User:Halibutt/Western betrayal

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Western betrayal or Yalta betrayal are terms used[1][verification needed] in some Eastern and Central European countries, which refer to the foreign policy of several Western countries between 1919 and 1968, which violated allied pacts and agreements made during the period from the Treaty of Versailles through World War II and to the Cold War.

The perception of "betrayal" comes about because the western Allies promoted democracy and self-determination, signing pacts and forming military alliances prior and during World War II, but subsequently apparently betrayed their Central European allies by abandoning these pacts, for example by not preventing Nazi Germany from invading and occupying Czechoslovakia (Munich Betrayal) or by abandoning their Polish allies during the Invasion of Poland (1939)[2] and during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.[3] Western powers also signed the Yalta agreement and after World War II did nothing or very little to prevent these states from falling under the influence and control of Soviet communism. In addition, during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Hungary received neither military nor moral support from the Western powers during the uprising, which was eventually suppressed by the Red Army.[4] The same scenario was repeated in 1968 when the armies of the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to crush the Prague Spring changes in the governing Communist system.

With regard to the Yalta Conference and its aftermath, some historians[who?] dispute the concept of western betrayal, arguing that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill and President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt had no option but to accept the demands of their ally Soviet premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran and later in Yalta. However, there were some misjudgments of the power of the Soviet Union by the Western powers, much like the case with Nazi Germany a decade before. Supporters of Yalta are sometimes outraged at the notion that Yalta was a "betrayal" of Eastern and Central Europe without considering the fate of Poland. Polish forces had fought the Germans longer than any country since the beginning of the Second World War. They fought alongside the U.S., British and Soviet troops in most major campaigns[5] in Europe, including the final battle of Berlin, with the strength of the Polish Armed Forces in the West peaking at 249,000 (out of 4 million Western allies), 180,000 in the East (out of over 6 million Soviets) and over 300,000 in underground[6] AK.[7][8] In the final stage of war the Polish troops on all the European fronts, excluding the Home Army, amounted to some 600,000 soldiers[9] (infantry, armored troops, aircraft and navy). This made the Polish Armed Forces the fourth largest after the Soviet Union, United States and British Armed Forces.[9][10] The Polish government in exile was an official ally of the U.S. and Britain. All this did not prevent Roosevelt from acquiescing[citation needed] in the dismantlement of this Allied government and its replacement with a puppet communist government. Even as the men of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, determined to link up with the American 90th Division under Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army and to close the trap on the German armies in Normandy, were battling the German Army and the Hitler Youth SS Panzer division,[11] Roosevelt was planning to hand Poland over to Stalin.[12]

Other historians[who?] suggest that Churchill urged Roosevelt to continue military action in Europe - but against the Soviet Union, to prevent the USSR extending its control beyond its own borders. Roosevelt apparently trusted Stalin's assurances and declined to support Churchill's intention of ensuring the liberty of all Europe outside the USSR. Without US backing, the exhausted, near starving and near bankrupt UK could not take action. Even with US backing, the result of action against the Soviet Union was very uncertain (see Operation Unthinkable).

Diplomacy and Central Europe between the wars[edit]

Starting in 1919, France maintained a policy of constructing a cordon sanitaire (quarantine line) in Eastern Europe that was designed to contain both the Germans and Soviets and their ideologies, which were metaphorically compared to diseases. The crushing of Béla Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 by the combined forces of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and France was an early example of an enforcement of the cordon sanitaire. In 1921, France signed a defensive alliance with Poland committing both states to come to each other's aid in the event of one of the powers being attacked by another European power. In 1924, the French signed a similar defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia, in 1926 with Romania and in 1927 with Yugoslavia.

In 1925, the French signed new treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which tightened the levels of military co-operation between the signatory states. In addition, the French tried to turn the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia which had been set up as an anti-Hungarian alliance in 1921 into an anti-German alliance. In 1921, Poland and Romania signed a defensive alliance. This was as close as Poland came to joining the Little Entente. The French would have preferred to also see Poland a member, but antagonism between Czechoslovakia and Poland doomed the idea.

Beyond the Covenant of the League of Nations, Britain had no defence commitments in Eastern Europe in the 1920s and made clear that they wanted to keep it that way. In 1925, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain had stated in public that the Polish Corridor was "not worth the bones of a single British grenadier".[13][14]

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). In 1932 and again in 1934, Poland signed a 10 year non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Also in 1932, the Soviets signed ten-year non-aggression pacts with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. In January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a ten-year non-aggression pact. In 1935, the Soviets signed treaties of alliance with France and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty committed the Soviets to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if attacked by a neighbor provided France did first.

In November 1933, there were rumours in Paris that a "preventive war" option against Germany was being considered by the French, Belgian and Polish governments. The British historian Lewis Bernstein Namier claimed later that the Poles had proposed a preventive war to the French at this time, but the French declined the offer. However, there is no evidence in the French, Belgian or Polish archives that a "preventive war" was considered in 1933.

Austria[edit]

In the Betrayal of the Cossacks at Lienz, Cossacks of the XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps of the Waffen-SS were forcibly delivered to areas of Germany controlled, at the end of World War II, by the Soviet Union. Cossacks had been fighting the Russian government since the Third Russian Revolution. No Western country had entered any alliance with the Cossacks.

Czechoslovakia[edit]

The term Western betrayal (Czech: zrada Západu) was coined after the Munich Conference (1938) when Czechoslovakia was forced to cede part of its area (Sudetenland) to Germany. Czech politicians joined the newspapers in regularly using the term and it, along with the associated feelings, became a stereotype among Czechs. The Czech terms Mnichov (Munich), Mnichovská zrada (Munich betrayal), Mnichovský diktát (Munich Dictate) and zrada spojenců (betrayal of the allies) were coined at the same time and have the same meaning. Winston Churchill himself said: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war".

