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The cosmological argument is an argument for the existence of a First Cause (or instead, an Uncaused cause) to the universe, and by extension is often used as an argument for the existence of an "unconditioned" or "supreme" being, usually then identified as God. It is traditionally known as an argument from universal causation, an argument from first cause, the causal argument or the argument from existence. Whichever term is employed, there are three basic variants of the argument, each with subtle yet important distinctions: the arguments from in causa (causality), in esse (essentially), in fieri (becoming), and the argument from contingency.
The basic premise of all of these is that something caused or continuously causes the Universe to exist, and this First Cause is what we call God. It has been used by various theologians and philosophers over the centuries, from the ancient Greeks Plato and Aristotle to the medievals (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas) and beyond. It is also applied by the Spiritist doctrine as the main argument for the existence of God.
- 1 History
- 2 Argument
- 3 Objections and counterarguments
- 4 Scientific positions
- 5 See also
- 6 References
- 7 External links
Plato (c. 427–347 BC) and Aristotle (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats. Plato posited a basic argument in The Laws (Book X), in which he argued that motion in the world and the Cosmos was "imparted motion" that required some kind of "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain that motion. Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos in his work Timaeus.
Aristotle argued against the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a "prime mover" or "unmoved mover" (πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον or primus motor) in his Physics and Metaphysics. Aristotle's famous argument was contrary to the atomist's depiction of a non-eternal cosmos which, he argued, would require an efficient first cause, a notion that Aristotle took to demonstrate a critical flaw in their reasoning. However, a non-eternal cosmos, with both a beginning and an end, would later come to reflect the prevalent theological beliefs in medieval Europe. By simply denying that an efficient first cause is problematic, being easily explained as the creative action of an omnipotent God, medieval theologians re-purposed and enhanced Aristotle's argument, as if the intention had been to prove God's existence. Like Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal cosmos with no beginning and no end (which in turn follows Parmenides' famous statement that "nothing comes from nothing"). In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotle did intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and deity (presumably Zeus); functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the "fixed stars" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth). According to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they're incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire", the celestial spheres, imitate that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by uniform circular motion. The unmoved movers inspiring the planetary spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover. Correspondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars. Aristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal pantheon, but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.
Plotinus, a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence - "creatio ex deo". His disciple Proclus stated "The One is God".
Centuries later, the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (c. 980–1037) inquired into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence (Mahiat) and existence (Wujud). He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the Universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an agent cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.
Steven Duncan writes that "it was first formulated by a Greek-speaking Syriac Christian neo-Platonist, John Philoponus," who claims to find a contradiction between the Greek pagan insistence on the eternity of the world and the Aristotelian rejection of the existence of any actual infinite." Referring to the argument as the "'Kalam' cosmological argument", Duncan asserts that it "received its fullest articulation at the hands of [medieval] Muslim and Jewish exponents of Kalam ("the use of reason by believers to justify the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the faith)."
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), a theologian in Medieval Europe, adapted the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle and Avicenna to form one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of First Cause was the idea that the Universe must have been caused by something that was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God.
This cosmological argument is one of which many Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and other theists all around the world believe gives proof that their version of God does exist as he is the only logical cause of all effects in our universe.
Many other philosophers have posited cosmological arguments both before and since Aquinas. The versions sampled in the following sections are representative of the most common derivations of the argument.
A version of the cosmological argument could be stated as follows:
- Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
- A causal loop cannot exist.
- A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.
- Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.
According to the argument, the existence of the Universe requires an explanation, and the creation of the Universe by a First Cause, generally assumed to be God, is that explanation.
In light of the Big Bang theory, a stylized version of argument has emerged (sometimes called the Kalam cosmological argument, the following form of which was created by Al-Ghazali and then strongly supported by William Lane Craig):
- Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
- The Universe began to exist.
- Therefore, the Universe had a cause.
Argument from contingency
In the scholastic era, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency", following Aristotle in claiming that there must be something to explain why the Universe exists. Since the Universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (contingency), its existence must have a cause – not merely another contingent thing, but something that exists by necessity (something that must exist in order for anything else to exist). In other words, even if the Universe has always existed, it still owes its existence to an Uncaused Cause, Aquinas further said: "...and this we understand to be God."
Aquinas's argument from contingency allows for the possibility of a Universe that has no beginning in time. It is a form of argument from universal causation. Aquinas observed that, in nature, there were things with contingent existences. Since it is possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which these things did not in fact exist. Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If this is so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Contingent beings, therefore, are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings: there must exist a necessary being whose non-existence is an impossibility, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is derived.
