Unique Identification Authority of India

Unique Identification Authority of India(UID)
भारतीय विशिष्ट पहचान प्राधिकरण
UIDAI (Aadhaar UIDAI new logo)
Agency overview
Formed	February 2009
Jurisdiction	Government of India (Union Government)
Headquarters	New Delhi
Annual budget	3,000 crore (US$660 million) (2010)
Agency executives	Nandan Nilekani, Chairman Ram Sewak Sharma, Director General and Mission Director
Website
uidai.gov.in

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The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) (Hindi: भारतीय विशिष्ट पहचान प्राधिकरण), is an agency of the Government of India responsible for implementing the AADHAAR scheme, a unique identification project. It was established in February 2009, and will own and operate the Unique Identification Number database. The authority aims to provide a unique id number to all Indians, but not smart cards. The authority will maintain a database of residents containing biometric and other data.

The agency is headed by a chairman, who holds a cabinet rank. The UIDAI is part of the Planning Commission of India. Nandan Nilekani, former co-chairman of Infosys Technologies, was appointed as the first Chairman of the authority in June 2009. Ram Sewak Sharma, an IAS Officer of Jharkhand Government is the Director General and Mission Director of the Authority.

Salient features of AADHAAR

Aadhaar is a 12-digit unique number which the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will issue for all residents in India. The number will be stored in a centralized database and linked to the basic demographics and biometric information – photograph, ten fingerprints and iris – of each individual.It is easily verifiable in an online, cost-effective way. So also, it is unique and robust enough to eliminate the large number of duplicate and fake identities in government and private databases The random number generated will be devoid of any classification based on caste, creed, religion and geography.

Launch

UIDAI launched AADHAAR program in the tribal village, Tembhli, in Shahada, Nandurbar, Maharashtra on 29 September 2010. The program was inaugurated by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh along with UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi. The first resident to receive an AADHAAR was Rajana Sonawane of Tembhli village.

Coverage, goals and logistics

collecting finger prints for Aadhar

collecting images of iris

Taking photos

It is believed that Unique National IDs will help address the rigged state elections and widespread embezzlement that affects subsidies and poverty alleviation programs such as NREGA. Addressing illegal immigration into India and terrorist threats is another goal of the program.

Most reports suggest that the plan is for each Indian citizen to have a unique identification number with associated identifying biometric data and photographs by 2011. However, other reports claim that obtaining a unique number would be voluntary, but those that opt to stay out of the system "will find it very inconvenient: they will not have access to facilities that require you to cite your ID number."

Government distributed benefits are fragmented by purpose and region in India, which results in widespread bribery, denial of public services and loss of income, especially afflicting poor citizens. As the unique identity database comes into existence, the various identity databases (voter ID, passports, ration cards, licenses, fishing permits, border area id cards) that already exist in India are planned to be linked to it. The Authority is liaising with various national, state and local government entities to begin this process. The Union Labor Ministry has offered its verified Employment Provident Fund (EPFO) database of 42 million citizens as the first database to be integrated into the unique ID system.

The UID will link a person's Passport Number, Driving License, PAN card, Bank Accounts, Address, Voter ID, etc. and all this information will be checked through a database. So, for example, if someone has different addresses on PAN and driving license, that person is liable to get caught. Those who will opt out of this program will have much inconvenience in doing business, operating bank accounts and other offices which will require a UID.

UIDAI has headquarters in Delhi and a technology centre in Bangalore. It also has 8 regional offices in Chandigarh, Delhi, Lucknow, Ranchi, Guwahati, Mumbai, Hyderabad and Bangalore.

Name and logo

UID project is known as AADHAAR meaning 'support' or 'foundation', and its logo is a yellow sun with a fingerprint embedded in its centre. The logo was designed by Atul Sudhakar Rao Pande.

Projected costs and business opportunities

One estimate of the cost to completely roll-out National IDs to all Indian residents above the age of 18 has been placed at 150,000 crore (US$33 billion). A different estimate puts it at US$ 6 billion. A sum of 100 crore (US$22 million) was approved in the 2009-2010 union budget to fund the agency for its first year of existence. UID has received a huge boost with Dr Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Finance, allocating 1,900 crore (US$418 million) to the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) for 2010-11.

Initial estimates project that the initiative will create 100,000 new jobs in the country, and business opportunities worth 6,500 crore (US$1.43 billion) in the first phase of implementation, over three years.

