Turkish invasion of Cyprus
||The neutrality of this article is disputed. (February 2011)|
|Turkish invasion of Cyprus|
|Part of the Cyprus dispute|
Ethnographic map of Cyprus according to the 1960 census.
|Commanders and leaders|
| Nurettin Ersin
Osman Fazıl Polat
| George Karayannis
Michael Georgitsis
Konstantinos Kombokis
Nikolaos Nikolaides
12,000 standing strength (40,000 fully mobilised, theoretical)
|Casualties and losses|
|568 killed (498 TAF, 70 Resistance)
Total 3,500 casualties (including civilians)
|Cyprus and Greece: 4,500–6,000 killed and wounded (military and civilian)
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, launched on 20 July 1974, was a Turkish military invasion in response to a Greek military junta backed coup in Cyprus. It is known in Turkey as the "Cyprus Peace Operation" (Turkish: Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı), "Cyprus Operation" (Kıbrıs Harekâtı) or by its Turkish Armed Forces code name Operation Atilla (Atilla Harekâtı).
The coup, ordered by the military Junta in Greece and staged by the Cypriot National Guard in conjunction with EOKA-B, deposed the Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios III and installed Nikos Sampson in his place.
More than one quarter of the population of Cyprus was expelled from the occupied northern part of the island where Greek Cypriots constituted 80% of the population. A little over a year later in 1975, there was also a flow of roughly 60,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north after the conflict. The Turkish invasion ended in the partition of Cyprus along the UN-monitored Green Line which still divides Cyprus today. In 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared independence, although Turkey is the only country which recognises it.
In 1571 the mostly Greek-populated island of Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, following the Ottoman–Venetian War (1570–1573). The island and its population was later leased to Britain by the Cyprus Convention, an agreement reached during the Congress of Berlin in 1878 between the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire. Britain formally annexed Cyprus (together with Egypt and Sudan) on 5 November 1914 as a reaction to the Ottoman Empire's decision to join the First World War on the side of the Central Powers; subsequently the island became a British Crown colony. Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 marked the end of the Turkish claim to the island. Article 21 of the treaty gave the minority Muslims on the island the choice of leaving the island to live as Turks in Turkey, or to stay on the island as British nationals.
At this time the population of Cyprus was composed by both Greeks and Turks, who identified themselves with their respective "mother" countries. However, the elites of both communities shared the belief that they were socially more progressive (better educated and less conservative) and therefore distinct from the mainlanders. Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived quietly side by side for many years.
Broadly, three main forces can be held responsible for transforming two ethnic communities into two national ones: education, British colonial practices, and insular religious teachings accompanying economic development. Formal education was perhaps the most important as it affected Cypriots during childhood and youth; education has been a main vehicle of transferring inter-communal hostility.
British colonial policies also promoted ethnic polarization. The British applied the principle of "divide and rule", setting the two groups against each other to prevent combined action against colonial rule. For example, when Greek Cypriots rebelled in the 1950s, the colonial office expanded the size of the Auxiliary Police and in September 1955, established the Special Mobile Reserve which was recruited exclusively from the Turkish community, to crush EOKA. This and similar practices contributed to inter-communal animosity.
Failure to fully adopt secular practices also fostered ethnic nationalism as the two main ethnic groups practised their own distinct religions, with very little crossover. Although economic development and increased education reduced the explicitly religious characteristics of the two communities, the growth of nationalism on the two mainlands increased the significance of other differences. Turkish nationalism was at the core of the revolutionary program promoted by the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938)., and affected Turkish Cypriots who followed his principles. President of the Republic of Turkey from 1923 to 1938, Atatürk attempted to build a new nation on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and elaborated the program of "six principles" (the "Six Arrows") to do so.
These principles of secularism (laicism) and nationalism reduced Islam's role in the everyday life of individuals and emphasized Turkish identity as the main source of nationalism. Traditional education with a religious foundation was discarded and replaced with one that followed secular principles and, shorn of Arab and Persian influences, was purely Turkish. Turkish Cypriots quickly adopted the secular program of Turkish nationalism.
Under Ottoman rule Turkish Cypriots had been classified as Muslims, a distinction based on religion. Being thoroughly secular, Atatürk's program made their Turkish identity paramount, and may have further reinforced their division from their Greek Cypriot neighbors.
In the early fifties a Greek nationalist group was formed called the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA, or "National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters"). Their objective was to drive the British out of the island first, and then to integrate the island with Greece. EOKA was a Greek nationalist organization and some members murdered Turkish Cypriots who were thought to have colluded with the British. EOKA wished to remove all obstacles, British, Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot from their path to independence, or union with Greece. EOKA initiated its activities by planting the first bombs on 1 April 1951 with the directive by Greek Foreign Minister Stefanopoulos.