The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz made a similar argument with his principle of sufficient reason in 1714. "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition," he wrote, "without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason [...] is found in a substance which [...] is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."
In esse and in fieri
The difference between the arguments from causation in fieri and in esse is a fairly important one. In fieri is generally translated as "becoming", while in esse is generally translated as "in essence". In fieri, the process of becoming, is similar to building a house. Once it is built, the builder walks away, and it stands on its own accord. (It may require occasional maintenance, but that is beyond the scope of the first cause argument.)
In esse (essence) is more akin to the light from a candle or the liquid in a vessel. George Hayward Joyce, SJ, explained that "...where the light of the candle is dependent on the candle's continued existence, not only does a candle produce light in a room in the first instance, but its continued presence is necessary if the illumination is to continue. If it is removed, the light ceases. Again, a liquid receives its shape from the vessel in which it is contained; but were the pressure of the containing sides withdrawn, it would not retain its form for an instant." This form of the argument is far more difficult to separate from a purely first cause argument than is the example of the house's maintenance above, because here the First Cause is insufficient without the candle's or vessel's continued existence.
Thus, Leibniz' argument is in fieri, while Aquinas' argument is both in fieri and in esse. This distinction is an excellent example of the difference between a deistic view (Leibniz) and a theistic view (Aquinas). As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument, including the Kalam argument, tend to lean very strongly towards an in fieri argument.
Objections and counterarguments
What caused the First Cause?
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One objection to the argument is that it leaves open the question of why the First Cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Proponents argue that the First Cause is exempt from having a cause, while opponents argue that this is special pleading or otherwise untrue. The problem with arguing for the First Cause's exemption is that it raises the question of why the First Cause is indeed exempt.
Secondly, the premise of causality has been arrived at via a posteriori (inductive) reasoning, which is dependent on experience. David Hume highlighted this problem of induction and argued that causal relations were not true a priori. However, as to whether inductive or deductive reasoning is more valuable still remains a matter of debate, with the general conclusion being that neither is prominent. Even though causality applies to the known world, it does not necessarily apply to the universe at large. In other words, it is unwise to draw conclusions from an extrapolation of causality beyond experience.
Identity of a First Cause
Even if one accepts the cosmological argument as a proof of a First Cause, an objection against the theist implication of the proposition is that it does not necessarily identify that First Cause with God. According to Austin Cline, the argument does not go on to ascribe to the First Cause some of the basic attributes commonly associated with, for instance, a theistic God, such as immanence or omnibenevolence. Cline argues that, just because the first cause does not itself have a cause, it does not necessarily mean that it must be a god:
Another objection is that the argument concludes that a “god” exists, but if so, this god must have a cause (according to the same argument). This leads to an infinite regress of causes (gods) unacceptable to the theist, so most believers make an exception for their god, asserting that it doesn’t need a cause — but there is no obvious reason why this exception cannot be applied to the universe, too. If a god “just is,” why can’t the universe “just be?”.
Furthermore, even if one chooses to accept God as the First Cause, there is an argument that God's continued interaction with the Universe is not required. This is the foundation for beliefs such as deism that accept that a god created the Universe, but then ceased to have any further interaction with it, and even pandeism, which proposes that the creator of the universe actually became the universe, and so ceased to exist as a separate and conscious entity.
However, according to Gregory Ganssle, Aquinas did not simply assert that the First Cause was God, but spent "several hundred pages or so in his work explaining why the first cause must be God". Ganssle goes on to argue that the first cause is not part of the universe - "not in space or time". It also must "be something with lots of power". Furthermore, there "is good reason to think that the first cause must be a person", otherwise "we cannot make much progress in thinking about why the universe is the age that it is". These "add up to good reasons to think that the first cause is God".
Existence of causal loops
A causal loop is a form of predestination paradox arising where traveling backwards in time is deemed a possibility. A sufficiently powerful entity in such a world would have the capacity to travel backwards in time to a point before its own existence, and to then create itself, thereby initiating everything which follows from it.
The usual reason which is given to refute the possibility of a causal loop is it requires that the loop as a whole be its own cause. Richard Hanley argues that causal loops are not logically, physically, or epistemically impossible: "[In timed systems,] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."
Existence of infinite causal chains
If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained.
