Battle of Britain

For other uses, see the Second World War battle.

Battle of Britain
Part of Second World War
An aerial observer scans the skies of London.
Date 1940 (see text) Location United Kingdom airspace Result Decisive British victory
Belligerents
British Empire	Germany Italy
Commanders and leaders
Hugh Dowding Keith Park Trafford Leigh-Mallory C. J. Quintin Brand Richard Saul	Hermann Göring Albert Kesselring Hugo Sperrle Hans-Jürgen Stumpff Rino Corso Fougier
Strength
754 single-seat fighters 149 two-seat fighters 560 bombers 500 coastal 1,963 total	1,107 single-seat fighters 357 two-seat fighters 1,380 bombers 428 dive-bombers 569 reconnaissance 233 coastal 4,074 total
Casualties and losses
Fighter Command: 1,023 fighters Bomber Command: 376 bombers Coastal Command: 148 aircraft 1,547 total. 27,450 civilians dead, 32,138 wounded	873 fighters 1,014 bombers 1,887 total.

Battle of Britain is the name given to the sustained strategic effort by the Luftwaffe during the Summer and Autumn of 1940 to gain air superiority over the RAF's Fighter Command. The name derives from an 18 June 1940 speech in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, "The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin..."

Had it been successful, the planned amphibious and airborne landings in Britain of Operation Sealion would have followed. The Battle of Britain was the first major campaign to be fought entirely by air forces. It was the largest and most sustained bombing campaign attempted up until that date. The failure of Nazi Germany to destroy Britain's air defence or to break British morale is considered their first major defeat.

Neither Hitler nor the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) believed it possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the British Isles until the RAF had been neutralised. Secondary objectives were to destroy aircraft production and ground infrastructure, to attack areas of political significance, and to terrorise the British people into seeking an armistice or surrender. Some historians, such as Derek Robinson, have argued an invasion could not have succeeded; the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine would have made Sealion a disaster and the Luftwaffe would have been unable to prevent decisive intervention by British cruisers and destroyers, even with air superiority.

British historians date the battle from 10 July to 31 October 1940, which represented the most intense period of daylight bombing. German historians usually place the beginning of the battle in mid-August 1940 and end it in May 1941, on the withdrawal of the bomber units in preparation for the attack on the USSR.

Background

Luftwaffe attacks on Britain began with raids on naval targets, with bombers being shot down over the Firth of Forth on 16 October 1939 and over Scapa Flow on the following day, but there were no major attacks during the Phoney War period, a lull in fighting that Hitler ended on 10 May 1940 with his invasion of the Low Countries.

Following the evacuation of the British from Dunkirk (Operation DYNAMO), and the French surrender on 22 June 1940, Hitler believed the war was practically over and the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly come to terms with Germany. Although there was an element of British public and political sentiment favouring negotiated peace with a clearly ascendant Germany, among them the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, the recently-installed Churchill nonetheless refused to consider an armistice with Hitler's Germany. Churchill's skilful use of rhetoric hardened public opinion against a peaceful resolution and prepared the British for a long war.

On 16 July, in an effort to finish the war in the west, Hitler ordered the rapid preparation of a plan to invade Britain. Hitler hoped to frighten Britain into peace using the preparations as a means to apply pressure. Prior to this, on 11 July, Admiral Raeder had told Hitler invasion could only be contemplated as a last resort, and only then with full air superiority. The Kriegsmarine had been nearly crippled during the Norwegian Campaign, with many of its ships having been sunk or damaged, while the Royal Navy had over 50 destroyers, 21 cruisers and eight battleships in the British Home Fleet. There was little the weakened Kriegsmarine could do to stop the RN intervening against the invasion. The only alternative was to use the Luftwaffe's dive bombers, which required air superiority in order to operate effectively. Although Hitler agreed with Raeder he nevertheless ordered all services to make preparations for an amphibious assault once air superiority had been achieved.

The plan was prepared by OKW. The operation, code-named Seelöwe ("Sealion"), was scheduled for mid-September 1940 and called for landings on the south coast of Great Britain, backed by an airborne assault. All preparations were to be made by mid-August.

Opposing forces

Further information: RAF Fighter Command Order of Battle 1940

Further information: Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940

The Luftwaffe was facing a more capable opponent than it had met before: a sizeable, highly-coordinated, well-supplied air force, fielding aircraft able to match the German Messerschmitt Bf 109E and Bf 110C. The majority of the RAF's fighting would rest upon the workhorse Hurricane Mk I. The performance of the Spitfire Mk I, over Dunkirk came as a surprise to the Jagdwaffe, although there was a strong belief that in the 109 they had a superior fighter

Aircraft

Main article: Battle of Britain Aircraft

The Bf 109E was superior to the Hurricane; it had a better climb rate and was faster by up to 30 to 40 mph. The Hurricane could, however, turn more tightly than both the 109 and the Spitfire. The Bf 109E and the Spitfire, in certain key areas, had advantage over each other. At some altitudes the 109 could out-climb the British fighter. The Spitfire was slightly faster at medium heights, was more manoeuvrable, and possessed a stronger airframe as well as having heavier armour and twice the fire-power of the Bf 109E-1.

However, the fuel injected Daimler-Benz DB 601 engine advantaged the 109 over the carburettor equipped Merlin engine; neither RAF fighter could simply "bunt" and dive away from an opponent, as the 109 could. This ability to perform negative-gee manoeuvres without the engine cutting out gave a 109 pilot the option to disengage at will. The direct fuel injection also meant that the DB 601 engine was more fuel efficient than the Merlin.

The Spitfire, initially, had a better protected cockpit with bulletproof windscreen and armoured plates behind the pilot's seat and head. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-3 received extra armour behind the pilots head, and seat armour. The revised armament of the E-3 and E-4 included two 20 mm MG FF (E-3) or MG FF/M cannon. This gave it a greater punch than the eight .303 (7.7 mm) machineguns of the British fighters, but the low muzzle velocity of the cannon, where the shells dropped quite quickly after firing, meant the Messerschmitt pilots had to open fire from close range. There were also problems with the fusing of the shells, which often detonated on contact with the skin of the airframe rather than penetrating then exploding.

The canopy of the E-4 was modified for better visibility and the new design was often retrofitted to earlier 109s. The Bf 109 was also equipped with Self-sealing fuel tanks, although this could not prevent possibly fatal damage being inflicted by the "de Wilde" tracer round which was being used by the RAF.

