User talk:Louis P. Boog/Iran-1953-coup

Proposed revised 1953 Iranian coup d'état article

[OUTDATED, article has changed]

[The purpose of this page is to work on a revised version of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état wikipedia article and fix its problems ].

The 1953 Iranian coup d’état (refered to as 28 Mordad Coup in Iran) deposed the democratically-elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq. The coup has been called "a critical event in post-war world history", the first covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against a foreign government, and is thought to have influenced "all of subsequent Iranian history," contributing to the 1979 overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi and his replacement with the anti-American Islamic Republic. In America, the coup was originally considered a triumph of covert action but now is considered by many to have left "a haunting and terrible legacy," not only in Iran, but worldwide. In recent years, speeches by both the American Secretary of State (2000), and President (2009), have acknowledged US involvment in the coup and the fact that a democratic government was overthrown.

In 1951, Mosaddeq, backed by nationalist supporters in the Iranian parliament, nationalized the British government-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), so that Iran could profit from its vast oil reserves previously controlled exclusively by the AIOC. Britain accused Mosaddeq of violating the legal rights of the AIOC — the UK's single largest overseas investment — and mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, pressuring Iran economically. America attempted to negotiate a sollution, but by March 1953 negotiations had failed, some supporters of Mosaddeq had abandoned him, and the new Eisenhower administration reversed its predessor's opposition to a coup, fearing that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire".

In Operation Ajax or TPAJAX the U.S. spy agency CIA worked with the British (who were already plotting to overthrow Mosaddeq) pressured Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi to order Mosaddeq's dismissal, while paying and organizing anti-Mosaddeq forces, and conducting a campaign of anti-Mosaddeq propaganda. The coup appeared at first to be a failure when on the night of August 15-16 Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempted to arrest Mosaddeq and the Shah fled the country the next day. After several days of mass confusion, however, a pro-Shah mob marched on Mosaddeq's residence, which was also attacked by a tank column led by retired General Fazlollah Zahedi. The prime minister fled when his defenders were overwhelmed.

In the wake of the coup Zahedi became prime minister and the Shah returned to Iran where he ruled as an autocrat for the next 26 years until being overthrown in 1979. The Iranian-controled national oil company was replaced by a consortium of international oil companies which shared profits 50-50 with Iran but did not to open their "books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors."

Background and motivation

Further information: Abadan Crisis timeline

Two major issues that have been described as leading to the coup are the nationalization of the British-owned AIOC oil company, and American and British fears of Communist influence in Iran under the Mosaddeq administration.

In a 2004 book on the coup whose "central goal" was to "resolve" controversy over who and what was responsible for the coup, editor Mark Gasiorowski, states "it is often argued that the main motive behind the coup was the desire of U.S. policy makers to help U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production ... it seems more plausible" the U.S. policymakers "were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran."

In his book on the coup All the Shah's Men, Stephen Kinzer speaks of how "the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history." Kinzer quotes a CIA veteran of Operation Ajax as saying "if anybody wasn't worried about the Soviet menace, I don't know what they could have been believing in. It was a real thing."

However, according to historian Ervand Abrahamian, "the 'communist danger' was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue." The coup d'état was "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". According to Abrahamian, Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "'Communist threat' was a smokescreen" in responding to President Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.

Oil and British intervention

Further information: Anglo-Persian Oil Company

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (APOC) got its start in 1901 when the Shah of Iran, Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, granted Englishman William Knox D'Arcy a 60-year concession to search for oil in return for shares of APOC stock, cash, but only 16% of future profits. The company became the British Royal Navy's chief source of fuel oil during World War I. During this period, British troops occupied strategic parts of Iran.

Iran renegotiated its agreement with Britain in 1933 but royalties paid to Iran remained only a fraction of AIOC profits In 1949 a "supplemental oil agreement" was offered by the AIOC (now owned by the British government) but offered neither more control over the management nor the right to audit the company's books and gave Iran less than 50% of AIOC profits. AIOC head Sir William Fraser refused to negotiate with the Iranian Prime Minister.

