User talk:Trust Is All You Need

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Xi Jinping[edit]

I started a subpage at User:Colipon/Xi Jinping for Xi Jinping infobox. Please contribute if you have time. This man has too many titles. Colipon+(Talk) 22:32, 16 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: I can, and I will. Will be a bit slow, with work and all, and my search for scholarly writings on the CPC control system. Its strange, no one, and I say no one (in English at least), has ever written a big scholar work focusing on communist control system, and I'm not saying just China. Analyzed their working, membership or anything for that matter. Its a loophole that is stunning to say the least, but it probably due to the fact that, according to liberal thought, its impossible for such efforts to succeed, so why bother studying failure? Back to the point, I will look at it, but may be a bit slow moving since its Christmas and all for people like me... As for you're reversion of my edit at the CPC Constitution; they did not diminish centralism by abolishing the Chairman, since they re-established the General Secretary. If thats true, which I doubt, it at least needs a source, because its more complicated then just abolishing a post. The North Koreans abolished the chairmanship, buts its not like the system was less centralized when Kim Il-sung became General Secretary. Of course the CPC is not the WPK, but still.. --TIAYN (talk) 14:04, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for your response. I am not trigger happy when it comes to reversions and am happy to discuss at any time. With regards to centralism, yes and no. Do note in my reverted version, I say the CPC attempted to reduce centralism - not that it actually had the effect of reducing centralism. Also it is not under dispute that after Deng, no one held supreme personal power until Xi Jinping. Jiang was closely checked by Li Peng, Li Ruihuan, and Zhu Rongji, while Hu basically had an entire Standing Committee of near-equivalent political stature not to mention occasional interference from Jiang. Of course whether the changes in the constitution facilitated this is debateable - it seems like 'decentralization' was largely attempted under Deng's personal fiat - but there is no doubt that the CCP attempted this de-centralization experiment and that abolishing the Chairman was part of this. Colipon+(Talk) 15:29, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
In the world of Communist arcana, names really do matter. For example recall when the Soviet party changed their "Politburo" to a "Presidium", in effect making the body seem more "supreme", and then reverted back to "Politburo" later on. I agree that more literature in this area is needed. By the way, I seem to recall that with Vietname, Ho Chi Minh did not have nearly as large of a cult of personality as Stalin or Mao. They seemed to have decentralized quite a bit since Ho's death. Colipon+(Talk) 15:32, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
By the way, I think the Hu infobox is 'ready to go'. Shall we migrate it to article space? Colipon+(Talk) 15:38, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: OK, seems reasonable. ... Seems reasonable, I've moved it into main space. Vietnam is similar to Yugoslavia, it just doesn't fit in the generalized picture of how a communist system works. Vietnam was organized on Stalinist lines, but Ho was never a one-man show. Truong Chinh led the agricultural collectivization of North Vietnam in the 1950s, and Le Duan and Le Duc Tho (with others) conceived of the military strategy to defeat the Americans. Ho was the charismatic man who held the party together, but even he began losing power to Le Duan at the end of his life (this situation, of course, never happened to Stalin or Mao since people were afraid of them).. In the 1970s and 1980s it looked and still looks that the CPV developed into a Brezhnevite party, but the power struggles were bigger and more controversial, and the centre was losing control over the provinces and localities. For instance, rural collectivization in South Vietnam was an utter failure; even forced collectivization didn't suceed in collectivization agriculture... During the 1990s, because of the economic reforms, the centre lost even more power to the localities - with some scholars arguing that in certain areas, the centre was unable to appoint the heads of the party organizations on decree alone. This is probably why a delegate at the 8th Congress was actual able to persuade the congress delegates to vote against the establishment of a Politburo Standing Committee on the lines of the CPC (he hadn't been appointed by the centre, but by a locality). Le Kha Phieu was even removed from power because he tried to strengthen the position of the leader - Xi would not have lasted long in Vietnam. The CPV shares more similarities with the CPSU in the late 1910s, and early 1920s then with Stalinism. The CPC is similar to Hungary and Poland; its dynamic Stalinism. People tend to forget that private entrepreneurs sat in the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party; economic reforms would probably have gone further if not for undynamic stalinism in the USSR.
To names: best examples, Chen Yun became First Secretary of the CCDI (instead of just secretary like his predecessors and successors), and Stalin upon his appointment as head of the Secretariat was given the title General Secretary (instead of Responsible Secretary as his predecessors). --TIAYN (talk) 15:57, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I resolved the problem with the large infobox (thinking of the test Xi infobox). --TIAYN (talk) 19:06, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for all your hard work. Do you think it may be preferable to list Xi's existing 'portfolios' ("Deepening Reform", "Military Reform", "Internet Security", "Foreign Affairs LG", "Finance LG" etc.) outside of the collapsable list? Ideally we want to make information that readers are looking for more apparent. Colipon+(Talk) 21:20, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: We can make a third column; Current post held. Then we rename the other column, to read Former posts held. Thats the only thing I can think of it. It would look strange to have the show signs begin below the office heading when it doesn't to it for the Members, central institutions column.. You decide. --TIAYN (talk) 21:34, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
An option is to separate the central coordination bodies with the "offices held", as being a "leader" of a "leading group" is not really the same as holding an office. Many of these groups are of an ad hoc nature anyhow. Let me experiment and show you a revision once I am done. Colipon+(Talk) 21:38, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
By the way, it may be worthwhile to explore the option of creating an "Infobox Communist leader" so we can begin using the template for other Communist leaders, but I am not an expert in the code. Also our "Hu Jintao" rendition of the infobox looks pretty on a browser, but does not look good on Mobile. Who would we contact to get code for this developed? Colipon+(Talk) 14:06, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I don't see the need for Infobox Communist leader if the current one works. Secondly, I don't have the fantasy to actual know how such an infobox would look.. What I think we need, however, is an Infobox for communist party agencies (or simply party agencies in general). The ones we currently have don't work, simple as that. I can try to find out, but you have to tell me how you think a Communist Leader infobox should look like. --TIAYN (talk) 21:16, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
I should have clarified what exactly I meant. I don't want to create an entirely new infobox that departs from the "infobox officeholder" paradigm, I just want to fix the bottom portion that you and I have conjured together with HTML table code into something that is part of a proprietary Wikipedia infobox template variation. This way it will be easier to use this template for others.
As for the agencies, today I took the "infobox organization" and experimented with it here: Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. I think you will like it. :) Colipon+(Talk) 21:27, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
You can ask on the talk page if an admin is willing to add it in as a example as to how to use the infobox. It looks good, but still feel it is needed. For more complex bodies, such as the CC, that template won't do. --TIAYN (talk) 12:58, 19 December 2014 (UTC)