Three view drawing of the Bf 109E-3 with the early style canopy.

A standard evasive manoeuvre adopted by RAF fighters was a steep, climbing spiral at about at 120 mph (193 km/h). The 109 trying to follow this often stalled then had to dive to regain control. Should a Spitfire perform a half-roll, then dive the superiority of the Spitfire's rate of roll would ensure the German fighter would gain too much speed, often overshooting the Spitfire. At high speeds the 109 flight controls became too heavy for the pilot to use and he could not respond to any evasive manoeuvres.

On 22 November 1939 a Bf 109E-3 (Wk-Nr 1304 of JG 76) landed intact in France. Evaluated at RAE Farnborough, the Bf 109 was used in mock combats with Spitfire Mk Is. The RAF test pilots found:

"The Bf 109 is inferior as a fighter to the Hurricane or Spitfire. Its manoeuvrability at high speeds is seriously curtailed by the heaviness of the controls, while its high wing loading causes it to stall readily under high normal accelerations and results in a poor turning circle."

Speed trials carried out by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough said:

" The Spitfire proved to be considerably the faster of the two, both in acceleration and straight and level flight, without having to make use of the emergency +12 boost.

It should be pointed out that at the time of the tests the 109 lacked some components of its oxygen gear, meaning that these comparisons were performed at a maximum altitude of 15,000 feet (4,572 m) so that the 109 was unable to use its full performance potential.

The Luftwaffe pilots who flew captured Spitfires reached completely different conclusions; for example, Werner Mölders flew a captured Hurricane and a Spitfire Mk I in June 1940 (one of three examples obtained in flyable condition by the Luftwaffe). Mölders reported that:

"It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land. The Hurricane is good-natured and turns well, but its performance is decidedly inferior to that of the Me 109. It has strong stick forces and is "lazy" on the ailerons.

"The Spitfire is one class better. It handles well, is light on the controls, faultless in the turn and has a performance approaching that of the Bf 109. As a fighting aircraft, however, it is miserable. A sudden push forward on the stick will cause the Motor to cut; and because the propeller has only two pitch settings (take-off and cruise), in a rapidly changing air combat situation the motor is either overspeeding or else is not being used to the full.

By July 1940 the more efficient de Havilland and Rotol constant-speed propellers had replaced the two-pitch propellers on the majority of frontline RAF fighters. It should also be noted that German aviation fuels had a lower octane rating than the American supplied 100 octane fuel then in regular use by RAF fighters.

The Bf 109 was also used as a fighter-bomber. Bf 109 E-7s had the ability to carry a 250kg bomb underneath the fuselage. The E-7/U2 model had extra armour installed to protect the Jabos. The Bf 109, unlike the Stuka could then, after releasing its ordnance, fight on equal terms with RAF fighters.

X4382, a late production Mk I of 602 Squadron flown by P/O Osgood Hanbury, Westhampnett, September 1940.

The Junkers Ju 87 Stuka was slow and possessed inadequate defences. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters, because of its low speed and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks. The Stuka depended on air superiority, the very thing being contested over Britain. It was therefore withdrawn from attacks on Britain in August, after prohibitive losses, leaving the Luftwaffe short of precision ground attack aircraft.

At the start of the Battle the twin engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 long range "Destroyer" (Zerstörer) was also expected to engage in air to air combat while escorting the Luftwaffe bomber fleet. It was soon realised that the Bf 110 stood little chance against determined pilots flying the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire. Although reasonably fast (Bf 110C about 340 mph [547 km/h]) and possessing a respectable combat radius as well as carrying a heavy armament of two 20 mm MG FF/M cannon and four 7.92 mm MG 17s concentrated in the forward fuselage, along with a single 7.92 mm MG 15 mounted for rear defence in the rear cockpit, the 110 was only slightly less manoeuvrable than the bombers they were meant to escort. They also suffered from poor acceleration. The casualty rates of the Bf 110 fighter units were extremely high throughout the Battle and they achieved none of the high aspirations of Hermann Goering, who had referred to them as his Eisenseiten or "Ironsides".

The most successful role of the 110 during the Battle was as a schnellbomber (fast-bomber). One unit Erprobungsgruppe 210 proved that the aircraft could carry a greater bomb load over a greater range than a Ju 87 and deliver it with similar accuracy, while its much higher maximum speed, especially at lower altitudes, meant that it was far more capable of escaping RAF fighters.

For the British, the most disappointing fighter was the Boulton-Paul Defiant two-seat turret fighter. This aircraft was intended to be used as a "bomber destroyer" because it was thought that; :"The speed of modern bombers is so great that it is only worthwhile to attack them under conditions which allow no relative motion between the fighter and its target. The fixed-gun fighter with guns firing ahead can only realise these conditions by attacking the bomber from dead astern..." By 1940 it was clear to both the RAF and the Luftwaffe that the deadliest opponents of bombers were single-engine, single-seat fighters with fixed, forward firing armament. Apart from the extra weight and drag imposed by the four gun turret and second crew member the Defiant lacked any form of forward firing armament. Should the gunner have had to escape from the turret in an emergency the only way he could do this was to traverse the turret to one side and bale out through the escape hatch; should the aircraft's electric system operating the turret be disabled there was no other escape route. After the strong intervention of Dowding, who realised that the Defiant was designed to an unworkable concept, there were only two units equipped with this aircraft, 141 and 264 squadrons.

After suffering heavy losses to 109s in July and August the Defiants were reassigned as "cat's eye" night-fighters, where they had little more success.

There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these aircraft (along with the Fairey Battle in Bomber Command) operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlin engines to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.

