User talk:Colipon

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Welcome to my talk page. I will generally respond to your messages here for the purpose of linking threads, but will respond on your talk page if you prefer.

ITN Redesign[edit]

Heya, I just wanted to say I appreciate your efforts to shake up the main page / ITN, I've been thinking along similar lines. I don't think anyone is really satisfied with the current format.

EdSaperia (talk) 17:47, 5 September 2014 (UTC)

Hi EdSaperia, I'm really glad you noticed, and I support your efforts in a Main Page revamp. I feel the current way of doing things at ITN is truly and utterly broken, and we need some bold action soon. I guess part of the problem is our consensus-based decision making model which is not conducive to making changes to a system that we all agree is bad but cannot agree on how to go about the change. Colipon+(Talk) 18:24, 5 September 2014 (UTC)
Just needs a strong proposal that people can get behind, I think. Previous discussions generally start with gathering lots of requirements and just end up with 10 conflicting goals so go nowhere. EdSaperia (talk) 19:20, 5 September 2014 (UTC)

RE: Scientific Outlook on Development[edit]

Its nice that you are contributing to the discussion, but to make it clear, my problems with Dark Liberty are not personal. My problem with his version is threeford; first it is inaccurate, secondly he boils the article down too one interpretation of what the Scientific Outlook on Development is (that the party-state is technocratic, and this ideology reaffirms the party's technocracy) and third, he uses unreliable sources. To be clear, I have no problems including technocracy, or even giving it the dominant role, but his text removes all other interpretations of the ideology from the article. At last, he has got the idea in his head that he alone has the right to remove information from the article which he deems uneccessary (for instance Confucianism). Sincerely, --TIAYN (talk) 20:16, 10 September 2014 (UTC)

Hi, thanks for this note. I have no doubt that his version is a big work of synthesis and I never backed his revisions. I don't think all of his points fail at face value, and like you I would say that Scientific Outlook is basically the Hu Administration's buzzword for being technocratic. In addition it is unclear how this philosophy continues to be applied by the current Chinese party-state (i.e. its relationship with the so-called "Chinese Dream"), which has become much more nationalist, aggressive, and market-oriented all at the same time. That said, if you are serious about improving the article, there are several sources which discuss this in depth. Willy Lam's book "Chinese politics in the Hu Jintao era" comes to mind, as does Joseph Fewsmith's essay "Promoting the Scientific Development Concept". The former is written in 2006 and latter in 2004, so again these are not the most up to date. But it does speak to why this policy was promoted in the first place - that it was essentially the Hu government's natural response to China's increasingly serious social problems as a result of unchecked focus on GDP growth. Colipon+(Talk) 12:35, 11 September 2014 (UTC)
In addition, I would agree that this user has behavioral issues. He reverts things wholesale and does not answer any of my good-faith inquiries coherently, only rambling about his point of view. I would caution against your own use of foul language and urge you to use civil terms of discourse, though, as it could make you appear like the villain even though you are not. Colipon+(Talk) 12:37, 11 September 2014 (UTC)
Good, we agree. On another note, here; Kerry Brown's article "The Communist Party of China and Ideology". This article argues against characterizing the CPC as post-ideological and China as a post-ideological society, claiming that the party does have an ideology. While he doesn't call the ideology socialist (rather referring to the present belief system/era as post-socialist), he does admit that there is a link between Marxist theory and modern Chinese ideology... At last, an error, while its true that the party has become more market-driven under Xi, you forget that while he supports marketizing the economy he is in tandem opposed to any more privatization. Also under him, there seems to have been a more concerted drive to refocus on ideology and thought control/indoctrination (of course this shouldn't surprise anyone, the guy did study Marxism)... Cheers, --TIAYN (talk) 21:46, 11 September 2014 (UTC)
I forgot, as for me expanding the article I don't know; been thinking about it, but I'll be honest, its neither a very interesting topic in itself and there are even fewer who have written about in detail (that is, what it means ideologically). At last, its really hard to know anything for sure, while the majority see technocrats, these authors claim that China and the CPC have never been more Marxist then what they are now. I'm been thinking about I while, but then I started working on the Ideology of the Communist Party of China article, the wrote the primary stage of socialism, and then I stopped working on the topic all together. However, a good thing as come out from my argument with Dark Liberty; I need to add a "Criticism" section (or something similar in the ideology article, so as to explain the position which sees the party as non-ideological. THe article at present explains the ideological concepts/theories presently used by the CPC, but don't ask the question if those ideologies really matters. Again, cheers. --TIAYN (talk) 22:09, 11 September 2014 (UTC)

A barnstar for you![edit]

Original Barnstar Hires.png The Original Barnstar
Thanks for creating new articles on China-related topics, such as Ji Dengkui and Gu Mu. Your contributions are greatly appreciated! Zanhe (talk) 20:02, 13 September 2014 (UTC)
Hi Colipon, I expanded Ji Dengkui and nominated it for DYK. See here. I'll try to work on Gu Mu in the next few days. Cheers! -Zanhe (talk) 00:18, 15 September 2014 (UTC)
I saw, thanks so much. I'm glad you find these topics interesting enough to write about :). They were nice 'red-link' finds to be honest. easy to dig in. And thanks so much for the Barnstar! Colipon+(Talk) 04:20, 15 September 2014 (UTC)
I've just nominated Gu Mu for DYK. See nomination page. -Zanhe (talk) 07:25, 17 September 2014 (UTC)

ISIS[edit]

How is "also widely known as ISIL, ISIS and Da'esh" "redundant to the above"? There is no mention before that that the group is still widely known by its former name ISIL/ISIS. It is extra information that should stay and I expect you will be reverted. --P123ct1 (talk) 23:20, 29 September 2014 (UTC)

I'm not sure I agree with you. The article's first line clearly reads: "The Islamic State (IS), which previously called itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and is also known by the Arabic acronym Dāʻish (داعش)." By repeating that these 'former names' are still used to refer to the group does not add anything to the reader that cannot already be discerned from the first line of the article. Colipon+(Talk) 00:12, 30 September 2014 (UTC)

DYK for Gu Mu[edit]

HJ Mitchell | Penny for your thoughts? 00:02, 30 September 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for September 30[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Liu Tienan, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Weibo. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 09:18, 30 September 2014 (UTC)

DYK for Ji Dengkui[edit]

HJ Mitchell | Penny for your thoughts? 12:04, 26 October 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for November 3[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Du Qinglin, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Zhang Xuezhong. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 12:54, 3 November 2014 (UTC)

Question, regarding the CPC[edit]

A question, regarding the CPC, is the post of first secretary of the Secretariat a formal post, or is it similar to Second Secretary in the Soviet Union? --TIAYN (talk) 22:14, 3 November 2014 (UTC)