CC Organization[edit]

I took some time today to organize the list of organizations and policy coordination bodies that directly report into the CPC Central Committee. Have a look here and let me know your thoughts. I'm hoping to incorporate some of these bodies into the "CPC Central Committee" Navigation template. Colipon+(Talk) 18:51, 18 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: I've been thinking of the same thing, but I found it too difficult. For instance, were does the Central Financial Work Commission (English searches don't say much...). Of course, you know Chinese, so its probably easier for you. At the sametime you seemed a bit confused about what is what too; Qiushi is published by the Central Party School and is not directly subordinate to the CC (the Central Party School is directly subordinated however...) ... I'll be honest, I can try and help, but I probably wouldn't be of much help, but I'll try... As for the edit I reversed on the CPC article, its because Its wrong (its true), but its because it lacks a reference (considering that the article is a GA, to many of those edits will lead it to lose its GA-status.. ) --TIAYN (talk) 21:16, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
This page was mostly translated from its corresponding Chinese article, so its lack of accuracy can be blamed there. It is true that there will be some problematic cases such as in the case of Central Financial Work Commission, but in the Hu years these "Central Leading Groups" seem to have streamlined quite a bit. Hu made it part of his mandate to publicize the work of these Leading Groups, as well as their membership. Since then the CLGs have emerged as a somewhat distinctive feature of the CPC as compared against other Marxist-Leninist parties (correct me if I'm wrong), and is an interesting feature of the Chinese political system. Anyway, since Xi came to power he has started three new CLGs which are ostensibly at a higher level than what Hu's CLGs were intended to be, including "Deepening Reforms", "Military Reform" and "Internet Security"; these CLGs, especially "Deepening reform", has a large contingent full-time staff and sometimes acts as an executive agency rather than just a policy coordination body as CLGs were intended to be. He also created the National Security Commission which is not a CLG and seems to have extraordinary decision making power. Colipon+(Talk) 21:34, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
You're right, its unique. The closest thing I could think of is when the Politburo established commissions (but they were not permanent; only established to study cases). Question, do you know when the CLG system established? It doesn't seem Dengist to me, but I may be wrong.. Another problem, what is the National Security Commission.. It is a Politburo organ or a CC organ. I just wonder, because I never found out what it is. It was established by the Central Committee, but so was the CCDI. The same problem could be said of the CLGs - they are organized by the Politburo... I guess what I'm saying is that this is a definitional question. I also wonder if you can claim that the CLG are subordinate to the CC, its an ad-hoc body; why would that need to be directly subordinate to one institution? In Soviet studies you talk of organs directly subordinate to the Central Committee Apparatus (or simply the Central Committee Apparat). The CPC has no term for apparat, from what I know at least.. According to Xinhua [1] there are 27 instuttions directly subordinated to the CC. I admit, some of these I have never heard of, such as Central Organizing Committee (not the Organization Department) and the COmmunications Office... But for all my questions, there probably is just one answer; the CPC must have a list somewhere, right? --TIAYN (talk) 12:54, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Sorry If I sound a bit to pessimistic; its possible, I've just created a list for all the offices within the CCDI and the institutions directly subordinate to it here. If I can do it for the CCDI, it should be much easier to find for the CC. --TIAYN (talk) 13:21, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
I myself am not sure, academic work in this area is very hard to come by. According to this article, by the author of the only full academic treatise on CLGs ever written published in 2010, CLGs were formed in the mid 1950's. The first was ostensibly the "Leading Group for Taiwan" established in July 1954, the second was a group on nuclear power. In any case, these groups don't appear to be institutionalized whatsoever and do not appear in the party constitution; some of them are remarkably ad-hoc bodies founded and dissolved within a few years, others are essentially permanent bodies with full complement of staff, probably most notable is the CLG on Taiwan. Only since Hu Jintao have the regular workings of these groups been published in official media sources. It seems their main role is to 'discuss and consult' on matters of concern to that portfolio, submit the report to the Politburo, so that the Politburo could make more informed decisions; essentially the final resolution from a CLG is considered the consensus of members of that group, and therefore the most optimal policy, as it would be tough for members of the Politburo to upstage this consensus. Therefore some CLGs have a remarkable amount of power. It is also notable that Xi's CLGs all went thru full ratification of the 3rd and 4th Plenums of the 18th CC, I am not sure if Hu's CLGs went through the same process or were simply 'commissioned' by fiat of the Politburo.
Another important distinction is that between a CLG and a "Commission", which unfortunately bears the same translation as a "Committee". A commission is an officially mandated body reporting directly to the CC (in reality the Politburo), examples include the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs (probably the most well-known), on "Spiritual Civilization", on "Social Management", on "Restructuring Institutions", and to answer your question above, also on "National Security". It is interesting though that Political+Legal, Social Management, and National Security Commissions will all have somewhat overlapping mandates, since they all have something to do with domestic control. Also notable is that some of the General Offices reporting to a CLG, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, do appear on the official org-charts of the CC, but the CLG does not. Colipon+(Talk) 14:40, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The problems with scholars from the West (or more general, scholars from liberal democracies) is that they believe institutions generally don't play a very important role in dictatorships, and if they do, its generally very few. For instance, I don't know if you've read Fukuyama's new book, but he claims that China has strong institutions (but the only institutions which are strong are those copied from the West). We don't believe in a dictatorships ability to renew itself because we consider that a monopoly of democracy (and in the few cases its done, it doesn't last forever).. Its stupidity, and worst of all, its ideology clouding over the social sciences. To the point, I don't think leading small groups are CC organs. To use the definition from the Organization of the Communist Party of China article (which is referenced); "A Central Leading Group, also translated as a "Leading Small Group", (领导小组; lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ) is an ad hoc supra-ministerial coordinating and consulting body formed to build consensus on issues that cut across the government, party, and military systems when the existing bureaucratic structure is unable to do so." Such an organ by definition can't only be a CC organ can it? I'm guesing the reason why these groups are so important for Xi is that they "centralizes" the discussion even further, and gives him more power to control it. The few times they've met they haven't actually done anything. Of course, the last part is just a theory of mine... I think you got the answer right there "notable is that some of the General Offices reporting to a CLG, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, do appear on the official org-charts of the CC, but the CLG does not." I think a separate list for central leading groups should be created. --TIAYN (talk) 15:33, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
I just read the full section on "Organization of the CPC" and checked the references. The section is not accurate. For instance it conflates Party Groups of non-party institutions (i.e., dangzu) with Central Leading Groups (i.e. lingdao xiaozu) which are two totally distinct concepts; therefore that section will require some editing. It seems from my reading of Chinese-language sources and the Chinese wikipedia, particularly the article I linked you above, that the first CLGs were created formally as a result of the 4th Plenum of the 8th CC, and therefore are not government organs. Also they always incorporate the word "Central" (i.e., zhongyang), which can imply it is part of the Central Committee, but you are right that this is not totally clear, since the term dangzhongyang (i.e., the Party Centre) is thrown around very liberally whether it means the Politburo, PSC, or the CC. In the case of Leading Groups, it seems that they report, de facto, into the Politburo, not the CC, but we currently list on Wikipedia the formal structure, not the actual structure, as seen on the navbox template for "Organization of the CPC". Nowadays, CLGs belong to either the government or the party, never both. Party CLGs always have a PSC member as its head, while Government CLGs always have the Premier or Vice-Premier as its head. Party CLGs are meant to formulate policies, while government CLGs are for the implementation of the same policies. I hope this clarifies things a little more. Colipon+(Talk) 19:06, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee reestablished the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, but the CCDI is not an institution of the Central Committee.. Central could also imply the government; as in the Central People's Government (I'm guessing this term is still used...) ... I'm pretty sure that the central leading groups reports to the Central Committee when its in session (just as the party leadership "reports" on its duties to the delegates of the National Congress). And an even better arguement, politburos were established to represent and take decisions in the name of the central committee (since it contained to many members). These decisions were later looked at by the CC in plenary session. The formal procedure even existed under Stalin, of course, I say formal... You clearly know more about this than I. Its a field of Chinese politics which is barely mentioned, but its a unique innovation. Instead of reforming the party structure, they've created bodies to spread the discussions which goes on in one sector to others. Instead of reforming democratic centralism, they've cheated it.. But I don't know enough about this to help you; its always mentioned in passing, and as you say, no one has actually written about it (the exception being of course in language I don't understand).... I can help you with the CC problem, but not the CLG problem... But I know something you can help me with; helping me write a CCDI Standing Committee (no one in the English language have written about this Standing Committee in any detail, but I'm guessing plenty of Chinese have).
Number two, I'll see if the university library has access to the Directory of Officials and Organizations in China (published in 2003), it may hold some answers. --TIAYN (talk) 23:09, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Yes they have it, but the 1998 one. It may still help. Thirdly, is the Xi infobox finished? --TIAYN (talk) 23:11, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
At last, [ http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca-cds/article/viewFile/427/425 according to this you're right it seems]. --TIAYN (talk) 23:41, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
Hello, that is a great find! Also, looks like you've done a great job at the "CCDI" article. My favourite is the Wei Jianxing quote - speaks volumes. I also spent some time over the weekend to read over your "ideology of the CPC" article, which is very well done! Looks like you figured out the "Standing Committee" part of the CCDI article as well, do you still need more help there?

