Would you stop by an article in philosophy if you get the chance?
I've been copyediting Nathan Salmon as part of an effort to clean up philosophy starts and stubs. It's between a C and a start, I think. The subject of the article is a sometimes editor of the article. He thinks I don't know enough about the subject to edit (I have a Master's degree in philosophy, but my Ph.D. is in something else). The article itself makes it sound as if he successfully argues against Kant, gives no citations, and cites no secondary literature. It needs to be wikified, I think (he's mentioned on the Existence page as having a particular position on existence. I think the article would be improved by saying the same thing on his page (that he has a particular point of view, more or less shared by several other philosophers - as stated in the Existence article) rather than making it sound like he is unique in his approach. Anyway - I'm wondering if you believe as I do, that the article needs citations other than his own? Especially as he is one of the editors...Thanks.--Levalley (talk) 02:27, 22 April 2009 (UTC)
For your thoughts on, and assistance with, the Nomenclature article . You might like to take a look at the text that resulted - to see whether it is absolute nonsense or not :-] Granitethighs (talk) 04:51, 4 September 2009 (UTC)
- Thanks Ostracon. I accept that what we see is to some extent theory-laden although I am not totally convinced that this is demonstrated effectively by a picture that can be interpreted in two or more ways. You are suggesting, ar you not, that I will see what I want to see or what I expect to see according to the particular theory I have at the time. Perhaps some objects/diagrams etc just look like both rabbits and ducks? What is of more interest, it seems to me, is not so much that a theory might underlie my perception, but that we cannot see both a duck and a rabbit at the same time. This I'm inclined to think is more a matter of pattern-recognition and less a matter of my theories/assumptions. Also I am not sure of the import of suggesting that when I see a rabbit on the road I am seeing the rabbit because I have a theory that it is a rabbit. And also that I could be wrong about it being a rabbit: that my senses can be deceived in various ways is hardly a revelation, Aren't you just saying, effectively, all that we see is a theory. Is this close to some sort of idealism? I suppose that, related to this, and more along what I was thinking of, is the way that language can condition thinking (linguistic relativity) - I wish I had a snappy example. Would you call language a theory ... does it operate like a theory in the mind? And what is even more miraculous is that our brain "must" be confronted with just fields of colours, shades etc but it discriminates and interprates these into something meaningful. Are these meaningful discriminates theories of the external world - perhaps they are.Granitethighs (talk) 02:04, 5 September 2009 (UTC)