The answer is quite complicated. To my understanding, the short answer to your question is 'no', it is not a formal post. There is no formal documentation of this title; indeed, Chinese media do not even mention this as a title unto itself. The First Secretary of the Secretariat is analogous of the "General Secretary" position once held by Deng Xiaoping (in the 1950-60s), and since the 1990s this person has always been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan). It is no longer the same thing as the "General Secretary". As you can glean from the rankings of the current PSC the First Secretary of Secretariat position actually does not actually rank highly in the hierarchy, usually it is in fifth or sixth position. I'm actually not familiar with the "Second Secretary" position of the CPSU. Colipon+(Talk) 22:46, 3 November 2014 (UTC)
In the Soviet Union the Second Secretary was the second-in-line after the CPSU General Secretary. The Second Secretary usually chaired the meetings of the Secretariat, and when the CPSU General Secretary could not fulfill his duties to the Politburo (that is, to chair its meetings), the Second Secretary chaired them. However, the post of Second Secretary never existed (until the 28th Congress, the last congress held by the CPSU, when the office of Deputy General Secretary was established).. As with so much else in Soviet politics, there were few strong institutions, and the system functioned more on norms (and less on written rules; read the CPSU statute, if you think the CPC's statute is vague on what the central bodies do then read the CPSU version). Of course, when there existed strong institutions, they were generally very strong (CPSU General Secretary).. As with everything else, the deinstitutionalized muddle that was Soviet politics was created by Stalin. I was thinking since the Communist Party of Vietnam has an analogous post of "Executive Secretary" of the Secretariat (of course, the CPV is probably the second most institutionalized party in communist history, behind only the League of Communists of Yugoslavia - which collapsed because it was too institutionalized in the end). But I'm thinking to much, and writing to much (as I always do). It was a formal post, but is not any more? I guess its the CPCs way of strengthening collective leadership, but not institutionalizing it (since that would threaten their "leader principle", right?!). Thanks for the info. --TIAYN (talk) 23:01, 3 November 2014 (UTC)
@Trust Is All You Need:: Yes, the CPV's degree of institutionalization is impressive and it still seems to be relatively stable; it's interesting that the Gen-Sec is ranked so low in their hierarchy. It will be interesting to see how it responds to moments of crises. The CPC similarly experimented with "separation of powers" in the 1980s, where the President, Premier, General Secretary, and actual leader (Deng) were four different people. Deng was quite contradictory in that he contributed signficantly to institutionalization, but not to the extent that Communist rule was threatened; I figure his efforts were aimed at preventing another personality cult and another Cultural Revolution... which he succeeded; on the flip side, he twice removed General Secretaries that he himself appointed through non-institutional means, and created a "Central Advisory Commission" made of party elders whose role was very ambiguous. Post-Tiananmen, they re-centralized power under Jiang Zemin, though Jiang never really held the type of 'paramount' power as seen in the cases of Mao or Deng because he did not have the same level of personal prestige, despite his frequent attempts at trying to solidify his status as similar to that of his predecessors (calling himself a "core figure of the third generation" and also authoring his own "extension of Communist theory"). I think the Yugoslav league collapsed partly because Tito died. I digress - I think Hu really attempted to institutionalize the Party further during his term, which is why he was so keen on stepping down when his time came at the 18th Party Congress (as a sign respect to the institutions of mandatory retirement and term limits); at the same time, since Xi's ascension, there is talk that he has yet again de-institutionalized the party and state by forming a myriad of ad-hoc policy coordination committees (National Security Commission, "Comprehensively Deepening Reform", "Internet Security", and "Military reform", all headed by himself) to decide the most important issues, rather than through the Politburo or state agencies.

Anyway, I re-worked the entire article on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, take a look if you have a chance. Colipon+(Talk) 21:22, 21 November 2014 (UTC)

Great work! :) Its a difficult topic to write about, I should know, I wrote 99 percentish of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union article but I must admit I'm not satisfied with my results.... See this is not what I don't understand, how does institutionalization of the party threaten it? ... At the 9th Congress (or 8th, don't remember) the party statute was amended to state that Tito was Eternal President of the party and state, but when he died power would be vested in a collective leadership. He instituted an extreme circumscribed version of this; the President of the Presidency (the leader of the party, and the Presidency being the Politburo) could only sit for one term, for one year (and then leave the Presidency). A quick reading of communist history, with some few exceptions (like Xi Jinping, but in comparison Deng used 3-4 years), shows that it generally takes 5 years at the most for the leader to gain control over the party (Brezhnev used the entire 1960s in a power struggle against Kosygin, Stalin was involved in 15 years power struggle and then initiated the Great Purge and killed the entire party elite, or Kim Il-sung who used an estimated 10 years to become undisputed leader, and another 20 to crush all opposition). Another problem, considering the nationality problems existing in the country, the republican central committees were allowed to democratically elect from their own membership (no list of proposed candidates that is) members to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). This led to the split which caused the LCY to break up at the 14th Congress; the centre was never strong enough (which isn't surprising since it was impossible; a member of the CC sat for five years or more, while a member of the Presidency sat for one year) to discipline their own republican branches. This led to the break-up of the LCY; the party's central leaders weren't able to acquire enough power. They tried, and failed (at the 11th Congress i think) to increase their term but lost in a tight vote... At the same time, the republican leaders were able to amass power; the presidents of the leagues in Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia etc didn't face term limits unlike their brethrens in the central leadership. This is why a man like Slobodan Milošević was able to amass such power within the LCY; as you can from any biography of him, this is a man who never held a leading position within the central LCY. If you simplify you can say Yugoslavia collapsed because Tito's death and the rising nationalism, but the explanation for why the party failed to react to these issues are found in the reforms instituted at the 9th LCY Congress. Of course, we have to remember other things, like the fact that the LCY actually had the Commission on Statutory Questions (CSQ), whose sole responsibility was to secure that party behaviour was in accordance with the statute.. This was a body with immense powers. The LCY's statute had over 112 articles, article 25 dealing with party democratic elections is 3 pages long. in contrast to the CPC statute of today has 52. Last example, if you look at Gorbachev's reform, what is clear is that the Soviet Communist Party had complete control of society until they held the 1989 elections. The conservatives (such as Yegor Ligachev), who Gorbachev accused of wanting to drag the country back to Stalinism or Brezhnevism, were in fact conservative reformers (conservative in sense that the party should hold power, but not conservative as meaning they didn't support change). For instance, several leading conservatives supported introducing multi-candidate election within the party without preapproved lists (but these same people opposed openly, or whispered in the background, their opposition to introducing such reforms in state institutions..).. You have to remember, Gorbachev did a terrible thing (from a communist standpoint); he began to institutionalize the state (and while, from the outside, the Soviet state looked mighty, the state machinery had no power - the party Politburo had it all)
The problem is that you say Deng institutionalized when he really didn't. He institutionalized the powers of the General Secretary, the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo.. There was never any talk of actually institutionalizing the party system (from Deng), but rather institutionalizing the role of the leader so it would be easier for his Politburo colleagues to keep him check. But in some ways you can claim the CPC didn't need such reforms, leading officials within the CPC, unlike the CPSU, actually opposed the leadership on certain occasions... In the USSR, the conservative reformers didn't begin to oppose Gorbachev until 1989-90), and unlike the CPSU, the CPC didn't have problem with "commandism", didn't have a nomenklatura system and most importantly, the party machine wasn't turned into an obedient servant which happened to the CPSU after the great purge. I've been working CPSU central committee members (and Politburo, Secretariat and Orgburo) articles lately, and what surprises me is that everyone was killed - the only people who survived were either those Stalinists Stalin trusted, women or men of old age.
But in short, I'm a structural-materialist in the mold of Francis Fukuyama, Karl Marx] and Michel Foucault. I don't believe the CPC can survive if the only strong institution it has is the leader. As you've already mentioned, Xi has amassed great power. If Deng had introduced the reforms you say he had Xi wouldn't be able to amass so much power in so short time. It took Stalin nearly 20 years to destroy the Leninist machinery, while it took Xi only one year to destroy the Dengist institutions. It sounds like Deng didn't do much at all, sadly... At last, sorry that my posts are so long, but I'm a geek and I just love talking about institutions in general whether they be communist or liberal democratic.--TIAYN (talk) 23:18, 21 November 2014 (UTC)
What can I say? If you want to talk about institutions as a whole then I must say that British legal tradition has produced some of the world's most enduring institutions, mostly because it tends to interpret things based on principle rather than based on a codified set of rules, allowing it to easily adapt to new conditions. It has shown that institutions which fall into disuse or lose its relevance and 'evolve' over time but has no detriment, generally, to government and society as a hole. The United States, interestingly, with its more rigid "constitutionalism", incentivizes 'gaming the system' for people vested by statute with a set of powers. Interestingly I observe Wikipedia to function much like the British system of "common law", where principles trump rules, and the ultimate beneficiary (theoretically) is the reader - though sometimes I wish there were better enforcement (or better gnoming) of blatant disregard for Wikipedia's policies.