The Xi infobox is basically done. I'm happy to put it up and revise later if need be directly in the article itself. Colipon+(Talk) 02:48, 22 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: Thanks! ... I agree about the Wei quote, but from what I learn the CPC is slowly moving in the right direction. Secondly, should the Ministry of Supervision article be merged with the CCDI? Its internal functions were merged with the CCDI in 1993, but the internal functions and department structures are CCDI and not MOS. Any thoughts? Thirdly, if you can expand on the Standing Committee I would appreciate. It currently has three lines, but not on what it does. I don't even have a source for what a CCDI plenum does. I have a faint idea of course, but still. It doesn't say anywhere. Fourth, future project for you, the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work (there nothings written about it in English, but it apparently controls the central inspection teams (it was a merger of the Organization Department and the CCDI teams pre-2011). Fifth, go ahead, the Xi infobox looks great. --TIAYN (talk) 14:56, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
I don't think the Minister of Supervision should be merged, as they are not quite "One organ, two nameplates". While they do work from the same office building, the MOS is mandated with investigating any corruption files involving non-Communist Party civil servants, and technically the CCDI cannot interfere in this as it is a party organ. In addition the Minister of Supervision is totally distinct from the CCDI chief, whereas in the case of the party and state CMCs they are clearly one in the same. I can write up the article on CLG for Inspection Work for sure - do you think any of the other CLGs are worth writing about?