During World War II, Czech propagandists from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (Emanuel Moravec, for example) employed the term to justify collaboration with Nazi Germany.[citation needed]

During the post-war 1946 parliamentary campaign, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia argued (with much success) that the historical unreliability of Western allies must be countered by closer relations with the Soviet Union.[citation needed]

After the Communist Party assumed all power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the betrayal was frequently referenced in propaganda. This interpretation of history was official and the only one allowed.

After the Communist Party lost its power in the 1989 Velvet Revolution, official use of the term stopped. Though the word "betrayal" is almost out of common use, the term "Munich" as well as "About us – without us" (Czech: O nás bez nás) together with the overall feelings of having been abandoned by the West repeatedly in 1938 (Munich), 1945-48 (Communist coup d'état) and 1968 (Prague Spring, and subsequent Soviet invasion) are still quite deeply imprinted in Czechs' minds.

Poland[edit]

First World War aftermath[edit]

After the First World War, Poland regained independence after 123 years of partitions. While the victorious Western allies proclaimed their support for an independent Poland, they primarily wanted to weaken Germany and the Soviet Union.[citation needed] As a result, their actual support was limited. One instance was the affair of Silesia. Many French and British politicians desired the industrial region of Silesia to remain part of Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying the Great War reparations to France and its allies. Britain provided no aid to Poland during the 1921 Silesian Uprisings. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite was to be held to determine which areas of ethnically mixed Silesia were to be ceded to Poland and which were to remain with Germany. In some districts of Upper Silesia, the majority of the people were Polish and opted for Poland; the majority in the rest of Upper Silesia opted for Germany. After the plebiscite, the Germans balked at handing over any part of Upper Silesia, claiming that the Versailles treaty did not call for partitioning Silesia by districts. The German interpretation was that the majority of people in Silesia had chosen Germany and so all of Silesia should remain with Germany. The German view was supported by Britain. In fact, Versailles did clearly state that Upper Silesia was to be partitioned by districts after the plebiscite.[15][16]

However, France and the French military in Silesia generally took a pro-Polish stance during the 1921 Polish uprising. In the years immediately after World War I, it was French policy to weaken Germany as much as possible, and though the French did not champion the border that the Poles wanted in Silesia, the French attitude to the Polish cause in regard to the Silesian dispute was markedly pro-Polish and anti-German. Indeed, it was an ultimatum from Paris that compelled the Germans to withdraw their forces from Silesia in June 1921.

Ostensibly, the British view that all of Silesia ought to remain with Germany was based on the belief that it would allow Germany to more easily pay reparations to France; by 1921, London had largely abandoned any claims against Germany and was strongly pressuring both France and Belgium to lower their reparations claims against the Germans as much as possible. The British argument about reparations was mostly a bid to influence French public opinion; the real reason for London's pro-German stance was the belief that if Germany were to lose too much territory, this could undermine the fragile Weimar Republic and lead to extremists taking power in Germany. Thus, British policy towards Silesia in 1921 was largely motivated by the desire to consolidate German democracy. Though the British were prepared to support an interpretation of Versailles that violated both its letter and its spirit, and though the Poles were understandably angry with London's pro-German view in this matter, it is very hard to justify referring to the British refusal to support the Polish rebels in Silesia as a "betrayal" as Britain had never made any commitments to do so.

During the Polish-Soviet War (1918–1921), there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the White Russians (representing the former Imperial Russia loyalists), the new Bolshevik revolutionaries, or newly independent countries trying to regain their territory at the expense of the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually, France and Britain decided to support the White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the French military mission. Further, when it seemed likely in early 1920 that Poland would lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the Curzon line).

In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War I surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the Trades Union Congress who objected to British support of "White Poland" ensured that none of the weapons that were supposed to go to Poland went any further than British ports. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill into offering the supplies. The threatened general strike was for Lloyd George a convenient excuse for backing out of his commitments. The French were hampered in their efforts to supply Poland by the refusal of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) dockworkers to unload supplies for Poland. Likewise, French efforts to supply Poland via land were hindered by the refusal of Czechoslovakia and Germany (both which had border disputes with Poland) to allow arms for Poland to cross their frontiers.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of Nazism in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (Franco-Polish Alliance and Anglo-Polish Alliance). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked[17][18][19]

Up to 1939[edit]

Diplomacy[edit]

In the years following the end of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War, Poland had signed alliances with many European powers. The most important were the military alliance with France signed on February 19, 1921 and the defensive alliance with Romania of March 3, 1921. The alliance with France was a major factor in Polish inter-war foreign relations, and was seen as the main warrant of peace in Central Europe; Poland's military doctrine was heavily influenced by this alliance as well.

As World War II was nearing, both governments started to look for a renewal of the bilateral promises. This was accomplished in May 1939, when general Tadeusz Kasprzycki signed a secret protocol (later ratified by both governments) to the Franco-Polish Military Alliance with general Maurice Gamelin. It was agreed that France would grant her eastern ally a military credit as soon as possible. In case of war with Germany, France promised to start minor land and air military operations at once, and to start a major offensive (with the majority of its forces) not later than 15 days after the declaration of war.