The first secret talks for EOKA, as a nationalist organization established to integrate the island to Greece, were started in the chairmanship of Archbishop Makarios III in Athens on 2 July 1952. In the aftermath of these meetings a "Council of Revolution" was established on 7 March 1953. In early 1954 secret weaponry shipments to Cyprus started with the knowledge of the Greek government. Lt. Georgios Grivas, formerly an officer in the Greek army, covertly disembarked on the island on 9 November 1954 and EOKA's campaign against the British forces began to grow.
The first Turk to be killed by EOKA on 21 June 1955 was a policeman. EOKA also targeted Greek collaborators.
On 12 June 1958, eight Greek Cypriot civilians from Kondemenos village were killed by the TMT near the Turkish Cypriot populated village of Geunyeli, after being dropped off there by the British authorities. After this the Turkish government ordered the TMT to blow up the offices of the Turkish press office in Nicosia to falsely put the blame onto the Greek Cypriots and prevent independence negotiations from succeeding. It also began a string of assassinations and murders of prominent Turkish Cypriot supporters of independence. The following year, after the conclusion of the independence agreements on Cyprus, the Turkish Navy sent a ship to Cyprus fully loaded with arms for the TMT. The ship was stopped and the crew were caught red-handed in the infamous "Deniz" incident. British rule lasted until 1960 when the island was declared an independent state under the London-Zurich agreements. The agreement created a foundation for the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, although the republic was seen as a necessary compromise between the two reluctant communities.
The 1960 Constitution of the Cyprus Republic proved unworkable however, lasting only three years. Greek Cypriots wanted to end the separate Turkish Cypriot municipal councils permitted by the British in 1958, made subject to review under the 1960 agreements. For many Greek Cypriots these municipalities were the first stage on the way to the partition they feared. The Greek Cypriots wanted enosis, integration with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots wanted taksim, partition between Greece and Turkey.
Resentment also rose within the Greek Cypriot community because Turkish Cypriots had been given a larger share of governmental posts than the size of their population warranted. In accordance with the constitution 30% of civil service jobs were allocated to the Turkish community even though at they time they only constituted 18.3% of the population. Additionally, the position of vice president was reserved for the Turkish population and both the president and vice president were given veto power over crucial issues. The veto power in particular made it difficult for the government to operate efficiently as any proposal had to be agreed to by both communities. The Turkish Cypriots had also vetoed the amalgamation of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot troops into the same units.
In December 1963 the President of the Republic Makarios proposed thirteen constitutional amendments after the government was repeatedly vetoed by the Turkish Cypriot legislators, forcing deadlock over all major legislations and the budget. Makarios believed it would help facilitate the functioning of the state and to more accurately reflect their ethnic make up. The amendments would have involved the Turkish community giving up many of their protections as a minority, including adjusting ethnic quotas in the government and revoking the presidential and vice presidential veto power. These amendments were rejected by the Turkish side and the Turkish representation left the government, although there is some dispute over whether they left in protest or whether they were forced out by the National Guard. The 1960 constitution fell apart and communal violence ensued. Turkey, Great Britain and Greece, the guarantors of the Zürich and London Agreements which had led to Cyprus's independence, wanted to send a NATO force to the island under the command of General Peter Young.
Between 21 and 26 December 1963, the conflict centered in the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia, which had been an area of tension in 1958. The participants now were Greek Cypriot irregulars and Turkish Cypriot civilians and former TMT members, known as the "fighters" during the Cyprus problem, the Turkish fighters were less powerful, outnumbered and were held down in "ghettos" from the superior Greek Cypriot side who were supplied with stored EOKA guns and eventually guns from foreign powers. Many Greek and Turkish Cypriot civilians who were caught in the crossfire and chaos that ensued over the Christmas week were killed, others were massacred by Greek or Turkish irregulars and had their homes looted and burnt down in small villages as the problem developed. The government of Turkey used these events as an excuse to cancel the residence permits of 12,000 Greek citizens living in Istanbul leading to the confiscation of their property.
Both President Makarios and Dr. Küçük issued calls for peace, but these were ignored. Meanwhile, within a week of the violence flaring up, the Turkish army contingent had moved out of its barracks and seized the most strategic position on the island across the Nicosia to Kyrenia road, the historic jugular vein of the island. So crucial was this road to Turkish strategic thinking that they retained control of that road until 1974, at which time it acted as a crucial link in Turkey's military invasion. From 1963 up to the point of the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974, Greek Cypriots who wanted to use the road could only do so if accompanied by a UN convoy.
700 Turkish hostages, including women and children, were taken from the northern suburbs of Nicosia. By 1964, 193 Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greek Cypriots were killed, with a further 209 Turks and 41 Greeks missing, presumed dead. The British Daily Telegraph later called it the "anti Turkish pogrom".