With regards to Communists, I, too, am surprised at the extent of which Stalin had gone to liquidate his political enemies, perceived or otherwise. One of the principal differences I observed between the Great Purge and the Cultural Revolution is that Mao always used very indirect ways to go after his enemies, and one could not (even to this day) figure out if he was primarily after the accumulation of power or merely looking to cement his place in history as an ideological sage. Stalin opted to simply murder most of his opponents, but while Mao also removed many of his perceived political rivals from power, their treatment ranges from death by force (Liu Shaoqi) to "lock away for now, but keep for future use" (Deng) to "let's just criticize and then leave them be" (Chen Yi).

What you say about the Commission on Statutory Questions of the LCY is also interesting, as that is basically amounts to a "constitutional court" of the party. I wonder if Vietnam will evolve (or has already evolved) to that level of checks and balancing. Keep in mind Vietnam does not have the same ethnic divisions that Yugoslavia did.

I don't know if it's true that Deng did not institutionalize. His "two-term limit" has become very closely followed almost everywhere. In fact, even if you look at provincial leadership positions, people very rarely serve more than two terms. Moreover, the mandatory retirement age of 67 has been followed almost to perfection at the leadership transitions of 2007 and 2012. One can only speculate that Xi will not break these very basic conventions. The unfortunate thing with Deng's institutionalization is that it seemed he wanted it to apply to everyone except for himself. He wanted to make the rules because he sees the long term benefits, but he didn't want to be bound by them because it limits his capacity for short-term execution. Xi has been characterized in many ways to be following in Deng's footsteps - if you read the 'communique' and 'decision' from the 4th plenum of the 18th CC, you will see Xi's contradictory messages at work in much the same manner as Deng. He stresses the importance of the constitution and constitutionalism in general but elevates the Communist Party above the constitution. Which makes you wonder, if China faced another crisis, would he, too, take a page out of Deng's playbook and use the informal powers at his disposal?

By the way, the CPC General Secretary position does not seem to have any extraordinary powers, at least it is not defined by the party constitution. If you read the letter of the constitution it would appear as though he basically just chairs the meetings and that's about it. The reality is obviously very different, but at least this shows that the Gen-Sec cannot rely upon statute as a means to legitimize his personal power; the side effect of this is that titles still do not equal actual power. Colipon+(Talk) 23:59, 21 November 2014 (UTC)

Interesting :) America looks to have strong institutions if you look from the outside; the presidency, the congress. But the civil service is weak, in contrast to Great Britain. For instance, Keynesianist dominated the National Resources Planning Board and the Republican opposition, instead of responding to the Keynesianist idea through debate, reacted by dissolving the body. In some ways its better; its easier for the president to appoint new civil servants and can hear alternate opinion, but unlike the United Kingdom, if the next president opposes these new people from the get go they will loose their jobs. The UK is opposite. For instance, Clement Attlee's Labour Government instituted planning of the economy and oversaw wide-scale nationalization of industry in its first two years, but when that policy proved inefficient and unpopular the government was able to respond by introducing Keynesian policies. The reason they were able to do it so quickly throughout 1948 is that Her Majesty's Treasury was dominated by Keynesians. The Attlee Government had simply ignored them in 1946-48, since they couldn't remove them. To simplify further, Her Majesty's Treasury (and British ministries in general) has firm guidelines on how to recruit civil servants, the corresponding American department appoints officials based on its chief and his orders. This might explain why the divide between the republicans and democrats are so wide - they literally respond to a different civil service unlike their British counterparts which responds to the same (and therefore heres the same ideas) ... I liked you're interpretation of WP - its actually the best I've heard.
Lets do a comparison between the CPC and the LCY. The Chinese constitution says this about the General Secretary (and only this);

Article 22. The Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party are elected by the Central Committee in plenary session. The General Secretary of the Central Committee must be a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. [...] The General Secretary of the Central Committee is responsible for convening the meetings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee and presides over the work of the Secretariat.

This is from the LCY statute (and this is only one article among many on the President and the Presidency):

Article 84. The President of the Central Committee of the LCY, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary, members and executive secretaries of the Presidency and other social organizations, suggests issues which should be considered by the Presidency, prepares and convenes sessions of the Presidency, ensures that all members of the Presidency are regularly and equally informed on all problems and activities which are of interest to the work of the Presidency, carries out consultations, and gives suggestions for the division of work and the periodic duties of the members of the Presidency. He coordinates the work of the commission and other working bodies of the Presidency, brings about contact and consultation with the most appropriate functionaries of the Federation in order to achieve a continuous cooperation and coordination of the activities of the organs and organizations within the Federation, and works for the enactment of the program of work of the Presidency.