Nevertheless, David E. White argues that the notion of an infinite causal regress providing a proper explanation is fallacious. Furthermore Demea states that even if the succession of causes is infinite, the whole chain still requires a cause. To explain this, suppose there exists a causal chain of infinite contingent beings. If one asks the question, "Why are there any contingent beings at all?", it won’t help to be told that "There are contingent beings because other contingent beings caused them." That answer would just presuppose additional contingent beings. An adequate explanation of why some contingent beings exist would invoke a different sort of being, a necessary being that is not contingent. A response might suppose each individual is contingent but the infinite chain as a whole is not; or the whole infinite causal chain to be its own cause.
The IUT claims that the physical world is governed by an infinite universal causality. Severinsen argues that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure. White tried to introduce an argument “without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress”.
Some cosmologists and physicists argue that a challenge to the cosmological argument is the nature of time: "One finds that time just disappears from the Wheeler–DeWitt equation" (Carlo Rovelli). The Big Bang theory states that it is the point in which all dimensions came into existence, the start of both space and time. Then, the question "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time. This has been put forward by J. Richard Gott III, James E. Gunn, David N. Schramm, and Beatrice Tinsley, who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole. However, some cosmologists and physicists do attempt to investigate what could have occurred before the Big Bang, using such scenarios as the collision of membranes to give a cause for the Big Bang.
- Biblical cosmology
- Creation myth
- Dating Creation
- Ex nihilo
- Kalām cosmological argument
- Quinquae viae
- Temporal finitism
- Timeline of the Big Bang
- "Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God", in Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), Vol. 2, p232 ff.
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- Scott David Foutz, An Examination of Thomas Aquinas' Cosmological Arguments as found in the Five Ways, Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy
- Craig, William L. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe". Truth Journal. Leaderu.com.
- Summa Theologiae, I : 2,3
- Aquinas was an ardent student of Aristotle's works, a significant number of which had only recently been translated into Latin by William of Moerbeke .
- Summa Theologiae, I : 2,3
- Monadologie (1714). Nicholas Rescher, trans., 1991. The Monadology: An Edition for Students. Uni. of Pittsburg Press. Jonathan Bennett's translation. Latta's translation.
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- Cline, Austin. "Cosmological Argument: Does the Universe Require a First Cause? | Agnosticism/Atheism". About.com. Retrieved June 20, 2008.
- "Deduction & Induction". Socialresearchmethods.net. 2006-10-20. Retrieved 2012-09-02.
- Craig, William L. "Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God". Leadership University. Retrieved June 20, 2008.
- "deism." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. Answers.com 20 Jun. 2008. http://www.answers.com/topic/deism
- Sean F. Johnston (2009 ISBN = 1-85168-681-9). The History of Science: A Beginner's Guide p. 90.
- Alex Ashman, BBC News, "Metaphysical Isms".
- Ganssle, GE, Thinking about God, Intervarsity Press, 2004, pp. 60-65.
- Richard Hanley, No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction, Synthese
- Alexander R. Pruss, The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
- White, David E. "An argument for God's existence". International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
- Calvert, Brian. "Another problem about Part IX of Hume's Dialogues". International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
- Rota, Michael. "Infinite Causal Chains and Explanation" (DOC). Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
- Borchardt, Glenn (2007). "Infinite Universe Theory". Proceedings of the NPA.
- Severinsen, Morten. "Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative". Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. "This implies that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure behind each disease, and that the disease mechanism would have to encompass the whole structure."
- White, David E. "An argument for God's existence". International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. "My intention is to show that a cosmological argument for God's existence (not that of a first cause simpliciter) can be constructed without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress."
- Folger, Tim. "Time may not exist". Retrieved August 17, 2012.
- (J. Richard Gott III, James E. Gunn, David N. Schramm, and Beatrice M. Tinsley, "Will the Universe Expand Forever?" Scientific American [March 1976], p. 65)
- Britt, Robert R. (April 18, 2001). "Brane-Storm | Challenges Part of Big Bang Theory". Space.com. Retrieved June 21, 2008.
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- Cosmological Argument entry by Bruce Reichenbach in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Version of the cosmological argument preemting all rebuttals by Yusuf Mullan
- Articles on the cosmological argument by William Lane Craig
- Articles on the cosmological argument by Alexander Pruss
- Articles on the cosmological argument by Timothy O'Connor
- Articles on the atheistic cosmological argument by Quentin Smith and others
- A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe by Quentin Smith