On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The reason for the British-issued "guarantee" of Romania and Poland was a panic-stricken ad hoc reaction to rumours (later proven to be false) of an imminent German descent on Romania in late March 1939. A German seizure of oil-rich Romania would ensure that in any future Anglo-German war, a British naval blockade would not starve Germany of oil. From London's point of view, it was imperative to keep the oil wells of Romania out of German hands. The British "guarantee" was primarily intended to block a German move against Romania; Poland was added to the "guarantee" almost as an after-thought.[citation needed] Only in April 1939 did it become evident that the next German target was Poland.[citation needed]

The British "guarantee" of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointedly excluded Polish territorial integrity. "The reasons for the guarantee policy are nowhere more clearly stated than in a memorandum by the Foreign Office, composed in the summer of 1939, which submitted that it was essential to prevent Hitler from "expanding easterwards, and obtaining control of the resources of Central and Eastern Europe," which would enable him "to turn upon the Western countries with overwhelming force.".[20] The basic goal of British foreign policy between 1919-1939 was to prevent another world war by a mixture of "carrot and stick". The "stick" in this case was the "guarantee" of March 1939, which was intended to prevent Germany from attacking either Poland or Romania. At the same time, the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax hoped to offer a "carrot" to Adolf Hitler in the form of another Munich type deal that would see the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) and the Polish Corridor returned to Germany in exchange for a promise by Hitler to leave the rest of Poland alone. [citation needed]

This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the "guarantee" of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry.[citation needed], and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.

On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's Government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939.

At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in Moscow which resulted in signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the early hours of August 24. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to Hans von Herwarth, an American informer in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet Poland's government was not informed of this fact either.[21].

Phoney War[edit]

Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Britain and France declared war on Germany after ultimatums to withdraw expired on September 3. However, some other items of the March 30 guarantee pledge were violated.[citation needed]. The pledge would not have obliged France and the United Kingdom to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor.[citation needed]. This was kept secret for diplomatic reasons.[citation needed]. Additionally, the Polish government ordered its troops not to engage the Soviets in hostilities, to yield territory and to withdraw; it did not declare war on the Soviet Union, nor did it publicly acknowledge the existence of a state of war with the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom and France enforced a naval blockade on Germany and seized German ships starting with the declaration of war.

According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French Army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after the mobilisation started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and to probe the German defences. On the 15th day of the mobilisation (that is on September 16), the French Army was to start a full scale assault on Germany. The pre-emptive mobilisation was started in France on August 26, and on September 1, the full mobilisation was declared. A French offensive in the Rhine river valley area (Saar Offensive) started on September 7. Eleven French divisions (out of 102 being mobilized) advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken with negligible German opposition. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. At the same time the U.K., who promised to start air-raids on German industry as soon as possible.[citation needed], conducted a number of air raids against the German Kriegsmarine on September 4, 1939, losing 2 Wellington and 5 Blenheim bombers in the action.[22][23] During those first days of the war Royal Air Force Whitley night bombers also dropped propaganda leaflets on German cities, taking great care to ensure that the leaflets were not dropped tied together so that they would not harm anyone on the ground.[citation needed]. On September 11, the leaflet raids were halted.

Both the pre-war reports of the Polish intelligence and the post-war testimonies of German generals (most notably of Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl) reported that there was an equivalent of less than 20 divisions facing France in 1939, as compared to roughly 90 French divisions. On the other hand, German orders of battle show 33 infantry divisions, plus eleven newly raised infantry divisions, plus the equivalent of six border guard divisions, all under command of Army Group C. Similarly, most of the Luftwaffe and all armoured units were then in Poland while the Siegfried Line was severely under-manned and far from completed, while most of the Bf 109 fighter units were still in the West, thus granting German air superiority. Knowing all of the above, the Polish commanders hoped that the French offensive would quickly break the German lines and force the OKW to withdraw a large part of its forces fighting on Polish soil back to German western frontier. This would force Germany to fight a costly two-front war.

The French assault was to be carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one armoured division, three mechanized divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions. All the necessary forces were mobilised in the first week of September. On September 12, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then, the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop not closer than 1 kilometre from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phoney war started. The French remained in control of a pocket in the Saarland. As a symbolic gesture, the 1st Polish Grenadier Division later raised in the French Army was stationed to occupy this German territory.

The Allied attitude towards Poland in 1939 has been a subject of an ongoing dispute among historians ever since. Some historians[24] argue that if only France had pursued the offensive agreed on in the treaties, it would have definitely been able to break through the unfinished Siegfried Line and force Germany to fight a costly two-front war that it was in no position to win. At the same time, others argue that France and Britain had promised more than they would deliver — especially when confronted with the option to declare war on the Soviet Union for violating Poland's territory on September 17, 1939 the way they had on Germany on September 3, 1939 (though in fact the pledge would not have obliged France and the United Kingdom to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor) — and that the French army was superior to the Wehrmacht in numbers only. It lacked the offensive doctrines, mobilization schemes, and offensive spirit necessary to attack Germany. Also, while the bulk of the Luftwaffe's bomber force was engaged in Poland (most of the fighter units were in the West), neither the French airforce nor the British Royal Air Force engaged in any operations against Germany beyond leaflet droppings and the bombing of German naval bases.[citation needed]

It seems unlikely, given the Soviet strategic doctrine of opportunistic war, that they would have carried on with invasion of Poland fulfilling their promises given to the Germans. [citation needed] Though the Germans asked the Russians to invade Poland on September 3 no such action took place till September 17, 1939. This is partly because the Soviet Union waited for a proof of Poland's collapse as well as a lack of military involvement on the part of the Allies [citation needed].

The problem with Polish expectations was that the French and British commitments greatly exaggerated their capabilities[citation needed]. Although France promptly declared war, the French mobilization was not complete until early October[citation needed], by which time Poland had fallen. In Britain where mobilization was more rapid, only 1 in 40 men were mobilized (compared to 1 in 10 in France, and 1 in 20 in Poland), thus providing only a token force against Germany's forces of several million. The presumption that "something could have been done but wasn't" overlooks the basic fact that the West, just like Poland, was ill-equipped to fight Germany even with the majority of German forces engaged in the east[citation needed]. After the war, General Alfred Jodl commented that the Germans survived 1939 "only because approximately 110 French and English divisions in the West, which during the campaign on Poland were facing 25 German divisions, remained completely inactive."