US government is also planning to implement the concept used for UID for there SSN programme.

Projected benefits^{[citation needed]}

1. Aadhaar will become the single source of identity verification. Residents would be spared the hassle of repeatedly providing supporting identity documents each time they wish to access services such as obtaining a bank account, passport, driving license and so on.
2. By providing a clear proof of identity, Aadhaar will also facilitate entry for poor and underprivileged residents into the formal banking system and the opportunity to avail services provided by the government and the private sector.
3. Giving migrants mobility of identity.
4. Financial inclusion with deeper penetration of banks, insurance and easy distribution of benefits of government schemes.

Enrollment

Details are available at http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=148&Itemid=41 In Kerala Palakkad Akshya egovernance Kendras are now carrying out data collection., and registration of biometrics will follow later. Karvy is the business partner for UIDAI. In some other states Karvy is taking online reservation of enrollment slots by collecting data in advance and providing an appointment. Details for online registration are available at http://uid.karvy.com/bookmyslot/.

Risks and criticism

Reliability of biometric methods

According to the UIDAI Model, Aadhaar is dependent on biometrics being reliable enough to guarantee that there is a one-to-one correspondence between real people and electronic identities on the CIDR (central ID repository).

The NIST certificate for biometric technology reads: “For purpose of NIST PATRIOT Act certification this test certifies the accuracy of the participating systems on the datasets used in the test. This evaluation does not certify that any of the systems tested meet the requirements of any specific government application. This would require that factors not included in this test such as image quality, dataset size, cost, and required response time be included.” A study by London School of Economics on the ID card project in UK notes: "Identity systems may create a range of new and unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens." America’s National Research Council (NRC) study concludes thus: “Human recognition systems are inherently probabilistic and hence inherently fallible. The chance of error can be made small but not eliminated….” The word ‘biometrics’ is missing from National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace issued by the White House in April 2011. The documents released in relation to United Kingdom’s proposed Digital Identity Assurance Project are no different. In both this documents there is not a single occurrence of the word ‘biometrics’. Even the L1 Identity Solutions, the company that supplies biometric readers for Aadhaar does not claim in their website that their equipments has the accuracy levels needed for mass consumer applications on the scale of Aadhaar. Still UIDAI claims that “Aadhaar — backed by biometric de-duplication — is a secure and robust identification infrastructure that covers two shortcomings in the existing identity databases: fraud and duplication."

In December 2010, UIDAI published the report on their proof of concept trial designed to test, among other things, whether biometrics are reliable enough to guarantee that every entry on the CIDR is unique. UIDAI's figures published show error rate at .01% using finger print and iris only, this low rate combined with photograph match can achieve the desired unique identification. There have been concerns expressed in some quarters that the biometrics data is not reliable enough, and that Aadhaar might drown in a sea of false positives.

Earlier, in March 2010, three academics published a paper, Fundamental issues in biometric performance testing: A modern statistical and philosophical framework for uncertainty assessment arguing that the level of uncertainty in biometrics is so great that tests tell you nothing, they cannot be used to predict how well biometrics technology will perform in the real world. One of them, Antonio Possolo, is head of the statistical engineering division at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an organisation that has advised UIDAI in the past. On this occasion, UIDAI has not followed NIST's advice.

With its academic support now withdrawn, the outlook for the global mass consumer biometrics industry has darkened, Throwing the towel in. At the same time, governments elsewhere are abandoning ship. NSTIC, the US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace makes no mention of using biometrics. Neither does IdA, the UK plan for digital delivery identity assurance. And Holland has suspended its plan to develop a centralised population register including everyone's biometrics. India may find itself the last adherent of this receding faith. Here's a detailed article about how the implementation is proceeding.

Book on AADHAAR

In November 2011, a book on Aadhaar titled "AADHAAR; How a Nation is Deceived" authored by Sri. Jijeesh P B, executive member of Greenpeople, a socio-environmental organisation based in Kerala was released by former Supreme Court judge Hon"ble Justice. V R Krishna Iyer at Kochi, Kerala. [[Image:http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-oH0MUia9DO8/Tt3jJttR10I/AAAAAAAAEE0/kozZ46GHrpY/s400/331387_2379971374678_1112476900_4759303_236914765_o%25281%2529.jpg%7Cthumb%7C200px%7CAadhaar How A Nation is deceived]] The book is a devastating critique of the scheme. Speaking on the occasion Justice V R Krishna Iyer said that “the project AADHAAR should not be implemented for it amounts to an assault on privacy and basic rights of individuals and is suited only for fascist nations. The author points out that the project was implemented without any prior-launch study, cost-benefit analysis, technical feasibility study or an enabling law. Even a Detailed project report was prepared only in April 2011, almost two years after the project took off.

