Thomas S. Power
|Thomas S. Power|
General Thomas Sarsfield Power
|Born||June 18, 1905
New York City, New York
|Died||December 6, 1970
Palm Springs, California
|Allegiance||United States of America|
|Service/branch||United States Air Force|
|Years of service||1929–1964|
|Commands held||Strategic Air Command
Air Research and Development Command
|Battles/wars||World War II|
Legion of Merit (2)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Air Medal (2)
General Thomas Sarsfield Power (June 18, 1905 – December 6, 1970) was commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command and an active military flier for more than 30 years.
Thomas Sarsfield Power was born in New York City in 1905, the eldest child of Irish immigrants, Thomas and Mary Rice Power. He had two sisters one of whom, Dorothy, married three times. After the death of her first husband, Dorothy went on to marry two British aristocrats. The first of these was David Beatty, 2nd Earl Beatty, whom she married in 1937. They were divorced after World War II, whereupon she married Peregrine Cust, 6th Baron Brownlow. They are both buried at Belton House, a stately home in Linconshire, England, that is now owned by the National Trust .
Power attended Barnard Preparatory School in New York and entered the U.S. Army Air Corps flying school February 17, 1928. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Air Corps in February 1929.
His early service included assignments at most of the famed Air Corps fields of the day - Chanute Field, Illinois, as a student officer; Langley Field, Virginia, as commanding officer of the 2d Wing Headquarters Detachment; Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., for duty as an Army air mail operations pilot; Randolph Field, Texas, as a flying instructor; and Maxwell Field, Alabama, to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. He completed his early career as engineering and armament officer at Nichols Field, Philippines.
World War II
During World War II, Power first saw combat flying B-24 missions with the 304th Bomb Wing in North Africa and Italy. After returning to the United States in August 1944, he was named commander of the 314th Bomb Wing (Very Heavy) and moved his B-29s to Guam as part of the 21st Bomber Command. From Guam, he directed the first large-scale fire bomb raid on Tokyo, Japan, on March 9, 1945.
On August 1, 1945, General Carl Spaatz, then commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, moved Power up on his staff as deputy chief of operations. He served in this capacity during the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
During Operation Crossroads, the 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, Power was assigned as assistant deputy task force commander for air on Admiral William H. P. Blandy's staff. Then came assignments as deputy assistant chief of air staff for operations in Washington and a period of air attaché duty in London, prior to his transfer to the Strategic Air Command as vice commander in 1948. During the next six years, Power assisted General Curtis E. LeMay, then commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, in building up SAC. He was then appointed commander of the Air Research and Development Command in 1954, a position he held for three years.
When General LeMay was named vice chief of staff of the Air Force in 1957, Power became commander in chief of SAC and was promoted to four-star rank.
Power was the architect of the Operation Chrome Dome airborne alert program of SAC that ensured that a proportion of the nuclear-armed strategic bombers were always aloft so as to survive a first strike.
Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!
On October 24, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, SAC was ordered to "Defcon 2," one step short of nuclear war. Although authorized to increase his alert level, Power took the unprecedented – and unauthorized – action of broadcasting that message to global Strategic Air Command (SAC) nuclear forces in "the clear" (on non-scrambled, open radio channels), presumably in an attempt to scare the Soviets into complying with American demands.
Raymond Garthoff, who was a participant in the crisis, noted that:
"...the Soviet political and military leaders must have been puzzled and alarmed at this flaunting of the American strategic superiority, so great that the United States could afford to ignore normal operational security in order to drive home the extent of its power. Equally extraordinary, and not known in Moscow, was that this remarkable display of American power was unauthorized by and unknown to the president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the JCS, and the Ex Comm as they so carefully calibrated and controlled action in the intensifying confrontation. The decision for this bold action was taken by General Thomas Powers [sic], commander-in-chief of SAC, on his own initiative. He had been ordered to go on full alert, and he did so. No one had told him how to do it, and he decided to ‘rub it in.’” [Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1987, pp. 37-38.]
Garthoff gives as his source:
I was first told about this action soon after the crisis by Major General (then Colonel) George J. Keegan, Jr., then SAC chief of intelligence, who was present when General Powers [sic] gave the order and it was executed.