In the end, many Poles believe that although Poland held out for five weeks, three weeks longer than was planned, it received no military aid from its allies, the United Kingdom and France. Additionally Poland never surrendered to either the Germans or Russians. The agreed upon "two week ground response" never materialized, and it is contended that Poland fell to the Nazis and the Soviets as a result. It is uncertain whether the British or French had any real capacity to launch a successful offensive on the German-French border before mid-October 1939. Nevertheless, an offensive within a two-week timeframe was what they had promised the Polish government.

Aftermath[edit]

File:Poster Anglio.jpg
German propaganda poster, says in Polish: "England! Your deed!"

After the hostilities ended, German propaganda tried to win over the Poles and ensure collaboration by underlining that Poland was abandoned by her allies, and that the only world order that could ensure peaceful and prosperous life for the Poles was the German Reich.[citation needed] These claims were even strengthened by the French cease-fire signed in 1940 which was a clear violation of the alliance (both parties agreed not to sign any unilateral agreements with Germany).

Similar slogans were expressed by the Soviet Union propaganda until 1989. The official propaganda in all Eastern Bloc countries stated that Poland was betrayed and the only ally Poland could rely on was the Kremlin.[citation needed]

1940s[edit]

Atlantic Charter[edit]

Soon after the Third Reich had invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, the Polish government in exile signed a pact with Joseph Stalin. Although the Poles wanted a declaration that all pacts the USSR had signed with the Nazis were null and void, Stalin refused to consider any suggestion that he surrender the territory he seized consequent to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Britain pressured the Poles to withdraw this demand, since, in Churchill's words, "We could not force our new and sorely threatened [Soviet] ally to abandon, even on paper, regions on her frontier which she regarded for generations as vital to her security." The Polish government-in-exile, based in London, conceded but only after Britain agreed to state in writing that all agreements which adjusted Poland's pre-war borders were null and void. The Soviet-Polish agreement was signed on July 30, 1941, and Anthony Eden formally notified the House of Commons of the arrangements that same day. In response to a parliamentary question about Britain's commitment, however, Eden stated that "The exchange of notes which I have just read to the House does not involve any guarantee of frontiers by His Majesty's Government."

The Poles were more successful in obtaining Soviet agreement to the creation of the Polish Army in the East, and obtaining the release of Polish citizens from the Soviet labor camps. Despite the difficulties the Soviet government made, many were freed from confinement and permitted to join the Polish Army formed formally on August 12, 1941. However, after the troops were withdrawn to the Middle East in March 1942, Stalin revoked the amnesty and in June and July arrested all Polish diplomats in the USSR.

Meanwhile, on September 24, 1941, Poland's government-in-exile and the Soviet Union signed the Atlantic Charter. It underlined that no territorial changes should be made that would not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. It was viewed by the Polish government as a warrant of Poland's borders, although it became apparent that some concessions would have to be made.

In December 1941, a Conference was held in Moscow between the USSR and the United Kingdom. Stalin proposed to base post-war Polish western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line and demanded that the United Kingdom accept the pre-war western borders of the Soviet Union. Anthony Eden accepted the demand as he assumed that the border in question was the 1939 line.[citation needed] However, Stalin apparently meant the 1941 border with Germany. This was soon discovered, but the British government decided not to change the document. On March 11, 1942 Winston Churchill notified the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, Władysław Sikorski, that the borders of the Baltic States and Romania were guaranteed, and that no decision was made regarding the borders of Poland.

Katyn and the Soviet pressure[edit]

One of the mass graves at Katyń.

From the very beginning of Polish-Soviet talks in 1941, the government of Poland was searching for approximately 20,000 Polish officers missing in Russia. Stalin always replied that they either must have fled to Mongolia or are somewhere in Russia, which is a big country and it's easy to get lost here[citation needed]. In April 1943 German news agencies reported finding mass graves of Polish soldiers as a result of Katyn massacre. The Polish government requested the Soviet Union examine the case and at the same time asked the International Red Cross for help in verifying the German reports.

On April 24, 1943, Sikorski met with Eden and demanded Allied help in releasing Polish prisoners in the gulags and Soviet prisons. Sikorski also declined the Soviet demand that Poland withdraw their plea to have the Red Cross investigate Katyn. Anthony Eden refused to help and the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Poland on the following day, arguing that the Polish government was collaborating with Nazi Germany. Despite Polish pleas for help, the United States and the United Kingdom decided not to put pressure on the USSR.

After the Soviets stopped the German advance on the Eastern Front, Poland lost its significance as the main Eastern ally. This was made obvious by the German defeat at Stalingrad.

Tehran[edit]

In November 1943, the Big Three (USSR, USA, and the UK) met at the Tehran Conference. Both President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland would roughly follow the Curzon Line. The Polish government was not notified of this decision and the only information given was the press release claiming that We await the day, when all nations of the world will live peacefully, free of tyranny, according to their national needs and conscience. The resulting loss of the "eastern territories", approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union is seen by Poles as another "betrayal" by their Western "Allies".

According to many historians, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Stalin to settle the issue with the Poles, however they never sincerely informed the Polish side. When the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile Stanisław Mikołajczyk attended the Moscow Conference (1944), he was convinced he was coming to discuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of the Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow. The Polish premier allegedly begged for inclusion of Lwów and Wilno in the new Polish borders, but got the following reply from Vyacheslav Molotov: "There is no use discussing that; it was all settled in Teheran."[25]

Warsaw Uprising[edit]

See: Lack of outside support in the Warsaw Uprising for more info on the Allied policy towards Poland during the Uprising.

Since the establishment of the Polish government in exile in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally, the plans for Operation Tempest were prepared and on August 1, 1944 the Warsaw Uprising started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish Home Army to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule.