First, thats not the whole Article 84, it has five other paragraphs as well... It should also be added that the LCY also has a detailed account on how the President and the Presidency are elected, how such election should be organized (in contrast to the CPC's "elected by the Central Committee in plenary session"). The CPC's Article 22 begs the question how plenary session are organized, which is explained in the LCY statute in a very detailed manner. Darn, the CPC is even less institutionalized then the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Their party statute reads:

Article 50 The Central Committee elects the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries from among its members by secret vote. [...] The First Secretary of the Central Committee organizes the work of the Politburo and Central Committee secretaries between Central Committee sessions, he chairs Central Committee sessions, represents the Central Committee, and speaks in the name of the party to the outside world.

The PUWP's statute was democratized at the 8th Congress in response to a inner-party rebellion (which was spurred by the economic crisis created by Edward Gierek). The rebels didn't call for radical reforms of society, but rather for constitutional oversight over the party leadership. If I remember correctly, at the 1st Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee all but two Politburo members failed to get reelected. Of course, I may be to harsh, the Soviet party statute reads:

"Article 38 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union elects: for directing the work of the Party between plenums of the Central Committee – a Politbureau; for guiding the current work, chiefly the section of cadres and the organization of the control of performance – a Secretriat The Central Committee elects the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU."

The CPSU General Secretary, Politburo and Secretariat are never mentioned again in relation to the Central Committee after that. The CPSU statute is extremely vague... Whats more surprising the Party Control Committee, the body responsible for safeguarding the party state and see its implementation is a body of the Central Committee (it used to be accountable to the congress similar to the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection but Stalin amended the statute in 1939). The problem is not, as you say, that "at least this shows that the Gen-Sec cannot rely upon statute as a means to legitimize his personal power; the side effect of this is that titles still do not equal actual power". The side-effect is that his fellow Politburo members can't hold him accountable. Petro Shelest (after the USSR had collapsed), when asked why the Politburo helped to consolidate Brezhnev's power when its members were equally split on wether to keep him or not, responded; "without the leader we would be lost". The CPSU developed a leader-principle. When Gorbachev wanted Politburo members to resign he didn't do it through a Politburo decision, rather he invited individual members into his office and asked them to resign (and they dully did). What could they say? There party statute didn't say nothing on the matter, so it couldn't be used to defend their own rights (in reality, the CPSU statute said they had no rights as Politburo members, leaving them open to removal when need felt be). What was the result? The General Secretary became omnipotent while the Politburo was turned into a body of advisers. Whats more surprising is that Mikhail Solomentsev, the Chairman of the Central Control Commission, called the biggest breach of party rules since Stalin, but he still couldn't punish Gorbachev for his behaviour. From what I understood, while the CPC constitution doesn't say the CPC General Secretary has to leave office after two terms, Deng's Politburo issued a party regulation on the matter. Even so, the Politburo (and the Central Committee) members aren't stupid, they know their rights. They, naturally, don't want to lose too much power too the General Secretary so they will get him to resign. I'll add that I think even Xi knows he has to resign after two terms - the idea of term-limits has been ingrained into the CPC's consciousness.

"The unfortunate thing with Deng's institutionalization is that it seemed he wanted it to apply to everyone except for himself." Alas thats the leader disease. He wasn't as shrewd as Tito whose reforms went into effect with his death - he was officially designated as "Eternal" leader when he lived. Xi stresses the importance of the constitution, but not constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is a liberal term. From a Marxist point of view, the state is a repressive institution which is bound by no laws and whose sole purpose is to defend its own class interest. Which means, as the state constitution says several times, those rights only mean anything if they are in accord in building a socialist society. State constitutionalism, as meaning that an organ is responsible for safeguarding the constitution is a theoretical impossibility within Marxism-Leninism (I could say classical Marxism as well since Marx and co never wrote about constitutionalism). The basic premise of Marxism is that checks and balances are inherently bad, and that direct people's power through elected representatives who have no limitations on their power (of course, it must be added, Marx and co barely wrote about this stuff..) In China (minus they don't have any powers), all powers are vested in the National People's Congress and its members. "Which makes you wonder, if China faced another crisis, would he, too, take a page out of Deng's playbook and use the informal powers at his disposal?" - he's already using informal power, since nothing in the statute (or any party regulation I know of) explains the CPC General Secretary's relationship with the other members of the Politburo, the Central Committee or the party as a whole. Yes he's the General Secretary of the Central Committee, but what does "of the Central Committee" imply. Does he chair its meeting? Is he accountable to the CC (or any institution)? Does CC members have any ways of legally defending their rights (do they have formal means of defending themselves against Politburo attack?) against the CPC General Secretary or the Politburo in general? They probable have, but its not written anywhere - like the CPSU the CPC is run more on norms then on rules.

The problem with Vietnam is that its institutionalized, with clear norms - for instance, an unknown delegate opposed the creation of a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) akin to the CPC at the 8th Congress, claiming it was a breach of inner-party democracy. He won the vote; while a PSC was established, in reality (from a reading of its duties and responsibilities) it was only a renaming of the Secretariat. Its important to note that the CPV is a a Soviet party with a functioning nomenklatura system which breeds corruption. The reason why the CPV has a strong inner-party democracy, while the CPSU and the CPC doesn't, is (like the LCY) that it never had a strongman leader. They had a strong leader, but like Tito (or even later, Lenin), Ho Chi Minh didn't kill members who opposed him, and maybe more importantly, people who opposed him weren't removed from office or lost their seats in the Central Committee, the Politburo or the Secretariat. There's one exception to this rule in Vietnam, and that is the Nhân Văn–Giai Phẩm affair. But Ho Chi Minh caved in to criticism, and the whole incident was criticised posthumously by the CPV leadership under Nguyen Van Linh. Again, lengthwise, sorry. --TIAYN (talk) 11:48, 22 November 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for November 10[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that you've added some links pointing to disambiguation pages. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

Cui Yongyuan
added a link pointing to Tell It Like It Is
Zhao Benshan
added a link pointing to Gulfstream

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 15:37, 10 November 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for November 18[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that you've added some links pointing to disambiguation pages. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

Gu Junshan
added a link pointing to Procuratorate
Li Lianyu
added a link pointing to 17th Party Congress

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 11:01, 18 November 2014 (UTC)

DYK for Gu Junshan[edit]

 — Crisco 1492 (talk) 10:17, 22 November 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for November 25[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Politics of Guangdong, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page General Political Department. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 10:06, 25 November 2014 (UTC)

DYK for Li Lianyu[edit]

 — Crisco 1492 (talk) 12:03, 28 November 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for December 2[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Zhu Mingguo, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Wuzhishan. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 10:08, 2 December 2014 (UTC)

Zhou Yongkang[edit]

Hi there. Any particular reason why you removed the Chinese language wrappers from Zhou Yongkang? Cheers,  Philg88 talk 21:04, 5 December 2014 (UTC)

