Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
|Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia|
|Part of the Cold War|
Šafárikovo námestie, Bratislava: Emil Gallo baring his chest in a gesture of protest
|Commanders and leaders|
| Leonid Brezhnev
| Alexander Dubček
|500,000 (27 divisions)
6,300 tanks, 800 airplanes, 2,000 cannons
|200,000 / 600,000 = 30 divisions in 2–3 days
(with general mobilization about 2,500,000)[clarification needed] more than 250 airplanes 2,500–3,000 tanks (numbers classified)
|Casualties and losses|
| 96 killed (84 in accidents),
10 killed (in accidents and suicides)
4 killed (in accidents)
|108 civilians killed, over 500 wounded.|
On the night of 20–21 August 1968, the Soviet Union and its main allies in the Warsaw Pact – Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, and Poland – invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in order to halt Alexander Dubček's Prague Spring political liberalisation reforms.
In the operation, codenamed Danube, approximately 500,000 troops attacked Czechoslovakia; approximately 500 Czechs and Slovaks were wounded and 108 killed in the invasion. The invasion successfully stopped the liberalisation reforms and strengthened the authority of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). The foreign policy of the Soviet Union during this era was known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.
- 1 Soviet fears
- 2 Czechoslovak negotiations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states
- 3 NATO
- 4 Intervention
- 5 Reactions in Czechoslovakia
- 6 Reactions in other Warsaw Pact countries
- 7 Reactions around the world
- 8 See also
- 9 Further reading
- 10 References
- 11 External links
Leonid Brezhnev and the leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries worried that the unfolding liberalizations in Czechoslovakia, including the ending of censorship and political surveillance by the secret police, would be detrimental to their interests. The first of such fears was that Czechoslovakia would defect from the bloc, injuring the Soviet Union's position in a possible war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Not only would the loss result in a lack of strategic depth for the USSR, but it would also mean that it could not tap Czechoslovakia's industrial base in a potential war.  Czechoslovak leaders had no intention of leaving the Warsaw Pact, but Moscow felt it could not be certain exactly what Prague's intentions were.
Other fears included the spread of liberal communism and unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact countries worried that if the Prague Spring reforms went unchecked, then those ideals might very well spread to Poland and East Germany, upsetting the status quo there as well. Within the Soviet Union, nationalism in the republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine was already causing problems, and many worried that events in Prague might exacerbate those problems. KGB chairman Yuri Andropov and Ukrainian leaders Petro Shelest and Nikolai Podgorny were the most vehement proponents of military intervention.
In addition, part of Czechoslovakia bordered Austria and West Germany, which were on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This meant both that foreign agents could potentially slip into Czechoslovakia and into any member of the Communist Bloc and that defectors could slip out to the West. The final concern emerged directly from the lack of censorship; writers whose work had been censored in the Soviet Union could simply go to Prague or Bratislava and air their grievances there, circumventing the Soviet Union's censorship.
Czechoslovak negotiations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states
|This section needs additional citations for verification. (August 2013)|
The Soviet leadership at first tried to stop or limit the impact of Dubček's initiatives through a series of negotiations. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union agreed to bilateral talks to be held in July 1968 at Čierna nad Tisou, near the Slovak-Soviet border.
At the meeting, Dubček defended the programme of the reformist wing of the KSČ while pledging commitment to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The KSČ leadership, however, was divided between vigorous reformers (Josef Smrkovský, Oldřich Černík, and František Kriegel) who supported Dubček, and conservatives (Vasil Biľak, Drahomír Kolder, and Oldřich Švestka) who adopted an anti-reformist stance. Brezhnev decided on compromise. The KSČ delegates reaffirmed their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and promised to curb "anti-socialist" tendencies, prevent the revival of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and control the press more effectively. The USSR agreed to withdraw their troops (still stationed in Czechoslovakia since the June 1968 maneuvers) and permit 9 September party congress.