Pilots

Prior to the war, the RAF's processes for selecting potential candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude. By the summer of 1940 there were about 9,000 pilots in the RAF for approximately 5,000 aircraft, the majority of which were bombers. However, the problem of pilot shortage was self-inflicted, being due to inefficiencies in training and assignment. With aircraft production running at 300 each week, only 200 pilots were being trained in the same period. In addition, more pilots, 26, were allocated to squadrons than were aircraft,20. Another problem was that only about 30% of the 9,000 pilots were assigned to operational squadrons; 20% of the pilots were involved in conducting pilot training, and a further 20% were undergoing further instruction, like those offered in Canada to the Commonwealth trainees, although already qualified. The rest were assigned to staff positions since, RAF policy dictated that only pilots could make many staff and operational command decisions, even in engineering matters. At the height of fighting, and despite Churchill's insistence, only 30 pilots were released to the frontline from administrative duties. For these reasons the RAF had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of trained pilots in the fighting squadrons, rather than the lack of machines, that became the greatest concern for Dowding. Drawing from regular RAF forces as well as the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster a total of some 1,103 fighter pilots on 1 July. Replacement pilots, with little actual flight training and often no gunnery training whatsoever, suffered high casualty rates. RAF forces were bolstered by foreign nationals, including: Template:Multicol

• Australia
• Belgium
• Canada
• Czechoslovakia
• Free France
• Ireland
• Jamaica
• Template:Multicol-break
• New Zealand
• Palestine
• Poland
• Rhodesia
• South Africa
• United States

The Luftwaffe could muster more fighter pilots, 1,450, mostly due to more efficient training, who were more experienced overall. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery, as well as instructions in tactics that were suited for fighter versus fighter combat. Luftwaffe training manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when the odds were in the pilot's favour.

Air combat tactics

In the late 1930s Fighter Command weren't expecting to be facing single-engine fighters over Britain, only bombers. With this in mind a series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manoeuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's fire-power to bring down bombers: with no apparent prospect of escorting fighters to worry about RAF fighter pilots flew in tight, vee-shaped "sections" ("vics") of three. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of four "sections" in another tight "V". With this formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to actually watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station. RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics in the midst of the battle, because replacement pilots, often with only minimal actual flying time, could not be readily retrained, and inexperienced RAF pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide. German pilots dubbed the RAF formations Idiotenreihen ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack. Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with a one or two "weavers" flying independently above and behind to provide increased observation and rear protection; these tended to be the least experienced men and were often the first to be shot down without the other pilots even noticing that they were under attack. After the battle, RAF pilots adopted a variant on the German formations called the "finger four".

The Luftwaffe employed devised a loose section of two, based on a leader (Rottenführer) followed at a distance of about 183 meters (200 yards) by his wingman (nicknamed the Rottenhund or Katschmareks), who also flew slightly higher and was trained to stay with his leader at all times. While the leader was free to search for enemy aircraft, and could cover his wingman's blind-spots, his wingman was able to concentrate on searching the airspace in the leader's blind-spots, behind and below. Any attacking aircraft could be sandwiched between the two 109s.

In the Luftwaffe formations, the pair allowed the Rottenführer to concentrate on getting kills. This latter aspect, however, caused some grievances in the lower ranks because it was felt that the high scores of some Rottenführer came at the expense of the Katschmareks. During the Battle of Britain a pilot who shot down 20 aircraft was automatically awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight's Cross), to which was added the Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds for each 20 aircraft then shot down. Those pilots who appeared to have a chronic desire to receive these awards were said to be suffering from Halsweh (a sore throat). Few wingmen in Luftwaffe fighter formations were able to shoot down opposing aircraft, while their formation leaders were scoring heavily.

Two of these sections were usually teamed up into a Schwarm, where all of the pilots could watch what was happening around them. Each Schwarm in a Staffel flew at staggered heights and with 183 meters (200 yards) of room between them, making the formation difficult to spot at longer ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility. By utilising a tight "cross-over" turn a Schwarm could quickly change direction. This formation was developed during the Spanish Civil War by Günther Lützow and Werner Mölders and other Luftwaffe pilots, based on principles dating to Oswald Boelcke in 1916.

The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that without the benefit of long-range drop tanks (which were introduced in very limited numbers in the late stages of the Battle), the 109s had an endurance of just over an hour. Once over Britain the 109 pilots had to keep an eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was illuminated they were forced to turn back and head for France. With the prospect of two long over-water flights, and knowing that their range was substantially reduced when escorting bombers or in the event of combat, the Jagdflieger coined the term Kanelkrank or "Channel sickness".

File:BF-110s.jpg

A "Schwarm" of Bf 110 C-1s from an unidentified ZG (Zerstörergeschwader).

Although the 110 was faster than the Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire its lack of manoeuvrability and acceleration meant that it failed in its role as a long-range escort fighter. The 110 fighter units adopted the same "finger-four" formation as the 109 units but were seldom able to use this to the same advantage. When faced with attack Zerstörergruppen increasingly resorted to forming large "defensive circles", in which each 110 guarded the tail of the aircraft ahead of it. These conspicuous formations were often successful in attracting RAF fighters, which were themselves sometimes "bounced" by high-flying 109s. This led to the often repeated myth that the 110s were being escorted by 109s. The 110's most successful method of attack was the "bounce" from above. As a Schnellbomber the 110 usually used a shallow dive to bomb the target and was able to escape at high speed.

Luftwaffe strategy

Further information: Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940

The Luftwaffe was designed as a tactical weapon to support the Army on the battlefield. In Poland and France, the Luftwaffe had operated jointly with the Wehrmacht in its blitzkrieg. In the Battle of Britain, however, the Luftwaffe had to be decisive in its own right. This new role was something it was unsuited for. Its main task was to ensure air supremacy over southeast England, to pave the way for an invasion fleet.

The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on the Britain's southern and northern flanks. Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albrecht Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. Luftflotte 3, under Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, targeted the West Country, Midlands, and northwest England. Luftflotte 5, led by Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, targeted the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night-time Blitz attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon Luftflotte 2's shoulders.

Initial Luftwaffe estimates allotted four days to defeat Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks for the bombers and long-range fighters to mop up the rest of the country and destroy the British aircraft industry. The plan was to begin with attacks on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland toward London and the ring of sector airfields defending it. Later reassessments gave the Luftwaffe five weeks to establish temporary air superiority over England within the period from 8 August to 15 September. To achieve this goal, Fighter Command had to be destroyed on the ground or in the air with the Luftwaffe maintaining a high enough kill ratio to avoid depleting its own forces to such a level that it could not support an invasion. The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population, but this alternative was considered unfeasible and was expressly forbidden by Hitler.

The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. Sperrle wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing it. His counterpart, Kesselring, championed attacking London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon which strategy to pursue. He seemed at times obsessed with maintaining his own power base in the Luftwaffe and indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.