Adding to Iranian unhappiness with the UK was Britain's history in Iran, including the 1891 aborted granting to the British Imperial Tobacco Company of a 50-year monopoly over the distribution and exportation of tobacco in Iran, division of Iran into Russian and British zones in 1907, Britains's use of Iranian routes to invade Russia in an attempt to overthrow the Bolshevik Revolutionaries, it's financial help to Reza Shah for his 1921 military coup, and the overthrowing of the allegedly German-leaning Reza Shah 20 years later when Britain (along with the Soviet Union) invaded and occupied Iran during World war II to ensure supply lines for the Soviets fighting against Nazi Germany. As Premier Mosaddeq himself told American soldier/diplomat Vernon A. Walters: `You do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch.`

1950s

Support for nationalization

By 1951, AIOC resistance to negotiating and increasing payment to Iran had created support for nationalization of that company among Iranians that was not just strong but passionate.

In March the pro-western Prime Minister Ali Razmara, who had spoken out against nationalization, was assassinated. The next month the Iranian parliament unanimously passed a bill to nationalize the oil industry, creating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This was undertaken with the guidance of western-educated Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq, at that time a member of the parliament, the leader of the nationalization movement. By May, Mosaddeq was appointed Prime Minister by the Shah.

That summer, American diplomat Averell Harriman came to Iran to try to negotiate a compromise between Mossedegh and the British. His plea for help from the Shah was met with the reply that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he [the Shah] could say a word against nationalization." Harriman called a press conference in Tehran were he read a statement calling for "reason as well as enthusiasm" in confronting the crisis. "As soon as those words were out of his mouth, one journalist jumped to his feet and shouted, 'We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mosaddeq and oil nationalization!' The others began cheering and then marched out of the room. Harriman was left alone, shaking his head in dismay."

Abadan Crisis

Further information: Abadan Crisis

The newly state-owned oil company saw a dramatic drop in production as a result of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC-mandated policy that British technicians not work with the newly created National Iranian Oil Company. This resulted in the Abadan Crisis, a situation that was further aggravated by its export markets being closed when the British Navy imposed a blockade around the country in order to force the Iranian state to abandon the effort to nationalize its nation's oil. By September 1951 the British had all but closed down oil production from the Abadan oil fields, prohibited the export to Iran of key British commodities, including sugar and steel, and blocked Iran's access to its hard currency accounts in British banks.

The United Kingdom took a case against the nationalization to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Mossadegh vowed that at the hearing, the world would hear of a, "cruel and imperialistic country," stealing from a "needy and naked people." Britain, representing the AIOC, lost the case. Britain argued that Iran was violating the company's legal rights and spearheaded a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil that submerged the regime into financial crisis.

American involvement

The government of Britain was concerned about its interests in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. It appealed to U.S. President Harry S. Truman but Truman refused. By 1953 however, both the US and UK had more conservative governments. General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the President of the United States, and the British under Churchhill convinced the new American administration to join them in overthrowing Mosaddeq and re-establishing control of Iranian oil.

America and the cold war

There is disagreement over the importance and/or legitimacy of American and British fears of Communist influence in Iran in regard to the coup.

According to journalist and author Steven Kinzer, for Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world." Consequently,

the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge.

In a 2004 book on the coup whose "central goal" was to "resolve" controversy over who and what was responsible for the coup, editor Mark Gasiorowski, states

"Two broad geostrategic conditions led the United States to take this fateful step. First, the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands. These concerns seem vastly overblown today, ... However after the 1945-46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War - and with the Red Scare at its height in the United States - U.S. officials simply could not risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran.

"Second, U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq."

"Consequently, it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup."

In the decades following the October Revolution, Iran's huge neighbor, the Soviet Union, had expanded its domain to rule over tens of millions of Muslim in Central Asia, and following World War II over much of Eastern Europe. On June 26, 1950, as the movement for oil nationalization was gathering steam in Iran, soldiers of the North Korean Communist regime with the backing of the Soviets, crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea, beginning the Korean War. Three years later, just before the coup in Iran, Soviet tanks crushed an anti-Communist uprising of strikes and protests in East Germany. In Iran itself, the well-organized, pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, greatly exceeded the National Front in the sized of its rallies as the crisis became worse.