Thereafter Turkey once again put forward the idea of partition. The intensified fighting especially around areas under the control of Turkish Cypriot militias, as well as the failure of the constitution were used as justification for a possible Turkish invasion. Turkey was on the brink of invading when US president Johnson stated, in his famous letter of 5 June 1964, that the US was against a possible invasion and stated that he would not come to the aid of Turkey if an invasion of Cyprus led to conflict with the Soviet Union. One month later, within the framework of a plan prepared by the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, negotiations with Greece and Turkey began.
After 1963–64 crisis, the Turkish population began to form enclaves in different areas that were blockaded by the National Guard and were directly supported by Turkey. In response to this, their movement and access to basic supplies became more restricted by Greek forces. Fighting broke out again in 1967 as the Turkish Cypriots pushed for more freedom of movement. Once again, this was only settled after Turkey threatened to invade on the basis that they would be protecting the Turkish population from possible ethnic cleansing by Greek Cypriot forces. In order to avoid this, a compromise was reached in which Greece was forced to remove some of its troops from the island, Georgios Grivas, leader of the EOKA had to leave Cyprus, and the Cypriot government lifted some restrictions of movement and access to supplies of the Turkish populations.
Greek military coup and Turkish invasion 
Greek military coup of July 1974 
The junta had come to power in a military coup in 1967 which was condemned by the whole of Europe but had the support of the United States. In the autumn of 1973 after the 17 November student uprising there had been a further coup in Athens in which the original Greek junta had been replaced by one still more obscurantist headed by the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Ioannides, though the actual head of state was General Phaedon Gizikis. Ioannides believed that Makarios was no longer a true supporter of enosis, and suspected him of being a communist sympathizer. This led Ioannides to support the EOKA-B and National Guard as they tried to undermine Makarios.
On 2 July 1974, Makarios wrote an open letter to President Gizikis complaining bluntly that 'cadres of the Greek military regime support and direct the activities of the 'EOKA-B' terrorist organization'. He also ordered that Greece remove some 600 Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard from Cyprus. The Greek Government's immediate reply was to order the go-ahead of the coup. On 15 July 1974 sections of the Cypriot National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the government.
Makarios narrowly escaped death in the attack. He fled the presidential palace by catching a taxi after escorting a party of school children out of the building and went to Paphos, where the British managed to retrieve him by Westland Whirlwind helicopter in the afternoon of 16 July and flew him from Akrotiri to Malta in an Royal Air Force Armstrong Whitworth Argosy (AW.650 / 660) transport and from there to London by de Havilland Comet the next morning.
In the meantime, Nikos Sampson was declared provisional president of the new government. Sampson was a Greek ultra nationalist who was known to be fanatically anti-Turkish and had taken part in violence against Turkish civilians in earlier conflicts.
The Sampson regime took over radio stations and declared that Makarios had been killed, but Makarios, safe in London, was soon able to counteract these reports. In the coup itself, 91 people were killed (All Greek-Cypriots). The Turkish-Cypriots were not affected by the coup against Makarios; one of the reasons was that Ioannides did not want to provoke a Turkish reaction (The Tragic Duel and the Betrayal of Cyorus-Marios Adamides-2012).
In response to the coup, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco to try to mediate the conflict. Turkey issued a list of demands to Greece via a US negotiator. These demands included the immediate removal of Nikos Sampson, the withdrawal of 650 Greek officers from the Cypriot National Guard, the admission of Turkish troops to protect their population, equal rights for both populations, and access to the sea from the northern coast for Turkish Cypriots. These demands were rejected as they would have given Turkey an unacceptable amount of power on the island. Turkey, led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, then applied to Britain as a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee to take action to return Cyprus to its neutral status. Britain declined this offer, and refused to let Turkey use its bases on Cyprus as part of the operation.
First Turkish invasion, July 1974 
Turkey invaded Cyprus on Saturday, 20 July 1974. Heavily armed troops landed shortly before dawn at Kyrenia (Girne) on the northern coast meeting resistance from Greek and Greek Cypriot forces. Ankara said that it was invoking its right under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus. The operation, codenamed 'Operation Atilla', is known in the North as 'the 1974 Peace Operation'.
Turkish forces primarily used a clear and hold strategy, forcing many Greek Cypriots to flee to the south. By the time a ceasefire was agreed three days later, Turkish troops held 3% of the territory of Cyprus. Five thousand Greek Cypriots had fled their homes.
By the time the UN Security Council was able to obtain a ceasefire on the 22 July the Turkish forces had only secured a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia, which they succeeded in widening during the next few days in violation of that ceasefire, demanded in Resolution 353.
On 23 July 1974 the Greek military junta collapsed mainly because of the events in Cyprus. Greek political leaders in exile started returning to the country. On 24 July 1974 Constantine Karamanlis returned from Paris and was sworn in as Prime Minister. He decided against further military involvement as the Turkish forces were much stronger. Shortly after this Nikos Sampson renounced the presidency and Glafcos Clerides temporarily took the role of president.