Tactics

Messerschmitt Bf 109E

The Luftwaffe varied its tactics considerably to try to find a way through the RAF defences. It launched many free-roving fighter sweeps, known as Freie Jagd ("Free Hunts"), to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable. Casualties were greatest among the escort units.

Standard tactics for raids soon became an amalgam of techniques. A free hunt would precede a raid to try to sweep any defenders out of the raid's path. The bombers would then fly in at altitudes between 10,000 and 16,000 feet (4,900 m), sometimes closely escorted by fighters. A "detached" escort or "top cover" would fly above the bombers and maintain a distant watch.

Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters, which were divided into single-engined Bf 109s and twin-engine Bf 110s. The Bf 110 Zerstörer ("destroyer") proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. Soon, they had to be given escorts of their own and were eventually restricted in their employment. This meant the bulk of fighter duties fell on the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection. Due to a similar concerns over losses in the hard-fought battles of 15 August and 18 August, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision shackled many of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bomber forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted primarily because they were forced to fly and maneouvre at reduced speeds.

Adolf Galland noted:

We had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be wrong. Fighter protection for bombers created many problems which had to be solved in action. Bomber pilots preferred close screening in which their formation was surrounded by pairs of fighters pursuing a zigzag course. Obviously, the visible presence of the protective fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security. However, this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive. He must never wait until attacked because he then losses the chance of acting. We fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the approach and over the target area. This, in fact, gives the greatest relief and the best protection for the bomber force.

The limited, 600 km (360 mi) total range of the Bf 109E single engined fighters was one of the most serious limitations on the Luftwaffe's tactics in the battle.

Intelligence

The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of intelligence about the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured and plagued by rivalries; their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940, there were few if any German agents operating in the UK and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences, in particular of the crucial command and control system built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as a November 1939 Abwehr assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities by Abteilung V, it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.

Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe had to launch numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence. Reconnaissance aircraft (at first mostly Dornier Do 17s, but increasingly Bf 110s) proved easy prey for British fighters, as it was seldom possible for them to be escorted by Bf 109s. Thus, the Luftwaffe operated "blind" for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many times the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were consistently exaggerated, due to over-enthusiastic claims and the difficulty of effective confirmation over enemy territory. In the euphoric atmosphere of perceived victory, Luftwaffe leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on any one type of target (such as airbases, radar stations, or aircraft factories), so the already haphazard effort was further diluted.

Navigational aids

While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively than the Germans realised, the Luftwaffe attempted to press its own offensive advantage with advanced radio navigation systems the British were initially not aware of. One of these was Knickebein ("crooked leg"); this system was used at night and for raids where precision was required. It was rarely used during the Battle of Britain. (See Dr. Reginald Jones and Battle of the Beams).

RAF strategy

The Dowding system

The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the "Dowding System," after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command.

Groups

The UK's airspace was divided up into four Groups.

• 10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Quintin Brand.
• 11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical approaches to London and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park.
• 12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.
• 13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.

At the HQ of each Group (e.g. RAF Uxbridge, for 11 Group), information from Fighter Command headquarters would be noted on plotting tables, large maps on which counters marking the incoming raids would be moved, and RAF officers known as Fighter Controllers could then order a response.

Despite appearances, the Groups were not mutually supporting; Park, for instance, could only request, not demand, assistance from Brand (from whom he often got it), nor from Leigh-Mallory (from whom he more often did not). This was because Dowding had never issued standing orders to assist, nor created a method to co-ordinate it.

There was a further problem in that the aircraft were not assigned equitably between Groups. While the most effective RAF fighter was the Spitfire, 70% of the No. 11 Group were Hurricanes. "In total, less then a third of Britain's best fighters were operating in the key sector."

Sectors

The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors; each commanding officer was assigned between two and four squadrons. Sector stations, comprising an aerodrome with a command post, were the heart of this organisation, though they also had satellite airfields to disperse squadrons to. When ordered by their Group HQ, the sector stations would "scramble" their squadrons into the air. Once airborne, the squadrons would be directed by radio-telephone (R/T) from their sector station. Squadrons could be ordered to patrol airfields or vital targets or be "vectored" to intercept incoming raids.

Limitations

Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at that time, the Dowding System had many limitations, including, but not often stressed, its emphatic need for qualified ground maintenance personnel, many of whom had received their training under the Aircraft Apprentice scheme instituted by Hugh Trenchard. RDF (radar) was subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T communications with airborne fighters were restricted because of the RAF's use of High-Frequency (HF) radio sets. HF radio was limited in range and even with a network of relay stations, the squadrons could not roam more than one or two sectors from their airfields. It was also restricted to a single frequency per squadron, making inter-squadron communication impossible. Finally, the system for tracking RAF fighters, known as HF/DF or "Huff-Duff", restricted sectors to a maximum of four squadrons in the air.

This is, in part, a reflection of the novelty of the type of combat, as well as the control system. It was perfectly possible for Sector Control to have been assigned one frequency for all fighters to "listen out" on (or "guard", in modern parlance), with "roving" intercept guidance, rather than the close positive control used in the event, which limited controllers' ability to handle large numbers of interceptors.

Efficiency

In spite of this, Fighter Command at times achieved interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets, which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range, and provided multiple channels. For all of its faults, RAF's system of ground control directed its fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.

Effect of signals intelligence

It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher, used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of the UK's command a view of German intentions but it seems little of this material filtered down to Hugh Dowding's desk. (It would have had little tactical value in any case.) However, the radio listening service (known as Y Service), monitoring the patterns of Luftwaffe radio traffic, contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.

Tactics

X4474, a late production Mk I of 19 Squadron flown by Sergeant Jennings in September 1940.

The weight of the battle fell upon 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was to subject attackers to continual attacks by relatively small numbers of aircraft and try to break up the tight formations of bombers. Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always achieved, however, and sometimes the Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles.

Hawker Hurricane I (R4118), Battle of Britain veteran, still flying (as of 2007).

During the battle, some commanders, notably Leigh-Mallory, proposed squadrons be formed into "Big Wings," consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a method pioneered by Douglas Bader. Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to over-claim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle zone. This led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they actually were.

