United States Embassy, Saigon
The United States Embassy in Saigon was first established in May 1950, and moved into a new building on a more secure compound in 1967. The embassy was the scene of a number of significant events of the Vietnam War, most notably the Vietcong attack during the Tet Offensive which helped turn American public opinion against the war, and the helicopter evacuation during the Fall of Saigon.
The first U.S. embassy was located at 39 Hàm Nghi Boulevard () and the original building remains there today.
On 30 March 1965, the Viet Cong detonated a car-bomb outside the embassy, killing one female embassy employee, Barbara Robbins, another American, 19 Vietnamese and one Filipino and injuring 183 other people.
Due to security concerns following the 1965 bombing, it was decided that a new embassy with greater protection would be constructed. The site selected was a 3.18-acre (12,900 m2) site known as the Norodom Compound at No 4 Thong Nhut (now Le Duan) Boulevard at the corner of Thong Nhut and Mac Dinh Chi Street (Reunification Palace).). The embassy was next door to the French embassy, opposite the British embassy and located near to the Presidential Palace (now the
The embassy comprised two separate compounds, a consular compound sealed off by a separate wall and steel gate and the embassy compound with the Embassy Chancery building, behind it was a parking lot, a two-story villa used as a residence by the Mission Coordinator (a civilian assistant to the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam), a motor pool and other facilities. There were two entry gates, a pedestrian entrance on Thong Nhut Boulevard and a vehicle entrance on Mac Dinh Chi Street.
The new Chancery was a distinctive six-story white concrete building, with a concrete lattice facade that served to both cool the building and deflect rockets and other projectiles. A small helipad was located on the roof. A concrete awning extended from the Chancery out over the pedestrian entrance on Thong Nhut Boulevard.
The Chancery was one of the tallest buildings in Saigon at the time of its construction. The embassy was opened in September 1967. Construction of the embassy cost US$2.6M.
The old embassy on Hàm Nghi Boulevard remained in use as an embassy annex.
Tet Offensive 
On 15 December 1967, as a sign of their confidence in the Vietnamese military, U.S. forces turned over responsibility for the defence of Saigon to the ARVN; henceforth, U.S. forces would only be responsible for defending themselves and their facilities in the city. On the night of 30 January 1968, four Vietnamese police posts provided an outer line of defence for the embassy. Two military policemen from the 716th MP Battalion part of the 18th Military Police Brigade guarded the vehicle entrance on Mac Dinh Chi Street, inside the Chancery building two U.S. Marines of the Marine Security Guard occupied a guard post and, due to the heightened security situation following the cancellation of the Tet truce, another Marine was stationed on the roof of the Chancery building.
Shortly after midnight on 31 January 1968, 19 Vietcong sappers from the elite C-10 Sapper Battalion gathered at a Vietcong safe house in a car repair shop at 59 Phan Thanh Gian Street to distribute weapons and conduct final preparations for the attack. The unit set off in a small truck and a taxi towards central Saigon. As the vehicles came down Mac Dinh Chi Street with their lights off after curfew, they were spotted by a Vietnamese police guard post north of the embassy, but rather than trying to stop the vehicles, the police instead took cover.
As the taxi turned from Mac Dinh Chi Street onto Thong Nhut Boulevard, the occupants opened fired on the two MPs guarding the night gate. The MPs, SP4 Charles L Daniel and PFC William E Sebast, returned fire, closed and locked the steel gate and radioed that they were under attack.
Hearing the firing on the side gate, Marine Sergeant Ronald W. Harper, who was in the rear of the embassy compound, ran back into the rear door of the Chancery across the lobby past Marine Corporal George B Zahuranic, who was calling for help. Harper pulled a Vietnamese night watchman into the building and closed and bolted the heavy teak doors to the Chancery.
Minutes later at 02:47 hours, the Vietcong blew a small hole in the perimeter wall on Thong Nhut Boulevard and gained access to the embassy compound. The first two Vietcong that crawled through the hole and into the grounds were shot and killed by SP4 Daniel and PFC Sebast in their guard post at the Mac Dinh Chi Street entrance. Daniel radioed "They're coming in! They're coming in! Help me! Help me!" before the radio went silent. Daniel and Sebast were themselves shot and killed by the Vietcong.
