User talk:Andrew Lancaster

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Welcome!

Hello, Andrew Lancaster, and welcome to Wikipedia! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few good links for newcomers:

I hope you enjoy editing here and being a Wikipedian! Please sign your name on talk pages using four tildes (~~~~); this will automatically produce your name and the date. If you need help, check out Wikipedia:Where to ask a question, ask me on my talk page, or place {{helpme}} on your talk page and someone will show up shortly to answer your questions. Again, welcome!  --{{IncMan|talk}} 08:13, 5 August 2005 (UTC)

Please explain to me why you think r1a is a domainant haplogroup in Southcentral Asia.[edit]

You said that I was trying to dismiss r1a in Southcentral Asia by calling it a pocket. If you look at the map that is clearly what it is. There is a corridor from Russia to Southcentral Asia that ends in a "pocket" or "bubble" or round shaped geographical area, of which the center, where r1a actually reaches more than 50% is an extremely small area compared to the European R1a.

R1a is not a Dominant Haplogroup in Southcentral Asia. There are Tribal groups that have high percentages of R1a because they do not mix with other groups in the area. There are no countries in Southcentral Asia in which R1a reaches a much higher level than 20% except Kyrgyzstan. This article is written in such a way that would imply that R1a is a dominant Haplogroup in Southcentral Asia, when in reality, R1a only accounts for a small fraction of Southcentral Asian men.Jamesdean3295

Maternal origins of European Hunter Gatherers[edit]

This may be of some value in these articles....Genetic Discontinuity Between Local Hunter-Gatherers and Central Europe’s First Farmers (Found in Science Express)

Nonetheless, it is intriguing to note that 82% of our 22 hunter-gatherer individuals carried clade U [U5-14/22, U4-2/22 and U?-2/22]. ...... Europeans today have moderate frequencies of U5 types, ranging from about 1-5% along the Mediterranean coastline to 5-7% in most core European areas, and rising to 10-20% in northeastern European Uralic-speakers. . .

Kant, nous, intellect[edit]

Hi Andrew, I'm not a Kant expert, in spite of my limited knowledge of his thoughts on reason. And I don't really have time to get into an in-depth discussion of intellect vs. mind vs. nous vs. reason. However, as I understand it, for the Greeks, nous was the highest possible metaphysical ideal or form, because it was pure form, and true knowledge for the Greeks was the knowledge that revealed the form that was represented in things. John Dewey wrote a great dictionary entry about nous in 1901:

Nous [Gr. νοῦς, reason, thought]: Ger. Nus (K.G.); Fr. intelligence; Ital. nous. Reason, thought, considered not as subjective, nor as a mere psychic entity, but as having an objective, especially a teleological, significance.



We owe the term, as a technical one, to Anaxagoras. He felt the need of a special principle to account for the order of the universe and so, besides the infinity of simple qualities, assumed a distinct principle, which, however, was still regarded as material, being only lighter and finer than the others. To it, however, greater activity was ascribed, and it acted according to ends, not merely according to mechanical impact, thus giving movement, unity, and system to what had previously been a disordered jumble of inert elements. […] Plato generalized the nous of Anaxagoras, proclaiming the necessity of a rational (teleological) explanation of all natural processes, and making nous also a thoroughly immaterial principle. As the principle which lays down ends, nous is also the Supreme Good, the source of all other ends and aims; as such it is the supreme principle of all the ideas. It thus gets an ethical and logical connotation as well as a cosmological.

On the other hand, nous gets a psychological significance as the highest form of mental insight, the immediate and absolutely assured knowledge of rational things. (Knowledge and the object of knowledge are thus essentially one.) … In man, however, the νοῦς assumes a dual form: the active (νοῦς ποιητικός), which is free and the source of all man's insight and virtue that links him to the divine (θεωρειν), and the passive (νοῦς παθητικός), which includes thoughts that are dependent upon perception, memory -- experience as mediated through any bodily organ. […] The distinction (of Kant, but particularly as used by Coleridge) of REASON from UNDERSTANDING (q.v.) may, however, be compared with it, but the modern distinction of the subjective from the objective inevitably gives reason a much more psychological sense than nous possessed with the ancients.[1]

The distinction between knowledge, or understanding, and reason in Kant therefore mirrors the distinctions between is and ought, or nature and freedom. Nikolas Kompridis similarly connects the knowledge/reason distinction to the discovery in Kant of practical reason's connection to possibility vs. experience:

The great innovation of Kant’s critical philosophy was to reconceive reason as spontaneously self-determining, or self-legislating, such that reason

frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas to which it adapts the empirical conditions and according to which it declares actions to be necessary even though they have not taken place and, maybe, never will take place.[1]

[…]

As distinct from the rule-governed activity of the understanding (whose rule-governed spontaneity is internally consistent with its concept), reason is a possibility-disclosing activity, proposing ends (‘‘ideas’’) that go beyond what is already given empirically or normatively. This much Kant already understood, if not fully appreciated, which is why he distinguished the possibility- disclosing activity of reason from the rule-governed acquisition and exercise of knowledge: ‘‘as pure self-activity [Selbsttätigkeit]’’ reason ‘‘is elevated even above the understanding . . . with respect to ideas, reason shows itself to be such a pure spontaneity and that it far transcends anything which sensibility can provide it.’

(Nikolas Kompridis, "The Idea of a New Beginning: A romantic source of normativity and freedom" in Philosophical Romanticism, p.34, 47)

References

  1. ^ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and eds Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 541.

Aristotle[edit]

hi andrew, i see you undid my contribution on Aristotle. i understand, since i did't provide sources, and don't know how to include them in wikipedia. anyway: Bradie and Miller [1984, 143]: ‘The type of movement required on Aristotle’s account for a potential for form is the type of movement exemplified by the DNA molecule. The genetic “program” contained in the molecule’s structure directs and limits the organism’s growth in the manner set forth in Aristotle’s biological writings.’ see: http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1174/aristel.5.10.pdf Posted by User:Mirrormundo

Teleological argument[edit]

Wikipedia:NOENG#Non-English_sources "Translations published by reliable sources are preferred over translations by Wikipedians".Tstrobaugh (talk)