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However, the delay in forming up Big Wings meant this often did not arrive until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields. Dowding, in an effort to highlight the problem of the Big Wing's performance, submitted a report compiled by Park to the Air Ministry on 15 November. In the report he highlighted the fact that during the period of 11 September – 31 October the extensive use of the Big Wing had resulted in just 10 interceptions and one German aircraft destroyed, but his report was ignored.. Postwar analysis agrees Dowding's and Park's approach was best for 11 Group. Dowding's removal from his post in November 1940 has been blamed on this struggle between Park and Leigh-Mallory's daylight strategy. However the intensive raids and destruction wrought during the Blitz also damaged Dowding and Park in particular, for the failure to produce an effective night-fighter defence system, something for which the influential Leigh-Mallory had long criticised them.

Bomber and Coastal Command contributions

A Bristol Blenheim Mk IV. The Blenheim bomber units of Bomber and Coastal Commands bore heavy casualties while undertaking a number of tasks during the Battle.

Bomber Command and Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. After the initial disasters of the war, with Vickers Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking Wilhelmshafen and the slaughter of the Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France, it became clear Bomber Command would have to operate mainly at night to achieve any results without very high losses. From 15 May 1940 a night-time bomber campaign was launched against German oil industry, communication and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr area.

As the threat mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry and to attack harbours and shipping able to support an invasion of Great Britain. From early August the assembling invasion fleet in French ports got a high priority target as well. The large barges intended by the Germans to transport troops across the Channel were targeted by bombers. In addition the Germans had few Freya radar stations set up in France, meaning air defence of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany. In September 1940, Bomber Command was directing some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports. The Bristol Blenheim units also raided German occupied airfields throughout July to December 1940, both during daylight hours and at night. Although most of these raids were unproductive there were some successes; on 1 August five out of 12 Blenheims sent to attack Haamsted and Evere (Brussels) were able to bomb, destroying or heavily damaging three Bf 109s of II./JG 27 and apparently killing a Staffelkapitan identified as a Hauptmann Albrecht von Ankum-Frank. Two other 109s were claimed by Blenheim gunners. Another successful raid on Haamstede was made by a single Blenheim on 7 August which destroyed one 109 of 4./JG 54, heavily damaged another and caused lighter damage to four more. During these and other types of operations, some of which were directed against Germany itself, Blenheim casualties were very high, and it is a testament to the courage of the men in these units that they continued to operate throughout these months with little respite and with little of the publicity accorded to Fighter Command.

Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy held coastline. In all, some 9,180 sorties were flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Compared to the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters it is relatively little, but bombers suffered about 50% the number of casualties as their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was therefore much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison. It is now sometimes forgotten that Churchill, in the famous speech about "The Few" of 20 August also described the role of the bombers;

"All hearts go out to the fighter pilots, whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day; but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss, with deliberate careful discrimination, and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power. On no part of the Royal Air Force does the weight of the war fall more heavily than on the daylight bombers who will play an invaluable part in the case of invasion and whose unflinching zeal it has been necessary in the meanwhile on numerous occasions to restrain."

Phases of the Battle

The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:

• 10 July–11 August: Kanalkampf, ("the Channel battles").
• 12 August–23 August: Adlerangriff ("Eagle Attack"), the early assault against the coastal airfields.
• 24 August–6 September: the Luftwaffe targets the airfields. The critical phase of the battle.
• 7 September onwards: the day attacks switch to British towns and cities.

Channel battles

A pair of 264 Squadron Defiants. (PS-V was shot down on 28 August 1940 over Kent by Bf 109s.)

The Kanalkampf comprised a series of running fights over convoys in the English Channel and occasional attacks on the convoys by Stuka dive-bombers. It was launched partly because Kesselring and Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it gave German aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British defenders. In general, these battles off the coast tended to favour the Germans, whose bomber escorts massively outnumbered the convoy patrols. The need for constant patrols over the convoys put a severe strain on RAF pilots and machines, wasting fuel, engine hours and exhausting the pilots, but eventually the number of ship sinkings became so great the British Admiralty cancelled all further convoys through the Channel. However, these early combat encounters provided both sides with experience. They also gave the first indications some of the aircraft, such as the Defiant and Bf 110, were not up to the intense dog-fighting that would characterise the battle.

Main assault

The main attack upon the RAF's defences was code-named Adlerangriff ("Eagle Attack").

Weather, which proved an important feature of the campaign, delayed Adlertag, ("Eagle Day") until 13 August 1940. On 12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit, Erprobungsgruppe 210 attacked four radar stations. Three were briefly taken off the air but were back working within six hours. The raids appeared to show British radars were difficult to knock out for any length of time. The failure to mount follow-up attacks allowed the RAF to get the stations back on the air, and Luftwaffe neglected strikes on the supporting infrastructure, such as phone lines or power stations, which could have rendered the radars useless, even if the towers themselves (which were very difficult to destroy) remained intact.

Adlertag opened with a series of attacks on coastal airfields, used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters. As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August was "The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. Luftflotte 5 attacked the north of England. Believing Fighter Command strength to be concentrated in the south, raiding forces from Denmark and Norway ran into unexpectedly strong resistance. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, bombers were shot down in large numbers. As a result of the casualties, Luftflotte 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.

File:Junkers Ju87.jpg

Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers

18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following the grinding battles of 18 August, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign. This veteran of blitzkrieg was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain, and to preserve the Stuka force, Göring withdrew them from the fighting. This removed the main Luftwaffe precision-bombing weapon and shifted the burden of pinpoint attacks on the already-stretched Erpro 210. Also, the Bf 110 had proven too clumsy for dog-fighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would only be used when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could not be provided for the bombers.

Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the weight of the attack now fell on Luftflotte 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in Luftflotte 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the Pas de Calais. Stripped of its fighters, Luftflotte 3 would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made a large change in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many Geschwaderkommodoren with younger, more aggressive pilots like Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders.

Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the Reichsmarschall nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence. It was known radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was anything bringing up the "Tommies" to fight was to be encouraged.

Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields

File:He1112KG26.JPG

He 111H-3 of 2.Kg/26

On 19 August 1940, Göring ordered attacks concentrating on aircraft production, then on 23 August 1940 his directive added a focus on RAF airfields, as well as day and night attacks aimed at weakening fighter forces across the United Kingdom. That evening saw the start of a sustained campaign of bombing, starting with a raid on tyre production at Birmingham. Raids on airfields continued through 24 August, and a major attack hit Portsmouth. That night, several areas of London were bombed, with the East End set ablaze and one release hitting central London. These have been attributed to a group of Heinkel He 111s, unable to find their target, releasing their bombs and returning home, unaware they were dropping them on the city, but this account has been contested. In retaliation, the RAF bombed Berlin on the night of 25 August–26 August, and continued bombing raids on Berlin. These hurt Göring's pride, because he had previously claimed the British would never be allowed to bomb the city, and enraged Hitler.

From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a fight between Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each; Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. At least seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the Germans. At times these raids knocked out the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system. Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.

The RAF was taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft, but replacement pilots were barely keeping pace with losses, and novice fliers were being shot down at an alarming rate. To offset losses, some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former (single-engine) Fairey Battle pilots were used. Most replacements from Operational Training Units (OTUs) had as little as nine hours flying time and no gunnery or air-to-air combat training. At this point the multinational nature of Fighter Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and individual personnel from the air forces of the Dominions were already attached to the RAF — Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These squadrons had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Jewish pilot from the British mandate of Palestine.

Polish fliers proved especially effective — the pre-war Polish Air Force had lengthy and extensive training, and high standards; with Poland conquered and under German occupation, the Polish pilots of 303 Squadron were strongly motivated. Josef František, a Czech regular airman who had flown from the occupation of his own country and joined the Polish and then French air forces before arriving in Britain, proved effective but undisciplined and flew as a guest of 303 Squadron chasing Germans. He shot down 17, now accepted as the highest "RAF score".

The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their downed aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer, and Kanalkrankheit ("Channel sickness") — a form of combat fatigue — began to appear among the German pilots. Their replacement problem was even worse than the British. Though the Luftwaffe maintained its numerical superiority, the slow appearance of replacement aircraft and pilots put increasing strain on the resources of the remaining attackers.

Formerly, the conventional wisdom was, the Luftwaffe was winning even so. Recent research shows this isn't true. Throughout the battle, the Germans "greatly underestimated the size of the RAF and the scale of British aircraft production. Across the Channel, the Air Intelligence division of the Air Ministry consistently overestimated the size of the German air enemy and the productive capacity of the German aviation industry. As the battle was fought, both sides exaggerated the losses inflicted on the other by an equally large margin. However, the intelligence picture formed before the battle encouraged the German Air Force to believe that such losses pushed Fighter Command to the very edge of defeat, while the exaggerated picture of German air strength persuaded the RAF that the threat it faced was larger and more dangerous than was actually the case." This led the British to the conclusion another fortnight of attacks on airfields might force Fighter Command to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. The German misconception, on the other hand, "encouraged first complacency, then strategic misjudgement. The shift of targets from air bases to industry and communications was taken because it was assumed that Fighter Command was virtually eliminated." Yet this analysis ignores the fact it was pilots, not aircraft, Fighter Command continued to be desperately short of, as it had been from the start of the Battle. Incompletely-trained recruits, and instructors cannibalised from the training program, did not augur well for the ability to sustain the defense.

Due to the failure of the Luftwaffe to establish air supremacy, a conference assembled on 14 September at Hitler's headquarters. Hitler concluded that air superiority had not yet been established and "promised to review the situation on 17 September for possible landings on 27 September or 8 October. Three days later, when the evidence was clear that the German Air Force had greatly exaggerated the extent of their successes against the RAF, Hitler postponed Sealion indefinitely." However, at the meeting on 14 September, the leadership of the Luftwaffe had persuaded him to give them a last chance to cow the RAF. "The air force chief of staff, General Hans Jeschonnek ... asked Hitler to allow him to attack residential areas to create 'mass panic'. Hitler refused, perhaps unaware of just how much damage had already been done to civilian targets. 'Mass panic' was to be used only as a last resort. Hitler reserved for himself the right to unleash the terror weapon. The political will was to be broken by the collapse of the material infrastructure, the weapons industry, and stocks of fuel and food. On 16 September Goering ordered the air fleets to begin the new phase of the battle. Like the campaign in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, air power was expected to deliver the political solution by undermining military capability and the conditions of daily existence."

Raids on British cities

Main article: The Blitz

Calais, September 1940. Göring giving a speech to pilots about the change in tactics to bomb the towns instead of the airfields.

The Luftwaffe offensive against Britain had included numerous raids on cities since August, but Hitler had issued a directive London was not to be bombed save on his sole instruction. However, on the night of 23 August, bombs were accidentally dropped on Harrow on the outskirts of London as well as raids on Aberdeen, Bristol and South Wales. The focus on attacking airfields had also been accompanied by a sustained bombing campaign which begun on 24 August with the largest raid so far killing 100 in Portsmouth, and that evening the first night raid on London as described above. Continuing RAF raids on Berlin in retaliation led to Hitler withdrawing his directive, and on 3 September Göring planned to bomb London daily, with Kesselring's enthusiastic support, having received reports the RAF was down to under 100 fighters and their airfields in the area were out of action. Hitler issued a directive on 5 September to attack cities including London.

File:Bombing of London.jpg

Bombing of London.

On 7 September 1940 a massive series of raids involving nearly four hundred bombers and more than six hundred fighters targeted docks in the East End of London, day and night. Though suffering from shortages, the RAF anticipated attacks on airfields and 11 Group rose to meet them, in greater numbers than the Luftwaffe expected. The first official deployment of 12 Group's Big Wing took twenty minutes to gain formation, missing its intended target, but encountering another formation of bombers while still climbing. They returned, apologetic about their limited success, and blamed the delay on being requested too late. Next morning, Keith Park flew his Hurricane over the city: "It was burning all down the river. It was a horrid sight. But I looked down and said 'Thank God for that', because I knew that the Nazis had switched their attack from the fighter stations thinking that they were knocked out. They weren't, but they were pretty groggy". Luftwaffe raids across Britain continued, with large attacks on London targeting the docks or bombing indiscriminately. Fighter Command had been at its lowest ebb, short of men and machines, and the break from airfield attacks allowed them to recover. 11 Group had considerable success in breaking up daytime raids. 12 Group repeatedly disobeyed orders and failed to meet requests to protect 11 Group airfields, but their experiments with increasingly large Big Wings had some successes. The Luftwaffe began to abandon their morning raids, with attacks on London starting late in the afternoon for 57 consecutive nights of attacks.