Report of the Parliamet's Standing Committee on Finance

In December 2011, Parliamet's Standing Committee on Finance headed by Sri. Yaswanth Sinha while considering the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010(that was to give legal backing for the whole exercise), termed the project as direction less and conceptualised with no clarity of purpose.. The committee also expressed its reservations on the technology used for the project calling it "untested, unproven, unreliable and unsafe".

According to the standing committee report the scheme is riddled with serious lacunae and concernes. “The UID scheme has been conceptualized with no clarity of purpose and leaving many things to be sorted out during the course of its implementation; and is being implemented in a directionless way with a lot of confusion.” The report continues “…The scheme which was initially meant for BPL families has been extended for all residents in India and to certain other persons. The Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM), constituted for the purpose of collating the two schemes namely, the UID and National Population Register(NPR), and to look into the methodology and specifying target for effective completion of the UID scheme, failed to take concrete decision on important issues…” More importantly the committee has observed that that the UID scheme lacks clarity on even the basic purpose of issuing “aadhaar” number.

Financial Exclusion

Observation 3(f) of the standing committee reads: “The full or near full coverage of marginalized sections for issuing aadhaar numbers could not be achieved mainly owing to two reasons viz. (i) the UIDAI doesn’t have the statistical data relating to them; and (ii) estimated failure of biometrics is expected to be as high as 15% due to a large chunk of population being dependent on manual labour.” Even the Ministry of Planning in their written reply to the standing committee stated that “failure to enroll is a reality”. The introducer system wont be of much use. How many introducers or GOs would be there to introduce millions of slum dwellers, tribal population, or in rural India where they hardly have electricity or internet connectivity? (friendly government school teachers who rang your door bell a year ago may perhaps know some of them) If they can find some introducers, why can’t some anti-social elements too can find out some others? The result would be disastrous for our national security for innumerable foreign national (including terrorists) would be enrolled in Aadhaar database with local addresses. Chances are that many more people in rural India where there is no electricity and internet connectivity will be excluded from social welfare schemes even if they acquire aadhaar number.

The committee in observation 3(d) notes: “Continuance of various existing forms of identity and the requirement of furnishing „other documents‟ for proof of address, even after issue of aadhaar number, would render the claim made by the Ministry that aadhaar number is to be used as a general proof of identity and proof of address meaningless”. UIDAI clearly says that UID is no substitutes for existing Ids and The Working Paper of the UIDAI which starts with a claim that UID will help the poor access various services ends with a caveat: “UID will only guarantee identity, not rights, benefits and entitlements”

Dependency on Private Players

“The National Informatics Centre (NIC) have pointed out that the issues relating to privacy and security of UID data could be better handled by storing in a Government data centre;” . Even then the UID project is dependent on private players. The committee further notes: “9. The Committee are afraid that the scheme may end up being dependent on private agencies, despite contractual agreement made by the UIDAI with several private vendors. As a result, the beneficiaries may be forced to pay over and above the charges to be prescribed by the UIDAI for availing of benefits and services, which are now available free of cost “ . UIADAI has entered into contracts with several government and non-government agencies for enrollment and data collection. The private companies include foreign companies like L1 Identitiy solutions and Accenture that have even ex-CIA officials on board and as staff.

National Security

The committee has expressed concern over the implications of the Project Aadhaar on national security. The committee is “The Committee are unable to understand the rationale of expanding the scheme to persons who are not citizens, as this entails numerous benefits proposed by the Government” “This will, they apprehend, make even illegal immigrants entitled for an aadhaar number”. The committee especially is concerned about the efficacy of introducer system on national security. As opined by many the introducer system could result in many anti-national and anti-social elements acquiring aadhaar numbers on false addresses.

