United States intervention in Chile
The United States intervention in Chilean politics started during the War of Chilean Independence. The influence of the United States of America in both the economic and the political arenas of Chile has gradually increased over the almost two centuries since, and continues to be significant.
Chilean independence 
The arrival of Joel Roberts Poinsett, in 1811, marked the beginning of U.S. involvement in Chilean politics. He had been sent by President James Madison in 1809 as a special agent to the South American Spanish colonies (a position he filled from 1810 to 1814) to investigate the prospects of the revolutionaries, in their struggle for independence from [who?]
War of the Pacific 
The United States tried to bring an early end to the War of the Pacific, mainly because of US business interests in Peru, but also because its leaders worried that the United Kingdom would take economic control of the region through Chile. Peace negotiations failed when a stipulation required Chile to return the conquered lands. Chileans suspected the new US initiative was tainted with a pro-Peruvian bias. As a result, relations between Chile and the United States took a turn for the worse. Chile instead asked that the United States remain neutral, and the United States, unable to match Chilean naval power, backed down.
War scare of 1891 
During the 1891 Chilean Civil War, the U.S. backed President José Manuel Balmaceda, as a way to increase their influence in Chile, while the UK backed the Congressional forces. As such, after the defeat of Balmaceda, they were determined to assert their influence in Chilean domestic affairs (then dominated by the victorious Congress) by any means, including war, pushing out British interests in the region.
Itata incident 
The incident concerned an attempted arms shipment by the ship Itata from the U.S. to Chile in 1891, destined to assist the U.S.-backed Presidential forces. The Itata Incident was the direct cause of the Baltimore Crisis and is one of the reasons that Benjamin Harrison was not reelected to a second term as the President of the United States.
Baltimore crisis 
After the Itata left Iquique to return to the U.S., the crew of the Baltimore took shore leave at Valparaiso. During the US sailors' shore leave on October 16, 1891, a mob of enraged Chileans angry about the Itata's capture (among other possible motives), attacked the sailors from the Baltimore. Two sailors were killed and several were seriously wounded. That Valparaiso riot prompted saber-rattling from enraged US officials, threatening war against Chile, which by now was controlled by victorious Congressional forces. War between the U.S. and Chile was ultimately averted when the Chilean government bowed, and while maintaining that the seamen were to blame for the riot offered to pay an indemnity of $75,000 to the victims' families.
First half of the 20th century 
United States involvement in Chilean affairs intensified in the early decades of the 20th century. After World War I, the United States replaced Britain as the main superpower controlling most of Chile’s resources, as most economic activity in the country lay in US hands. Such a change prevented Chile profiting from the result of the war and gaining its economic independence. The dependence on the United States formally began in the early years of the 1920s as two major US industries Anaconda and Kennecott took control of the profitable resources. Up until the 1970s, “both industries controlled between 7% to 20% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product”. The conclusion of World War II brought more of the same as Chile could not even exploit the “excess of copper they produced as almost all the copper was marketed through subsidiaries of United States copper firms established in Chile for whom the allied government fixed a ceiling price upon copper products during the course of the war.” As the working class demanded an improvement in their standard of living, higher wages and improved working conditions, the notion that a leftist government could be the solution for the people began to take form.
1950s and 1960s 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States put forward a variety of programs and strategies ranging from funding political campaigns to funding propaganda aimed at impeding the presidential aspirations of leftist candidate Salvador Allende. Throughout this time, the United States successfully impeded the left-wing parties from gaining power. In the 1958 presidential election, Jorge Alessandri - a nominal independent with support from the Liberal and Conservative parties - defeated Allende by nearly 33,500 votes to claim the presidency. His laissez-faire policies, endorsed by the United States, were regarded as the solution to the country’s inflation problems. Under recommendations from the United States, Alessandri steadily reduced tariffs from 1959, a policy that caused the Chilean market to be overwhelmed by American products. The government’s policies angered the working class, who asked for higher wages, and the repercussions of this massive discontent were felt in the 1961 congressional elections. The president suffered terrible blows, sending the message that laissez-faire policies were not desired. As the “grand total of $130 million from the U.S. banking Industry, the U.S. Treasury Department, the IMF and the ICA” accepted by Alessandri illustrates, laissez-faire policies only made Chile more dependent on the United States.
Presidential candidate Salvador Allende was a top contender in the 1964 election. The US, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), covertly spent three million dollars campaigning against him, before and after the election, mostly through radio and print advertising. The Americans viewed electing Christian Democratic contender Eduardo Frei Montalva as vital, fearing that Alessandri’s failures would lead the people to support Allende. Allende was feared by the Americans because of his warm relations with Cuba and his open criticism of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Furthermore, clandestine aid to Frei was put forward through John F. Kennedy`s Latin American Alliance for Progress, which promised "$20 billion in public and private assistance in the country for the next decade." In direct terms, the United States contributed US$20 million to the campaign, but they also sent in about 100 people with assigned tasks to prevent Allende`s victory.