Members of the London Auxiliary Firefighting Service.

The most damaging aspect to the Luftwaffe of the change in targets (to London) was the increase in range. The Bf 109 escorts had a limited fuel capacity, and by the time they arrived over the city, had only 10 minutes of flying time before they had to turn for home. This left many raids undefended by fighter escorts. On 11 September, Hitler postponed Operation Sealion until 24 September. RAF Bomber Command contributed to the problems facing the German naval forces by sinking eighty barges in the Port of Ostend alone.

On 15 September, two massive waves of German attacks were decisively repulsed by the RAF, with every single aircraft of the 11 Group being used on that day. The total casualties on this critical day were 60 German aircraft shot down versus only 26 RAF. The German defeat caused Hitler to order, two days later, the postponement of preparations for the invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of mounting losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the Luftwaffe switched from daylight to night-time bombing.

On 13 October, Hitler again postponed the invasion until the spring of 1941; however, the invasion never happened, and October is regarded as the month in which regular bombing of Britain ended. It was not until Hitler's Directive 21 was ordered on 18 December 1940, that the threat of invasion finally dissipated.

Aftermath

The Battle of Britain marked the first defeat of Hitler's military forces, with air superiority seen as the key to victory. Pre-war theories led to exaggerated fears of strategic bombing, and British public opinion was invigorated by having come through the ordeal. To Hitler it did not seem a serious setback, as Britain was still not in a position to cause real damage to his plans, and the last minute invasion plan had been an unimportant addition to German strategy. However, for the British, Fighter Command had achieved a great victory in successfully carrying out Sir Thomas Inskip's 1937 air policy of preventing the Germans from knocking Britain out of the war. (Fighter Command was so successful, the conclusion to Churchill's famous 'Battle of Britain' speech has come to refer solely to them: "...if the British Empire and its Commonwealth lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.'")

The Battle also signalled a significant shift in U.S. opinion. During the battle, many people from the U.S. accepted the view promoted by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, and believed the UK could not survive. However, Roosevelt wanted a second opinion, and sent "Wild Bill" Donovan on a brief visit to Britain, who became convinced Britain would survive and should be supported in every possible way.

Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the actual numbers, because of the confusion of fighting in dynamic three-dimensional air battles. Postwar analysis of records has shown between July and September, the RAF claimed over 2,698 kills for 1,023 fighter aircraft lost to all causes, where 147 Polish pilots claimed 201 out of that number, while the Luftwaffe fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed for losses of 1,887, of which 873 were fighters. To the RAF figure should be added an additional 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command aircraft conducting bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defence of the country.

Three historians, Dr Christina Goulter, Prof Gary Sheffield and Dr Andrew Gordon, who teach at Joint Services Command and Staff College, have suggested the existence of the Royal Navy was enough of a deterrent to the Germans; even had the Luftwaffe won, the Germans had limited means with which to combat the Royal Navy, which would have intervened to prevent a landing. Some veterans of the battle point out the Royal Navy would have been vulnerable to air attack by the Luftwaffe if Germany had achieved air superiority, quoting the fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse which, in December 1941, were overwhelmed by air power alone.. In the Mediterranean Theatre in 1941 and 1942 the Luftwaffe proved itself to still be a potent weapon, wreaking a great deal of damage on RN Destroyers and Cruisers. The case is hypothetical, because the Luftwaffe did not gain the requisite air-superiority.

Though the claims about the Royal Navy's ability to repulse an invasion may be contested, there is a consensus among historians that the Luftwaffe simply could not crush the RAF, without which a successful invasion of Britain was impossible. Stephen Bungay illustrated in his book "The Most Dangerous Enemy (Arum, 2000)" that Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was vindicated. The RAF, not the Luftwaffe, proved to be a robust and capable organisation which was to use all of the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage. Richard Evans wrote:

"Irrespective of whether Hitler was really set on this course, he simply lacked the resources to establish the air superiority that was the sine qua non of a successful crossing of the English Channel. A third of the initial strength of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had been lost in the western campaign in the spring. The Germans lacked the trained pilots, the effective fighter planes, and the heavy bombers that would have been needed."

The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day and night blitzes. The switch to terror bombing allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have withdrawn to the Midlands, out of the range of German fighters, and continued the battle from there. Postwar records show British aircraft were being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its strength even as the Luftwaffe's declined. In losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew, the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered.

The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial potential, and made little systematic effort to do so. Hindsight does not disguise the fact the threat to Fighter Command was very real and for the participants, it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and defeat. The victory was as much psychological as physical.

The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was not without heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids occurring on 19 December 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died.

Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the contribution of Fighter Command with the words, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few". However, the brilliant leadership of Dowding and Keith Park in successfully proving their theories of air defence had created enemies amongst RAF senior commanders, and in a shabby episode, both were sacked from their posts in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Pilots who fought in the Battle have been known as The Few ever since. 15 September is celebrated in the United Kingdom as "Battle of Britain Day", marking the battle.

The end of the battle allowed the UK to rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied stronghold. Britain later served as a base from which the Liberation of Western Europe was launched.

International participation

Main articles: Non-British personnel in the RAF during the Battle of Britain and Corpo Aereo Italiano

The RAF roll of honour for the Battle of Britain recognises 574 non-British pilots (out of almost 3,000 in total) as flying at least one authorised operational sortie with an eligible unit of the Royal Air Force or Fleet Air Arm between 10 July and 31 October 1940. This included pilots from Poland, New Zealand, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Australia, South Africa, France, Ireland, United States of America, Jamaica, Palestine, and Southern Rhodesia. The highest-scoring unit during the Battle of Britain was the No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini insisted on providing an element of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) to assist his German ally during the Battle of Britain. This expeditionary force was called the Italian Air Corps (Corpo Aereo Italiano or CAI) and first saw action in late October 1940. It took part in the latter stages of the battle but achieved limited success and was redeployed in early 1941.