Yes, I just didn't think it flowed very well that the text had to be preceded by "Chinese:" every time... there is probably some other way to do this omitting the "Chinese:" but I don't know how to do this. Colipon+(Talk) 21:50, 5 December 2014 (UTC)
As a trivial example you can use ({{zh|s=机票|t=機票|labels=no}}), which will produce (机票; 機票). All the other parameters for the standard {{zh}} template work, but the "labels" flag is the key one. I'm with you on the over pinyinisation thing, so where it's appropriate I always write the italicised non-accented pinyin first followed by the hanzi in brackets. Zhu hao (祝好),  Philg88 talk 22:41, 5 December 2014 (UTC)
  • Can you give a direct link to the prior nom on the current ITN nom thread? That would make it a lot easier for many people like myself to support. μηδείς (talk) 23:32, 5 December 2014 (UTC)

ITN for Zhou Yongkang[edit]

-Zanhe (talk) 09:11, 7 December 2014 (UTC)

Nomination for deletion of Template:HKafter1997[edit]

Ambox warning blue.svgTemplate:HKafter1997 has been nominated for deletion. You are invited to comment on the discussion at the template's entry on the Templates for discussion page. —PC-XT+ 11:49, 16 December 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for December 19[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that you've added some links pointing to disambiguation pages. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

Foreign Affairs Leading Group
added links pointing to Wang Chen and Wang Yi
Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization
added a link pointing to Wang Yi

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 11:34, 19 December 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for December 27[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited 2nd Airport Expressway, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Chaoyang District. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 09:33, 27 December 2014 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for January 3[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that you've added some links pointing to disambiguation pages. Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

Huang Xingguo
added a link pointing to Xiangshan County
Iraq War
added a link pointing to Iraqi insurgency

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 11:26, 3 January 2015 (UTC)

Keep up the great work![edit]

You've been doing some great work on the CCDI article for the last couple of days. Keep it up! When I began working on China-related articles I was afraid I had to do all the hard work alone (as I've had to do with other topics); but I see that I had nothing to fear.. Sorry for the lack of activity recently, but real-life has kept me away. Anyhow, I've been looking through some articles recently, and come to the conclusion there are four things missing (I can fix three of them); the CCDI–MOS internal merger, CCDI–state collaboration (how the CCDI gives over cases to the state, how it collaborates with state anti-corruption agencies and so on), party discipline and CDI–CMC (or maybe something broader as say CCDI–PLA something). I can fix the first three, but I can't fix the last since there is no work on it in English (that is, any work in the last 10–15 which has devoted any attention to it). I'm unsure if it should have its own section or not (under the organization heading), but that's up to you to decide. The apprehension of Xu Caihou has made it "urgent" to devote at least some attention to it. Currently its mentioned in passing once; that it was established in 1980... What's you're thought on this? Am I making a big deal out of a "non-important" institution? Is there anything else missing? --TIAYN (talk) 21:58, 8 January 2015 (UTC)

Hi, thank you! You have been doing great work as well. It's great finding people with common interests in Wikipedia, especially something regarded as so obscure such as the subject matter we are editing. Those sections you named makes sense. I have some sources for the CDI-CMC relationship, in Chinese; I have enough sources to build a substantive article. However, I think that should be an article unto itself (at Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission) as I don't want this CCDI article to get too long. Also note that the military does not publicize as many details about its investigations for the purpose of national security. For example, I don't think people who are court martialed, such as in the case of Gu Junshan (under investigation since 2012) will have their prosecution and judicial process appear on the public record.

By the way, I'm curious to see if there is a way to make sub-headings out of the "institutional history" section. I'm also itching to make some edits to the non-existent biographies of the current CCDI deputy chiefs. By the way, do these deputy chiefs do all that much on a day-to-day basis? It seems the only person from the CCDI who gets airtime on national tv is Wang Qishan. Colipon+(Talk) 14:31, 9 January 2015 (UTC)

Creating a separate article is fine, but it should at least get a short mention in the organization section... Sub-headings for the "Institutional history" is a good idea. I've been thinking of it, but haven't done anything about it really. My original plan for the article was to have a short history section, but since the majority of English sources write about institutional reform and the institutional structure, It became bigger and bigger... Sections shouldn't be that difficult; Reform and dissolution (1949–1968), Reestablishment and Dengist years (1977–1992), Reforming the "dual leadership" system (1992–2012) and Xi's reforms (2012–). Better section titles can of course be made, I see that :p.... ". By the way, do these deputy chiefs do all that much on a day-to-day basis".. I have no clue, no one ever writes about the Standing Committee, its deputy secretaries or the secretary-general (the secretary is barely mentioned too). But the CCDI is more regulated then most institutions in the CPC, and the CCDI have regulations on day-to-day work on its website (or so I've read somewhere). That Wang Qishan is the person who gets most attention does not surprise me a lot; he's a member of the PSC. I'd guess that the deputy secretaries are like vice premiers; they are delegated a responsibility area. For instance Liu Jinguo is Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection in the Ministry of Public Security. But this is theorizing; I don't know... Just the same, I have no clue what the Secretary-General does; I'm guessing he does all the administrative paper work, but no one actually states so. If I were you I would try to track down one of those CCDI regulations; its probably a boring, but interesting, read (I'm guessing from personal experience; reading the Yugoslav party constitution was painful, but extremely interesting). --TIAYN (talk) 14:25, 10 January 2015 (UTC)
question, does the CCDI have similar relations to the people's police as it does with the military? Its crossed my mind because (a) of Liu Jinguo is the discipline inspector of the MPS and (b) because the CCDI article already devotes much attention to the judiciary and the law I felt something was missing. I have no clue however if this warrants attention; do you? --TIAYN (talk) 15:14, 14 January 2015 (UTC)
I actually have no idea. When I search keywords "Armed Police" and "CDI" I actually end up getting quite a few conspiracy-theory-style articles on how Zhou Yongkang supposedly stormed the 38th Army on the day of the fateful "Beijing coup". But to answer your question my best guess is yes. Since PAP comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security (and since Xi, presumably the National Security Commission), it is, I think, considered totally separate from the military. To me, it is also unclear whether ordinary military offenses that have nothing to do with corruption, such as, say, leaking state secrets or insubordination, falls under the jurisdiction of the Military's CDI or falls under ordinary military disciplinary procedures. Similar question for the PAP as well. Colipon+(Talk) 15:34, 14 January 2015 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for January 13[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited New Zhijiang Army, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Taizhou (check to confirm | fix with Dab solver). Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 09:23, 13 January 2015 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for January 23[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Tan Zhenlin, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Chen Yi (check to confirm | fix with Dab solver). Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 09:43, 23 January 2015 (UTC)

Hi again![edit]

HI again! I have a question. Should we add a field for current CDI secretaries in the List of current Chinese provincial leaders? Secondly, do you feel its worth mentioning the relatively high percentage of women serving as CDI secretary (5 out of 31)? To me that seems a lot, considering how men generally dominate Chinese (and communist) politics.--TIAYN (talk) 21:36, 30 January 2015 (UTC)