Despite the fact that Polish and later Royal Air Force (RAF) planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies from 4 August on, the United States Air Force (USAF) planes did not join the operation. The Allies specifically requested the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw on 20 August but were refused by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurgents as 'a handful of criminals'). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on 25 August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on 26 August that I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe.[26] The commander of the British air drop, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, later stated, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust the Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary men."

Various scholars (including Norman Davies in his recently published Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw) argue that during the Warsaw Uprising both the governments of United Kingdom and the United States did little to help Polish insurgents and that the Allies put little pressure on Stalin to help the Polish struggle.

Yalta[edit]

See also: Yalta conference.

In 1945, Poland's borders were redrawn following the decision made at the Tehran Conference of 1943 at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The Polish government was not invited to the talks and was to be notified of their outcome. Polish representatives did present arguments concerning borders at the Potsdam conference, however, and Polish demands for German territory were agreed to. The eastern territories which the Soviet Union had occupied in 1939 (with the exception of the Białystok area) were permanently annexed, and most of their Polish inhabitants expelled: today these territories are part of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. The factual basis of this decision was the result of a forged referendum from November 1939 in which the "huge majority" of voters accepted the incorporation of these lands into Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In compensation, Poland was given former German territory (the so-called Regained Territories): the southern half of East Prussia and all of Pomerania and Silesia, up to the Oder-Neisse Line. The German population of these territories was expelled and these territories were subsequently repopulated with Poles expelled from the eastern regions. This combined with other similar migrations in Central and Eastern Europe to form one of the largest human migrations in modern times. Stalin ordered Polish resistance fighters to be either incarcerated or deported to gulags in Siberia.

Many Poles believe that Western leaders tried to force Polish leaders to accept the conditions of Stalin. Some view it as a 'betrayal' of Poland by Churchill (which can be seen as part of a larger 'betrayal' to 'allow' it to fall entirely into the Soviet sphere of influence).

At the time of Yalta over 200,000 troops of the Polish Armed Forces in the West were serving under the high command of the British Army. Many of these men and women were originally from the Kresy region of eastern Poland including cities such as Lwow and Wilno. They had been deported from Kresy to the Russian Gulags when Hitler and Stalin occupied Poland in 1939 in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. When two years later Churchill and Stalin formed an alliance against Hitler, the Kresy Poles were released from the Gulags in Siberia, formed the Anders Army and marched to Persia to create the II Corps (Poland) under British high command.

These Polish troops were instrumental to the Allied defeat of the Germans in North Africa and Italy, and hoped to return to Kresy in an independent and democratic Poland at the end of the War. But at Yalta, Churchill agreed that Stalin should keep the Soviet gains Hitler agreed to in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, including Kresy, and carry out Polish population transfers (1944–1946). Consequently, Churchill had agreed that tens of thousands of veteran Polish troops under British command should lose their Kresy homes to the Soviet Union.[27] In reaction, thirty officers and men from the II Corps (Poland) committed suicide.[28]

Churchill defended his actions in a three-day Parliamentary debate starting 27 February 1945, which ended in a vote of confidence. During the debate, many MPs openly criticised Churchill and passionately voiced loyalty to Britain's Polish allies and expressed deep reservations about Yalta.[28] Moreover, 25 of these MPs risked their careers to draft an amendment protesting against Britain's tacit acceptance of Poland's domination by the Soviet Union. These members included: Arthur Greenwood; Sir Archibald Southby, 1st Baronet; Sir Alec Douglas-Home; Commander Sir Archibald Southby, 1st Baronet; James Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, 3rd Earl of Ancaster and Victor Raikes.[28] After the failure of the amendment, Henry Strauss, 1st Baron Conesford, the Member of Parliament for Norwich, resigned his seat in protest at the British treatment of Poland.[28]

When the Second World War ended, a Communist government was installed in Poland. Most Poles felt betrayed by their wartime allies. Many Polish soldiers refused to return to Poland, because of the Soviet repressions of Polish citizens (1939–1946), the Trial of the Sixteen and other executions of pro-democracy Poles, particularly the former members of the AK (Armia Krajowa). The result was the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, Britain's first mass immigration law.

Yalta was used by ruling communists to underline anti-Western sentiments.[29][30] It was easy to argue that Poland was not very important to the West, since Allied leaders sacrificed Polish borders, legal government and free elections.[31][32][33]

With this background, even Stalin looked like a better friend of Poland, since he did have strong interests in Poland. The Federal Republic of Germany, formed in 1949, was portrayed by Communist propaganda as the breeder of Hitler's posthumous offspring who desired retaliation and wanted to take back from Poland the "Recovered Territories".[34] Giving this picture a grain of credibility was the fact that Federal Republic of Germany until 1970 refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line and the fact that some West German officials had a tainted Nazi past. Thus, for a segment of Polish public opinion, Communist rule was seen as the lesser of the two evils.

Defenders of the actions taken by the Western allies maintain that Realpolitik made it impossible to do anything else, and that they were in no shape to start an utterly un-winnable war with the Soviet Union over the subjugation of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries immediately after the end of World War II. Some argue that the actions of the Secretary of State were a result of ignorance rather than Realpolitik.[citation needed] It could be contended that the presence of a double standard with respect to Nazi and Soviet aggression existed in 1939 and 1940, when the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and then the Baltic States, and then Finland, and yet the Western Allies failed to declare war.

What the Western allies sacrificed is also disputed. Some argue that Poland's borders had been re-drawn many times in history, the country had not had free elections since 1926 and throughout the 1930s it had endured increasing political repression under an authoritarian Sanacja government. On the other hand, the Polish government in exile was composed entirely of the pre-war democratic opposition and all political parties of the Polish Secret State underlined the need to follow the democratic traditions of March 1921 constitution, rather than the autocratic April constitution of Poland of 1935.