On the Chancery roof, Marine Sergeant Rudy A. Soto Jr saw the Vietcong sappers coming through the wall and tried to fire on them with his 12-gauge shotgun which jammed after a few rounds. He then emptied his .38 caliber revolver at the hole, but such fire was unlikely to be effective at that height and range. Inside the embassy, the Vietcong opened fire on the Chancery building with Type 56s and RPG-2s. Several RPGs penetrated the walls of the Chancery, wounding Corporal Zahuranic and destroying the two radio sets in the guard post. Sergeant Soto tried unsuccessfully to contact the lobby guard post and, assuming that Harper and Zahuranic were dead, he called for assistance and waited for the Vietcong to reach him.
An MP jeep patrol responded to the calls for help from Daniel and Sebast but as they approached the embassy they were met by automatic weapons fire from the Vietcong that were outside the wall, killing Sergeant Johnie B Thomas and SFC Owen E Mebust.
In addition to the three Marines, there were two Vietnamese and six American civilians inside the Chancery building at the time of the attack. The Americans armed themselves with .38 revolvers, Beretta M12 submachine guns and a shotgun and waited for the Vietcong to come inside.
Outside in the embassy grounds, the Vietcong were unsure of their next move as both of the sapper team's leaders, Bay Tuyen and Ut Nho, had both been killed early in the attack by Daniel and Sebast after they entered the embassy grounds. The Vietcong were armed with more than 40 pounds of C-4 explosive and could easily have blasted their way into the Chancery had they been ordered to do so. Instead they took positions in or near the circular planters around the Chancery and returned fire at the growing numbers of Americans shooting at them.
At the Marine Guards' living quarters five blocks from the embassy, Captain Robert J. O'Brien organised the remaining Marines of the Marine Security Guard detachment into quick reaction teams and headed to the embassy. As they approached the side gate on Mac Dinh Chi Street, they found it locked and could see Vietcong inside the grounds, calling out to the MPs they were answered with fire from the Vietcong and withdrew to firing positions further down the street and laid fire on the embassy gardens.
At around 04:00, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, through an aide, contacted the head of Saigon police, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Luan to ask for police reinforcements for the embassy. The First Precinct police commanding officer refused to move his men in the dark and instead asked the Americans to escort his men to the embassy. The Vietnamese police proved to have been worthless in defending the embassy with all policemen abandoning their posts when the firing began.
At 04:20, General William Westmoreland ordered the 716th MP Battalion to clear the embassy as their first priority. Lacking armored vehicles and helicopters, the MPs moved in more troops to cordon off the Embassy. The tactical situation was confused by darkness and the poor communications within the Chancery and between the Chancery and the MPs and Marines outside the Embassy compound. Sergeant Harper and the other Americans inside the Chancery could communicate with the outside by telephone, while Sergeant Soto on the roof only had a radio.
Marine Corporal James C. Marshall climbed the roof of a small building in the Consular compound and was firing on Vietcong in the Embassy compound, when he was hit by a rocket fragment he remained in place firing on the Vietcong until he was shot and killed, he would be the last American killed at the Embassy that day.
At 05:00, a helicopter carrying troops from the 101st Airborne Division attempted to land on the rootop helipad but was driven off by fire from the surviving Vietcong in the Embassy grounds. At 06:15, a medevac helicopter landed on the roof picked up Corporal Zahuranic and dropped off three cases of M16 rifle ammunition, however none of the Americans in the Chancery had an M16 and so this resupply was useless.
As dawn broke on the morning of 31 January, the hole that the Vietcong had blown in the wall to gain access to the Embassy compound was located. At the same time, MPs had finally managed to shoot off the locks of the front gate on Thong Nhut Boulevard and rammed the gates open with a jeep. The MPs and Marines charged through the open gate into the Embassy grounds and within a few minutes, they easily killed all of the few surviving Vietcong for most of them by then were already dead or dying in the Embassy garden from the prolonged firefight. At the same time, a helicopter carrying troops from the 101st Airborne Division landed on the roof and proceeded to sweep the Chancery building, finding no Vietcong inside.
In his villa, Colonel Jacobson heard movement downstairs; he threw down his grenade and called out to the MPs in the grounds to throw him up a weapon. The MPs threw up an M1911 Colt pistol and a gas mask to Jacobson, CS gas grenades were then thrown by the MPs through the ground floor windows and Jacobson proceeded to shoot a wounded Vietcong as he came upstairs.