On 3 August, representatives from the Soviet Union, East Germany, People's Republic of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia met in Bratislava and signed the Bratislava Declaration. The declaration affirmed unshakable fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and declared an implacable struggle against bourgeois ideology and all "antisocialist" forces. The Soviet Union expressed its intention to intervene in a Warsaw Pact country if a bourgeois system—a pluralist system of several political parties representing different factions of the capitalist class—was ever established. After the Bratislava conference, Soviet troops left Czechoslovak territory but remained along Czechoslovak borders.
As these talks proved unsatisfactory, the USSR began to consider a military alternative. The Soviet Union's policy of compelling the socialist governments of its satellite states to subordinate their national interests to those of the Eastern Bloc (through military force if needed) became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The United States and NATO largely turned a blind eye to the evolving situation in Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet Union worried it might lose an ally, the United States had absolutely no desire on gaining it. President Lyndon Johnson had already invested the United States in the Vietnam War and was unlikely to be able to drum up support for a potential conflict in Czechoslovakia. Also, he wanted to pursue an arms control treaty with the Soviets, SALT. He needed a willing partner in Moscow in order to reach such an agreement, and he did not wish to potentially risk that treaty for Czechoslovakia. For these reasons, the United States made it clear that it would not intervene on behalf of the Prague Spring, giving the USSR a free hand to do as it pleased.
At approximately 11 pm on 20 August 1968, Eastern Bloc armies from four Warsaw Pact countries – the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary – invaded Czechoslovakia. That night, 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops and 2,000 tanks entered the country. Romania did not take part in the invasion, and neither did Albania, which withdrew from the Warsaw Pact over the matter. Participation of German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was cancelled just hours before the invasion.
The invasion was well planned and coordinated, simultaneously with the border crossing by ground forces, a Soviet airborne division (VDV) captured Prague Václav Havel Airport (at the time called Ruzyne International Airport) in the early hours of the invasion. It began with a special flight from Moscow which carried more than 100 plainclothes agents. They quickly secured the airport and prepared the way for the huge forthcoming airlift, in which An-12 transport aircraft started arriving and unloading Soviet airborne troops equipped with artillery and light tanks.
As the operation at the airport continued, columns of tanks and motorized rifle troops headed toward Prague and other major centers, meeting no resistance. The bulk of invading forces were from the Soviet Union supported by other countries from the communist bloc. Among them were 28,000 troops of the Polish 2nd Army from the Silesian Military District, commanded by general Florian Siwicki, and all invading Hungarian troops were withdrawn by 31 October.
During the attack of the Warsaw Pact armies, 72 Czechs and Slovaks were killed (19 of those in Slovakia) and hundreds were wounded. Alexander Dubček called upon his people not to resist. He was arrested and taken to Moscow along with several of his colleagues. Dubček and most of the reformers were returned to Prague on 27 August, and Dubček retained his post as the party's first secretary until he was forced to resign in April 1969 following the Czechoslovak Hockey Riots.
The invasion was followed by a wave of emigration, largely of highly qualified people, unseen before and stopped shortly after (estimate: 70,000 immediately, 300,000 in total). Western countries allowed these people to immigrate without complications.
Failure to prepare
The Dubcek regime took no steps to forestall a potential invasion, despite the ominous troop movements by the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovak leadership believed that the Soviet Union and its allies would not invade, having believed that summit at Čierna nad Tisou smoothed out the differences between the two sides. They also believed that any invasion would be too costly, both because of domestic support for the reforms and because the international political outcry would be too significant, especially with the World Communist Conference coming up in November of that year. Czechoslovakia could have raised the costs of such an invasion by drumming up international support or making military preparations such as blocking roads and ramping up security of their airports, but they decided not to, paving the way for the invasion.