In May 2005 US President George W. Bush admitted that the Soviet domination of central and eastern Europe after World War II was "one of the greatest wrongs of history" and acknowledged that the United States played a significant role in the division of the continent and that the Yalta conference "followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. (...) Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable."[citation needed].

The chief American negotiator at Yalta was Alger Hiss, later convicted of perjury for lying to the House Committee on Unamerican Activities on whether he was spying for the Soviets. He was, however, never convicted of espionage itself and his ultimate guilt or innocence remains disputed to this day.

Aftermath[edit]

Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, was killed in an air crash over Gibraltar in July 1943. As he was the most prestigious leader of the Polish exiles, his death was a severe setback to the Polish cause, and was certainly highly convenient for Stalin. It was in some ways also convenient for the western Allies, who were finding the Polish issue a stumbling-block in their efforts to preserve good relations with Stalin.

This has given rise to persistent suggestions that Sikorski's death was not accidental. Many historians speculate that his death might have been effect of Soviet, British or even Polish conspiracy. This has never been proved, and the fact that the principal exponents of this theory in the west have been the revisionist historians David Irving and Rolf Hochhuth has not encouraged many western historians to take it seriously. The issue may not be settled until the release of UK intelligence archives in another "50 to 100 years." [citation needed]

In November 1944, despite his mistrust of the Soviets, Sikorski's successor, Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk resigned to return to Poland and take office in the new government established under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities. Many of the Polish exiles opposed this action, believing that this government was a facade for the establishment of Communist rule in Poland, a view that was later proved correct; after losing an election which was later shown to have been fraudulent, Mikołajczyk left Poland again in 1947.

Meanwhile the government in exile had maintained its existence, but the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their recognition on July 6, 1945. The Polish armed forces in exile [officially Polish Armed Forces under British Command] were disbanded in 1947.

Out of approximately 265,000 Polish armied forces in the West in 1945, only 105,000 returned to Poland, but close to 160,000 stayed in Western (mostly British) territory.

The London Poles had to leave the embassy on Portland Place and were left only with the president's private residence at 43 Eaton Place. The government in exile then became largely symbolic, serving mainly to symbolise the continued resistance to foreign occupation of Poland, and retaining control of some important archives from pre-war Poland. Ireland and Spain were the last countries to recognize the government in exile.

Originally the British Government invited representatives of the newly recognised regime in Warsaw to march in the 1946 victory parade in London but the delegation from Poland never arrived – the reason was never adequately explained, pressure from Moscow being the most likely. Bowing to press and public pressure, the British eventually invited representatives of the Polish Air Force under British Command to attend in their place. They in turn refused to attend in protest at similar invitations not being extended to the Polish Army and Navy. In the resulting humiliation the only representative of the fourth largest allied military at the parade was Colonel Jozef Kuropieska – the military attaché of the Communist regime in Warsaw.

At the war's end many of these feelings of resentment were capitalized on by the occupying Soviets, who used them to reinforce anti-Western sentiments within Poland. Propaganda was produced by Communists to show Russia as the Great Liberator, and the West as the Great Traitor. Moscow's Pravda reported in February 1944 that all Poles who valued Poland's honour and independence were marching with the "Union of Polish Patriots" in the USSR.[35] Capitalism was shown as being inherently bad, because capitalists only cared for "their own skin", while communism was portrayed as the great "uniter and protector".

Ryszard Kaczorowski, the last president of the government in exile, passed the presidential insignia to Lech Wałęsa in 1990 after Poland regained independence from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Russia[edit]

In the final days of the war, masses of refugees from Nazi-abandoned Russia and Croatia were fleeing from the Red Army and Tito's partisans. In Operation Keelhaul, British troops gathered these thousands of refugees in Austria including Cossacks, Ustase, Croatian and White Russian troops, and civilians. The Soviet and Russian citizens were turned to Soviet-occupied Germany, where in many cases they were summarily shot. The Western powers had not undertaken any international commitment about these individuals.[citation needed]

Spain[edit]

A similar feeling occurred among the supporters of the Second Spanish Republic. During the Spanish Civil War, the democratic countries had taken to neutrality instead of supporting the democratically-elected republic against the rebels supported by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. At most, the people of France, Belgium and Britain took refugee children, and some foreign volunteers, mostly leftists, joined the International Brigades. Only the Soviet Union, Poland and Mexico offered limited military help to the Republic.

To this perception, they added the treatment of republican soldiers that fled to France who were secluded in harsh concentration camps.

During the Second World War, many of the former republican soldiers joined the French Resistance and the Free French Forces, expecting that the next step after allied victory would be the defeat of Francoist Spain. However, the Allies did not invade Spain. It was just left alone in autarky.

The entry of Spain in the United Nations and the visit of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Spain dispelled any hope of Western action against Franco.

Baltic states[edit]

Although many Poles feel betrayed by a lack of aggressiveness with which the western allies pursued the war against their invaders, the western allies did maintain their commitments to declare war on Germany. For the Baltic States, however, who also had their fate sealed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, the western allies failed to take up the defence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania when the Soviet Union invaded in 1940 as they had for Poland in 1939. On the other hand, France and Britain had no formal, legal commitments with regard to the Baltic States.

Memel Territory[edit]

The Memel territory was separated from German East Prussia in 1920, and put under French administration. The area had been conquered by the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages, and had belonged to Prussia for at least 500 years. It was inhabited by Germans as the largest part of the population[citation needed], while a quarter declared itself Lithuanian, and another quarter, as local Memelländer and/or Klaipedians depending on language.

In 1923, Lithuanian forces occupied the area during what is called the Klaipeda revolt. The French forces put up a token resistance and left, and later the annexation of the area now called the Klaipeda region by Lithuania was confirmed by the International Community. This was considered a Western betrayal by many, especially by France who did not protect autonomy either with their troops, or by diplomacy [citation needed]. Also, when the government of the Weimar Republic agreed to the annexation in 1928, it was also considered a betrayal by many Germans, by their own government.