1970 election 
According to the 1975 Church Commission Report, covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The CIA spent $8 million in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over $3 million in 1972 alone. Covert American activity was present in almost every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973, but its actual effect on electoral outcomes is not altogether clear. Chile, more than any of its South American neighbours, had an extensive democratic tradition dating back to the early 1930s, and even before. Because of this, it is difficult to gauge how successful CIA tactics were in swaying voters.
Allende Presidency 
Salvador Allende ran again in the 1970 presidential election, winning a narrow plurality (near 37%). U.S. president Richard Nixon stated his fear that Chile could become "another Cuba", and the U.S. cut off most of its foreign aid to Chile and supported Allende's opponents in Chile during his presidency, intending to encourage Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the impending election of 1976. To this end, the Nixon administration clandestinely funded independent and non-state media and labor unions.
The U.S. government had two approaches to fighting Marxism as represented by Allende. "Track I" was a State Department initiative designed to thwart Allende by subverting Chilean elected officials within the bounds of the Chilean constitution and excluded the CIA. Track I expanded to encompass a number of policies whose ultimate goal was to create the conditions that would encourage a coup. "Track II" was a CIA operation overseen by Kissinger and CIA’s director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessine. "Track II" excluded the State Department and Department of Defense. The goal of Track II was to find and support Chilean military officers that would support a coup.
Immediately after the Allende government came into office, the U.S. sought to place pressure  on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests, such as Allende's total nationalization of several U.S. corporations and the copper industry. Nixon directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile.
The U.S. provided humanitarian aid to Chile in addition to forgiving old loans valued at $200 million from 1971-2. The U.S. did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid due to Allende's nationalizations. Allende also received new sources of credit that was valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.
Track I 
Track I was a State Department plan designed to persuade the Chilean Congress, through outgoing Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva, to confirm conservative runner-up Jorge Alessandri as president. Alessandri would resign shortly after, rendering Frei eligible to run against Allende in new elections.
Track II 
The CIA had also drawn up a second plan, Track II. The agency would find military officers willing to support a coup and provide them with support. They could then call new elections in which Allende could be defeated.
In September 1970, President Nixon found that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million to stop Allende from coming to power or unseat him. As part of the Track II initiative, the CIA used false flag operatives to approach Chilean military officers, to encourage them to carry out a coup. A first step to overthrowing Allende required removing General René Schneider, the army chief commander. Scheider was a constitutionalist and would oppose a coup d'etat. To assist in the planned kidnapping of Schneider, the CIA provided "$50,000 cash, three submachine guns, and a satchel of tear gas, all approved at headquarters...":361 The submachine guns were delivered by diplomatic pouch.
The attempted kidnapping and resultant death of General René Schneider shocked the public and increased support of the Chilean Constitution. Schneider was killed by a group led by a retired general, General Roberto Viaux (with another General in active service, Camilo Valenzuela; and a Admiral, Hugo Tirado), who had been forced into retirement after the Tacnazo insurrection. Viaux was considered unstable by the U.S. and was discouraged from attempting a coup. Instead, the CIA encouraged him to join forces with an active duty general, General Camilo Valenzuela, who had also been approached by CIA operatives. On October 22, Viaux went ahead with a plan to kidnap Scheider, which was badly botched. Gen. Schneider drew a handgun to protect himself from his attackers, who shot him in four vital areas; he died in Santiago's military hospital three days later. The event provoked national outrage.
A CIA and White House cover-up obscured American involvement, despite Congressional investigative efforts.:100 The Church Committee, which investigated U.S. involvement in Chile during this period, determined that the weapons used in the debacle "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators."
On September 10, 2001, a suit was filed by the family of Schneider, accusing former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging Schneider's 1970 murder because he would have opposed a military coup. CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing was never intended.:360 Kissinger said he had declared the coup "hopeless" and had "turned it off".
After Schneider's death, the CIA recovered the submachine guns and money it had provided. Both Valenzuela and Viaux were arrested and convicted of conspiracy after Schneider's assassination. One member of the coup plotters that escaped arrest requested assistance from the CIA, and was paid $35,000, so "The CIA did, in fact, pay "hush" money to those directly responsible for the Schneider assassination—and then covered up that secret payment for thirty years.":34
In 1970, the U.S. manufacturing company ITT Corporation owned of 70% of Chitelco, the Chilean Telephone Company, and funded El Mercurio, a Chilean right-wing newspaper. The CIA used ITT as a conduit to financially aid opponents of Allende's government. On 28 September 1973, ITT's headquarters in New York City, was bombed by the Weather Underground for the alleged involvement of the company in the overthrow of Allende.