By 09:00, the Embassy was declared secure. Of the 19 Vietcong fighters that attacked the building, 18 had been killed and one wounded fighter was captured.
The first news reports of the Embassy attack were sent by the Associated Press at 03:15 based on fragmentary information, a later report stated that 3 Vietcong had entered the Embassy ground. The news reports from the Embassy reflected the confused tactical situation. At 07:25 the associated press carried a story stating that the Vietcong had seized part of the first floor of the Embassy building and that U.S. forces were being held back by fire from the Embassy building. This report was picked up by NBC news who, on the 6:30pm EST Huntley-Brinkley Report, broadcast that the Vietcong occupied the first floor of the Embassy building and that U.S. forces were in the Embassy grounds exchanging fire with them. Later news reports corrected the facts of the attack, but the initial reports had shocked the American public.
While the Embassy attack (like much of the Tet Offensive) was tactically insignificant, it had a profound political and psychological impact. The United States had been fighting in Vietnam for over two-and-a-half years, 20,000 Americans had been killed and despite the presence of nearly 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Vietcong had managed to penetrate the U.S. Embassy, sovereign U.S. territory and the symbol of American power.
On 4 November 1968 Ambassador Bunker presented a scroll of appreciation to LTC Tyler H. Fletcher, Commanding Officer of the 716th Military Police Battalion for their role in defending the Embassy. Ambassador Bunker also dedicated a plaque in the Chancery lobby commemorating the 4 MPs and 1 Marine who died defending the Embassy.
A fire-bomb attack on the Embassy took place on 18 February 1971.
Fall of Saigon and Operation Frequent Wind 
On 12 April, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), which was to supply helicopters and a security force for the evacuation, sent a delegation to consult with Ambassador Graham Martin on current plans. Ambassador Martin told them that he would not tolerate any outward signs that the United States intended to abandon South Vietnam. All planning would have to be conducted with the utmost discretion. Brigadier General Richard E. Carey, commander of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB), flew to Saigon the next day to see Ambassador Martin, he later said that ‘The visit was cold, non-productive and appeared to be an irritant to the Ambassador’.
On 25 April 40 Marines from the 9th MAB on the USS Hancock (CV-19) were flown in by Air America helicopters in civilian clothes to the DAO Compound to augment the 18 Marine Security Guards assigned to defend the Embassy, an additional 6 Marines were assigned to protect Ambassador Martin.
Ambassador Martin remained optimistic that a negotiated settlement could be reached whereby the United States would not have to pull out of South Vietnam and, in an effort to avert defeatism and panic he specifically instructed Major James Kean, Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion and Ground Support Force Commander United States Embassy Compound, that he could not begin to remove trees and shrubbery which prevented the use of the Embassy parking lot as a helicopter Landing Zone.
On 28 April at 18:00 Tan Son Nhut Airport was bombed by 3 A-37 Dragonflys piloted by former VNAF pilots who had defected to the Vietnamese People's Air Force at the fall of Da Nang. Sporadic PAVN rocket and artillery attacks also started to hit the airport, increasing to 40 rounds per hour by 04:00 on 29 April.
At 07:00, Major General Homer D Smith Jr, the senior Defence Attache advised Ambassador Martin that fixed wing evacuations should cease and that Operation Frequent Wind, the helicopter evacuation of U.S. personnel and at-risk Vietnamese should commence. Ambassador Martin refused to accept General Smith's recommendation and instead insisted on visiting Tan Son Nhut to survey the situation for himself. Finally at 10:51 the order was given to commence Operation Frequent Wind, however due to confusion in the chain of command General Carey did not receive the execute order until 12:15.
The two major evacuation points chosen for Operation Frequent Wind were the DAO Compound adjacent to Tan Son Nhut Airport for American civilian and Vietnamese evacuees and the Embassy for Embassy staff.
By the morning of 29 April it was estimated that approximately 10,000 people had gathered around the Embassy, while some 2500 evacuees were in the embassy and consular compounds. From 10:00 to 12:00 Major Kean and his Marines cut down trees and moved vehicles to create an LZ in the embassy parking lot behind the Chancery building. Two LZs were now available in the embassy compound, the rooftop for UH-1s and CH-46 Sea Knights and the new parking lot LZ for the heavier CH-53s.
Air America UH-1s began ferrying evacuees from other smaller assembly points throughout the city (including the Pittman Building, famously photographed by Hubert van Es) and dropping them on the embassy's rooftop LZ.