Letter of invitation
Although on the night of the invasion, the Czechoslovak Presidium declared that Warsaw Pact troops had crossed the border without knowledge of the ČSSR Government, the Soviet Press printed an unsigned request, allegedly by Czechoslovak party and state leaders, for "immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces". At the 14th KSČ Party Congress (conducted secretly, immediately following the intervention), it was emphasized that no member of the leadership had invited the intervention. At the time, a number of commentators believed the letter was fake or non-existent.
In the early 1990s, however, the Russian government gave the new Czechoslovak President, Václav Havel, a copy of a letter of invitation addressed to Soviet authorities and signed by KSČ members Biľak, Švestka, Kolder, Indra, and Kapek. It claimed that "right-wing" media were "fomenting a wave of nationalism and chauvinism, and are provoking an anti-communist and anti-Soviet psychosis". It formally asked the Soviets to "lend support and assistance with all means at your disposal" to save the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic "from the imminent danger of counterrevolution".
A 1992 Izvestia article claimed that candidate Presidium member Antonin Kapek gave Leonid Brezhnev a letter at the Soviet-Czechoslovak Čierna nad Tisou talks in late July which appealed for "fraternal help". A second letter was supposedly delivered by Biľak to Ukrainian Party leader Petro Shelest during the August Bratislava conference "in a lavatory rendezvous arranged through the KGB station chief". This letter was signed by the same five as Kapek's letter, mentioned above.
Long before the invasion, planning for a coup was undertaken by Indra, Kolder, and Biľak, among others, often at the Soviet embassy and at the Party recreation centre at Orlík Dam. When these men had managed to convince a majority of the Presidium (six of eleven voting members) to side with them against Alexander Dubček's reformists, they asked the USSR to launch a military invasion. The USSR leadership was even considering waiting until 26 August Slovak Party Congress, but the Czechoslovak conspirators "specifically requested the night of the 20th".
The plan was to unfold as follows. A debate would unfold in response to the Kašpar report on the state of the country, during which conservative members would insist that Dubček present two letters he had received from the USSR, letters which listed promises he had made at the Čierna nad Tisou talks but had failed to keep. Dubček's concealment of such important letters, and his unwillingness to keep his promises would lead to a vote of confidence which the now conservative majority would win, seizing power, and issue a request for Soviet assistance in preventing a counterrevolution. It was this formal request, drafted in Moscow, which was published in Pravda on 22 August without the signatories. All the USSR needed to do was suppress the Czechoslovak military and any violent resistance.
With this plan in mind, the 16–17 August Soviet Politburo meeting passed a resolution to "provide help to the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia through military force". At 18 August Warsaw Pact meeting, Brezhnev announced that the intervention would go ahead on the night of 20 August, and asked for "fraternal support", which the national leaders of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland duly offered.
Failure of the plot
The coup, however, did not go according to plan. Kolder intended to review the Kašpar report early in the meeting, but Dubček and Špaček, suspicious of Kolder, adjusted the agenda so the upcoming 14th Party Congress could be covered before any discussion on recent reforms or Kašpar's report. Discussion of the Congress dragged on, and before the conspirators had a chance to request a confidence vote, early news of the invasion reached the Presidium.
An anonymous warning was transmitted by the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Hungary, Jozef Púčik, approximately six hours before Soviet troops crossed the border at midnight. When the news arrived, the solidarity of conservative coalition crumbled. When the Presidium proposed a declaration condemning the invasion, two key members of the conspiracy, Jan Pillar and František Barbírek, switched sides to support Dubček. With their help, declaration against the invasion won with a 7:4 majority.
The Moscow Protocol
By the morning of 21 August, Dubček and other prominent reformists had been arrested and were later flown to Moscow. There they were held in secret and interrogated for days.