The first round of peace talks took place in Geneva, Switzerland between 25 and 30 July 1974, James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, having summoned a conference of the three guarantor powers. There they issued a declaration that the Turkish occupation zone should not be extended, that the Turkish enclaves should immediately be evacuated by the Greeks, and that a further conference should be held at Geneva with the two Cypriot communities present to restore peace and re-establish constitutional government. In advance of this they made two observations, one upholding the 1960 constitution, the other appearing to abandon it. They called for the Turkish Vice-President to resume his functions, but they also noted 'the existence in practice of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community'. By the time that the second Geneva conference met on 14 August 1974, international sympathy (which had been with the Turks in their first attack) was swinging back towards Greece now that she had restored democracy. At the second round of peace talks, Turkey demanded that the Cypriot government accept its plan for a federal state, and population transfer. When the Cypriot acting president Clerides asked for 36 to 48 hours in order to consult with Athens and with Greek Cypriot leaders, the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would use it to play for more time.
Second Turkish invasion, 14–16 August 1974 
The Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş had said to the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, When I say "Ayşe is going on vacation" (Turkish: "Ayşe Tatile Çıksın"[dn 1]), it will mean that our armed forces are ready to go into action. Even if the telephone line is tapped, that would rouse no suspicion. An hour and a half after the conference broke up, Turan Güneş called Ecevit and said the code phrase. On 14 August Turkey launched its "Second Peace Operation", to gain control of 40 percent of Cyprus. Britain's then foreign secretary (later prime minister) James Callaghan, later disclosed that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger "vetoed" at least one British military action to pre-empt the Turkish landing. Turkish troops rapidly occupied even more than was asked for at Geneva. 40% of the land came under Turkish occupation reaching as far south as the Louroujina Salient. In the process, many Greek Cypriots became refugees. The Cypriot government estimates their numbers at about 200,000, with other sources stating 140,000 to 160,000. Many of them were forced out of their homes by the Turkish army which has been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights in four interstate applications between Cyprus and Turkey as well as in other cases as in the case of Loizidou vs Turkey), the rest fleeing at the word of the approaching Turkish army. The ceasefire line from 1974 today separates the two communities on the island, and is commonly referred to as the Green Line.
After the conflict, Cypriot representatives and the United Nations consented to the transfer of the remainder of the 51,000 Turkish Cypriots that had not left their homes in the south to settle in the north, if they wished to do so.
The United Nations Security Council has challenged the legality of Turkey's action, because Article Four of the Treaty of Guarantee gives the right to guarantors to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs. The aftermath of Turkey's invasion, however, did not safeguard the Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but had the opposite effect: the de facto partition of the Republic and the creation of a separate political entity in the north. On 13 February 1975, Turkey declared the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus to be a "Federated Turkish State", to the universal condemnation of the international community (see UN Security Council Resolution 367(1975)). The United Nations recognizes the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus according to the terms of its independence in 1960. The conflict continues to affect Turkey's relations with Cyprus, Greece, and the European Union.
Atrocities and human right abuses 
Atrocities towards the civilian Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot and communities have been committed.
Against Greek Cypriots 
In general, Turkey was found guilty by the European Commission of Human Rights for:.
- Displacement of persons (13 votes against 1)
- Deprivation of liberty (8 votes against 1)
- Ill treatment (12 votes against 1)
- Deprivation of Life (14 votes against 1)
- Deprivation of Possessions (12 votes against 1)
The Turkish policy of forcing a third of the island's Greek population from their homes in the occupied North, preventing their return and settling Turks from the mainland there is considered an example of ethnic cleansing.
According to historian Brad R. Roth, writing in a volume published by Oxford University Press:
This is the case of Cyprus, where external guarantors were reserved "the right to take action" to preserve a constitutional arrangement providing for power- sharing between the two ethnic groups that together comprised the Cypriot political community. In 1974, Turkey invoked the treaty as a justification (or pretext) for invading Cyprus. a move that, although plausibly provoked by predatory designs of the extra-constitutional Cypriot leadership in collusion with Greece, led to a partition of the country accompanied by measures now known as "ethnic cleansing".
According to historian Thomas M. Franck, writing in a volume published by Cambridge University Press:
Once its objective had been achieved by the collapse of the Greek junta, however, Turkey went on to occupy a disproportionate part of the island, precipitating large-scale ethnic cleansing The UN system, although of necessity positioning its peacekeepers along the resultant line of demarcation forged by events beyond its control, firmly rejected – and, almost three decades later still rejects — the island's forcible partition in violation of the "territorial integrity" endorsed both by the Council and Assembly.
In Cyprus, the ethnic cleansing of the northern part of the island and its secession as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has not received international recognition, beyond Turkey (Richarte 1995).
