders were in short supply and corps commanders were seldom sacked at this stage of the war.  After the war Snow wrote that the Gommecourt salient had proven stronger than anticipated. 
At Cambrai Snow’s VII Corps were on the right flank, and at one point it was suggested that they might be placed under French command if the French joined in the offensive. This did not happen. 
Despite being in pain from his injured pelvis, Snow surveyed his positions from Ronssoy-Epehy Ridge each day, and warned his superiors that a German counterattack was brewing for 29 or 30 November. They were still preoccupied with the attack at Bourlon Wood on the left, and did not believe – wrongly - that the Germans had sufficient reserves left after Third Ypres to mount a major attack.  At 7pm on 28 November his chief of staff (Brigadier-General “Jock” Burnett-Stuart) telephoned Byng’s chief of staff (Maj-Gen Louis Vaughan) to request reinforcements, and was told that the Guards Division could soon be sent. However, when the counterattack came, the Guards Division had already been committed to III Corps. 
Bryn Hammond describes Snow at Cambrai as a “safe pair of hands” on account of his experience but also “tired and relatively old”.  After criticism of British leadership during the German counter-attack, and along with several other BEF corps commanders, he was replaced largely on grounds of age on 2 January 1918. 
In 1918, Snow became General Officer Commanding-in-Chief for Western Command. He retired from the army in 1920. He was also Colonel of the Suffolk Regiment and from 1919 to 1929 he was Colonel of the Somerset Light Infantry.
He died at his home in Kensington Gate, London on 30 August 1940, aged 82.
- Sudan: Mentioned in Despatches twice
- 1907: CB
- 1915: KCB
- 1917: KCMG
- First World War: Mentioned in Despatches six times
- Commander, Legion of Honour
- Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold (Belgium)
Snow was the eldest son of Reverend George D'Oyly Snow of Langton Lodge, Blandford Forum and his wife Maria Jane, the daughter of Robert Barlow.
Snow married Charlotte Geraldine, second daughter of Major-General John Talbot Coke of Trusley, Derbyshire on 12 January 1897. They had two sons and two daughters. One of his sons was the schoolmaster and bishop George D'Oyly Snow. He was the grandfather of British broadcasters Peter Snow and Jon Snow (who writes about him in the Foreword to Ronald Skirth's war memoir The Reluctant Tommy) and great grandfather of historian and TV presenter, Dan Snow.
One of his daughters was Diana Mary Snow. She entered the Deaconess Community of St. Andrew and was ordained Deaconess and life professed on 10 June 1925. As Mother Clare she served as Mother Superior 1942-1964 and taught theology. She was one of the first two women awarded a Lambeth MA in 1958 (along with Dame Betty Ridley). She died 22 December 1965.
- Generals' Nicknames No33: Thomas D'Oyly Snow ('Slush')
- "Snow, Thomas D'Oyly (SNW878TD)". A Cambridge Alumni Database. University of Cambridge.
- Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives
- Travers 1987, p42
- Beckett&Corvi 2006, p197, 199
- Terraine 1960, p150
- Beckett&Corvi 2006, p194
- Travers 1987, p14
- Simpson 2006, p209
- Simpson 2006, p230
- Simpson 2006, p35
- Travers 1987, p154-7
- Travers 1987, p105
- Travers 1987, p154-7
- Travers 1987, p154-7
- Hammond 2008, p92
- Hammond 2008, p328-9, 439
- Hammond 2008, p332, 354
- Hammond 2008, p54, 332
- Simpson 2006, p230
- Hammond 2008, p441
- Ronald Skirth; Jon Snow (16 April 2010), Duncan Barrett, ed., The Reluctant Tommy: An Extraordinary Memoir of the First World War, Macmillan, ISBN 978-0-230-74673-2
- Beckett, Dr Ian F; Corvi, Steven J (editors) (2006). Haig's Generals. London: Pen & Sword. ISBN 9781844158928.
- Hammond, Bryn (2008). Cambrai, The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle. Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London. ISBN 978-0-7538-2605-8.
- Simpson, Andy (2006). Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18. Stroud: Spellmount. ISBN 1-86227-292-1.
- Terraine, John (1960). Mons, The Retreat to Victory. Wordsworth Military Library, London. ISBN 1-84022-240-9.
- Travers, Tim (1987). The Killing Ground. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-85052-964-6.
|General Officer Commanding the 4th Division
|GOC VII Corps
Sir William Campbell
|GOC-in-C Western Command
Sir Beauvoir De Lisle