1973 coup 
In the Chilean coup of 1973, Augusto Pinochet rose to power. While declassified documents related to the military coup have shown that the CIA "probably appeared to condone" the 1973 coup, there is no evidence that the US actually participated in it.
On November 9, 1970 the US National Security Council, in Decision Memorandum 93, noted that President Nixon had decided:
(1) The public posture of the United States will be correct but cool to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US and hemisphere interests.
During the period leading up to the coup, the CIA received information about potential coup plots. The 1975 Church report noted:
The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader.
Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973.
One such coup plot was the Tanquetazo which Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon made reference to in the course of an informal telephone call on 4 July 1973:
- Nixon: I want you to take the Fourth off now so ... I just looked over the news thing, nothing new here. It's relatively quiet. The Latin American guys are having there [sic] usual - you know I think that Chilean guy may have some problems.
- Kissinger: Oh, he has massive problems. He has definitely massive problems.
- Nixon: If only the Army could get a few people behind them.
- Kissinger: And that coup last week - we had nothing to do with it but it still came off apparently prematurely.
- Nixon: That's right and the fact that he just set up a cabinet without any military in it is, I think, very significant.
- Kissinger: It's very significant.
- Nixon: Very significant because those military guys are very proud down there and they may just - right?
- Kissinger: Yes, I definitely think he's in difficulties.
According to the CIA document "CIA Activities in Chile",[note 1] during the late summer of 1973, the local CIA station suggested that the US commit itself to support for a military coup. In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the station that "there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup."
On the issue of CIA involvement in the 1973 coup, the CIA document is equally unequivocal:
On 10 September 1973 -- the day before the coup that ended the Allende government -- a chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup was being planned and asked for US government assistance. He was told that the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly an internal chilean matter. The Station Officer also told him his request would be forwarded to Washington. CIA learned of the exact date of the coup shortly before it took place. During the attack on the Presidential Palace and its immediate aftermath, the Station's activities were limited to providing intelligence and situation reports.
The Church report also answered the allegation that the US government involved itself in the 1973 coup:
Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The Committee has found no evidence that it was.
There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid. Rather the United States - by its previous actions during Track II, its existing general posture of opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts with the Chilean military- probably gave the impression that it would not look with disfavor on a military coup. And U.S. officials in the years before 1973 may not always have succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it.
In all probability, the exact timing of the 1973 coup perhaps came as a surprise to the US. However, it was without doubt a major vindication for the Republican administration. Conrad Black, in his work "Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full", notes:
After more than thirty years, no evidence has come to light in either country that the United States played a direct role in the overthrow of the Allende government, but it was certainly a geopolitical bonanza for the United States, as Allende was cavorting with Castro with a particularly irritating relish.
On September 16, 1973, approximately one week after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon:
- Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?
- Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.
- Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.
- Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.
- Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.
- Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.
- Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.
There is no evidence that the U.S. instigated or provided material support to Pinochet's successful coup in 1973, but the Nixon administration was undoubtedly pleased with the outcome; Nixon had spoken with disappointment about the failed coup earlier that year.
Pinochet regime 
|Archives and reports|
The U.S. provided material support to the military regime after the coup, although criticizing it in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, titled "CIA Activities in Chile", revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses.
CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras (paid asset from 1975 to 1977 according to the CIA in 2000). Some have alleged that the CIA's one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile. The CIA's official documents state that at one time, some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras' poor human rights track record, but the single payment was made due to miscommunication.
On March 6, 2001, the New York Times reported the existence of a recently declassified State Department document revealing that the United States facilitated communications for Operation Condor. The document, a 1978 cable from Robert E. White, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, was discovered by Professor J. Patrice McSherry of Long Island University, who had published several articles on Operation Condor. She called the cable "another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor."
In the cable, Ambassador White relates a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay's armed forces, who told him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor "keep in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America". This installation is "employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries". White, whose message was sent to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was concerned that the U.S. connection to Condor might be revealed during the then ongoing investigation into the deaths of Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt. "It would seem advisable," he suggests, "to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in U.S. interest."
The document was found among 16,000 State, CIA, White House, Defense and Justice Department records released in November 2000 on the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and Washington's role in the violent coup that brought his military regime to power. The release was the fourth and final batch of records released under the Clinton Administration's special Chile Declassification Project.
Later comments and actions by U.S. officials 
U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered the release of numerous documents relating to U.S. policy and actions toward Chile.  The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were opened to the public by the U.S. State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup. One of these documents establishes that U.S. military aid to the Chilean armed forces was raised dramatically between the coming to power of Allende in 1970, when it amounted to US$800,000 annually, to US$10.9 million in 1972.
Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA concluded in a report issued in 2000 that:"The CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende but did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency."  However, the 2000 report also stated that: "The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier in 1970 in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the Presidency. Nonetheless, the U.S. Administration's long-standing hostility to Allende and its past encouragement of a military coup against him were well known among Chilean coup plotters who eventually took activities of their own to oust him.