The question becomes a bit murkier when new material uncovered by Stanford's Prof. Scott Sagan led him to write:
In addition, it is revealing that on October 24, shortly after DEFCON 2 was declared, General Power also sent the following special message to all SAC wings, in a clear (uncoded) voice transmission, emphasizing the need for safety and caution in the dangerous operation:
This is General Power speaking. I am addressing you for the purpose of reemphasizing the seriousness of the situation the nation faces. We are in an advanced state of readiness to meet any emergencies, and I feel that we are well prepared. I expect each of you to maintain strict security and use calm judgement during this tense period. Our plans are well prepared and are being executed smoothly. If there are any questions concerning instructions which by the nature of the situation deviates from the normal, use the telephone for clarification. Review your plans for further action to insure that there will be no mistakes or confusion. I expect you to cut out all nonessentials and put yourself in a maximum readiness condition. If you are not sure what you should do in any situation, and if time permits, get in touch with us here.
Although Power has been widely criticized for revealing the readiness status of U.S. strategic forces in an uncoded transmission (which was reportedly picked up by Soviet intelligence services), the message’s major purpose appears to have been to encourage subordinate SAC officers to place priority on "calm judgment"and the prevention of mistakes in the crisis.  Such signs of leaders concerns for safety should have had a positive impact in reducing the risk of accidents.
Footnote 45: Earlier assessments, my own included, were critical of Power's decision to send this message in the clear. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, revised ed. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 62; … and Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management," page 108. My earlier views on this matter were based on the recollections of the SAC officer involved in the incident [probably the same man quoted by Garthoff in his book]. They changed after I saw the full declassified message printed above. It is also important to note here that DEFCON increases apparently were routinely transmitted in unclassified messages in the clear to federal agencies until 1972… It is likely therefore that the Soviet Union would have immediately picked up DEFCON increases, even without Power's actions.
However, evidence to the contrary (i.e., that Power was trying to do an end run as stated by Garthoff and, earlier, by Sagan) is contained in SAC's history of the Cuban crisis. Pages 94–95 of that document state
General Power sought to have the DOD’s position [of withholding information about SAC’s state of maximum readiness] modified in order to strengthen the nation’s current and future security in dealing with incidents of a similar nature. With this objective in mind, he proposed on 2 November that four major SAC activities in support of the Cuban quarantine be publicly released … Advised of DOD’s disapproval, on 7 November General Power requested the Secretary of Defense to release the information … As General Power stated: “Therefore, from a deterrent point of view, I believe it to the national advantage that the high degree of readiness of this command be made known, within the bounds of security, to all members of the Communist Bloc, and particularly, the Soviet Union.” In spite of the CINCSAC’s strong appeal, the Secretary of Defense never replied to his letter. However, portions of the CINCSAC’s proposals … were included in a November DOD news release after the Cuban crisis ended.
The above indicates that Power’s broadcast in the clear of DEFCON 2 was not likely to have met with McNamara's approval, and adds weight to the hypothesis that it been done as was originally indicated by Garthoff and Sagan (but later retracted by Sagan) as a way to get his way without specifically disobeying orders. Also, Sagan's newer statement does not indicate why General Power would have been aware that civilian agencies were told of the DEFCON 2 status in the clear.
It should be noted that some accounts incorrectly state that General Power went to DEFCON 2 without authorization. As noted by Michael Dobbs in One Minute to Midnight (page 96):
Contrary to some later accounts, Pentagon records show that Power was acting on presidential authority when he took his forces to DEFCON-2. But his decision to address his commanders over open communications channels was unauthorized and highly unusual.
Like his mentor General LeMay, Power believed that the only effective form of war strategy against enemy nations run by dictators in possession of nuclear weapons was Mutually Assured Destruction. Power continued supervision of this strategy, both in the development and deployment of the necessary weaponry, and the willingness to use these weapons in case of impending threat. Like LeMay, Power emphasized the value of bomber aircraft, which (unlike missiles) can be recalled in the event of an error in technical threat detection, and offer a strategic recourse short of total war.
Power retired from the Air Force on November 30, 1964 and died of a heart attack December 6, 1970. He was a rated command pilot and aircraft observer, and was America's last general officer with no post-secondary education.
Awards and recognitions
General Power was awarded the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, Air Medal with oak leaf cluster, Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, and the French Croix de Guerre with Palm.
- Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
- Silver Star
- Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
- Distinguished Flying Cross
- Bronze Star
- Air Medal
- Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
- French Croix de Guerre with Palm.
- "Gen. Thomas S. Power Dies; SAC Chief Under 3 Presidents". December 8, 1970.
- "William Kaufmann, 90; MIT political scientist reshaped Kennedy's defense strategy". The Boston Globe. 26 December 2008. Retrieved 17 October 2009.
- Air power: the men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II / Stephen Budiansky ISBN 0-670-03285-9
- Thomas S. Power Papers at Syracuse University
Curtis E. LeMay
|Commander, Strategic Air Command
John Dale Ryan
This article incorporates public domain material from the United States Government document "http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6801".