Yugoslavia[edit]

During the war[edit]

At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, a decision was made by the Allies to cease their support of the Royalist Chetniks, and switch allegiances to Josip Broz Tito's communist Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

As the Kingdom of Yugoslavia under its Prince Regent Paul Karađorđević began to approach the German sphere of influence in the late 1930s, relations with the west deteriorated. However, two days after Yugoslavia's signing of the tripartite pact on March 25, 1941, a western-sponsored coup brought the underage King Peter II to power along with General Dušan T. Simović who became the new Prime Minister. Days after the pro-western government was installed, German forces invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, and had completely occupied the country by April 17, 1941. The King and his government managed to escape into exile in the United Kingdom, and were granted the full support of the West.

In Yugoslavia, two resistance movements emerged. The People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (NOV i POJ), known simply as the Partisans, was a left-wing, socialist, and republican movement led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) and Josip Broz Tito. The movement supported a post-war Yugoslav federal republic, with full rights for its five non-Serbian nations (as opposed to the unitarianist pre-war monarchy). While the predominantly Serbian Royalist Chetnik movement led by Draža Mihailović supported the exiled King, and a unitary post-war Yugoslav monarchy with a strong predominance of its Serbian population ("Greater Serbia").

The West (primarily the United Kingdom) had initially supported the Chetniks, providing assistance via RAF and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) prior to 1943. However, from very early on the Chetniks found common ground with the Germans against the Partisans, and as the war drove on they became increasingly dependent on their relationship with the occupation forces. By 1943 the vast majority of the movement served as an Axis auxiliary militia, holding captured ground against the Partisans and aiding the large German offensives against the resistance. With the failure of several of these Axis offensives the Partisans, despite the union of their adversaries, destroyed large Chetnik forces and became vastly more numerous and popular in Yugoslavia, in addition to being the only resistance movement seriously combating the occupation.

The people of Yugoslavia had by and large already abandoned the monarchy, given how the kingdom deteriorated after the death of King Alexander and especially how it crumbled in March and April 1941 when it was invaded. Therefore it would be difficult to speak of a "Western betrayal of Yugoslavia" in the context of the 1940s and later decades.

Supporters of the Chetniks contend that if the Allies had maintained their assistance support for their cause, the Karađorđević family would have been restored to the Yugoslav throne. This argument has been the subject of considerable controversy. Opponents of this viewpoint have argued that the Allies had no other choice than to sever their support for the Chetniks as the Chetniks were collaborating with the Axis while the Partisans were resisting the Axis. They also add that the Partisans were superior both in numbers, popularity, and tactics to the Chetniks, who were losing support because of their collaboration and militia organization (as opposed to the mobile operational groups of the Partisans). Therefore, it is argued that the Chetniks would've been defeated regardless of any weapons shipments they received, and that they were already being generously supplied with arms by the Axis.

After the war[edit]

The Western Allies had never entered any obligation whatsoever with the Independent State of Croatia, indeed it was a fascist puppet-state of Nazi Germany that was never part of the Allies, so it is difficult to talk of a betrayal in the generally understood sense (betrayal of an ally).

During the final days of the war, large numbers of refugees were fleeing from the Red Army and Yugoslav Partisans. These refugees consisted of three main groups:

On May 5, in the town of Palmanova (50 km northwest of Trieste), between 2,400 and 2,800 members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps surrendered to the British. On May 12, about 2,500 additional Serbian Volunteer Corps members surrendered to the British at Unterbergen on the Drava River.

On May 11 and 12, British troops in Klagenfurt, Austria, were harassed by arriving forces of the Yugoslav Partisans. In Belgrade, the British ambassador to the Yugoslav coalition government handed Tito a note demanding that the Yugoslav troops withdraw from Austria.

On May 15, Yugoslav Partisan forces in Austria under Allied control. A few days later he agreed to withdraw them. By May 20, Yugoslav troops in Austria had begun to withdraw.

On May 15, 1945 the refugees from the Independent State of Croatia attempted to surrender to British forces in southern Germany (Austria) near the village of Bleiburg. They were rejected by the British authorities as Yugoslav civilians and were passed on to the custody of the Yugoslav army for repatriation.

Around June 1, the Croatian Home Guard, the Ustaše, and the XVth SS Cossack Cavalry Corps who surrendered to the British were turned over to the Yugoslav forces as part of what is sometimes referred to as Operation Keelhaul. The Partisans proceeded to execute the POWs in what became known as the Bleiburg massacres.

The Ustaša POWs were executed while the survivors were marched back to newly proclaimed Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.

See also[edit]