According to Sam Falle, a young British diplomat at the time of the coup,

1952 was a very dangerous time. The Cold War was hot in Korea. The Soviet Union had tried to take all Berlin in 1948. Stalin was still alive. On no account could the Western powers risk a Soviet takeover of Iran, which would almost certainly have led to World War III

In addition to fear of the Soviet influence in Iran, the Cold War influenced American support for, or at least lack of opposition to, Britain's policies there. Hardline British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddeq. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect `Anglo-American unity` on Iran."

But according to Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, "the `communist danger` was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue." The coup d'état was "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the “`Communist threat` was a smokescreen” in responding to Pres. Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.

Despite 20,000 members and 110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mossadeq was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.

As part of the post–coup d'état political repression of the Tudeh, the imposed imperial government revealed that the party had 477 members in the Iranian armed forces: "22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets", however, none was member of the tank divisions, stationed around Tehran, that might have participated in (or prevented) the 1953 coup d'état; the Shah had carefully screened these commanders.

Perception of Mosaddeq

Various British and American officials complained to each other that the Iranian prime minister was "impervious to reason", "a sick leader", posessing "megalomania ... now verging on mental instability," and "one of" Iran's "most sick leaders.` This has been attributed to their unfamiliarity with Iranian culture and with Mosaddeq's "visionary political modus operandi" but also to Mosaddeq's "inability or refusal to understand how the world looked to Western leaders."

Political crises

In late 1951 Prime Minister Mosaddeq held a parliamentary election. Told by aides that British agents were bribing rural candidates and and political bosses, and realizing that "the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats", Mossadeq halted the election as soon as enough deputies (79 or 80) had been elected "to form a parliamentary quorum". This was interpreted variously as a defensive action against subversive British agents by Mosaddeq supporters, and "as undemocratic and grasping for personal power" by his opponents.

In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister, a position traditionally filled by the Shah. Mosaddeq appealed to the general public for support and recieved an overwhelming response. After five days of mass demonstrations, 29 killed in Tehran, and "signs of dissension in the army," the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddeq to form a new government. This was an enormous personal triumph for Mosaddeq vis-a-vis the Shah and Mosaddeq capitalized on it by asking the majlis (parliament) for "emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms."

Mosaddeq dealt his opponents "not only at the Shah and the military but also at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament ... a rapid succession of blows."

In early 1953 Mosaddeq successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months. With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased peasants' shares of production.

By mid-1953 Mosaddeq's struggle with Parliament had resulted in a mass of resignation of his parliamentary supporters reducing parliament below its quorum, and a referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister powers to legislate law. The referendum passed with 99% approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against, but was critized by opponents for its use of separately placed ballot boxes for yes or no ballots and a requirement that "each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card."

However while Mosaddeq gained political power during this time, Britain’s boycott had cut off revenue to the Iranian government and devastated Iran's economy. Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day". Former supporters of Mosaddeq, Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, along with the three groups representing the bazaar - the Society of Muslim Warriors, the Toilers Party, and the Fadayan-e Islam - turned against him.

Operation TPBEDAMN

Contributing to an unknown degree to the alienation with Mosaddeq's policies was Operation TPBEDAMN, a CIA program originally designed in the late 1940s to `counter` (what the CIA called) `the vicious covert activities of the USSR.` TPBEDAMN employed both "grey propgaganda", in the form of "newspaper articles that portrayed the Soviet Union and the Tudeh as anti-Iranian or anti-Islamic, described the harsh reality of life in the Soviet Union, or explained the Tudeh's close relationship with the Soviets and its popular-front strategy;" and "black" operations, such as bribes to "right-wing nationalist organizations" and religious figures, and even more unsavory actions such as "provoking violent acts and blaming them on the communists, and hiring thugs to break up Tudeh rallies." By at least summer of 1952, however the Tehran CIA station had targeted not only the Tudeh but Mosaddeq and the National Front, despite the Truman administration's policy of supporting Mosaddeq. The Tehran-based CIA believed "Mosaddeq's refusal to settle the oil dispute" with the British "was creating political instability in Iran, making a Tudeh takeover increasingly likely."

While Mosaddegh attempted to cope with the loss of support by interest groups and subversion by the CIA, Britain's boycott had cut off revenue to the Iranian government and devastated Iran's economy. Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day".