Relationship with National Population Registry

UIDAI is using data collected by the Census authorities to prepare the National Population Register(NPR) for creating the UIDs. The NPR is not an exclusive database of Indian Citizens. It contains data on all residents of the country including foreigners. Therefore, issuing UIDs based on the data in the NPR would help illegal migrants get these IDs and would allow them access the government services and programs. Nationality of the individual is one of the variables being recorded during the enumeration of NPR. But the instruction to the Census personnel says:"Nationality of each person has to be asked from the respondent and recorded as declared by him". The officials have been asked to advise people to give correct nationality and that he/she can be penalized for giving false information. Such advise may not work with illegal migrants. The responsibility of proving the identity still lies on the shoulders of residents and not on UIDAI.

Potential privacy and civil liberty issues

Certain activist have expressed concerns that Aadhaar has potentials for civil liberty and privacy violations, especially when registrars include non-government agencies. Many eminent personalities including former Supreme Court Justice. V R Krishna Iyer, Historian Romila Thaper, Independent Law Researcher Dr. Usha Ramanathan, Magsaysay Award winner Aruna Roy , Booker prize winner Arundhathi Roy have questioned the legal validity of the whole exercise. The standing committee on finance observes that:” The clearance of the Ministry of Law & Justice for issuing aadhaar numbers, pending passing the Bill by Parliament, on the ground that powers of the Executive are co-extensive with the legislative power of the Government and that the Government is not debarred from exercising its Executive power in the areas which are not regulated by the legislation does not satisfy the Committee. The Committee are constrained to point out that in the instant case, since the law making is underway with the bill being pending, any executive action is as unethical and violative of Parliament‟s prerogatives” The committee also observed that a National Data Protection Law is “ a pre-requisite for any law that deals with large scale collection of information from individuals and its linkages across separate databases. would be difficult to deal with the issues like access and misuse of personal information, surveillance, profiling, linking and matching of data bases and securing confidentiality of information etc. “ The UIDAI’s claim that it has incorporated data protection principles within its policy and implementation framework does not satisfy the committee.

In another observation that could raise many questions on the legalities of collection of biometrics even for NPR, the committee notes that “The collection of biometric information and its linkage with personal information of individuals without amendment to the Citizenship Act, 1955 as well as the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003, appears to be beyond the scope of subordinate legislation, which needs to be examined in detail by Parliament”.

The committee deliberated at length on the civil liberty perspective of the project and considered opinions from eminent personalities in the field of law and civil rights. And speaking on the possibilities of data misuse notes that “The Committee are at a loss to understand as to how the UIDAI, without statutory power, could address key issues concerning their basic functioning and initiate proceedings against the defaulters and penalize them” The committee also notes that the scheme leads to ID fraud as prevalent in some countries.

Cabinet and Parliamentary approval

The former chief minister of Kerala, V. S. Achuthanandan claimed in July 2011 that the program was being launched without "proper debate" in parliament. Other activists have expressed similar concerns. In a letter to the Prime Minister in November 2011, home minister P. Chidambaram has also expressed discomfort about the fact that the project has no cabinet clearance, and hence, may be questioned at a later date..

On 17 December 2011 parliamentary standing committee on finance chaired by Yashwant Sinha “…the Committee categorically convey their unacceptability of the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010…The Committee would, thus, urge the Government to reconsider and review the UID scheme.…”

This was the conclusion of Parliament's Standing Committee on Finance (SCoF), which examined the Bill to convert the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) into a statutory authority. With this categorical rebuff, the SCoF dealt a body blow to the Aadhaar project, which is being implemented from September 2010 without Parliament's approval..

Economic risks

The projected costs of the Aadhaar project have been quoted between US$6 billion and US$30.42 billion. These costs may not be covered by future revenue produced from the project, which is estimated at US$1.32 billion.

Parliaments standing Committee on Finance committee discussed at length on the financial implications of the project as evident from page 23-25 of their report. Till date Rs.3170.32 crores have been allotted for the project. More fund clearance is on the anvil. Rs. 8861 crore has been approved for Phase III of the project. There are no clear figures available on the financial burden the project could incur while some independent estimates pegs the cost as high as Rs.1,50,000crores. As was the case with UK ID project, the cost will escalate for sure. Lets quote from the report of the standing committee on finance : “(a) no committee has been constituted to study the financial implications of the UID scheme; and (b) comparative costs of the aadhaar number and various existing ID documents are also not available. The Committee also note that Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the UID Scheme has been done much later in April, 2011. The Committee thus strongly disapprove of the hasty manner in which the UID scheme has been approved. Unlike many other schemes / projects, no comprehensive feasibility study, which ought to have been done before approving such an expensive scheme, has been done involving all aspects of the UID scheme including cost-benefit analysis, comparative costs of aadhaar number and various forms of existing identity, financial implications and prevention of identity theft, for example, using hologram enabled ration card to eliminate fake and duplicate beneficiaries.”