By the way, on the CCDI article, I have two questions. 1. Are you ok to remove "of the Communist Party of China" from the article title? I don't think it usage of "Central Commission for Discipline Inspection" is ambiguous and we should be as brief as possible as long as the name is unambiguous. 2. Do you reasonably forsee articles ever being created for the section "Offices" and "Offices and "Institutions subordinate to the CCDI"? If not maybe it is best to remove those red links. Personally I do see a point in creating maybe one or two articles from that list but that's about it. Colipon+(Talk) 21:45, 22 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: In addition the Minister of Supervision is totally distinct from the CCDI chief; this is were you're wrong, the current MOS chief Huang Shuxian is a CCDI Deputy Secretary, and therefore responsible to the CCDI's decisions, right? .. And as said, maybe not clear enough in the article, the offices within the MOS were merged into the CCDI's offices (that is the MOS offices were abolished, and the MOS staff began working for CCDI's offices). And as the Chinese WP website makes clear, the MOS' headquarters is the CCDI office.. "do you think any of the other CLGs are worth writing about" — I'm guessing those which have existed for a while, and are held by Politburo Standing Committee members (of course, few exceptions, such as the Central Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development)... But it all depends, the Central leading group for Inspection Work could just as easily have its own section in the CCDI article - its not like the article will be anything more then a stub or start (considering how the Chinese press write very little about leading groups in general) .. " Are you ok to remove "of the Communist Party of China" from the article title? " — I just asked an admin if he would be willing to move the article (its impossible to move without an admin currently).. "2. Do you reasonably forsee articles ever being created for the section "Offices" and "Offices and "Institutions subordinate to the CCDI"? .. THose offices are clearly not notable enough, but the journals and the institutions probably are. But red link, no link — I know one thing, I'm not creating those articles. But I don't really care. I've never had a problem with red links, but if you have, just remove them. --TIAYN (talk) 21:58, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
You're right about MOS & CCDI, I think a good reason to maintain separate articles is that the MOS and CCDI have different institutional histories. I don't think I will be creating an article for "Central Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development", it was a temporary thing, and I don't think Xi will be "studying" the Scientific Outlook any time soon. As for CLG for Inspection, there is actually a good reason to build out the article, as there has been quite a few "Circuit Groups" that report into the CLG for Inspection that have been doing some major work of late in Xi's anti-corruption campaign. FWIW, I'm not ordinarily bothered by redlinks unless I am reasonably sure there will never be an article for that link. Colipon+(Talk) 23:27, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Good enough for me :) ... The Organization of the Communist Party of China article defines a leading group as an ad-hoc consulting body. This can't be the case if the Central leading group for Inspection Work actually control the central inspection teams (and not the CCDI). The summary of what a leading group is is missing something. Or am I missing something? --TIAYN (talk) 16:09, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
Like I said before, that section is quite inaccurate. In reality the purpose of the CLGs seem to differ for every leader, also the 'permanent' CLGs such as "Foreign Affairs" and "Finance & Economics" are totally different in function from the 'temporary' CLGs such as "Study Scientific Development" or "Beijing Olympics". "Deepening Reforms" is said to be expiring in 2020 when its goals have been accomplished. In addition, some of the General Offices of the CLGs have significant institutional power and permanent staff. In any case, we will have to re-write that section. As for the inspection teams, I'm not sure if you are referring to the Xunshi CLG? The Chinese article for what I think is the Central Leading Group for Inspection is here, which lists all the recent "inspection teams" dispatched after the 18th Congress; I checked the sources and they do not explicitly mention whether these 'teams' report into the CCDI or the CLG for Inspection, I only assume the latter because it is a group whose specific task is inspection. You also imply that the Inspection CLG has been around for a while, but the Chinese article says it has only been around since 2009. Colipon+(Talk) 21:30, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The CLGIW was created in 2009, but its "predecessor" (if you could even call it that) was the joint collaboration between the Organization Department and the CCDI, and it was this collaboration which formed the basis for the current CLGIW, right? Thats my understanding of it at least, but there is a large enough possibility that I'm wrong on this. --TIAYN (talk) 22:05, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The one copied from Chinese WP is correct. --TIAYN (talk) 09:13, 24 December 2014 (UTC)
Indeed you're correct. I have now written the article for the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work, now only a handful more to go before we complete the 'major' CLGs. You are welcome to make changes as you see fit. :) Colipon+(Talk) 16:34, 24 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Great work. I will check it out. --TIAYN (talk) 20:45, 25 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I have reached the conclusion that having a separate article on bodies under the CC may not be such a good idea. The reason? Simply because all these institutions could easily be mentioned in a CC article which is expanded. I think it should be a matter of improving the original CC article, and if that's not enough, we could probably make a list of CC institutions.... Secondly, how do you transliterate "李正亭".. I've used countless of engines, but all of them translate it into "A Statement".. I need it for the Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Thanks. --TIAYN (talk) 09:35, 26 December 2014 (UTC)

CC[edit]