Operation Ajax

Planning

The organizer of Operation Ajax was Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a senior CIA officer, and grandson of the former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. While formal leadership was vested in Kermit Roosevelt, the project was designed and executed by Donald Wilber, a career CIA agent and acclaimed author of books on Iran, Afghanistan and Ceylon.

The CIA operation centered around having the Shah dismiss Prime Minister Mosaddeq and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi with the assistance of Colonel Abbas Farzanegan, a choice agreed on by the British and Americans after careful examination for his likeliness to be anti-Soviet.

The BBC spearheaded Britain's propaganda campaign, broadcasting the code word to start the coup.

Attempted Nasiri coup

Colonel Nasiri of the Imperial Guards arrived at the Mosaddeq's doorstep late the night of August 15-16 with a number of Imperial Guards and "a royal decree replacing Mossadeq with Zahedi as premier". Mosaddeq had been tipped off by the Tudeh military network however, and a pro-Mosaddeq army contingent surrounded and arrested Nasiri. With this failure, the Shah fled to Iraq and then Italy.

With planned coup a failure, Roosevelt choose to stay in Iran and improvise another coup, find another coup leader. This turned out to be retired General Fazlollah Zahedi. Mossadegh forces mistakenly believed Shah was behind coup and with him gone relaxed their guard.

In Tehran, the next two days riots are started by "black" mobs, i.e. paid for by the CIA to "loot shops, destroy pictures of the Shah, ransack offices of royalist groups". They also include sincere supporters of Mossedeq who have joined in the rioting.

Zahedi coup

On August 19 Sha'yban the Brainless, a south Tehran strongman paid by Roosevelt, led a noisy demonstration from the red light district to the bazaar. The gendarmerie also transported 800 farm hands from the royal stables in Veramin to central Tehran. Many anti-Mosaddeq demonstrators were killed attempting to overrun Mosaddeq's house by armed defenders, but in the afternoon General Zahedi, commanding 35 Sherman tanks surrounded the premier's residence. A nine-hour battle ended with 300 people dead, Mossadeq fleeing and his house burnt.

Zahedi was installed to succeed Prime Minister Mosaddeq.

"In the days after the coup, Zahedi's forces mopped up the remaining pockets of resistance, Zahedi declared a curfew in Tehran and deployed troops and tanks throughout the city. He closed Iran's borders to prevent fugitives from fleeing ... broke up scattered pro-Mosaddeq demos... hunted down Mosaddeq's colleagues and Tudeh party members... Pro-Mosaddeq newspapers were harassed or closed down. Zahedi made a speech promising to raise wages, reduce the cost of living, provide free medical care, pave roads, mechanize agriculture, permit political freedom, and hold new elections. The shah flew back to Iran on August 22 with an Iraqi fighter escort, unsure of the loyalty of his own air force. ... "

Iranian assistance

"Foreign intelligence agents set the stage for the coup and unleashed the forces that carried it out. At a certain point, however, the operation took on a momentum of its own. The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people's loss of faith in Mossadeq."

Crap

As a condition of restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the U.S. required that the AIOC's oil monopoly lapse. Five major U.S. oil companies, plus Royal Dutch Shell and French Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were designated to operate in the country alongside AIOC after a successful coup.

In planning the operation, the CIA organized a guerrilla force in case the communist Tudeh Party seized power as a result of any chaos created by Operation Ajax. According to formerly "Top Secret" documents released by the National Security Archive, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the CIA had reached an agreement with Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded guerrillas and intelligence agents could operate.

Media report

In 2000, The New York Times made partial publication of a leaked CIA document titled, "Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran – November 1952-August 1953." This document describes the planning and execution conducted by the American and British governments. The New York Times published this critical document with the names censored. The New York Times also limited its publication to scanned image (bitmap) format, rather than machine-readable text. This document was eventually published properly – in text form, and fully unexpurgated. The complete CIA document is now web published. The word 'blowback' appeared for the very first time in this document.

Aftermath

The coup has been described as having "left a profound and long-lasting legacy," leading to the 1979 Revolution — and according to one observer extending even to the 9/11 attack.