The conservatives asked Svoboda to create an "emergency government" but since they had not won a clear majority of support, he refused. Instead, he and Gustáv Husák traveled to Moscow on 23 August to insist Dubček and Černík should be included in a solution to the conflict. After days of negotiations, the Czechoslovak delegation accepted the "Moscow Protocol", and signed their commitment to its fifteen points. The Protocol demanded the suppression of opposition groups, the full reinstatement of censorship, and the dismissal of specific reformist officials. It did not, however, refer to the situation in the ČSSR as "counterrevolutionary" nor did it demand a reversal of the post-January course.
Reactions in Czechoslovakia
Popular opposition was expressed in numerous spontaneous acts of nonviolent resistance. In Prague and other cities throughout the republic, Czechs and Slovaks greeted Warsaw Pact soldiers with arguments and reproaches. Every form of assistance, including the provision of food and water, was denied to the invaders. Signs, placards, and graffiti drawn on walls and pavements denounced the invaders, the Soviet leaders, and suspected collaborationists. Pictures of Dubček and Svoboda appeared in the streets. Citizens gave wrong directions to soldiers and even removed street signs (except for those giving the direction back to Moscow).
Initially, some civilians tried to argue with the invading troops, but this met with little or no success. After the USSR used photographs of these discussions as proof that the invasion troops were being greeted amicably, secret Czechoslovak broadcasting stations discouraged the practice, reminding the people that "pictures are silent". The protests in reaction to the invasion lasted only about seven days. Explanations for the fizzling of these public outbursts mostly center around demoralization of the population, whether from the intimidation of all the enemy troops and tanks or from being abandoned by their leaders. Many Czechoslovaks saw the signing of the Moscow Protocol as treasonous. Another common explanation is that, due the fact that most of the society was middle class, the cost of continued resistance meant giving up a cushy lifestyle, which was too high a price to pay.
The generalized resistance caused the Soviet Union to abandon its original plan to oust the First Secretary. Dubček, who had been arrested on the night of 20 August, was taken to Moscow for negotiations. It was agreed that Dubček would remain in office, but he was no longer free to pursue to liberalization that he had before the invasion.
Finally, on 17 April 1969, Dubček was replaced as First Secretary by Gustáv Husák, and a period of "Normalization" began. Pressure from the Soviet Union pushed politicians to either switch loyalties or simply give up. In fact, the very group that voted in Dubček and put the reforms in place were mostly the same people who annulled the program and replaced Dubček with Husák. Husák reversed Dubček's reforms, purged the party of its liberal members, and dismissed the professional and intellectual elites who openly expressed disagreement with the political turnaround from public offices and jobs.
Reactions in other Warsaw Pact countries
One unintended consequence of the invasion was that many within the Soviet State security apparatus and Intelligence Services were shocked and outraged at the invasion and several KGB/GRU defectors and Spies such as Oleg Gordievsky, Vasili Mitrokhin, and Dmitri Polyakov have pointed out the 1968 invasion as their motivation for cooperating with the Western Intelligence agencies.
In the People's Republic of Poland, on 8 September 1968, Ryszard Siwiec immolated himself in Warsaw during a harvest festival at the 10th-Anniversary Stadium in protest against the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia and the totalitarianism of the communist government. Siwiec did not survive.
A more pronounced effect took place in the Socialist Republic of Romania, which did not take part in the invasion. Nicolae Ceauşescu, already a staunch opponent of Soviet influences and one to have declared himself on Dubček's side, held a public speech in Bucharest on the day of the invasion, depicting Soviet policies in harsh terms. This response consolidated Romania's independent voice in the next two decades, especially after Ceauşescu encouraged the population to take up arms in order to meet any similar maneuver in the country: he received an enthusiastic initial response, with many people, who were by no means communist, willing to enroll in the newly formed paramilitary Patriotic Guards.
In the German Democratic Republic, the invasion aroused discontent among those who had hoped that Czechoslovakia would pave the way for a more liberal socialism.[who?] However, isolated protests were quickly stopped by the police and Stasi.