In 1976 and again in 1983, the European Commission of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of repeated violations of the European Convention of Human Rights. Turkey has been condemned for preventing the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their properties. The European Commission of Human Rights reports of 1976 and 1983 state the following:
Having found violations of a number of Articles of the Convention, the Commission notes that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively directed against members of one of two communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community. It concludes by eleven votes to three that Turkey has thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race, religion as required by Article 14 of the Convention.
Greek Cypriots who were enclaved in the occupied Karpass Peninsula in 1975 were subjected by the Turks to violations of their human rights so that by 2001 when the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of the violation of 14 articles of the European Convention of Human Rights in its judgement of Cyprus v. Turkey (application no. 25781/94), less than 600 still remained. In the same judgement, Turkey was found guilty of violating the rights of the Turkish Cypriots by authorising the trial of civilians by a military court.
Since the Turkish invasion, a large number of Turks have been brought to the north from Anatolia in violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention and hence a war crime, to occupy the homes of the Greek Cypriot refugees.
The European commission of Human Rights with 12 votes against 1, accepted evidence from the Republic of Cyprus, concerning the rapes of various Greek-Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers and the torture of many Greek-Cypriot prisoners during the invasion of the island.
Against Turkish Cypriots 
Atrocities against the Turkish Cypriot community were committed during the invasion of the island. In the Maratha, Santalaris and Aloda massacre, 126 people were killed on 14 August 1974. The United Nations described the massacre as a crime against humanity, by saying "constituting a further crime against humanity committed by the Greek and Greek Cypriot gunmen." In the Tochni (Taşkent) massacre, 85 Turkish inhabitants were massacred.
The Washington Post covered another news of atrocity in which it is written that: "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol, 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."
Missing persons 
The issue of missing persons in Cyprus took a new turn in the summer of 2007 when the UN-sponsored Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) began returning remains of identified missing individuals to their families (see end of section).
However, since 2004, the whole issue of missing persons in Cyprus took a new turn after the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) designed and started to implement (as from August 2006) its project on the Exhumation, Identification and Return of Remains of Missing Persons. The whole project is being implemented by bi-communal teams of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot scientists (archaeologists, anthropologists and geneticists) under the overall responsibility of the CMP. By the end of 2007, 57 individuals had been identified and their remains returned to their families.
The missing persons list of the Republic of Cyprus confirms that 83 Turkish Cypriots disappeared in Tochni on 14 August 1974. Also, as a result of the invasion, over 2000 Greek-Cypriot prisoners of war were taken to Turkey and detained in Turkish prisons. Some of them were not released and are still missing. In particular, the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) in Cyprus, which operates under the auspices of the United Nations, is mandated to investigate approximately 1600 cases of Greek Cypriot and Greek missing persons.
Destruction of cultural heritage 
In 1989, the government of Cyprus took an American art dealer to court for the return of four rare 6th-century Byzantine mosaics that survived an edict by the Emperor of Byzantium, imposing the destruction of all images of sacred figures. Cyprus won the case, and the mosaics were eventually returned. In October 1997, Aydın Dikmen, who had sold the mosaics, was arrested in Germany in a police raid and found to be in possession of a stash consisting of mosaics, frescoes and icons dating back to the 6th, 12th and 15th centuries, worth over $50 million. The mosaics, depicting Saints Thaddeus and Thomas, are two more sections from the apse of the Kanakaria Church, while the frescoes, including the Last Judgement and the Tree of Jesse, were taken off the north and south walls of the Monastery of Antiphonitis, built between the 12th and 15th centuries.
According to a Greek Cypriot claim, since 1974, at least 55 churches have been converted into mosques and another 50 churches and monasteries have been converted into stables, stores, hostels, or museums, or have been demolished. According to the government spokesman of the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this has been done to keep the buildings from falling into ruin.
In January 2011, the British singer Boy George returned an 18th-century icon of Christ to the Church of Cyprus that he had bought without knowing the origin. The icon, which had adorned his home for 26 years, had been looted from the church of St Charalampus from the village of New Chorio, near Kythrea, in 1974. The icon was noticed by church officials during a television interview of Boy George at his home. The church contacted the singer who agreed to return the icon at Saints Anargyroi Church, Highgate, north London.
Turkish settlers 
As a result of the Turkish invasion, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that the demographic structure of the island has been continuously modified as a result of the deliberate policies of the Turks. Following the occupation of Northern Cyprus, civilian settlers from Turkey began arriving on the island. Despite the lack of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admitted that Turkish nationals began systematically arriving in the northern part of the island in 1975. It was suggested that over 120,000 settlers were brought into Cyprus from mainland Turkey. This was despite Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupier from transferring or deporting parts of its own civilian population into an occupied territory.