Other historians concur of the ill effects of the coup, which "deeply alienated Iranian patriots of all social classes and weakened the moderate, liberal nationalists" i.e. the National Front; prevented religious liberalization, and the "awakening" the masses of Iranians; led to the "anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution and the embassy hostage crisis, "convinced the Iranian people that the United States cared little for their interests", and provided the roots to "Iranian ... suspiciousness and hostility" toward the US.

Iran

Some immediate effects of the coup include a crackdown on the opposition - especially on the Tudeh party - and a concentration of political power in the hand of the Shah and his court; "The parliamentary elections of early 1954 were thoroughly rigged, preventing a significant opposition presence from emerging in this body." a sharp improvement in Iran's economyfrom an end to the embargo and significant increase in oil revenue above pre-nationalization levels.

Mosaddeq was tried in what some have called a show trial of where he defended himself "brilliantly", and was sentenced to death before the Shah commuted the sentence to three years in a military prison and house arrest for life. After prison Mosaddeq was confined to the village of Ahmad Abad of his country estate. He stayed in his estate compound running his farm for the rest of his life.

The Shah's major opposition groups -- the Tudeh and National Front -- were effectively "destroyed," paving "the way for the eventual emergence" of the religous opposition movement that overthrew the Shah.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, (now know as BP), attempted to "return to its old position in Iran, but public opinion was so opposed that the new government could not permit it." The Shah signed an agreement replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium of British Petroleum, and eight other European and American oil companies. The new consortium retained the name National Iranian Oil Company but foreigners controlled the company. Profits were to be shared 50-50 with Iran, the company books were not open to Iranian auditors and there were no Iranians on its board of directors. As a result of the agreement oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954-55 to $181 million in 1956-57 and continued on up in later years. In addition America provided development aid to Iran.

Longer term however this funding enabled Mohammad Reza Shah "to become dictator". and the memory of the CIA assistance "responsible for putting an end to democratic rule in 1953" according to Stephen Kinzer. The sight of the Shah fleeing the country until a military coup with its covert conspiring of foreign powers returned him to the throne, is often credited with being a major cause of his overthrow in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The occupation of the U.S. embassy also took place during the 1979 revolution, which caused diplomatic relations to be severed between the new Iranian government and the United States. The role that the U.S. embassy had played in the 1953 coup led the revolutionary guards to suspect that it might be used to play a similar role in suppressing the revolution, some revolutionary guards reported.

According to Jacob G. Hornberger, "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes -- until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979." According to Hornberger, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond."

The monarchy supported by the U.S. and Britain invited western oil companies back into Iran. "The crushing of Iran's first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on US aid and arms," Dan De Luce wrote in The Guardian in a review of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer, a reporter for The New York Times, who for the first time revealed details of the coup.

Internationally

The 1953 coup was the first peacetime use of covert action by the United States to overthrow a foreign government. "similar efforts followed in Guatemala, Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, and Cuba." Operation Ajax was initially seen as a unalloyed success there, with "immediate and far-reaching effect. Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert In the long term the coup has had what author Stephen Kinzer describes as "a haunting and terrible legacy," perhaps even leading to the 9/11 attack

"It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York." action came to be regarded as a cheap and effective way to shape the course of world events." A coup against the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán which had expropriate land owned by the United Fruit Company followed the next year.

Acknowledgments

In recent years US officials have acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the poisonous US-Iranian relations. In 2000 US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated ,

The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. ... But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei condemned her admission as deceitful and complained that it 'did not even include an apology.'

In 2009 President Obama admited US involvement in the coup in his keynote speech to the Muslim world from Cairo University, saying "In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government." According to Iranian government new service Press TV, This was "first time a sitting US president has publicly admitted American involvement in the coup".

Conspiracy theories

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the main expose of the 1953 coup, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, by Stephen Kinzer, has been censored to exclude descriptions of the late Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities in the coup. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani and described as "one of the top members of the current ruling elite" who has been approved twice to run for the presidency by the Council of Guardians, denies there was a coup in 1953 and says Mosaddeq himself was following British plans and carrying out their dictates. In his words:

In my opinion, Mosaddeq was the director of the British plans and implemented them. .... Without a doubt Mosaddeq had the primary and essential role

in the August 1953 coup. Kashani says Mosaddeq, the British and the United States were working together against Ayatollah Kashani to undermine the role of Shia clerics. According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, this theory is contradicted by the fact that "the second person who spoke on Radio Tehran announcing and celebrating the overthrow of Mossadegh was Ayatollah Kashani’s son, who was hand-picked by Kermit Roosevelt."