A White House press release in November 2000 acknowledged that "actions approved by the U.S. government during this period aggravated political polarization and affected Chile's long tradition of democratic elections..." 
In a 2003 town hall with students, high school student James Doubek asked Secretary of State Colin Powell about the United States support for the coup, to which Powell replied that "it is not a part of American history that we're proud of".
During U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Chile in 2011, some critics asked Obama to apologize for past U.S. support of Pinochet. Obama did not apologize, saying that people need to learn from the past, but move on to the future.
See also 
-  page 70
- Theodore H. Moran, Multinational corporation and the politics of dependence: copper in Chile(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton university Press, 1974), 6.
- Loveman, Brian. Chile: The legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. New York: Oxford university Press, 2001.
- Barbara Stallings, Class conflict and Economic development in Chile, 1958-1973(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1978, 33.
- Faundez Julio, Marxism and democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the fall of Allende. London United Kingdom: Yale University Press, 1988.
- CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile, CBS News, September 19, 2000. Accessed online 19 January 2007.
- Stephen G. Rabe, The most dangerous Area in the world: John F. Kennedy confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999),2.
- Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973 by Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive.
- Gustafson, Kristian C. "CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970". Retrieved 2008-06-21year=2002.
- CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile, Admits Support For Kidnappers, Links To Pinochet Regime - CBS News
- Falcoff, Mark,"Kissinger and Chile", FrontPageMag.com, November 10, 2003.
- Hinchey Report CIA Activities in Chile. September 18, 2000. Accessed online 18 November 2006.
- Weiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York: Anchor Books. p. 361. ISBN 978-0-307-38900-8.
- Kornbluh, Peter (2003). The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: The New Press. p. 28. ISBN 1-56584-936-1.
- Why the law wants a word with Kissinger, Fairfax Digital, April 30, 2002 (English)
- "U.S. Dept. of State FOIA Electronic Reading Room – Hinchey Report (CIA Activities in Chile)". Foia.state.gov. Retrieved 19 November 2011.
- Stout, David (30 January 2003). "Edward Korry, 81, Is Dead; Falsely Tied to Chile Coup". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
- Montgomery, Paul L. (29 September 1973). "I.T.T. OFFICE HERE DAMAGED BY BOMB; Caller Linked Explosion at Latin-American Section to 'Crimes in Chile' I.T.T. Latin-American Office on Madison Ave. Damaged by Bomb Fire in Rome Office Bombing on the Coast Rally the Opponents". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
- "The secret government: the Constitution in crisis : with excerpts from "An essay on Water-gate" Bill D. Moyers, Henry Steele Commager, 1990
- "The Secret Government" PBS Bill Moyers, 1987
- CIA Report
- Henry Kissinger (9 November 1970). "National Security Decision Memorandum 93". National Security Council. Retrieved 2010-07-20.
- Frank Church et al. (18 December 1975). "Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973". US Government Printing Office. Retrieved 2010-07-20.
- Henry Kissinger (4 July 1973). "Telcon (San Clemente): President/Kissinger". The Kissinger Telcons. National Security Archives. Retrieved 2010-07-21.
- CIA (19 September 2000). "CIA Activities in Chile". Chile Documentation Project. National Security Archive. p. 13. Retrieved 2010-07-21.
- Black, Conrad (2007). Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full. Public Affairs. pp. 921–922. ISBN 978-1-58648-519-1.
- Henry Kissinger (16 September 1973). "TelCon: Mr. Kissinger/The President". The Kissinger Telcons. National Security Archives. Retrieved November 26, 2006.
- Peter Kornbluh (19 September 2000). "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet’s Repression: Report to Congress Reveals U.S. Accountability in Chile". Chile Documentation Project. National Security Archive. Retrieved November 26, 2006.
- Operation Condor: Cable suggests U.S. role, National Security Archive, March 6, 2001. Accessed online November 26, 2006.
- CIA 2000 report (Summary of Responses to Questions, 2.A) published by National Security Archives
- White House press statement November 13, 2000 regarding "releasing newly declassified and other documents related to events in Chile from 1968-91". Accessed online 18 November 2006.
- This was written in response to an amendment to an appropriations bill in 2000, the text of which can be read here which required the CIA to answer questions related to their activities in Chile
- Thomas Karamessines (1970). Operating guidance cable on coup plotting in Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
- Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.
- James F. Petras & Morris H. Morley (1974). How Allende fell: A study in U.S.–Chilean relations, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
- Church Report. Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973 (FOIA)
- National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
- "Make the Economy Scream" famous instruction of Nixon to the CIA about Chile
- CIA activities in Chile (detailed report by the CIA itself)
- Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976