And do you know anything about this (its the only thing I can find about it, but there is surely more on it, right?) The article doesn't go into detail on how the reforms changed the current structure ... On another note, I think the CCDI article is finished (I know I was planning to write a section on party discipline, but none of the articles go into any detail so the "Jurisdiction" will have to suffice for now. --TIAYN (talk) 22:27, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
And one last note, would you be willing to look at the User:Trust Is All You Need/China.. I've shortened down the CPC Central Organization section (merging the "National Congress" and the "Bodies of the Central Committee" sections). Is it good enough? --TIAYN (talk) 23:17, 30 January 2015 (UTC)

Hello! Good to have you back! Re: women in the CDI system. Yes, I think this is worth mentioning. I've noticed that women generally serve at the provincial level in less important roles such as "United Front" chief.
Re:Recent CCDI reforms; from what I've read this is just incremental reforms from what we have already written. The CCDI article looks excellent, could probably use a copyedit but I think overall it should be able to make GA status.
Re: cutting down the CPC article, sure, I can take a look. Colipon+(Talk) 15:53, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

Thanks! The CCDI article has been listed at the WikiProject Guild of Copy Editors/Requests, but I can take a look at it later in the day. I feel a lot clearer in the head now then I wrote it, so I should be able to improve it to some degree at least. I'm thinking of shortening the ideology section too. --TIAYN (talk) 10:03, 3 February 2015 (UTC)
Quick note, this article led to these; [1], [2]. The Current CCDI article fails to explain the extent of reorganization apparently; for of the CCDI's internal offices were established in the last two years, and on 28 March 2013 the CCDI became the first central institution outside of the Central Committee to establish its own Propaganda and Organization Department. That is has its own Organization Department, and ability to appoint members into its midst as it sees fit should be of extreme interest to anyone following Chinese politics. --TIAYN (talk) 23:39, 14 February 2015 (UTC)
Thanks - this is an interesting read (all three articles) but I don't understand its implications. It's very clear now that Xi and Wang intend to reform the CCDI to become much more independent in its operations. By the way, has any other Communist Party gone this route with their 'supervisory' or 'constitutional review' bodies? Moreover, since the CCDI still derives its authority from the PSC and Xi Jinping, it will only act as an effective check on lower levels of the party organization, but probably never the sitting Politburo itself. By the way, what exactly do the so-called "internal offices" do?? Also yes, the organization and propaganda department piece is very interesting, as is the so-called "parachuting" of people, particularly CCDI standing committee members, into provincial CDI offices. This is clearly a step in the right direction as it 'stirs the pot' in the entrenched patron-client networks in the provinces. Colipon+(Talk) 16:06, 17 February 2015 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for February 4[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Li Chongxi, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Zhang Xuezhong (check to confirm | fix with Dab solver). Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 08:58, 4 February 2015 (UTC)

ITN for Deng Liqun[edit]

--SpencerT♦C 20:58, 12 February 2015 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for February 18[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Si Xinliang, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Pujiang County (check to confirm | fix with Dab solver). Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 08:57, 18 February 2015 (UTC)

Of interest[edit]

I just found two very good articles (written by the same author) on the CPC's leading small groups system; "The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups" and "More Already on the Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups" (this one is very short, but works as a great summary). For instance, did you know "Thus, for example, the general office of the CC Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform is in fact two bureaus under the CC Policy Research Office, led by Wang Huning"? There are of course, more interesting details. According to this article "China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy" a “Leading small groups… are sometimes referred to by the leadership as ‘advisory bodies’ for the PB or Party Secretariat, and their decisions are often issued in the name of those bodies. However, they can also bring finished policy packages to the party leading organs at times and can sometimes issue orders and instructions directly to line departments and units.". "Xi Jinping and the Party Apparatus" is a worthy source on the leading group relations with the Secretariat. This is great too "It’s All in the Execution: Struggling with the Reform Agenda"