Those three characters transliterate into "Li Zhengting". The "Bodies under CC" article would be a 'list' and would correspond with the Chinese wiki, the CC article can mention some of the more important bodies but the more obscure ones probably only belong under a separate article. What do you think? Colipon+(Talk) 19:33, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Thanks, now the article/list is complete (I hope...). .. Thats OK of course. My layout (for the CC article) would be something like this;
  • History
    • Mao years
    • Deng–Jiang years
    • Hu to present
  • Powers, procedures and role
    • Duties and responsibilities
    • Democratic centralism
    • Election of CC
    • Informal politics
    • Sessions
  • Membership
  • Apparatus (for the lack of a better word...)
    • The offices of chairman and general secretary
    • Permanent bodies (again, for the lack of a better word)
      • Central Military Commission (is it?)
      • Politburo
        • Politburo Standing Committee
      • Secretariat
    • Central leading groups
    • Commissions and departments
    • Party education system
    • Ideology
    • Media
      • People's Daily (maybe...)
    • Military and police control
  • Non-CC bodies
    • Control over the state
    • Relation to the CCDI
Any suggestions, or better thoughts? --TIAYN (talk) 20:11, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
Looks pretty good. My concern is that parts of it will become redundant with the "Communist Party of China" article or the "Organization of the CPC" article - those two articles already overlap about 80%... Colipon+(Talk) 18:58, 28 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Sorry for the postponed response, was thinking on the problems (for longer then I should :P).. Anyhow, you're right, the CPC and the CPC Organization articles are, to be honest, exact copies (minus one section). The reason being that, when I created the CPC Organization article, I thought it would be better to have an organization article then no organization article at all... The Ideology of the Communist Party of China suffers from the same problem, but not as extensively. First, the CC article will dwell on the issues of CC organs more thorough then the CC organization will. The CPC article won't expand on organizational issues, unless it has to (if for example a new central organ is established) or if radial institutional reform of the CPC takes place (which doesn't seem likely).. The CPC Organization article can expand on all fields (and should), but most emphasize should be on expanding the lower-levels organization section. Someone (probably going to be me :P) should expand it and give more focus on each level, such as provincial, city and such ... In general, much more space will be given to the subordinate organs of the CC in the CC article then in the CPC organization article because of page constraints (therefore, that section should not be expanded)... I share you're worries, but I see a solution in sight. First, the CPC Organization article needs to be expanded, and when that is done, the CC should be expanded article. In this area I'm a Gorbachevian; that is, always the eternal optimist. A solution will be found. --TIAYN (talk) 18:43, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
I like your optimism! For me, I would like to cut down on the details at the "Communist Party of China" article, but you are probably reluctant since I know that was your 'baby' that got taken to GA status. Ideally people should click on the link to the "Organization" article if they want to find out more about what this office does and what leading groups are and so on. As you probably see I have been busy working on some articles related to recent changes in the provincial ranks (these are largely administrative changes which are boring but always necessary), but you are free to dig into the article at "Central Committee" and I'll assist when I can. Also do note I created an article for Party Standing Committee - I'm not sure if Vietnam or former Soviet Union had these at the local level so excuse me for writing from a "Chinese perspective" yet again. These bodies are very powerful locally but there is no article in the English wikipedia that deals with it at all. Colipon+(Talk) 20:24, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: I agree, certain parts of the CPC article could be shortened (I'm thinking mostly of "History" and "Organization". I moved the subordinate organs section to the CPC Organization article, and thinking of shortening the CPC members section. I find it bit more difficult to shorten the sections on the central organs (since most of them are small to begin with), but this can of course be fixed.... The Vietnamese have standing committees, the Soviets had the same, but called them bureaus (different names for the same thing.).. I believe it would be best to either move it to "Standing committee of the Communist Party of China", or, in the future, create a Lower-level organizations of the Communist Party of China (the articles on provinicial committees and those below won't be very long due to a combination of a lack of interest by scholars and WP editors in general I would argue).... But I'm still not finished with the CCDI article; currently reading "Objective Responsibility vs. Subjective Responsibility: A Critical Reading of the CCP's Internal Supervision Regulation" and "The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission in the Reform Era", and trying to get access to "The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas" and "The Dual Nature of Anti-corruption Agencies in China" (which I hope the university have access to, if not, I'll buy at least one of them)... I must admit, I consider myself to have above average knowledge of Chinese politics, but I've never heard of the "Internal Supervision Regulation" before I read the aforementioned article, and its extremely important (at least as a hallmark) it seems, since its the first published regulation on the party's internal control/inspection system.. Have you heard of it? --TIAYN (talk) 21:25, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
China is full of Standing Committees, literally everywhere. All the legislatures are modeled after the Standing Committee model of the Central Committee of the CPC, including the National People's Congress, the CPPCC, and all provincial and local subsidiaries thereof. The CCDI and all provincial CDIs have SCs. All party committees down to the township level have a standing committee. All real power is the vested in the Standing Committee. The larger committee that the SC represents, whatever it may be, convenes very rarely and does more ratifying and legitimizing than actually discussing, I'm sure you're well aware. Anyway I have no idea what "internal supervision regulation" refers to, my best guess would be that it's non-publicized rules about how to carry out inspections and anti-corruption efforts and things like Shuanggui, because they became so out of control as local governments did whatever they pleased when carrying out directives from superiors, such as torturing their subjects and so on. Also I'd add that local government is actually much more important in affecting people's lives, and that, at least before Xi, many local governments operated largely by their own fiat and often ignored decisions of the centre altogether. Chen Liangyu's Shanghai, Shanxi for most of its post-Cultural Revolution history, and Bo Xilai's Chongqing stand out as the most notable examples. This is why I think Hu's "Harmonious Society" and "Scientific Perspective" sounded good in theory but they had a very difficult time implementing this vision. Anyways, this is digressing. I do agree that having a bigger article about lower-level organizations is preferable to having separate articles. How is CCDI article coming along? Colipon+(Talk) 18:32, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: I get that, I do. But I've changed my mind, the article should be left as it is (and a section should be added about the Vietnamese and Laotian standing committee; it could work like a sort of a disambig page), and the lower-level article should still be created sometime in the future. But there is SO much to do.. You would have thought the largest organization by members would get more attention on WP, but no :p .....