Results of UIDAI Study (Dec 2011)

UIDAI conducted a study using the enrolment of 8.4 crore (84 million) residents and obtained statistical results to measure the efficacy of use of biometrics for de-duplication of Indian population. The test was conducted on a production scale (comprising biometric data of 84 million residents in 32 States and Union Territories). The earlier claims of critics (which were drawn from much smaller samples) were found to be several orders of magnitude different from the actual recorded biometrics of Indian population.

The key results of the study are summarized below:

Efficacy of Biometrics in AADHAAR Enrolment

Item Definition Critics Claim UIDAI Study Failure to Enrol Per UIDAI policy, failure to enroll in Aadhaar is not allowed. That is, Aadhaar is a right of every Indian resident and cannot be denied. 15% 0% Biometric Failure to Enrol The resident who cannot provide both iris (e.g. severely damaged eyes) or any of the fingerprints (e.g. handicapped with both hands missing Or severely damaged fingerprints due to manual labour) cannot provide biometrics for de-duplication. They have to be manually adjudicated. 15% 0.14% False Rejection The system de-duplicates the resident packet to ensure that the resident has not previously been given a Aadhaar number. The error by the biometric system, in case it erroneously rejects legitimate residents, is called false rejection of Aadhaar or False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR) of the biometric system. So high that system will be useless 0.057% False Acceptance The system performs de-duplication to ensure that the resident has not previously been given an Aadhaar number. If in case the biometric system accepts the resident as new when in reality it was actually a duplicate, the resident will end up with two Aadhaar numbers. This error by the biometric system is called false acceptance of Aadhaar or False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR). No Claim 0.0352% The study lays to rest the fear that the use of biometric technology in the Indian context would be unreliable and flawed. It has been affirmed that UIDAI’s biometric capability for enrolments is ready to handle high throughput (10 lakh Aadhaars per day), accuracy (99.965% on duplication detection) and scale (database can be of 1.2 billion people). The UIDAI since issuing the first Aadhaar number on September 29th 2010 in Tembhali, Maharashtra has issued over 10 crore Aadhaar numbers as of Dec 31st 2011, making it one of the largest biometric systems in the world. The primary design decisions that have enabled achievement of this high degree of accuracy and scale are: Combining both 10 Finger Prints and 2 Iris has greatly improved accuracy of de-duplication. The mulit-modal ‘Fusion’ approach of biometrics has been validated. The multi-ABIS solution architecture (three biometric service providers) has contributed to lowering costs, increasing throughput and fine-tuning accuracy. The combining of demographic and biometric de-duplication has further helped in eliminating trivial duplicates and increasing accuracy. The highly scalable architecture based on open components and commodity hardware has made this ramp-up possible. The UIDAI conducted a detailed analysis of the biometric accuracy and performance based on 8.4 crore Aadhaar enrollments. This analysis has resulted in the UIDAI releasing this paper “The Role of Biometric Technology in Aadhaar Enrollment”). Some of the key findings of this paper include: Since both fingerprints and irises are being captured using high quality sensors, as well as the use of 3 different biometric service providers at the UID’s CIDR (Central ID Repository), high levels of accuracy are being achieved in enrolling residents. On the effectiveness of biometric technology in Indian context with large number of rural/agricultural workers, the analysis has shown that the ‘Failure to Enroll’ (FTE) rate of the UIDAI Biometric system is at: 0.14%. This implies that 99.86% of the population can be uniquely identified by the biometric system. Even the exceptions (0.14%) are checked manually and processed. The False Negative Identification Rate (FNIR) of the UIDAI system is computed to be as low as 0.035%. This implies that 99.965% of all duplicates submitted to the biometric de-duplication system are correctly caught by the system as