I know that the best way to convince people to read is to post as many articles as possible, but some of these articles are very good (and would help both of in you're work). On another note, WP lacks an article on the "Central leading group on Party-Building" which is, according to the sources, one of the permanent leading groups (and reports directly to the standing committee). I can finally fix the leading small group section in the Organization of the Communist Party of China article! --TIAYN (talk) 16:14, 24 February 2015 (UTC)
Indeed, I have come across most of the articles you listed except for the military one. Seems like Xi has done a very thorough job of consolidating institutional power in his own hands, but on the flip side (according to the article on "implementation") the reform juggernaut still requires technocratic steering and coordination as well as challenges with vested interests, making implementation extraordinarily difficult. Also it is interesting reading in "party apparatus" that Xi was apparently only supposed to preside over the party and the government was to be the purview of Li Keqiang, but in reality since the 18th Congress Xi has undoubtedly taken center stage himself. There should be ample material now to create a standalone article on "Leading Small Groups" (as an aside I prefer the translation "Leading Group" rather than "Leading Small Group" because the Chinese xiaozu only means "small group" in the very literal sense.) It will be interesting to see what happens at the 19th Party Congress in terms of institutional evolution. Colipon+(Talk) 18:52, 24 February 2015 (UTC)
Regarding what I wrote the other day (on Marxist ideology), see this. My writing may be a bit confusing at times, so its a good introductionary article. Under Hu writings on ideology were often very vague, this has changed under Xi - its much clearer.
Point 2, I tend to disagree. The premier is after all responsible for implementation of party policy. I must admit that I don't know much about Wen, but in his official pronouncement he portrayed himself as a reformer. If this is true, he failed—the Hu era saw the strengthening of state monopolies, the clear state favouritism and the belief that the state through the market, and not the market, should guide development. Wen talked about privatization, and giving a larger role to the market; this never happened. The major difference I think is in propaganda; Xi is portrayed as the one leader, and Hu was portrayed as the leader of the leading collective (which gave more room for the other PSC members). Considering how quick these changes have been (in media portrayal), they would probably have been accepted by the Hu PSC. I know of no other communist leader who have amassed such power immediately; Stalin used fifteen, Mao became the paramount (but never sole leader) and Tito had to fight power struggles throughout the 1920s and early 1930s (and they continued until the 1960s in some form). A communist system does not function this way, unless if you're a Kim and the whole country is centred around you and you're family for its survival. As the book The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (which is very mediocre, but has interesting antidotes) makes clear; Xi wrote of the need for a strong leader (a clear first amongst equals) already in the 1990s. He wrote something on the lines; if the party was a fist, the leader should symbolize the finger (it didn't matter if it was the longest or the shortest). --TIAYN (talk) 12:08, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
Point 3, sure. Small group would better wouldn't it? That would refer to all small groups, not only the central-level but also does which exist in the localities, provinces and so on, right?
Point 4, is it to early to write an article on Xi's "Four Comprehensives"? --TIAYN (talk) 12:20, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
Marxist theory is a little dense, particularly "dialectical materialism" - so can you explain to me what it is? Seems like Xi, in addition to consolidating power, also is bent on re-introducing the centrality of Marxism in Chinese Communist thought.
I wonder if Xi's being the new undisputed leader is also part of an implicit consensus among the Communist elite that this is the only way forward in response to the power diffusion and power struggles of the Hu era; i.e., that everyone, including elders such as Hu, Jiang, etc., and the top party brass collectively endorsed Xi's centralized leadership style. If the CCTV New Year's Gala is any indication of the extent to which Chinese politics has changed, it is highly notable that in previous renditions of the gala, a 'patriotic' song usually featured Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu with one scene or two scenes lasting several seconds each, with some years featuring the entire leadership collective (i.e., the PSC) but this year, not only were the four 'paramount leaders' not shown at all, Xi was given some 30 different scenes in a seemingly endless video montage devoted entirely to himself.
Another notable feature of Xi's is that he has seemingly departed from the so-called Resolutions on Certain Questions from 1981, which condemned the Cultural Revolution and Mao's role within it; Xi seems to want to tie closely together the Mao-era CPC with the post Mao-era legacy so as to increase the legitimacy of the present-day role role of the CPC.
In response to the "Four Comprehensives" - I also wonder whether or not it is mature enough yet to be considered a guiding ideology, but there is already talk of writing it into the party Constitution. It's not too early to create that article. The other Xi-related articles that are worth looking into is the so-called "New Normal" economic model and also Wang Huning, who is apparently the brains behind most of the theoretical innovations of the CPC since the 1990s. I am also not very happy with the current state of the "Chinese Dream" article. Colipon+(Talk) 16:04, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
Other Xi-era articles worth creating: "The Two Centenaries", "Three Confidences", "Eight Rules of the Party Centre" (otherwise known as "Xi's eight rules"), "Anti-corruption Campaign in China (2013-)". Colipon+(Talk) 18:34, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
Point 1 (long answer), Dialectical materialism is the reason why the CPC refers to socialism as "scientific" or as a "science" (or refer science in policy speeches, as in the political report). Hence Hu's "Scientific Outlook on Development" could just as well have been named "Socialist Outlook on Development". There was a debate within academia during the Cold War if dialectical materialism was a Marx or a Engels invention (those who believed it was a Engels invention blamed him for the USSR, China and so on, and pardoned Marx...)
After Marx's death, Engels went on to publish books which designated Marxism as a science. This is a problem (if you don't believe in it) and probably led to several of the "black spots" in communist history—the idea that they were always right since their views were scientifically proven. Historical materialism, that is the theory which Marx formulated in which societies (or at least Western societies) develop from primitive communism to ancient, ancient to feudalism, feudalism to capitalism, capitalism to socialism and socialism to communism (this process was dialectical; the thesis, primitive communism in which everyone is free but lack advanced technology, anthithesis capitalism in which the clear majority is oppressed but in which has acquired advanced technology, synthesis communism, the society in which everyone has acquired freedom and advanced technology). Dialectics seek to find the thesis (a force, the working class for instance), antithesis (the opposite force, the capitalist class for instance) and synthesis (which solves the conflict between the two oppositions, that is thesis and anthithesis), see Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.... Dialectical materialism holds that contradictions existing in the whole material world (which includes nature). To study dialectically one has to accept four propositions; (1) everything in this world is interconnected somehow, (2) everything is in constant motion, that is, history never takes a break, (3) more specific, all phenomenas undergo constant change and (4) things develop and change because of their interaction with opposing forces (for instance, capitalists interact with workers) or internal contradictions (for capitalism to succeed capitalism has to seek profit no matter what, but capitalism is going to fail because capitalists only seek profit and look only for quick fixes and so on...). So when Deng said the primary contradiction in modern-day China was between the advanced spiritual level (the superstructure or socialist spiritual civilization) and the backward productive forces (meaning economy/materialist forces in general) he was formulating a dialectical materialistic standpoint. Jiang later expounded on this view at the 15th National Congress when he stated that the "science and technology is the primary productive force" (Deng had himself said so in 1988, but in 1997 it became party policy). When a dialectical materialist talks of the main or primary contradiction as Mao and Deng did, they are talked about the main driver for historical period in that given period. For Mao, the main driver was class struggle, for Deng it was economic development (in which science and technological development were of primary importance).
Just to be clear, dialectics here means two opposing sides, and materialism refers to nature and the economy as the base (everything starts from nature). To take another example, when the article I showed you states "The biggest objective reality in contemporary China is that our country still is, and for a long time will remain, in the primary stage of Socialism" its saying that everything in China; political system, media, hair styles, ideology and thought exist because of China's economic situation. Matter, as in non-human to generalize, is objective reality which exists outside and independent of us. But this doesn't mean that dialectical materialism (as some assume) negates individual behaviour. As Xi points out "dialectical materialism is not a denial of the counter effect of consciousness on matter, but it believes that this sort of counter effect sometimes can be extremely huge. Our Party has put ideological construction in the first place in Party building from beginning to end, and has stressed that ‘revolutionary ideals are higher than heaven’, the reason for this is that spirit changes matter and matter changes spirit dialectically"