Albania responded in opposite fashion: already feuding with Moscow over suggestions that the country should focus on agriculture to the detriment of industrial development, and concerned that Moscow was becoming too liberal in its dealings with Yugoslavia (which, by that time, Albania regarded as a threatening neighbor and had branded in propaganda as "imperialist"), it withdrew from the Warsaw Pact entirely. Economic fallout from this move was mitigated somewhat by a strengthening of Albanian relations with the People's Republic of China, which was itself on increasingly strained terms with the Soviet Union.
In the fall of 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev and other Warsaw Pact leaders drafted a statement calling the 1968 invasion a mistake. This acknowledgement likely helped to encourage the popular revolutions that overthrew communist governments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania at the end of 1989 by providing assurance that no similar Soviet intervention would be repeated were such uprisings to occur.
Reactions around the world
The night of the invasion, Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the United Kingdom, and the United States all requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. That afternoon, the council met to hear the Czechoslovak Ambassador Jan Muzik denounce the invasion. Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik insisted the Warsaw Pact actions were those of "fraternal assistance" against "antisocial forces". The next day, several countries suggested a resolution condemning the intervention and calling for immediate withdrawal. US Ambassador George Ball, suggested that "the kind of fraternal assistance that the Soviet Union is according to Czechoslovakia is exactly the same kind that Cain gave to Abel".
Ball accused Soviet delegates of filibustering to put off the vote until the occupation was complete. Malik continued to speak, ranging in topics from US exploitation of Latin America's raw materials to statistics on Czech commodity trading. Eventually, a vote was taken. Ten members supported the motion; Algeria, India, and Pakistan abstained; the USSR (with veto power) and Hungary opposed it. Canadian delegates immediately introduced another motion asking for a UN representative to travel to Prague and work for the release of the imprisoned Czechoslovak leaders. Malik accused Western countries of hypocrisy, asking "who drowned the fields, villages, and cities of Vietnam in blood?" By 26 August, another vote had not taken place, but a new Czechoslovak representative requested the whole issue be removed from the Security Council's agenda.
Although the United States insisted at the UN that Warsaw Pact aggression was unjustifiable, its position was compromised by its own actions. Only three years earlier, US delegates to the UN had insisted that the overthrow of the leftist government of the Dominican Republic, as part of Operation Power Pack, was an issue to be worked out by the Organization of American States (OAS) without UN interference. The OAS accepted adherence to Marxism–Leninism as an armed attack justifying self-defense by the United States. American involvement in the Vietnam War led UN Secretary-General U Thant to draw further comparisons, suggesting that "if Russians were bombing and napalming the villages of Czechoslovakia" he might be more vocal in his denunciation.
In Finland, a neutral country under some Soviet political influence at that time, the occupation caused a major scandal. Like the Italian and French Communist Parties, the Communist Party of Finland denounced the occupation.
The United States government sent Shirley Temple Black, the famous child movie star, who became a diplomat in later life, to Prague in August 1968 to prepare to become the first United States Ambassador to a free Czechoslovakia. Two decades later, when Czechoslovakia became independent in 1989, Mrs. Black was finally recognized as the first American ambassador to a truly free Czechoslovakia.
- Bischof, Günter, et al. eds. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Lexington Books, 2010) 510 pp. ISBN 978-0-7391-4304-9.
- Williams, Kieran, 'Civil Resistance in Czechoslovakia: From Soviet Invasion to "Velvet Revolution", 1968–89', in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), 'Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 110–26. ISBN 978-0-19-955201-6.
- Windsor, Philip, and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance (London: Chatto & Windus, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 200 pp.
- "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War". Ciaonet.org. 1978-04-27. Retrieved 2014-02-13.
- Skomra, Sławomir. "Brali udział w inwazji na Czechosłowację. Kombatanci?" (in Polish). Agora SA. Retrieved 21 September 2013.
- globalsecurity.org (27 April 2005). "Global Security, Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 19 January 2007.
- Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Soviet invasion of 1968 to have its own web page. Aktualne.centrum.cz. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- (Czech) August 1968 – Victims of the Occupation – Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů. Ustrcr.cz. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Chafetz, Glenn (30 April 1993). Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe, 1985–1990. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-94484-0. Retrieved 9 October 2009.
- Karen Dawisha, "The 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for the Future" in Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent ed. Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson (New York, NY: Homs and Meier Publishers Inc, 1981) 11
- Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision" (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) 3
- Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul," International Security 5, (1980), 117
- Mark Kramer. Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (part 2). New Evidence from the Ukrainian Archives. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15. 2004. pp. 273–275.
- Valenta (Fn. 7) 17
- "The Bratislava Declaration, August 3, 1968" Navratil, Jaromir. "The Prague Spring 1968". Hungary: Central European Press, 1998, pp. 326–329 Retrieved on 4 March 2013.
- Dawisha (Fn. 6) 10
- "Russians march into Czechoslovakia". The Times (London). 21 August 1968. Retrieved 27 May 2010.
- Czechoslovakia 1968 "Bulgarian troops". Google Books. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Washington Post, (Final Edition), 21 August 1998, (Page A11)
- Soviet foreign policy since World .... Google Books. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- "1955: Communist states sign Warsaw Pact". BBC News. 14 May 1955. Retrieved 27 May 2010.
- Stolarik, M. Mark (2010). The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers. pp. 137–164. ISBN 9780865167513.
- Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki: A Concise History of Poland, 2006. Google Books (17 July 2006). Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Czechoslovakia 1968 "Hungarian troops". Google Books (22 October 1968). Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- "Springtime for Prague" at. Prague-life.com. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- "Day when tanks destroyed Czech dreams of Prague Spring" (''Den, kdy tanky zlikvidovaly české sny Pražského jara'') at Britské Listy (British Letters). Britskelisty.cz. Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Jiri Valenta, "Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved" Orbis 35 (1991) 597
- Valenta (Fn. 23) 599
- H. Gordon Skilling, "Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution," (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)
- Kieran Williams, "The Prague Spring and its aftermath: Czechoslovak politics 1968–1970," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Vladimir Kusin, "From Dubcek to Charter 77 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1978) 21
- John Keane, Vaclav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 213
- Bertleff, Erich. Mit bloßen Händen – der einsame Kampf der Tschechen und Slowaken 1968. Verlag Fritz Molden.
- Alexander Dubcek, "Hope Dies Last" (New York: Kodansha International, 1993) 216
- Williams (Fn. 25) 42
- Letter by Yuri Andropov to Central Committee about the demonstration, 5 September 1968, in the Vladimir Bukovsky's archive, (PDF, faximile, in Russian), JHU.edu
- Andropov to the Central Committee. The Demonstration in Red Square Against the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia. 20 September 1968, at Andrei Sakharov's archive, in Russian and translation into English, Yale.edu
- (English) "Hear my cry". culture.pl. Retrieved 22 August 2008.[dead link]
- (English) "Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek honoured the memory of Ryszard Siwiec". www.vlada.cz. Press Department of the Office of Czech Government. Retrieved 22 August 2008.
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Die versäumte Revolte: Die DDR und das Jahr 1968 – Ideale sterben langsam (in German). Bpb.de (2 March 2011). Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
- Franck, Thomas M., "Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It," (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.) ISBN 0-19-503587-9
- "Western CPs Condemn Invasion, Hail Prague Spring" by Kevin Devlin at Open Society Archives[dead link]
- "International; Prague's Spring Into Capitalism" by Lawrence E. Joseph at The. New York Times (2 December 1990). Retrieved on 23 June 2011.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.|
- August 1968 – Victims of the Occupation page dedicated to documenting the invasion, created by the Totalitarian Regime Study Institute
- The short film Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) is available for free download at the Internet Archive [more]
- The short film Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) is available for free download at the Internet Archive [more]