See also

• Battle of Britain RAF squadrons
• Battle of Britain RAF airfields
• Battle of Britain Memorial Flight
• Battle of Britain Memorial, Capel-le-Ferne
• Battle of Britain Monument in London
• Bombing of Coventry
• British military history of World War II
• Evacuations of civilians in Britain during World War II
• Kent Battle of Britain Museum
• The Darkest Hour
• The Few
• Battle of Britain, theatrical release documenting the battle starring Sir Laurence Olivier, Trevor Howard, Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer and Robert Shaw
• Battle of Britain II: Wings of Victory, a PC flight simulator about the battle
• Battle of Britain Class Steam Locomotives of the Southern Railway

References

Bibliography

• Allen, Hubert Raymond "Dizzy", Wing Commander, RAF. Who Won the Battle of Britain? London: Arthur Barker, 1974. ISBN 0-213-16489-2.
• Ansell, Mark. Boulton Paul Defiant: Technical Details and History of the Famous British Night Fighter. Redbourn, Herts, UK: Mushroom Model Publications, 2005. pp. 712-714. ISBN 8-389-45019-4.
• Bishop, Patrick. Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940. New York: Viking, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03230-1); Penguin Books, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-200466-9). As Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940. London: Harper Perennial, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-00-653204-7).
• Brittain, Vera. England's Hour. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-8264-8031-4); Obscure Press (paperback, ISBN 1-84664-834-3).
• Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. London: Aurum Press 2000. ISBN 1-85410-721-6(hardcover), ISBN 1-85410-801-8(paperback 2002).
• Bergström, Christer (2007). Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July-December 1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
• Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War – Their Finest Hour (Volume 2). London: Cassell, 1949.
• Craig, Phil and Clayton, Tim. Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-684-86930-6); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-684-86931-4).
• Deighton, Len. Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain. London: Pimlico, 1996. Originally published: London: Jonathan Cape, 1977.) ISBN 0-71267-423-3.
• Ellis, John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. London: Andre Deutsch, 1990. ISBN 0-8264-8031-4.
• Evans, Michael. (2006) "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to... the Navy." The Times, 24 August 2006. [2] Retrieved: 3 March 2007.
• Feist, Uwe. The Fighting Me 109. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993. ISBN 1-85409-209-X.
• Fisher, David E. A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59376-047-7); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 1-59376-116-3).
• Foreman, John. Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And December 1940. Wythenshawe, Lancashire, UK: Crécy Publishing, 1989. ISBN 1-871187-02-8.
• Gaskin, Margaret. Blitz: The Story of December 29, 1940. New York: Harcourt, 2006. ISBN 0-15-101404-3.
• Haining, Peter. Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940. London: Robson Books, 2004. ISBN 1-86105-750-4.
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Fight for the Sky: Stories of Wartime Fighter Pilots. Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1986. ISBN 0-85059-749-8.
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Fighter Pilots in World War II: True Stories of Frontline Air Combat (paperback). Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2004. ISBN 1-84415-065-8.
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Stations: Military Airfields of Greater London v. 8 (hardcover). Cambridge, UK: Patrick Stephens, 1984. ISBN 0-85039-885-1.
• Harding, Thomas (2006a). "Battle of Britain was won at sea." The Telegraph, 25 August 2006. Retrieved: 25 August 2006.
• Harding, Thomas (2006b). "It's baloney, say RAF aces". The Telegraph, 24 August 2006. Retrieved: 3 March 2007.
• Holmes, Tony. Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain. Oxford, London: Osprey Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-84603-190-8.
• Hough, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02766-X); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-30734-4).
• James, T.C.G. The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 2). London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5123-0; paperback, ISBN 0-7146-8149-0).
• James, T.C.G. Growth of Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 1). London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5118-4).
• James, T.C.G. Night Air Defence During the Blitz. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5166-4).
• Macksey, Kenneth. Invasion: The German Invasion of England, July 1940. London: Greenhill Books, 1990. ISBN 0-85368-324-7.
• McGlashan, Kenneth B. with Zupp, Owen P. Down to Earth: A Fighter Pilot Recounts His Experiences of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Dieppe, D-Day and Beyond. London. Grub Street Publishing, 2007. ISBN 1-90494-384-5.
• Olson, Lynne and Cloud, Stanley. A Question of Honor. The Kosciuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II. New York: Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0-37541-197-6.
• Overy, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02008-8); 2002 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-32297-1).
• Parry, Simon W. Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's Night Intruder Force, the Fernnachtjager. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1989. ISBN 0-904811-07-7.
• Ponting, Clive. 1940: Myth and reality. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1991. ISBN 978-1566630368
• Price, Alfred. The Hardest Day: 18 August 1940. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980. ISBN 0-684-16503-1.
• Price, Alfred. Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of the Aces 12). London: Osprey Books, 1996, ISBN 1-85532-627-2. Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41.
• Ramsay, Winston (editor). The Battle of Britain Then and Now Mk V. London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd, 1989. ISBN 0-900913-46-0
• Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory 1940. London: Cassel & Co., 2001. ISBN 0-304-35677-8.
• Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85409-229-4); London: Orion Publishing, 1996 (paperback, ISBN 1-85409-345-2).
• Robinson, Derek. Invasion, 1940: Did the Battle of Britain Alone Stop Hitler? New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005. ISBN 0-7867-1618-5.
• Scutts, Jerry. Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Operational Record. Sarasota, FL: Crestline Publishers, 1996. ISBN 978-076-030262-0.
• Taylor, A.J.P. and Mayer, S.L., eds. A History Of World War Two. London: Octopus Books, 1974. ISBN 0-70640-399-1.
• Townsend, Peter. Duel of Eagles (new edition). London: Phoenix, 2000. ISBN 1-84212-211-8.
• Weal, John. Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstōrer Aces of World War 2. Botley, Oxford UK: Osprey Publishing, 1999. ISBN 1-85532-753-8 Bf 110 Zerstōrer Aces.
• Wellum, Geoffrey. First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man in the War-Torn Skies Above Britain. New York: Viking Books, 2002 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-91248-4); Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-471-42627-X); London: Penguin Books, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-100814-8).

External links

• Battle Of Britain Historical Society
• ADLG Visits RAF Uxbridge Battle of Britain Operations Room
• Royal Air Force history
• Battle of Britain in the Words of Air Chief Marshall Hugh Dowding (despatch to the Secretary of State, August 1941)
• British Invasion Defences
• Map of UK Airfields and squadrons.
• RAF Battle of Britain Roll of Honour
• Battle-Of-Britain Website.
• Battle-Of-Britain Website in Dutch.
• Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (airfield repair)
• Battle of Britain Memorial
• Shoreham Aircraft Museum
• Tangmere Military Aviation Museum
• Kent Battle of Britain Museum