At 15:00 the first CH-53s were sighted heading towards the DAO Compound at Tan Son Nhut. Major Kean contacted the Seventh Fleet to advise them of his airlift requirements, until that time the fleet believed that all evacuees had been bussed from the embassy to the DAO Compound and that only 2 helicopters would be required to evacuate the Ambassador and the Marines from the embassy.
At 17:00 the first CH-46 landed at the embassy.
Between 19:00 and 21:00 on 29 April approximately 130 additional Marines from 2nd Battalion 4th Marines were lifted from the DAO Compound to reinforce perimeter security at the embassy, bringing the total number of Marines at the Embassy to 175.
The evacuation from the DAO Compound was completed by about 19:00 after which all helicopters would be routed to the embassy, however Major Kean was informed that operations would cease at dark. Major Kean advised that the LZ would be well lit and had vehicles moved around the parking lot LZ with their engines running and headlights on to illuminate the LZ.
At 21:30 a CH-53 pilot informed Major Kean that the Admiral Whitmire, Commander of Task Force 76 had ordered that operations cease at 23:00. Major Kean saw Ambassador Martin to request that he contact the Oval Office to ensure that the airlift continued. Ambassador Martin soon sent word back to Major Kean that sorties would continue to be flown. At the same time, General Carey met with Admiral Whitmire to convince him to resume flights to the embassy despite pilot weariness and poor visibility caused by darkness, fires and bad weather.
By 02:15 one CH-46 and one CH-53 were landing at the embassy every 10 minutes at this time the embassy indicated that another 19 lifts would complete the evacuation. At that time Major Kean estimated that there were still some 850 non-American evacuees and 225 Americans (including the Marines), Ambassador Martin told Major Kean to do the best he could.
At 03:00 on 30 April, Ambassador Martin ordered Major Kean to move all the remaining evacuees into the parking lot LZ which was the Marines' final perimeter.
At 04:30 with the 19 lift limit already exceeded, Major Kean went to the rooftop LZ and spoke over a helicopter radio with General Carey who advised that President Ford had ordered that the airlift be limited to U.S. personnel and General Carey, Commanding General, 9th MAB, ordered Major Kean to withdraw his men into the Chancery building and withdraw to the rooftop LZ for evacuation.
Major Kean returned the ground floor of the Chancery and ordered his men to withdraw into a large semicircle at the main entrance to the Chancery. Most of the Marines were inside the Chancery when the crowds outside the embassy broke through the gates into the compound. The Marines closed and bolted the Chancery door, the elevators were locked by Seabees on the 6th floor and the Marines withdrew up the stairwells locking grill gates behind them. On the ground floor a water tanker was driven through the Chancery door and the crowd began to surge up through the building toward the rooftop. The Marines on the rooftop had sealed the doors to the rooftop and were using mace to discourage the crowd from trying to break through. Sporadic gunfire from around the Embassy passed over the rooftop.
At 04:58 Ambassador Graham Martin boarded a USMC CH-46 Sea Knight, call-sign "Lady Ace 09" of HMM-165 and was flown to the USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19). When Lady Ace 09 transmitted "Tiger is out", those helicopters still flying, thought the mission was complete, thereby delaying the evacuation to the Marines from the embassy rooftop.
CH-46s evacuated the Battalion Landing Team by 07:00 and after an anxious wait a lone CH-46 "Swift 2-2" of HMM-164 arrived to evacuate Major Kean and the 10 remaining men of the Marine Security Guards, this last helicopter took off at 07:53 on 30 April and landed on USS Okinawa (LPH-3) at 09:30. At 11:30 PAVN tanks smashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace (now the Reunification Palace) and raised the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) flag over the building; the Vietnam War was over.
Marine pilots accumulated 1,054 flight hours and flew 682 sorties throughout Operation Frequent Wind, evacuating 5,000 from Tan Son Nhut and 978 U.S. and 1,120 Vietnamese and third-country nationals from the Embassy. Some 400 evacuees were left behind at the Embassy including over 100 South Korean citizens.
Lady Ace 09, CH-46 serial number 154803 is now on display at the Flying Leatherneck Aviation Museum in San Diego, California.