duplicates. The amount of hardware processing power needed by the UIDAI system is well within the design and expectations and has not increased in a non-linear fashion. Based on the analysis, the UIDAI confirms that the enrollment system has proven to be reliable, accurate and scalable to meet the nation’s need of providing unique Aadhaar numbers to the entire population. It is asserted that the system will be able to scale to handle the entire population. The analysis resulting from such a large data set (8.4 crore enrollments) is empirically repeatable and statistically accurate. Current Status The total numbers of AADHAARs issued as of 28-Jan-2012 is 12.56 crores (125 million). This is more than 10% of the total population of India. The target is to issue 20 crore (200 million) AADHAARs by March 2012 and 60 crore (600 million) AADHAARs by the end of 2014. Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Delhi lead in terms of the number of AADHAARs issued. Further details are available at the UIDAI portal. AADHAARs Issued (state-wise) Rank State / Union Territory Population AADHAARs Issued  % of Population INDIA &100000012105934220000001,210,593,422 &10000000125625822000000125,625,822 10.38% 1 Andhra Pradesh &1000000008466553300000084,665,533 &1000000003473348000000034,733,480 41.02% 2 Maharashtra &10000000112372972000000112,372,972 &1000000002447181600000024,471,816 21.78% 3 Karnataka &1000000006113070400000061,130,704 &100000000095296370000009,529,637 15.59% 4 Delhi &1000000001675323500000016,753,235 &100000000084510990000008,451,099 50.44% 5 Punjab &1000000002770423600000027,704,236 &100000000067929480000006,792,948 24.52% 6 Uttar Pradesh &10000000199581477000000199,581,477 &100000000062539580000006,253,958 3.13% 7 Jharkhand &1000000003296623800000032,966,238 &100000000051483940000005,148,394 15.62% 8 Rajasthan &1000000006862101200000068,621,012 &100000000049418820000004,941,882 7.20% 9 Madhya Pradesh &1000000007259756500000072,597,565 &100000000046736600000004,673,660 6.44% 10 Tripura &100000000036710320000003,671,032 &100000000027024300000002,702,430 73.61% 11 Gujarat &1000000006038362800000060,383,628 &100000000026483310000002,648,331 4.39% 12 Kerala &1000000003338767700000033,387,677 &100000000025747150000002,574,715 7.71% 13 Orissa &1000000004194735800000041,947,358 &100000000021132430000002,113,243 5.04% 14 Himachal Pradesh &100000000068565090000006,856,509 &100000000020694840000002,069,484 30.18% 15 Tamil Nadu &1000000007213895800000072,138,958 &100000000020541180000002,054,118 2.85% 16 Haryana &1000000002575308100000025,753,081 &100000000013582920000001,358,292 5.27% 17 Bihar &10000000103804637000000103,804,637 &100000000010703500000001,070,350 1.03% 18 West Bengal &1000000009134773600000091,347,736 &10000000000946423000000946,423 1.04% 19 Uttarakhand &1000000001011675200000010,116,752 &10000000000808134000000808,134 7.99% 20 Pondicherry &100000000012444640000001,244,464 &10000000000690468000000690,468 55.48% 21 Chandigarh &100000000010546860000001,054,686 &10000000000481318000000481,318 45.64% 22 Goa &100000000014577230000001,457,723 &10000000000427618000000427,618 29.33% 23 Sikkim &10000000000607688000000607,688 &10000000000248686000000248,686 40.92% 24 Chhattisgarh &1000000002554019600000025,540,196 &10000000000149773000000149,773 0.59% 25 Daman and Diu &10000000000242911000000242,911 &1000000000009781300000097,813 40.27% 26 Andaman and Nicobar Islands &10000000000379944000000379,944 &1000000000007746100000077,461 20.39% 27 Manipur &100000000027217560000002,721,756 &1000000000004298400000042,984 1.58% 28 Jammu and Kashmir &1000000001254892600000012,548,926 &1000000000003038200000030,382 0.24% 29 Assam &1000000003116927200000031,169,272 &1000000000001181900000011,819 0.04% 30 Dadra and Nagar Haveli &10000000000342853000000342,853 &1000000000001113600000011,136 3.25% 31 Nagaland &100000000019806020000001,980,602 &100000000000082260000008,226 0.42% 32 Mizoram &100000000010910140000001,091,014 &100000000000048800000004,880 0.45% 33 Others &100000000044110470000004,411,047 &10000000000000864000000864 0.02% Gallery collecting fingerprints Rush in an Aadhar centre Equipment used for taking picture of iris Equipment used for taking fingerprints Equipment used for taking picture of iris Equipment used for taking fingerprints See also National Population Register References External links Official Website of UIDAI