This allegation is also advanced in a book alleged to have been written by former SAVAK official Hossein Fardoust entitled Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust). According to it, Mohammad Mosaddeq was not a mortal enemy of the British, but had "always favored" them, and his campaign to nationalize the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been inspired by `the British themselves.` Scholar Ervand Abrahamian has suggested that torture by Islamic Republican authorities is likely to have been used against Fardoust whose death was announced before the publication of the book.

See also

• Abadan Crisis
• Abadan Crisis timeline
• Asadollah Rashidian
• Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
• False flag operations

References

• Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-26517-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Kapuściński, Ryszard (1982). Shah of Shahs. Vintage. ISBN 0-679-73801-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Roosevelt, Kermit (1979). Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran. McGRAW-Hill Book Company. ISBN 0-07-053590-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

External links

• 50 Years Later—a look back at the 1953 U.S.-backed coup in Iran
• The C.I.A. in Iran—New York Times report based on uncovered CIA documents
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953—Provided by the National Security Archive
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran—new book from the National Security Archive reexamines the coup
• How to Overthrow a Government—interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
• US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror—Interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men
• All The Shah’s Men—interview with Steven Kinzer
• Review of All the Shah's Men by David S. Robarge
• A Very Elegant Coup—critique of All the Shah’s Men
• The spectre of Operation Ajax by Guardian Unlimited

---

Comments

Complaint about proposed lead

Skywriter: (pasted from 1953 coup article talk page)
"This suggested new lede does not begin to explain the reasons for the 1951-53 crisis. There is nothing in this account explaining that the Brits led a world-wide boycott of Iranian oil, blocking Iran's ports in the Persian Gulf, causing real economic crises in Iran, with widespread unemployment and unrest between 1951 and 1953, or that the reason for the boycott was specifically over British anger (greed) over the nationalization of Iranian oil which Britain had controlled since 1913. This account does not mention that, after the coup, and, for the first time in half a century, Britain shared Iranian oil with the United States as a reward for overthrowing the Iranian government. Britain shared the profits of Iranian oil, 40 percent for US oil companies, 40 percent for British oil companies and 20 percent divided among French and other oil companies. These inconvenient facts were deleted in last week's orgy of reverts by snowfire, et al. and that's why any account leaving out the role oil played in this coup is unacceptable."

reply: the lead reads "Britain accused Mosaddeq of violating the legal rights of the (AIOC) and mobilized a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil, plunging Iran into financial crisis." Is there any source drawing any connection between the coup and the different percentages of ownership of different oil companies in the consortium? --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:00, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Complaints about current lead [outdated as of 4-2010]

• The current lead is a bit big.

• Chronology goes back and forth. It starts with Britain and nationalization, from around 1951 ("Mossaddeq, backed by his nationalist supporters in the Iranian parliament, had angered Britain ...") then goes on to the 1953 coup and Mossaddeq's overthrow, then back to British boycott, ("The economic and political crisis in Iran that began in early 1952 with the British-organized world-wide boycott of Iranian oil,") , then ahead to after the coup (“the Consortium Agreement of 1954”),