Notes and references[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. ^ http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Jalta-symbolem-zdrady-aliantow-wobec-Polski,wid,6624250,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=18594
  2. ^ "FRENCH AND BRITISH BETRAYAL OF POLAND IN 1939". 
  3. ^ http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/20%20Article.htm
  4. ^ http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808812,00.html
  5. ^ http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/articles/view/2339
  6. ^ http://www.ww2.pl/The,underground,home,army,25.html
  7. ^ http://www.ww2.pl/Polish,Army,on,the,Eastern,Front,24.html
  8. ^ http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF-8&vid=ISBN0850454174&id=AAdYFeW2fnoC&pg=PA26&lpg=PA26&dq=first+polish+army&vq=counter-government&sig=qPA6i-Gms1D-8JEiRw58CNeDmvc#PPA26,M1
  9. ^ a b http://www.ww2.pl/Polish,contribution,to,the,Allied,victory,in,World,War,2,(1939–1945),132.html
  10. ^ http://www.angelfire.com/ok2/polisharmy/chapter1.html
  11. ^ http://www.1st-mac.com/
  12. ^ http://www.randomhouse.com/boldtype/0797/radzinsky/excerpt.html
  13. ^ (English) Andrew Rothstein (1980). The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919. Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishing. p. 35. ISBN 0333276930. 
  14. ^ Arthur Harris used the same phrase in 1945 and the historian Frederick Taylor on page 432 in Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945 mentions that it was a deliberate echo of a famous sentence used by Bismarck "The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier."
  15. ^ (English) various authors (1961 (1974)). "Upper Silesia, Poland, and the Baltic States, January 1920–March 1921 <333". In Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, M.E. Lambert. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. 1st XI. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. ISBN 0-11-591511-7.  Check date values in: |date= (help)
  16. ^ (Polish) Tadeusz Jędruszczak (1984). Plebiscyt i trzecie powstanie śląskie. Historia Polski IV. Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences. ISBN 83-01-003865-9 Check |isbn= value (help). 
  17. ^ (Polish) Andrzej Ajnenkiel (2000). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy. Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej. 
  18. ^ (Polish) Jan Ciałowicz (1971). Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921–1939. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 
  19. ^ (English) Count Edward Raczyński (1948). The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning. London: The Mellville Press. 
  20. ^ (English) Stephen Borsody (1994). The New Central Europe. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 1-882785-03-7. 
  21. ^ (English) Charles E. Bohlen (1973). Witness to history, 1929-1969. Norton. p. 562. ISBN 978-0393074765. 
  22. ^ [1] World War II timeline for 1939
  23. ^ [2] German Chronik des Seekriegs
  24. ^ (Polish) Leszek Moczulski (September 2009). "Zachód okazał się parszywieńki". Rzeczpospolita (28-08-2009). Retrieved 2009-09-17. 
  25. ^ The Fruits of Teheran, TIME Magazine, December 25, 1944
  26. ^ http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/shows/warsaw.rising/interactive/timeline.warsaw/frameset.exclude.html
  27. ^ http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/about/index.html
  28. ^ a b c d pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003
  29. ^ (English) Samuel Leonard Sharp (1953). Poland, white eagle on a red field. Harvard: Harvard University Press. p. 163. 
  30. ^ (English) Norman Davies (2005 [1982]). God's Playground 2. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-12819-3.  Check date values in: |date= (help)
  31. ^ (English) Howard Jones (2001). Crucible of Power: a history of U.S. foreign relations since 1897. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 205–207. ISBN 0842029184. 
  32. ^ (English) various authors (1948). "A compilation of selected resolutions, declarations, memorials, memorandums,..". Selected Documents (Chicago, IL: Polish American Congress) (1244-1248): 112. 
  33. ^ Sharp, op.cit., p.12
  34. ^ "Poland under Stalinism", _Poznan in June 1956: A Rebellious City_, The Wielkopolska Museum of the Fight for Independence in Poznan, 2006, p. 5
  35. ^ Dr Mark Ostrowski Op.Cit. Chapter 6

Notations[edit]

  • Nicholas Bethell, The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939, New York, 1972.
  • Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski The history of Poland Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2000.
  • Russell D. Buhite Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1986.
  • Anna M. Cienciala "Poland in British and French policy in 1939: determination to fight — or avoid war?" pages 413–433 from The Origins of The Second World War edited by Patrick Finney, Arnold, London, 1997.
  • Anna M. Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki From Versailles to Locarno: keys to Polish foreign policy, 1919–25, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
  • Richard Crampton Eastern Europe in the twentieth century — and after London; New York: Routledge, 1997.
  • Norman Davies, Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw. Viking Books, 2004. ISBN 0-670-03284-0.
  • Norman Davies, God's Playground ISBN 0-231-05353-3 and ISBN 0-231-05351-7 (two volumes).
  • David Dutton Neville Chamberlain, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
  • Sean Greenwood "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pages 247–272 from The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians edited by Gordon Martel Routledge Inc, London, United Kingdom, 1999.
  • Robert Kee, Munich: the eleventh hour, London: Hamilton, 1988.
  • Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1948. ISBN 1-125-47550-1.
  • Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein (editors) The Munich crisis, 1938: prelude to World War II, London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Inc, 1999.
  • Margaret Olwen Macmillan Paris 1919: six months that changed the world New York: Random House, 2003, 2002, 2001.
  • David Martin, Ally Betrayed. Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946.
  • David Martin, Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich. Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1978. ISBN 0-8179-6911-X.
  • David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, San Diego & New York, 1990. ISBN 0-15-180704-3
  • Lynne Olson, Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honor: The Kosciuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II. Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0-375-41197-6.
  • Anita Prażmowska, Poland: the Betrayed Ally. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. ISBN 0-521-48385-9.
  • Edward Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, New York, 1958, reprint Boulder, CO, 1989.
  • Henry L. Roberts "The Diplomacy of Colonel Beck" pages 579–614 from The Diplomats 1919–1939 edited by Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1953.
  • Wacław Stachiewicz (1998). Wierności dochować żołnierskiej. Rytm, Warsaw. ISBN 83-86678-71-2. 
  • Robert Young France and the origins of the Second World War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
  • Piotr Stefan Wandycz The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926–1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
  • Piotr Wandycz France and her eastern allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.
  • Gerhard Weinberg A world at arms: a global history of World War II, Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • John Wheeler-Bennett Munich: Prologue to Tragedy, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.
  • Paul E. Zinner "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes" pages 100–122 from The Diplomats 1919–1939 edited by Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1953.
  • Republic of Poland, The Polish White Book: Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933–1939; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, New York, 1940.
  • Daniel Johnson, Betrayed by the Big Three. Daily Telegraph, London, November 8, 2003
  • Diana Kuprel, How the Allies Betrayed Warsaw. Globe and Mail, Toronto, February 7, 2004
  • Ari Shaltiel, The Great Betrayal. Haaretz, Tel Aviv, February 23, 2004

External links[edit]