Better example (since I feel like I presented Marx as a fool yesterday). thesis Capitalism develops technology, antithesis capitalism cannot control technology, thesis capitalist profit is reduced. Real life example. Capitalism produced the internet, but the internet is harming the music industry since people download music illegally these days (or at least don't bother to buy records, but only particular songs). This is an example of an internal contradiction; capitalism produces a technology which they cannot control, and their profits therefore decrease. This process Marxists argue will go on and on until existing technology which capitalism produced destroys capitalism. Better explanation of all of this, see this, which is very accessible.
Point 2, People forget, but Jiang's rule contained several heated ideological debates. Secondly Hu's concept Scientific Outlook on Development even says its Marxist in the name (scientific is another word for Marxism in communist discourse). Xi studied Marxism at university, people forget that too. He's not trying to re-introduce Marxism's centrality in Chinese Communist thought, its always been central, which is clearly proven by the fact that if it hadn't been central Xi would have had to purge the CPC's ideological institutions (which he hasn't). There is a clear continuation in party ideological personnel, and in party speak, from Hu to Xi (there is no sign of a break) so I doubt he has reintroduced anything. What he has done is to purge non-Marxists from offices from, well, every post conceivable it seems (but for it to be reintroduced he would have had to purge the party first one must assume).
Point 3, I don't think he has departed from "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party". The document condemns the Cultural Revolution (and Xi has not rehabilitated that) but it stated that Mao was 70 percent good, 30 percent bad. 70 percent is the communist way of saying he was a great leader, but a great leader with faults I'd assume. But you're right, he's opposed to shedding negative light on the Mao era and of comparing him unfavourable to Deng. But this is nothing new, what is new is the way he is ramming it through. The cult of personality is nothing new either (even Hu had one, but it was similar to Brezhnev's I guess; "a personality cult without a personality" as the Soviets used to say), its the intensity of the propaganda work which is. I didn't know about the CCTV New Year's Gala; interesting. He's clearly stating that retirement means just that, retirement. But its more surprising (I think at least) that he left out Mao and Deng - they are, after all, the great leaders of China according to CPC accounts.
Point 4, it will be introduced into the party constituion at the 19th Congress is my guess. Topics on party ideology is scarce in English (mainly because 90 percent of everyone just believes its empty-talk and has no meaning; people still think of communism as one-party state and planned economy I guess). We should also create an article for the "Socialist core value system" which seems to be very important (a Hu term by the way). The Chinese Dream article is terrible. I've been thinking about, but It just doesn't seem that interesting. The problem is that its a slogan, and not a theoretical concept, or am I wrong? If its a slogan its even harder I would believe to expand it (its like the CPC tells how they conceive of slogans or anyting really). The anti-corruption article needs to be created (should have been created a long time ago). I'll be honest, I always thought someone else would create it (but that only goes to show how few people edit China-related articles here on WP). I saw that Chinese WP has a good (or at least, a very long article on it). --TIAYN (talk) 00:34, 26 February 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for the very lengthy answer and all the article links, I read through it and have a better understanding now. It's great that you are well versed in the ideological elements. While perusing through Chinafile I also found a very well written article on Xi's assessment of Mao which may well be interest to you as well. Anyway, my take on it is that Xi is returning Marxism to prominence again, part of his overall campaign to strengthen ideological conviction of the Communist Party and also its legitimacy as a ruling party. The post-Deng years have seen a retreat from ideology, even the quasi-ideology of Dengist-style pragmatism, and essentially embraced an "anything goes" attitude where the party was just focused on economic construction and gradually losing steam on the ideological front. Moreover the proliferation of information made ideological dynamism and pluralism inevitable, and orthodox Marxism was not a central part of CPC rhetoric during either the Jiang or Hu years (even though it was still officially a guiding ideology). Indeed, while Hu did attempt to entrench his "Scientific Outlook on Development" on paper, what actually occurred was a clear divergence of ideology within the party itself, opening way for an increasingly apparent "Left-right" schism, with Bo Xilai being the representative figure of the left and Wen Jiabao generally seen as the flagbearer of the right. With the Bo Xilai affair of 2012 and the unchecked growth of the empire of Zhou Yongkang, I think the CPC began realizing that power diffusion was almost as destructive as political corruption in undermining party legitimacy, which is why they resolved to 'reunify' the party under a strong leadership figure. Whether this was conceptualized by Xi himself and 'pushed through' against resistance by vested interests or whether this is the direction endorsed by consensus of the collective leadership is still somewhat of a mystery, but it is clear that "democratic centralism" has won the day and that the "centralism" is now regarded as Xi rather than the abstract "party centre".
You should have a look at this article about the political spectrum under Xi, it seems that in addition to centralizing control Xi is also attempting to cater to all sides of the political spectrum, which in my view actually stays quite true to the "Harmonious Society" vision of Hu, despite the specific vocabulary having fallen out of favour. Colipon+(Talk) 15:51, 26 February 2015 (UTC)
A very good textual analyse; rather surprising that the author studied law and not history. Xi's approach to Mao (and his generation) is very dialectical (and emotional aloof), but a smart. In contrast, Gorbachev referred to the whole history of Soviet socialism since Stalin's death first "deformed socialism", then as "authoritarian-bureucratic socialism", and then he stopped mentioning Leninism and Lenin (stating that he had also made mistakes)—its not surprising that people lost belief in the system when the leader clearly had. I understand why Xi is cautious. If, as the The Diplomat article suggests, Xi is trying to represent himself as the centre, this speech is proof of that. It seems to me that the point of the speech was not to piss anyone off–a good idea, since I'm guessing that most Chinese either have a very positive view of him or a very negative one.
"The post-Deng years have seen a retreat from ideology". I can't agree with that. For instance, in 1990 China proposed the established of an international organization for the remaining socialist states (but gave up the idea when the USSR collapsed; why lead a group of poor impoverished nations?) Jiang later referred to Gorbachev as a "traitor like Trotsky". What is surprising here is not that he called Gorbachev a traitor, but compared him to Trotsky—he still held a very Stalinist position as leader. China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation is the only book in recent years which tells the story of how the CPC confronted the death of European communism, and what lesson they sought to learn from it. One of the reactions to the fall was to introduce permanent courses on why the USSR collapsed in all universities under Hu. The "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Enhancing the Party's Ruling Capacity", a resolution published by the Central Committee in 2004, claims that one of the reasons the USSR (and the other socialist states collapsed) was that their leading communist parties "distorted Marxism" and treated is a dogma. When the CPC talks about updating and adapting Marxism its no joke—they actually consider it one of the main reason for why the European communists failed. Even if you don't agree with me the book is a must read for every China enthusiast: he studies the system. I'd argue that Hu's main ideological contribution is not the Scientific Outlook on Development or Harmonious Society, but the socialist core value system (Xi still mentions it; he never mentions the other ones).
I do not agree that Xi rules like a one-man. For example, if Xi was a one man show would he use one year to put Zhou under formal arrest? Secondly, we haven't heart anything about Zhou since he was formally arrested—if Xi had total power I would assume Zhou would have been prosecuted a long time ago. But I don't know, what I do know is this, he clearly seeks to strengthen the CPC's central organization (and himself in the process); this is seen in his bid to strengthen the CCDI, but also how the CPC's propaganda machine is portraying him. But alas, Gorbachev ruled the party like a one man show, so its a very real possibility that you're right. --TIAYN (talk) 00:10, 27 February 2015 (UTC)

Cultural Revolution[edit]

Sorry - I should have talked here first.Jmg38 (talk) 03:13, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for March 17[edit]

Hi. Thank you for your recent edits. Wikipedia appreciates your help. We noticed though that when you edited Qiu He, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Li Xiaopeng (check to confirm | fix with Dab solver). Such links are almost always unintended, since a disambiguation page is merely a list of "Did you mean..." article titles. Read the FAQ • Join us at the DPL WikiProject.

It's OK to remove this message. Also, to stop receiving these messages, follow these opt-out instructions. Thanks, DPL bot (talk) 08:55, 17 March 2015 (UTC)

ITN for Xu Caihou[edit]

--Zanhe (talk) 03:26, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

File:April26editorial.jpg listed for deletion[edit]

A file that you uploaded or altered, File:April26editorial.jpg, has been listed at Wikipedia:Files for deletion. Please see the discussion to see why it has been listed (you may have to search for the title of the image to find its entry). Feel free to add your opinion on the matter below the nomination. Thank you. B (talk) 01:47, 1 April 2015 (UTC)