• Some unsourced statements: Mossaddeq “had angered Britain with his argument that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves instead of allowing profits to continue to flow to Britain through its control of Iran's oil industry.” He angered the UK government by nationalizing the AIOC, but who said the UK was angered by “his argument”? Why not just say UK retaliated with a boycott?
  • “The ejection of the British staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from the Iranian refineries triggered the Abadan Crisis and nearly caused a war.” The AIOC built the refineries, which of course is part of the dispute. The British thought their discovery of the oil, drilling wells, building refinery, etc. entitled them to lots of compensation. Should say something like “The ejection of the British staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from their refineries in Iran triggered the Abadan Crisis and nearly caused a war”
  • “British and U.S. spy agencies replaced the government of the popular Prime Minister Mosaddeq with an all-powerful monarch.” yes the shah became an autocrat, but the sentence sounds like the UK/US put the Shah on the throne with all-powerful powers. What source says that? Revised is better "In the wake of the coup Zahedi became prime minister and the Shah returned to Iran where he ruled as an autocrat for the next 26 years until being overthrown in 1979."
  • “From Iran's perspective, the Consortium Agreement of 1954 was much more unfavorable than conditions set forth several months earlier in the joint 'Winston Churchill-Dwight D. Eisenhower' proposal to Mosaddegh.” Two problems with this
    • First, what's the "Churchill Eisenhower proposal"? It's not explained in the lead. In fact it's never mentioned again in the article!
    • Second, there are three sources given for the statement, but the only one that supports the statement about "much more unfavorable than conditions set forth several months earlier" comes from a state-owned company in the Islamic Republic, not really a WP:Reliable Sources. Here are the three sources:
    • the first one is petropars Go to the link and you will find the statement: “From the point of Iran, the contents of this agreement were much more unfavorable than conditions set forth several months earlier in the joint ‘Churchill-Eisenhower’ proposal to Dr. Mosaddegh.” Petropars is owned by “NICO an affiliated company of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) owns all of Petropars shares.” ( http://www.petropars.com/tabid/53/Default.aspx ) and the NIOC is a part of the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum. This statement may (or may not) be true but a subsidiary of the Iranian oil company is not exactly an unbiased source.
    • The second is a joint statement from the consortium agreement. It (not surprisingly) says nothing about the agreement being "more unfavorable than conditions set forth several months earlier in the joint 'Winston Churchill-Dwight D. Eisenhower' proposal"
    • and the third source is a very brief mention in a book called The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which the footnote claims explains: “Article 41b of the Iran Consortium Agreement of 1954 precluded Iran from making any administrative or legislative changes to oil company operations without the consent of the foreign oil companies.”

When you go the book you find it says nothing about the coup, has no judgement about whether the Consortium Agreement was "more unfavorable" for Iran, says nothing specifically about whether Iran was "precluded ... from making any administrative or legislative changes to oil company operations," and next to nothing about Iran. It deals with the finer points of contract law. I’ve typed it out:

“… Perhaps the best-known example of a stabilization clause it that stipulated by Article 41b of the Iran Consortium Agreement of 1954, which provides

`No general or special administrative measures or any other act whatsoever ... shall annul this agreement, amend or modify its provisions or prevent or hinder the due and effective performance of its terms. Such annulment, amendment or modification shall not take place except by agreement of the parties to this agreement`"

... i.e. pretty clear cut WP:Original Research.

Proposed change for Jan 2011 version of lead

Aliwiki (above) and Kurdo777 (here) have both made complaints about the proposed changes I think have merit so I'm revising the change so that Iran falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire"[7] refers to the US administration point of view and not a statement of fact. --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:18, 24 January 2011 (UTC)

Current wording

• Initially, Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the Abadan oil refinery, the world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee opted instead to tighten the economic boycott. while using Iranian agents to undermine his government. With a change to more conservative governments in both Britain and the United States, Churchill and the U.S. administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to overthrow Iran's government though the predecessor U.S. Truman administration had opposed a coup.

... resolute prevention of the slim possibility that the Iranian government might align itself with the Soviet Union, although the latter motivation produces controversy among historians as to the seriousness of the threat.

Proposed change

• Initially, Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the Abadan oil refinery, the world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee opted instead to tighten the economic boycott. while using Iranian agents to undermine his government. By 1953 both Britain and the United States had more conservative governments and the new US Eisenhower administration reversed its predessor's opposition to a coup, fearing that Iran was in danger of falling under the influence of the expansionist Soviet Communist "empire".

... prevention of Iran falling under the influence of the Communist Soviet Union.

See also

• 1953 Iranian coup d'état - issue of Communism - sources
• 1953 Iranian coup d'état - Issue of Mosaddeq domestic support - sources
• 1953 Iranian coup d'état - issue of Mosaddeq's behavior - sources
• 1953 Iranian coup POV: Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case
• Abadan Crisis timeline