UN Resolution 1987/19 (1987) of the "Sub-Commission On Prevention Of Discrimination And Protection Of Minorities", which was adopted on 2 September 1987, demanded "the full restoration of all human rights to the whole population of Cyprus, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property" and also expressed "its concern also at the policy and practice of the implantation of settlers in the occupied territories of Cyprus which constitute a form of colonialism and attempt to change illegally the demographic structure of Cyprus".
In a report prepared by Mete Hatay on behalf of PRIO, the Oslo peace center, it was estimated that the number of Turkish mainlanders in the north who have been granted the right to vote is 37,000. This figure however excludes mainlanders who are married to Turkish Cypriots or adult children of mainland settlers as well as all minors. The report also estimates the number of Turkish mainlanders who have not been granted the right to vote, whom it labels as "transients", at a further 105,000.
||This article duplicates, in whole or part, the scope of other article(s) or section(s). (March 2013)|
Turkish Cypriot 
Turkish Cypriot opinion quotes Archbishop Makarios III, who whilst ruling a government they did not approve of, at least did not support immediate enosis. Makarios described the coup which replaced him as "An Invasion of Cyprus by Greece" in his speech to the UN security council and stated that there were "no prospects" of success in the talks aimed at resolving the situation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as long as the leaders of the coup, sponsored and supported by Greece, were in power.
Turks often claim that the Council of Europe supported the legality of the invasion by Turkey in its resolution of the 29 July 1974. They claim that the Court of Appeal in Athens stated that the invasion was legal and that "The real culprits... are the Greek officers who engineered and staged a coup and prepared the conditions for the invasion".
"Turkey exercised its right of intervention in accordance with Article IV of the Guarantee Treaty."
Greek Cypriot 
The Republic of Cyprus established after the militant struggle against the British was a compromise to Turkish minority who wanted to see the island under Turkey's control. That becomes evident through today's occupation of 36% of the island having as a "justification" that Turkey's forceful presence is to restore constitutional order, 33 years ago.
Since 1974 Turkey has occupied 36% of the island and claims that her presence is to secure the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots argue that all these are diplomatic ploys, furthered by ultra nationalist Turkish militants to justify Turkey's expansionist objective.
Turkey's support for partition through the forced displacement of populations is revealed in the Galo Plaza report of 1965 and in its demands during negotiations with the British over Cyprus independence and the so-called Acheson plan which would have divided Cyprus between Turkey and Greece.
Turks seeking to justify the Turkish invasion, often refer to a few isolated judgements which may, taken out of context, appear to go against the grain. They often refer to a purported judgement of the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (resolution 532/1974), dated 29 July 1974, which stated the following:
The key feature of the statement purportedly made at the CoE is the date at which is was made. At the time of the statement, it was not yet absolutely apparent that Turkey, rather than using its right of intervention as a Guarantor power, was acting contrary to it, under its guise.
Critically, following the date, the Greek junta had collapsed and the democratic government of the Republic of Cyprus was restored under Glafkos Clerides leaving further "intervention" unwarranted. Nevertheless, there followed a second wave of Turkish invasion which was universally condemned and revealed the underlying motivations behind the first wave.
Whereas the first wave of military action was and still is said (by many Turks) to have been carried out in accordance with the right of intervention, the second wave of military action revealed that Turkey's right of intervention was used as little more than a guise for an invasion. The second phase of the Turkish invasion was characterised by a disproportionate use of violence and disproportionate occupation of territory (in relation to the ethnic populations) Ultimately, the right of intervention to protect the sovereignty, integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus was abused as those goals were undermined by Turkey's creation of an internationally unrecognised pseudo-state, the TRNC, and the stationing of 40000 Turkish troops on sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus, in violation of all resolutions of the United Nations.
The decision reflected the mood and attitude towards the Greek junta which was itself exogenous to the Republic of Cyprus. It is for this reason that President Makarios, in his speech to the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974, described the coup which replaced him as "...an Invasion of Cyprus by Greece..." and called for the restoration of the democratic government.
Many Greek Cypriots have long believed that the NATO powers, notably Britain and America, were against the idea of an independent Cyprus because of fears that it could fall into communist hands and become a "Mediterranean Cuba".
Negotiations and other developments 
Ongoing negotiations 
The United Nations Security Council decisions for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus soil and the safe return of the refugees to their homes have not been implemented by Turkey and the TRNC. Turkey and TRNC defend their position, stating that any such withdrawal would have led to a resumption of intercommunal fighting and killing.
Negotiations to find a solution to the Cyprus problem have been taking place on and off since 1964. Between 1974 and 2002, the Turkish Cypriot side (effectively controlled by the Turkish government) was seen by the international community as the side refusing a balanced solution. Since 2002, the situation has been reversed according to US and UK officials, and the Greek Cypriot side rejected a plan which would have called for the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus without guarantees that the Turkish occupation forces would be removed. The latest Annan Plan to reunify the island which was endorsed by the United States, United Kingdom and Turkey was accepted by a referendum by Turkish Cypriots but overwhelmingly rejected in parallel referendum by Greek Cypriots, after Greek Cypriot Leadership and Greek Orthodox Church urging the Greek population to vote No.