North Vietnamese troops as well as intelligence and army officials scoured the abandoned Embassy shortly after taking Saigon on the afternoon of April 30. Over the next several days, they apparently were able to piece together classified documents that had been shredded but not burnt and used these to track down South Vietnamese employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The embassy was used as the offices of the local oil company, PetroVietnam, throughout the 1980s.
1995 to present 
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, a new U.S. embassy was opened in Hanoi in 1995 and the site of the former U.S. Embassy in Saigon was handed back to the U.S. government.
It was decided that the former U.S. Embassy building was unusable after more than 20 years of neglect in Vietnam's tropical climate, but it also seems likely that the history of the building itself carried such negative connotations that it did not fit with the new U.S.–Vietnam relationship. The former U.S. Embassy was demolished in May–July 1998 and the new Consulate-General of the United States in Ho Chi Minh City was built on the old consular compound adjacent to the old Embassy site.
During the demolition of the embassy the ladder leading from the embassy rooftop to the helipad was removed and sent back to the United States, where it is now on display at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum.
Some visible remnants of the old embassy remain, most notably the large round concrete planters which sat in front of the embassy and were used as firing positions by the Vietcong during the Tet Offensive attack. The footprint of the old embassy building can still be seen from above, the site is now a park for Consulate staff.
On 14 November 2002, a dedication ceremony was held for the replacement plaque commemorating the U.S. Marine guard and the 4 MPs who were killed defending the embassy. The original plaque was left at the embassy during the Fall of Saigon and was subsequently on display at the War Remnants Museum (Ho Chi Minh City) before disappearing
See also 
- Consulate-General of the United States in Ho Chi Minh City
- United States Ambassador to South Vietnam
- Oberdorfer, Don (1971). Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 10. ISBN 0-8018-6703-7.
- History of the 716th Military Police Battalion
- Oberdorfer, p. 9-10.
- Oberdorfer, p.11.
- "SP4 Charles L Daniel". The Virtual Wall.
- "CPL William M Sebast". The Virtual Wall.
- Oberdorfer, p.11-12.
- Oberdorfer, p.13.
- "SGT Johnie B Thomas". The Virtual Wall.
- "SP4 Owen E Mebust". The Virtual Wall.
- Oberdorfer, p.12-13.
- Oberdorfer, p.23-24.
- Oberdorfer, p.14.
- Oberdorfer, p.22-23.
- Oberdorfer, p.9-10.
- Oberdorfer, p.23.
- Oberdorfer, p.24.
- "CPL James C Marshall". The Virtual Wall.
- Oberdorfer, p.25-26.
- Oberdorfer, p.29-30.
- Oberdorfer, p.16.
- Oberdorfer, p.27-28.
- History Net: Air America: Played a Crucial Part of the Emergency Helicopter Evacuation of Saigon
- Major James H, Kean SSN/0802 USMC, After Action Report 17 April ~ 7 May 1975 p. 3
- Dunham, George R (1990). U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973-1975 (Marine Corps Vietnam Operational Historical Series). Marine Corps Association. p. 183. ISBN 978-0-16-026455-9.
- Dunham, p. 196.
- Kean, p. 5.
- Kean, p. 6.
- Dunham, p. 195.
- Dunham, p. 198.
- Dunham, p. 199.
- Kean, p. 7.
- Dunham, p. 200.
- Kean, p. 7-8.
- Kean, p. 8.
- Dunham, p. 201.
- Norman Kempster (1999-09-08). "Albright Opens Consulate Near Infamous Saigon Spot". Los Angeles Times.
- Jane Perlez (1999-09-08). "A U.S. Office Opens, Stirring Saigon Memories". The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-03-19.
- Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum Leadership in Diplomacy exhibit
- Gerald R. Ford's Remarks at the Opening of the Ford Museum's Saigon Staircase Exhibit April 1999
- "Dedication Ceremony". 2002-11-14.
- John Rossie (1999-2002). "Plaque Page".
- American Embassy Saigon, Vietnam Marines and Civilians
- Fall of Saigon Marines
- ITN News footage of the Fall of Saigon.
- Saigon Facilities Map, 1969
- Scenes from Operation Frequent Wind.
- Tet Offensive 1968, U.S. Embassy & Saigon fighting. CBS News footage of fighting in Saigon during the Tet Offensive.
- U.S. Consulate, Ho Chi Minh City, official website
- "White Christmas: The Fall of Saigon" - Dirck Halstead, The Digital Journalist.