I've read the articles (and the university had access)! Very good articles, and they show (some better then others) the Dengist approach to formalize procedures, defining what discipline breaches and creating formal accountability (not saying people and institutions should just do stuff, and not write/publish a regulation or anything about it as happened during the Mao era/in the Soviet Union)... I've stated that Deng was not a radical institutional reformer too you before (and while when it comes to the leading party bodies that assessment is right), he did push for the formalization of supervision procedures; for instance, regulations defined a breach of party discipline being to uphold collective leadership, while under Mao it was usually defined as being a good communist (and that last idea led to the Cultural Revolution).. The "Internal Supervision Regulation" was the first regulation/party by-law to formalize the CPC's inner-party supervision system (and is the first regulation by any ruling communist party to formalize its control system), how it worked, what procedures needed to be taken by lower-level party members to report higher ups for corruption (and how they are protected from the accused), defining breaches of party discipline (last time that had been done was in the 1980s), the role of the CCDI and the CDIs, etc. Every ruling communist party have, with the exception of the 1980s Yugoslav party, adherred to their party by-laws in the breach (and the CPC still does this with the CC) but the formalisation of procedures and duties, and the relation between the CCDI and other institutions, make that much more difficult. This is good, what is bad is that it formalized the "dual leadership" system and what made the CCDI so ineffective in the first place. But of the system is reformable, and the CPC is reforming the system, albeit very slowly'... The articles are good reads; if you're ever interested I could send them too you.
I'm writing at least three more section; "Inner-party supervision", "Defining discipline breaches" and "CCDI–state relations". After that I need to give the article a decent copyedit, but thats all (I think). The history section is finished, and I can't find much information on its central organization. Did you know that it is "alleged" that both Wei Jianxing and Wu Guanzheng tendered their resignation in protest of the CCDI's institutional weakness? It seems both far-fetched, and realistic at the same time. They were probably the men who were criticized for the party's poor handling of the anti-corruption strategy, and none of the two could respond to the situation in any meaningful way because of the system itself. That these men were the first to call for reform of the system is not very surprising, or is it? Anyhow, to answer the question, its going well. The only being that I don't have access to academic work from Hong Kong, but I can't complain.--TIAYN (talk) 21:52, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for your response, I appreciate it. I am very surprised to hear about Wei Jianxing and Wu Guanzheng threatening to quit and it is certainly the first time I've heard of it. What is the source? One expects that Wang Qishan is having a pretty good time right about now and won't be considering the same thing any time soon (if you know what I mean)! It's very nice to see how thoroughly you conduct your research. In any case, I agree that there is too much work left to do. There's a couple of more things that I wanted to ask you if you've come across in your research, first is, what exactly is specifically defined as a "violations of discipline"? It seems from the recent sweeping crackdown on officials that the most oft-cited "violations" are "abuse of power for the illicit gain of others, taking large amounts of bribes" and curiously, "adultery". So the party considers extramarital relationships in and of itself an offense...? Secondly, I know there's a lot of controversy about Shuanggui, some say they torture subjects to extract forced confessions, yet others say that it is really the only way to ensure that all the facts are established without interference from the guanxi of the subject, particularly in the form of intervention from patrons. But my question for you is, when it comes to Shuangui'ing top officials like Zhou Yongkang, what exactly is the procedure?? And do these centrally mandated "targets" of Shuanggui also face the same "enhanced interrogation techniques" as their lower-level counterparts? Colipon+(Talk) 03:03, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: Its mentioned in the "Ma, Stephen K. (March 2008). "The dual nature of anti-corruption agencies in China". Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2) (Springer Netherlands). pp. 153–162" source. The article sources an article from Cheng Ming Monthly. The magazine is the "most widely-read political magazine in Hong Kong" according to themselves. But of course, the article says "alleged".
According to "Gong, Ting (2009). "Chapter 3: Dual dimensions of responsibility: The internal disciplinary regulations of the Chinese Communist Party". In Li, Linda Chelan. Towards Responsible Government in East Asia: Trajectories, Intentions and Meanings. Routledge. pp. 50–67. ISBN 041545316X" the "Internal Supervision Regulation" stated that these eighth points were subject to permanent institutional oversight; "(1) adhering to the Party Constitution, general policies, and decisions; (2) obeying the law; (3) practicing democratic centralism; (4) respecting members' rights; (5) implementing the Party's personnel policies; (6) staying in close touch with the public and working for their basic interests; and (7) observing professional integrity.". There are others too, but Ting Gong doesn't care to mention all of them.... Zhou, and Bo to a certain extent, both violated at least point 1 and 3 (dictatorial), 2 (corruption), and 7 (adultery). Adultery is a problem since its a breach of professional integrity . For instance, these two women were expelled from the party on charges of adultery, but they were not prosecuted by the state (because they never broke any state laws). As the article says, the CDIC "said adultery was not against law, but was regarded as unacceptable behaviour for party members".
In "Guo, Xuezhi (September 2014). "Controlling Corruption in the Party: China's Central Discipline Inspection Commission". The China Quarterly 219 (Cambridge University Press for the School of Oriental and African Studies). pp. 597–624" its stated (without any doubts it seems) that its the local CDIs which are the problem, and the not the CCDI. Torture is illegal in Shuanggui. The three people who died last year in shuanggui, Yu Qiyi, Jia Jiuxiang and Qian Guoliang, were tortured to death in shuanggui controlled by local CDIs in Huangmei in Hubei, Wenzhou in Zhejiang and Sanmenxia in Henan. He notes, somewhat drily, that this is to be blamed on poor training and the fact that the operation itself is carried away from any lawful oversight... According to Guo, all form of cadres are sent to shuanggui, and they are treated as "comrades" until proven guilty. The problem here of course is that those three probably never admitted corrupt behaviour (or even worse, were never guilty in the first place), but the inspectors were certain that they had gotten the correct men. If Guo is right in that its the local CDIs and not the CCDI which breaches these rules, then I'm guessing that Zhou and Bo were not tortured physically, but there is of course tremendous psychological pressure since every party officials fears the shuanggui system itself - just being there in the first place is torture in itself I guess. To answer the question, torture is illegal in China, and in shuanggui is not a special case. The "enhanced interrogation techniques" are not supposed to happen in the first place, but does since the person (and the local CDIs it seems) are effectively closed out from outside supervision. Torturing high-level officials would not make sense. The party is trying to portray itself as of late as a law-abiding institution. Having a tortured Zhou show up in court would not help Xi's cause of establishing the "rule of law", and Bo was clearly not tortured (I don't believe a tortured man would try to defend himself in court). This is were Xi's rule of law reforms come in; if the centre amasses more power over the judiciary and the CDIs, the chances of these things happening will be reduced. Xi's reform is not so much about "rule of law" as trying to create a system in which only the party centre can breach the law if needs be (centralizing power). --TIAYN (talk) 12:39, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