Greek Cypriots rejected the UN settlement plan in an April 2004 referendum. On 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriots rejected by a three-to-one margin the plan proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The plan, which was approved by a two-to-one margin by the Turkish Cypriots in a separate but simultaneous referendum, would have created a United Cyprus Republic and ensured that the entire island would reap the benefits of Cyprus' entry into the European Union on 1 May. The plan would have created a United Cyprus Republic consisting of a Greek Cypriot constituent state and a Turkish Cypriot constituent state linked by a federal government. More than half of the Greek Cypriots who were displaced in 1974 and their descendants would have had their properties returned to them and would have lived in them under Greek Cypriot administration within a period of 31/2 to 42 months after the entry into force of the settlement. For those whose property could not be returned, they would have received monetary compensation.
The entire island entered the EU on 1 May 2004 still divided, although the EU acquis communautaire – the body of common rights and obligations – applies only to the areas under direct government control, and is suspended in the areas occupied by the Turkish military and administered by Turkish Cypriots. However, individual Turkish Cypriots able to document their eligibility for Republic of Cyprus citizenship legally enjoy the same rights accorded to other citizens of European Union states. Nicosia continues to oppose EU efforts to establish direct trade and economic links to TRNC as a way of encouraging the Turkish Cypriot community to continue to support the resolution of the Cyprus dispute.
Declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot assembly declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Immediately upon this declaration Britain convened a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to condemn the declaration as "legally invalid". United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the "attempt to create the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus". It went on to state that it "Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal".
Return of Varosha 
In the following year UN resolution 550 (1984) condemned the "exchange of Ambassadors" between Turkey and the TRNC and went on to add that the Security Council "Considers attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible and calls for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations".
To this day, neither Turkey nor the TRNC have complied with the above resolutions and Varosha remains uninhabited.
In 22 July 2010, United Nations' International Court of Justice decided that "International law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence". In response to this non legally-binding direction, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said it "has nothing to do with any other cases in the world" including Cyprus.
Code names 
Attila Operations refers to the two operations performed by the Turkish Armed Forces during the invasion of Cyprus.
Atilla I was the first stage of the operation. The invasion began in the early hours of 20 July 1974 in response to a Greek-inspired coup d'état that sought to overthrow the government of President Makarios. Three days later, the coup was dissolved, and the elected government was re-established.
See also 
- Battle of Tylliria (Cyprus 1964)
- Timeline of events in Cyprus, 1974
- Military operations during the Invasion of Cyprus (1974)
- Battle of Pentemili beachhead (1974)
- Reported Military Losses during the Invasion of Cyprus (1974)
- Rodger P. Davies
- Cyprus National Guard
- Cyprus Air Forces
- Cyprus Navy and Marine Police
- Military Equipment of Cyprus
- Greco-Turkish relations
- Enclaved Greek Cypriots
- Turkish Cypriot Enclaves
- Modern history of Cyprus
- Cypriot refugees
- Cyprus under the Ottoman Empire
- List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
- Ayşe is a daughter of Turan Güneş, today Ayşe Güneş Ayata, (Alper Sedat Aslandaş & Baskın Bıçakçı, Popüler Siyasî Deyimler Sözlüğü, İletişim Yayınları, 1995, ISBN 975-470-510-0, p. 34.)
- Juliet Pearse, "Troubled Northern Cyprus fights to keep afloat" in Cyprus. Grapheio Typou kai Plērophoriōn, Cyprus. Grapheion Dēmosiōn Plērophoriōn, Foreign Press on Cyprus, Public Information Office, 1979, p. 15.
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- Richard D. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 978-0-521-82176-6, p. 104., on the refusal of legal recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, see S.K.N. Blay, "Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of an Old Conflict", 10 Australian Yearbook of International Law (1987), pp. 67–100.
- Keser, Ulvi (2006). Turkish-Greek Hurricane on Cyprus (1940 – 1950 – 1960 – 1970), 528. sayfa, Publisher: Boğaziçi Yayınları, ISBN 975-451-220-5.
- Η Μάχη της Κύπρου, Γεώργιος Σέργης, Εκδόσεις Αφοι Βλάσση, Αθήνα 1999, page 260 (Greek)
- Haydar Çakmak: Türk dış politikası, 1919-2008, Platin, 2008, ISBN 9944137251, page 688 (Turkish); excerpt from reference: 415 ground, 65 navy, 5 air, 13 gendarmerie, 70 resistance (= 568 killed)
- American University (Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area Studies; Eugene K. Keefe (1980). Cyprus, a country study. Foreign Area Studies, American University : for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off. Retrieved 5 December 2012. "Authoritative figures for casualties during the two- phased military operation were not published; available estimates listed Greek Cypriot losses at 6,000 dead and Turkish losses at 1,500 dead and 2,000 wounded..."
