United States v. Munoz-Flores

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United States v. Munoz-Flores
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued February 20, 1990
Decided May 21, 1990
Full case name United States v. German Munoz-Flores
Citations 495 U.S. 385 (more)
110 S.Ct. 1964; 109 L. Ed. 2d 384
Holding
The "special assessments" statute, 18. U.S.C. §3013 (2006) that requires a monetary penalty be imposed on those convicted of federal misdemeanor crimes does not constitute a "revenue bill" and thus does not violate the Origination Clause of the constitution.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Marshall, joined by Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Kennedy
Concurrence Stevens, joined by O'Connor
Concurrence Scalia
Laws applied
18 U.S.C. §3013 (2006).

United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) was a United States Supreme Court case that interpreted the Origination Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court was asked to rule on whether a statute that imposed mandatory monetary penalties on persons convicted of federal misdemeanors was enacted in violation of that clause, as the lower court had held.

Background[edit]

In June 1985 German Munoz-Flores was charged with and pleaded guilty to aiding the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. The two misdemeanor counts were for aiding and abetting aliens to elude examination and inspection by immigration officers.[1] A provision of the federal criminal codes requires courts to impose a "special assessment" monetary penalty on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor.[2] The money accrued from these special assessments is given to the Crime Victims Fund which was established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984.[3] The fund uses the money for programs to both compensate and assist victims of federal crimes. Munoz-Flores moved to correct his sentence arguing that the special assessments ($25 per offense in his case) were unconstitutional because they violated the Origination Clause of the constitution. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of Munoz-Flores.[4]

Analysis[edit]

The issue at the center of this case was whether the statute requiring the special assessments conflicts with the constitution. The Origination Clause states that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives..."[5] The Court was tasked with deciding whether the special assessments statute qualified as a "bill for raising revenue" per the Origination Clause. The Court relied on precedent to find that the special assessments should not be considered a revenue bill.[6] As a general rule the Court stated that a statute that establishes a federal program and raises revenue to support that program does not violate the constitution. The Court differentiated this type of revenue from a statute that raises revenue to support government generally.

In Munoz-Flores, despite the finding that the special assessment was not a revenue bill, the Court made it clear that if it had been a revenue bill, then even if it had subsequently been passed by both houses, it would still be subject to judicial review of its legality.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority: Although the House can certainly refuse to pass a bill because it violates the Origination Clause, the ability does not absolve this Court of its responsibility to consider constitutional challenges to congressional enactments. In short, the fact that one institution of government has mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power does not require the judiciary to remove itself from controversy by labeling the issue a political question. Justice Marshall further stated: A law passed in violation of the Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both houses and signed by the President than would a law passed in violation of the First Amendment.

Stevens Concurrence[edit]

Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in this case in which he argued that a bill can originate unconstitutionally but nevertheless still become an enforceable law if passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the president. Because of this belief Stevens argued that it was not necessary for the Court to decide whether the statute was passed in violation of the Origination Clause because it passed both houses of Congress was signed by the president. Stevens rested this argument on the fact that while the Origination Clause provides for how Congress and the president should go about enacting laws it is silent as to what the consequences should be for an improper origination.

References[edit]

  1. ^ 495 U.S. 385 at 388.
  2. ^ 18 U.S.C. §3013(a)(1)
  3. ^ Crime Victims Fund, 42 U.S.C. §10601
  4. ^ United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1988).
  5. ^ U.S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1
  6. ^ See Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)