Hu Jintao[edit]

Look at what I actually did before reverting. You obviously didn't.

You also didn't actually *read* what I said.. The way the infobox was, it took up 1/2 the page in the browser. That is not normal. It also wasn't accessibility friendly. Bgwhite (talk) 08:42, 24 December 2014 (UTC)

Ah, just say your message on my page. Not fun when we are typing at the same time. Thank you. Bgwhite (talk) 08:46, 24 December 2014 (UTC)

Seasonal Greets![edit]

Wikipedia Happy New Year.png Merry Christmas and a Prosperous 2015!!!

Hello Trust Is All You Need, may you be surrounded by peace, success and happiness on this seasonal occasion. Spread the WikiLove by wishing another user a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, whether it be someone you have had disagreements with in the past, a good friend, or just some random person. Sending you a heartfelt and warm greetings for Christmas and New Year 2015.
Happy editing,
Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 11:00, 25 December 2014 (UTC)

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Disambiguation link notification for December 30[edit]

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please help[edit]

original version
messed up current version

in Template:Infobox political party the results bars are seperated to far vertically from each other, the original version looked aesthetically better can you please help me? Dannis243 (talk) 16:10, 3 January 2015 (UTC)

hello?! Dannis243 (talk) 12:40, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
@Dannis243: I'm not good at infoboxes, sorry. My advice is simple, create a sandbox, User:Dannis243/Sandbox, and revert all the changes you made to the current version, and move you're current version to the sandbox (and when you've fixed the problem, you can move the sandbox version to the page). That's literally the best thing I can do. I'm not a "infobox dude", its not were I "shine". --TIAYN (talk) 12:49, 4 January 2015 (UTC)

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Talk:Hafizullah Amin[edit]

Please could you use the article talk page to discuss your objections to recent edits.-- Toddy1 (talk) 07:53, 12 February 2015 (UTC)

Vietnamese articles[edit]

Hello, TIAYN. I want to inform you that, for a past few days, user Phuchoang92 (user contributions - [2]) is making some edits on articles related to Vietnamese officeholders to which I can't agree. Firstly, he tried to put list of Vietnamese presidents to article President of Vietnam, although that article isn't for list, but for description of office (he did exactly the same thing in the July of last year, with this edit - [3], and you reverted it). Next, he uploads a number of non-free images and put them to articles, lists, etc although its known that such images aren't appropriate for that. In the end, and most important, he apparently wants to remove section about the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam from List of Presidents of Vietnam and List of Prime Ministers of Vietnam. I really can't agree with that, that section should remain a part of those lists (as both Democratic Republic and Provisional Revolutionary Government formed the current Vietnamese state in 1976)... Also, I think he doesn't edit just as Phuchoang92, but also as Nariko92 (user contributions - [4]). Is that a sock puppetry? I assume he's also using a number of IP addresses... I reverted him several times, but I have no intention to go to edit war with him. I also left a message on his talk page, but he didn't respond. I felt obliged to inform you about this issue, because you spend a great deal of time working on these Vietnamese articles, and I wanted to know what you think about all of this. Cheers! --Sundostund (talk) 13:29, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization[edit]

Hello, haven't seen you around very often lately. What is your next big project? I am curious, what do you know about the so-called "Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization"? Why was this commission ever created and what is it supposed to achieve? If it is basically a propaganda group, then how does it differ from the leading group for Propaganda Work? Is "spiritual civilization" a Marxist concept or is it purely a CPC creation? Colipon+(Talk) 15:41, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Several reasons, after working on the CCDI for such a long period I felt I needed a rest from Wikipedia. Secondly, real life has been keeping me busy. My plan is the same; fix the CPC organization article, then the CPC Central Committee article... Spiritual Civilization is a CPC term to denote the Marxist concept of superstructure. It came to prominence under Deng.
The CPC has argued over the years that China has an advanced spiritual/superstructural relations, but a backward material/production relations (this idea is based on the Marxist concept of uneven development). This line has been policy since 1949, and explains the policies New Democracy (but also the Soviet line during the 1920s of New Economic Policy). However, Mao came to believe that spiritual/superstructural relations could dominate the material base (the economy) and therefore that the economy could jump from feudalism, low-staged capitalism straight to socialist production if the superstructural relations (that is, the people, the political system etc) were socialist. The official party-line is that this failed, and was un-Marxist (which it was). Marx claimed that the material base (the economy) reproduces a superstructure; for instance, feudalism, capitalism or socialism will inevitably produce a political system which safeguards its interests. To quote Marx; "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." Example, if a person is born poor doesn't mean he will stay poor, but he will confront a "culture" (for a lack of a better word) which belongs to the poor and therefore have views which delineate from that; the same goes for the rich, the capitalist, the worker. In short, circumstances matter.
Marx did believe that superstructural relations could affect the material base, but he did not believe that superstructural relations could force "jumps through stages" - such a view was condemned as idealism. The main contradiction in China, according to Deng, was that the material base was lagging behind the spiritual base (uneven development). According to Marx France was undergoing uneven development in the aftermath of the French Revolution (its spiritual base was more developed then its material base). In France, an advanced bourgeoise capitalist culture had developed, but the economy was still not an advanced capitalist economy (like Britain). In present-day China the concept of spiritual civilization is linked to the theory of the primary stage of socialism; China has a low material base and therefore has to use capitalist methods to develop the productive forces and the relations of production (in non-Marxist terms; China has to develop the economy, which leads to technological change, and which will over time change labour relations), but it has an advanced spiritual base (proven by the fact that the CPC still rules and its ideology dominates the ideological landscape, see cultural hegemony). The problem for the CPC is that Marxism states that the material base dominates the rest; this means that the non-socialist elements in present China are a threat to the socialist superstructural relations. The Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization is probably responsible for disseminating what the party considers socialist ideology so as to combat non-socialist ideological penetration. Xi's campaign against Western values is probably an example of this, but also Hu's "Socialist Concepts on Honours and Disgraces". The belief that material forces produce superstructural changes (for instance, electricity leads to the radio, the radio leads to music, and the music is, to but it crudely, the music of the level in which the productive forces [the economy] have reached) still dominates Chinese thought. As the The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China notes Liu Yunshan believes that the material base dominates and changes the superstructural base (it should be noted that the author himself does not seem to understand that this is Marxism and seems to consider such a view strange, and only strange).
Short answer: its a very important concept in CPC discourse. If this concept is proven false, the whole course set by Deng is wrong. If this is wrong, then China should have a political system which protects capitalism and not socialism. Its one of the few pure Marxist concept left which CPC officials always refer to (Xi's speeches, Hu's speeches are/were always peppered with references to the material and spiritual civilizations; its even mentioned in the state constitution). The commission was probably established to keep conservatives and Marxist theoreticians happy (since it could just as easily be a subdivision within the CPC Propaganda Department). .. Sorry for a long answer, but you did not ask a small question. --TIAYN (talk) 16:43, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection[edit]