- Bruce W. Jentleson; Thomas G. Paterson; Council on Foreign Relations (1997). Encyclopedia of US foreign relations. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511059-3. Retrieved 5 December 2012. "Greek/Greek Cypriot casualties were estimated at 6,000 and Turkish/Turkish Cypriot casualties at 3,500, including 1,500 dead..."
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- "CYPRUS: Big Troubles over a Small Island". TIME. July 29, 1974.
- “Cyprus: A Country Study” U.S Library of Congress. Ed. Eric Solsten. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. Web. Retrieved 1 October 2010.
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- Oberling, Pierre. The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot exodus to Northern Cyprus. New York: Columbia University Press. 1982.
- Borowiec, Andrew. “The Mediterranean Feud”. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983,pg. 99
- Dodd, Clement. “The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict. New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2010,113.
- Kassimeris, Christos. “Greek Response to the Cyprus Invasion” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19.2 (2008): 256–273. EBSCOhost 28 September 2010. 258
- Kassimeris, Christos. “Greek Response to the Cyprus Invasion” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19.2 (2008): 256–273. EBSCOhost 28 September 2010, 258.
- Mehmet Ali Birand, "30 sıcak gün", March 1976
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- “Cyprus: A Country Study” U.S Library of Congress. Ed. Eric Solsten. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. Web. 1 October 2010.
- Jan Asmussen, Cyprus at war: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis, I.B. Tauris, 2008, ISBN 978-1-84511-742-9, p. 191.
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- Press and Information office (Cyprus) Retrieved 19 September 2012 via Web Archive
- Security Resolution 367
- European Commission of Human Rights, "Report of the Commission to Applications 6780/74 and 6950/75" , Council of Europe, 1976, p. 160,161,162,163.
- Welz, Gisela. Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict. Indiana University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0-253-21851-9.
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- Rezun, Miron (2001). Europe's nightmare: the struggle for Kosovo. New York: Praeger. p. 6. ISBN 0-275-97072-8.
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- Jean S. Forward, Endangered peoples of Europe: struggles to survive and thrive The Greenwood Press "Endangered peoples of the world" series Endangered peoples of the world, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, 0313310068, 9780313310065, p. 53
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- University of Minnesota. Modern Greek Studies Program, Modern Greek studies yearbook, Τόμος 9, University of Minnesota, 1993, p.577
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Further reading 
Official publications and sources 
- The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Cyprus.
- Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, dated 7 June, which circulated as an official document of the U.N. Security Council
- Legal Issues arising from certain population transfers and displacements on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus in the period since 20 July 1974
- Address to Cypriots by President Papadopoulos (FULL TEXT)
- The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Aspects of the Cyprus Problem
- 1st Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and aftermath (20 July 1974 – 18 May 1976)
- 2nd Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and aftermath (19 May 1976 to 10 February 1983)
- European Court of Human Rights Case of Cyprus v. Turkey (Application no. 25781/94)
Books and articles 
- James H. Meyer, "Policy Watershed: Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974", Princeton University Press
- Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, "The Cyprus Conspiracy" (London: IB Tauris 1999)
- Christopher Hitchens, "Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger" (New York: Verso, 1997)
- Christopher Hitchens, "The Trial of Henry Kissinger" (Verso, 2001)
- Christopher Hitchens, "Cyprus" (Quartet, 1984)
- Christopher Brewin, "European Union and Cyprus" (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000)
- Claude Nicolet, "United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974" (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001)
- Dudley Barker, "Grivas, Portrait of a Terrorist" (New York Harcourt: Brace and Company 2005)
- Farid Mirbagheri, "Cyprus and International Peacemaking" (London: Hurst, 1989)
- James Ker-Lindsay, "EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus" (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
- Pierre Oberling, "The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot exodus to northern Cyprus" (Social Science Monographs, 1982)
- Nancy Cranshaw, "The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece" (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978)
- Oliver Richmond, "Mediating in Cyprus" (London: Frank Cass, 1998)
- The Lobby for Cyprus study group, Origins of the present crisis – 1950s to 1970s
- Christos P. Ioannides, "In Turkey's image: The transformation of occupied Cyprus into a Turkish province", (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas, 1991)
- Dr. Stavros Panteli, "The history of modern Cyprus", Topline Publishing, ISBN 0-948853-32-8
- Marios Adamides-The Tragic Duel and the Betrayal of Cyprus-2012
Other sources 
- ITN documentary, Cyprus, Britain's Grim Legacy
- Channel 4 Television documentary, Secret History – Dead or Alive?
- CIA World Factbook
- UN Chronicle
- Nilgun Gulcan, Chronology – Cyprus Issue, Journal of Turkish Weekly.
- Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office
- Association Of Turkish Cypriots Abroad