Orphaned non-free image File:Picture of Vo Chi Cong.jpeg[edit]

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Anti-Corruption[edit]

Hi, I started a draft, you may have noticed already, at my sandbox on the "anti-corruption campaign". Feel free to contribute if you have time. Colipon+(Talk) 19:35, 27 February 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: I will, but now. I've just downloaded 30-40 articles on CPC organizational system below the central level. I will of course; you gave me a helping hand with the CCDI articles so I owe you. --TIAYN (talk) 21:41, 27 February 2015 (UTC)
The article is somewhat complete now and can be migrated into mainspace should you be around to copyedit and comment. Colipon+(Talk) 20:28, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

Stalin[edit]

You still working on your redo of the Stalin article? If so, want any help. or would you prefer just to get on with it yourself? --YeOldeGentleman (talk) 20:41, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

I would love some help! ... But I havn't started yet. I haven't been that active for a while. Due to exam and real life. Currently, I have two things on my plate, rewriting the Organization of the Communist Party of China article and helping Colipon write an article on Xi Jinping's current anti-corruption campaign. I'll probably work on these through March. I have all the sources I need (and finding new ones aren't that difficult either) so it shouldn't be that difficult to start. --TIAYN (talk) 10:18, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

Numbering the Soviet Central Committees[edit]

While it is absolutely (whispering) original I nevertheless really like your approach of numbering of the Central Committees to match the RKP/VKP/CPSU Congresses that elected them. I do question your leaving out the extremely important Central Control Commissions in lieu of including the obscure Central Auditing Committees, however, and think it would probably be best if you rethought the ummmm (whispering) originality of the naming protocol. A change to List of party officials elected by the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (for example) could include the CCC as well and would not run into the what seems to me inevitable big problem of, ummmm, (whispering) originality. Best regards and keep up the good work! —Tim //// Carrite (talk) 17:53, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

@Carrite: Thanks. I'm not finished. I got all the info from this site. As you know copying names is boring, so I suddenly found other things to do (I know, I lack discipline). In any case, is it original? The communist parties of China, Laos and Vietnam number their central committees, and the Workers' Party of Korea used to . Anyhow, that would probably be better names. I'll fix it when I have time. --TIAYN (talk) 20:31, 13 March 2015 (UTC)
I've never seen the Soviet Central Committees numbered like that anywhere in the literature. My initial reaction was: What the fuck?!?!?!?!?' I think the idea is sound but you have to take care not to invent a numbering system and install that as if it is official terminology, because eventually some Russian history expert will call you on it and there is no way to defend it against OR charges if someone pushes hard enough. Simple phrasing should do the trick — "Central Committee (10) (12)" rather than "(10th) (12th) Central Committee" in the info boxes and a rename and expansion along the lines of what I have outlined above would put you on solid ground, in my estimation. best, —Tim /// Carrite (talk) 21:36, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

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excellent stuff on 中纪委 piece[edit]

i was reading through the careful account of the history of the zhongjiwei and its various incarnations and splinters, the control commission, and all such things. I was quite surprised that wikipedia had such detailed, granular information on such a (to most) recondite topic -- with what excellent references, to boot. so i obviously had to poke through the history and find out who'd gone to the trouble. great work! the feeling i have - simple respect for honest intellectual labor done anonymously - is exactly the one i wish to engender in other readers. better get to work. Happy monsoon day 22:50, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Don't really know what I can say (I seldom get compliments). Anyhow, I didn't do it all on my own (Colipon helped me). Anyhow, thanks. --TIAYN (talk) 07:33, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
its an obscure area so that makes sense. regarding this - do you think readers will know precisely what 'central-level' means?Happy monsoon day 12:34, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
changed to Central Committee. --TIAYN (talk) 21:51, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
but is that really the case? I thought the CCDI was unified under the pbsc and pb. anyway, if we had to source that sentence, what would the ref be? Happy monsoon day 13:36, 8 April 2015 (UTC)
The Politburo, the PSC are Central Committee institutions... Without the Central Committee, no PB or PSC. Without the PB and PSC there would still exist a Central Committee. The composition of the CEntral COmmission for Discipline Inspection is elected by the national congress and needs to be ratified by the 1st plenary session of the Central Committee. --TIAYN (talk) 14:39, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

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Xi template[edit]

Hi, when you have some time, please help put more things onto Template:Xi Jinping. Anything that you think deserves an article please inject it to the template, so that we have something to 'work towards'. Thanks, Colipon+(Talk) 16:05, 16 April 2015 (UTC)

OK. --TIAYN (talk) 11:09, 19 April 2015 (UTC)